The current chapter of the advaita siddhi continues with the argument that the charge of contradiction cannot be applied to the inference of the world's unreality. Previously, contradiction by perception was denied, now contradiction by inference will be denied. Hence the title of the chapter - anumAna bAdha uddhAra.
The opponent commences the argument:
स्यादेतत् - अध्यक्षस्य भिन्नविषयत्वादिना बाधाक्षमत्वेऽपि अनुमानमेव बाधकं स्यात् | Even if perception is incapable of contradicting the inference of unreality, because it reveals a different object (that is, perception reveals the empirical reality of the world whereas the advaitin's inference denies its absolute reality), it can be contradicted by inference itself.
He proceeds with an elaborate inference.
तथाहि - ब्रह्मप्रमान्येन वेदान्ततात्पर्यप्रमितिजन्यज्ञानान्येन वा मोक्षहेतुज्ञानान्येन वा अबाध्यत्वे सत्यसत्त्वानधिकरणत्वे सति ब्रह्मान्यत्, विमतं वा, सत्, परमार्थसद्वा, प्रातिभासिकत्वानधिकरणत्वे सत्यसद्विलक्षणत्वात्, ब्रह्मवत्, व्यतिरेकेण शशशृङ्गवद्वेति - चेन्न;
The paksha - the ground for the inference
Four options are cited.
1) ब्रह्मप्रमान्येन अबाध्यत्वे सति That which is not sublated by any cognition other than the right cognition of Brahman,
In the vivaraNa sub-school, Brahman is the object of cognition, whereas in bhAmati, it is argued that Brahman cannot be the object of cognition. The opponent anticipates a particular rebuttal from the bhAmati sub-school which could argue that paksha is superfluous because there is no such thing as a cognition of Brahman, so he refines the paksha thus:
2) वेदान्ततात्पर्यप्रमितिजन्यज्ञानान्येन वा अबाध्यत्वे सति Or, that which is not sublated by any cognition other than the one generated by the right understanding of the import of vedAnta
There is some debate whether the comprehension of import is responsible for the comprehension of sentence meaning, or not. One group argues that AkAnksha, yogyatA, sannidhi and tAtparya are needed for sentence meaning and another group says that only the first three are needed.
AkAnksha is the mutual expectancy of the words that constitute a sentence. For example, the verb "give" has the expectation of the object that is to be given, a giver, and a taker. Similarly, the object has an expectation of a verb, and the agents involved, etc.
yogyatA is the appropriateness or the absence of contradiction of the words in a sentence. For example "the water is on fire" is an inappropriate sentence because water cannot be on fire. It is contradicted by experience.
sannidhi is the mutual juxtaposition of words in space and time. Different words can only be considered to form a sentence and convey meaning if there is a reasonable temporal / spatial sequence.
tAtparya is the import, or intention that is meant to be conveyed. Sometimes, the same words can mean different things in different situations. The word saindhava can mean horse or salt and the context and the intent of the speaker will determine what is meant when used in a sentence.
There is some debate whether the understanding of import leads to sentence meaning or not, with the naysayers holding that the understanding of the import of the sentence in certain places can only come after understanding the sentence meaning, so if the sentence meaning requires understanding the import, it leads to the defect of mutual dependency. The yes camp argue otherwise, but we need not go into that right now.
As some people argue that sentence meaning is not a result of "understanding the import of vedAnta" in the second option listed above, a third option is listed.
3) मोक्षहेतुज्ञानान्येन वा अबाध्यत्वे सति Or, that which is not sublated by any cognition other than the one which is the cause of liberation
4) विमतं वा Or, that which is the vimatam, the paksha in the advaitin's inference
असत्त्वानधिकरणत्वे सति ब्रह्मान्यत् And, that which is not the locus of non-existence while being different from Brahman (these two features are added to each of the four options listed above)
Having elaborately defined the paksha, the sAdhya is taken up next.
sAdhya - the hypothesis
सत्, Is existent.
The advaitin will say that the world is existent empirically, and therefore such an inference by the opponent is not proving anything new (it suffers from the defect of siddha sAdhanam). Anticipating this, he offers an alternative:
परमार्थसद्वा, Or, is ultimately existent.
hetu - the reason
प्रातिभासिकत्वानधिकरणत्वे सत्यसद्विलक्षणत्वात् Because it happens to be different from the absolutely non-existent (asat) while not being apparently real (prAtibhAsika).
ब्रह्मवत्, व्यतिरेकेण शशशृङ्गवद्वेति - Like Brahman, or unlike the hare's horn.
The inference in full is as follows:
ब्रह्मप्रमान्येन वेदान्ततात्पर्यप्रमितिजन्यज्ञानान्येन वा मोक्षहेतुज्ञानान्येन वा अबाध्यत्वे सत्यसत्त्वानधिकरणत्वे सति ब्रह्मान्यत्, विमतं वा, सत्, परमार्थसद्वा, प्रातिभासिकत्वानधिकरणत्वे सत्यसद्विलक्षणत्वात्, ब्रह्मवत्, व्यतिरेकेण शशशृङ्गवद्वा
That which is not sublated by any cognition other than the right cognition of Brahman, or the cognition generated by the right understanding of the import of vedAnta, or the cognition which is the cause of liberation, or that which is the entity which the advaitin wishes to establish as unreal with his inference, and that which is not the locus of non-existence while being different from Brahman is existent, or alternatively, ultimately existent, because it happens to be different from the absolutely non-existent while not being only apparently real, like Brahman, or alternatively, the hare's horn.
इति चेन्न; The opponent argues that such an inference will overrule the inference of the world's unreality. The siddhikAra, in response says - No.
Defects in the hetu
त्वन्मते प्रातिभासिकस्याप्यसत्त्वेन व्यर्थविशेषणतया व्याप्यत्वासिद्धे:, As there is no separate category called apparently real in your school (the shell-silver is non-existent in dvaita, not apparently real), there is a redundant adjective in the hetu, which will lead to a situation of vyApyatva asiddhi - the hetu will limit the inference to only a subset of the sAdhya.
The accepted syllogism is that wherever smoke is seen, fire is seen. The smoke is the hetu for fire, the sAdhya. If we were to add an adjective, black to the smoke and say that the syllogism is that wherever black smoke is seen, fire is present, it affects the syllogism because it limits the presence of the fire only to a specific type of smoke, when the fact is that smoke, irrespective of its colour, can only occur when fire is present.
अस्मन्मतमाश्रित्य हेतूकरणे च देहात्मैक्ये ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाध्ये व्यभिचारात् | If on the other hand, it is said that the hetu is directed towards us (who accept a category called the apparently real), then the syllogism will suffer from the defect of vyabhichAra (the invariable concomitance is disproven because the hetu is present, but the sAdhya is absent) in the case of the illusion of the body as the self, which is unsublated by any cognition other than the knowledge of Brahman.
Taking the body to be the self is an illusion (the sAdhya of reality is absent) even when the hetu is present (the hetu of not being apparently real while being different from the absolutely non-existent is true in this illusion's case).
नहि प्रातिभासिकत्वं ब्रह्मज्ञानेतरबाध्यत्वादन्यत् | That which is apparently real is not different from (i.e., is the same as) being sublated by a cognition other than the knowledge of Brahman.
Defects in the paksha
त्वया हि प्रातिभासिकस्य शुक्तिरूप्यादेरपक्षत्वाय सत्यन्तमाद्यं विशेषणत्रयं विकल्पेन पक्षे प्रक्षिप्तम् |
You decided to exclude apparently real objects such as the shell-silver etc by adding the three qualifiers, ending with the word sati, in the paksha.
तत्र ब्रह्म वृत्तिव्याप्यमिति मतेनाद्यम्, तदनभ्युपगमे तु शाब्दप्रमां प्रति तात्पर्यप्रमा हेतुरिति मतेन द्वितीयम्, अन्योन्याश्रयत्वात् न सा हेतुरिति मतेन तृतीयम् | The first qualifier was provided if Brahman is considered to be the object of cognition (vivaraNa), the second qualifier was provided if that is not accepted (bhAmati) and if import is considered to one of the contributory factors for the comprehension of sentence meaning, and the third one was provided if it cannot be a contributory factor because it would mean that comprehension of import and comprehension of sentence meaning are mutually dependent.
तथाच प्रातिभासिकस्यासत्त्वानधिकरणत्वमङ्गीकृतमेव; Thereby, that the apparently real is different from the absolutely non-existent has been certainly accepted (by the opponent).
अन्यथा तुच्छवारकासत्त्वानधिकरणत्वविशेषणेनैव तद्व्यावृत्तावेतावत्प्रयासवैयर्थ्यापत्ते: | If that was not the case (that is they were the same), as the qualifier "not being the locus for non-existence", which excludes the absolutely non-existent, would be sufficient to exclude that (apparently-real objects) also, the effort in introducing the various qualifiers in the paksha is unnecessary.
एवं च देहात्मैक्यस्यापि पक्षत्वे बाध एव | Moreover, the inference suffers from the flaw of inherent contradiction in that the illusion of the body as the self has become part of the paksha.
The opponent accepts that the notion of the body as the self is an illusion, and to include that in the paksha in a syllogism meant to prove the reality of the paksha is inherently contradictory.
बाधे च सति पक्षविशेषणस्य पक्षत्वस्यासिद्ध्याश्रयासिद्धिरपि | If despite its contradiction, it is considered a part of the paksha, then as the attribute of the paksha and the paksha itself are non-existent (the illusion does not exist), the locus of the inference would end up non-existent (AshrayAsiddhi).
In the previous chapter on the defect of upAdhi here and here, various upAdhi-s were cited as defects in the advaitin's inference. If the opponent tries to use the same upAdhi-s as ways to protect his own inference, the following answer is given.
अतएव स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषजन्यज्ञानाविषयत्वे सतीति वा स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यबाधाविषयत्वे सतीति वा स्वसमानाधिकरणकर्मप्रागभावसमानकालीनज्ञानाबाध्यत्वे सतीति वा विशेषणप्रक्षेपेऽपि न निस्तार:, देहात्मैक्ये पुर्वोक्तदोषाव्यावृत्तेरेव |
Even if the following qualifiers are added, it does not exclude the body-self-identity from the paksha and remedy the previously cited defect:
a) स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषजन्यज्ञानाविषयत्वे सतीति वा That which is not the object of the cognition born as a result of the defect not sublated by what is considered to be the sublating cognition (of that thing).
The body-self illusion is a product of the defect of ignorance, so the sublating cognition of the body-as-self identity sublates the defect of ignorance that gave rise to the illusion too. So this qualifier cannot exclude it.
b) स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यबाधाविषयत्वे सतीति वा Or, that which is not the object of a cognition considered to be a sublating cognition of a thing and which sublates it, while not sublating the object in question.
The body-as-self-identity does not remain unsublated when the cognition that sublates the world illusion arises.
c) स्वसमानाधिकरणकर्मप्रागभावसमानकालीनज्ञानाबाध्यत्वे सतीति वा That which is unsublated by the cognition that is contemporaneous and colocated with the prior absence of karma.
According to nyAya, cognitions are located in the self. The opponent argues that the absence of karma-s (future effects of karma-s performed to date, is located in a seed or causal form, waiting to be fructified) is also located in the self. The only cognition that is not contemporaneous and colocated with this prior absence of karma is the cognition of Brahman, because when it arises, it sublates all karma. When karma is sublated, its prior absence is also sublated, as there is no counterpositive for it.
In the case of the body-self-identity, the only cognition that sublates it is the cognition of Brahman. Thus, it is unsublated by every cognition that is contemporaneous and colocated with the prior absence of karma.
Defects in the sAdhya
The opponent had argued that the sAdhya is either existent or ultimately existent.
The advaitin argues:
यत्तु - प्रथमे साध्ये व्यावहारिकसत्त्वमादाय सिद्धसाधनम्, द्वितीयसाध्ये तु वादिन: परमार्थत्वविशेषणं व्यर्थम् ; व्यावर्त्याप्रसिद्धे: - इति |
In the case of the first sAdhya, by classifying existence as empirical existence, there is the charge of proving something already accepted by the advaitin. In the latter, there is no need to qualify existence as "ultimate", because there is no difference of categories within existence for (one group of) the debaters (as the dvaitin has only one class of existence), necessitating a qualifier to identify a particular one.
The opponent responds:
तन्न; That is not true.
व्यावहारिकसत्त्वं सत्त्वेन व्यवहारमात्रमिति मतेन प्रथमप्रयोगात्, The first usage is to denote empirical existence, an existence that is transactional.
अनुगतं पृथग्व्यावहारिकं सत्त्वमिति तु मते द्वितीय: प्रयोग: | The second usage, however, is to denote an ultimate reality that pervades every transactional reality.
नच विशेषणं व्यर्थम् ; Thus it cannot be said that the qualifier is redundant.
परार्थानुमाने परं प्रति सिद्धसाधनोद्धारस्य तत्प्रयोजनत्वात्, It serves to remove the charge of proving an already proven thing when this inference is directed to some other groups, who accept different orders of reality.
Logicians attempt to prove the existence of God through reason. The opponent uses this inference as an example to prove that qualifiers need not necessarily be used to distinguish one item from the rest.
ईश्वारानुमाने जन्यकृत्यजन्यमित्यत्र जन्यत्वस्येव विश्वपरमार्थत्ववादिनं प्रति परमार्थत्वस्य प्रमेयत्वादिवदुपरञ्जकत्वेन विशेषणत्वोपपत्तेश्च | In the inference to prove the existence of God, the term "not a product of finite effort", contains the qualifier "finite". To the mImAmsaka, the qualifier "finite" is redundant, because he holds that all efforts are finite. But such an inference is still used because the inference can be applied to other groups. In the same way, the word "ultimately" can be used as a qualifier that does not serve to differentiate, like in the case of "knowability".
To explain, knowability is kevalAnvayi, i.e universally present. Therefore when the word "knowable" is used, it cannot serve to uniquely identify an object - because if it is present in every thing, by calling something knowable, it cannot identify that object separately from an unknowable object. It merely serves to say that the object is knowable.
The opponent's contention is that there is no requirement that a qualifier can only be used if both debaters accept that it serves to distinguish one thing from the other. Even if one of the two accept it, that justifies its inclusion.
The siddhikAra responds:
तस्मात् पूर्वोक्त एव दोष: | हेतौ च व्यर्थविशेषणत्वदोष: | Therefore, the defect stated previously alone remains (vyabhichAra in dehAtmaikya). The issue of using a redundant qualifier in the hetu is problematic.
यद्यपि मतद्वयेऽपि अप्रामाणिकस्यापि निषेधप्रतियोगित्वाभ्युपगमादारोपितत्वेनोभयसंमतत्वरूपस्य वा प्रतिभासमात्रशरीरत्वरूपस्य वा प्रातिभासिकत्वस्य प्रसिद्धिरस्ति, अन्यथा सिद्धान्तेऽपि मिथ्यात्वानुमाने प्रातिभासिकान्यस्यैव पक्षीकर्तव्यत्वाद्दोषसाम्यं स्यात्; तथापि हेतौ प्रातिभासिकत्वविशेषणं व्यर्थम् ;
Because, even though the following is true, reality qualified as "apparent" in the hetu is redundant:
In both of our systems, that a non-existent object can also be the object of negation, is accepted. So the idea of apparent reality - either as a superimposed object that is accepted by both of us, or as something having existence only at the time of cognition, is recognised. Otherwise (i.e, that prAtibhAsika is known to both, is not accepted), then, as even the advaitin's inference of reality needs to remove apparent reality from the paksha, the cited defect against the dvaitin would apply equally to the advaitin too.
The siddhikAra will go on to argue that a concomitance is possible between "not being a substratum" and "ultimate reality". Such a concomitance is seen in pure consciousness, which is ultimately real, but not a substratum (because it is completely independent of relations). Thus, the opponent's hetu to prove ultimate reality need not be "not a substratum for apparent reality", simply "not a substratum" would have been enough.
अनधिकरण्त्वे सत्यसत्त्वानधिकरणत्वमात्रस्यैव परमार्थसत्त्वसाधकत्वोपपत्ते: In order to prove that the world is ultimately real, it is sufficient to say that the world, while not being a substratum, is not the locus of non-existence.
Defects in the dRShTAnta
शुद्धमेव हि ब्रह्म दृष्टान्तत्वेनाभ्युपेयम्; धर्मवतो दृष्टान्तत्वे साध्यवैकल्यापत्ते: | It is only pure Brahman that can be cited as an example, because Brahman with attributes will lead to sAdhya vaikalya - the hetu is not present in the example. Brahman with attributes is not admitted to be absolutely real.साध्यं तु बाधाभावरूपत्वादधिकरणस्वरूपमेव न धर्म:, धर्म्यतिरिक्ताभावानभ्युपगमस्योक्तत्वात्, The sAdhya is the absence of sublatability, wherein the absence is of the nature of the substratum, and not an attribute - because there is no absence apart from the locus itself.
According to advaita, Brahman (Existence) is not that which has the attribute of existence. That is, Brahman does not have existence, it IS existence. The nature of existence is the absence of sublatability in all periods of time. Does it mean that Brahman has the absence of sublatability as an attribute in it? No.
To explain, when we say that "there is no pot on the ground", while the logician may say that the ground has the absence of the pot as an attribute, in advaita, there is no absence attribute present in the ground, for that would be a contradiction in terms. Rather, the ground, the locus, is the absence. Therefore, Brahman does not have the absence of sublatabilty, it is the absence of sublatability.
तथाच चक्षुस्तैजसत्त्वानुमाने रूपादिषु मध्य इत्यस्यासिद्धिवारकस्यापि व्याप्तिग्रहौपयिकत्वेन व्यभिचारवारकविशेषणतुल्यतया यद्यपि सार्थकत्वम्; व्यभिचारवारकस्यापि सार्थकत्वे व्याप्तिग्रहौपयिकत्वमात्रस्य तन्त्रत्वात्;
In the inference to prove that sight has (some) aspect of fire, the qualifier "amongst form, etc", serves to establish the invariable concomitance by removing the defect of asiddhi (the hetu not being in the paksha), and thus being equivalent to the usage of a qualifier to remove the defect of vyabhichAra (the hetu is present in the paksha, but the sAdhya is not), serves a purpose. As a rule, the usage of the qualifier to remove vyabhichAra is only for the purposes of establishing the concomitance.
तथापि 'क्षित्यादिकं न कर्तृजन्यं शरीराजन्यत्वा' दित्यत्र शरीरस्येव व्याप्तिग्रहानुपयोगित्वेन प्रातिभासिकत्वस्य वैयर्थ्यमेव; Even so, like in the Buddhist's inference, "Space etc., are not products of a creator, because they are not created by an embodied entity", the usage of the qualifier "embodied" does not serve the purpose of establishing the concomitance and is thus deemed redundant - the qualifier "apparently real" (in the dvaitins' inference) also does not serve the purpose of establishing the concomitance, and is deemed redundant.
The siddhikAra gives two examples - the first where a qualifier is permitted even when there is no vyabhichAra, and the second where a qualifier is not permitted as there is no vyabhichAra. He argues that the dvaitin's inference falls into the second category.
1) The logician tries to prove that eyes are a product of fire through the inference, चक्षुः तैजसं रूपादिषु मध्ये रूपस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वात्, दीपवत् - The eyes, have the characteristic of fire, because they are able to reveal form alone amongst form, etc. (sound, touch, form, taste and smell), like a lamp. The hetu is "because they reveal form amongst the attributes of form, etc". The opponent argues that the reason why the qualifier "amongst the attributes of form, etc." is added is because without it, the hetu would not be present in the paksha (asiddhi). The eyes reveal form and form-ness, so if we don't qualify "form alone" in the clause, "form alone among the five attributes in question", someone could cite some other attribute that the eyes reveal, leading to asiddhi. The siddhikAra argues that the addition of the qualifier in this instance is not because of asiddhi alone, but because the asiddhi leads to the concomitance itself not being observed. That is, because the hetu is not present in the example too (because the lamp reveals heat, in addition to form), there is no place where the hetu and sAdhya occur together, causing the inference to fail. Therefore, a qualifier can be permitted to be added to the hetu in the case of asiddhi (not just vyabhichAra) also, provided that such an asiddhi pervades the example too, and prevents the comprehension of the concomitance itself. It is only in such circumstances that a qualifier for the removal of asiddhi has equivalence with the qualifier that is used for the removal of vyabhichAra.
2) The second example is the redundant qualifier in the Buddhist's inference for the non-existence of God. This is in response to the logician who had argued for God's existence using the argument that the world is a product of a Creator, because it is a product. The Buddhist refutes this by arguing that the world is not the product of a Creator, because it is not created by a person with a body (unlike the pot, where the potter has a body). The logician refutes this inference by arguing that the qualifier "with a body" is redundant because the concomitance can simply be achieved if the hetu was "because it is not created". A qualifier can only be added if it serves to remove vyabhichAra, and there is no vyabhichAra in the inference.
Similarly in the present inference, the adjective "empirically real" is redundant.
The siddhikAra continues:
आकाशादावजन्यत्वकर्तृजन्यत्वाभावयोरिव निर्धर्मके ब्रह्मण्यनधिकरणत्वपरमार्थसत्त्वयोर्व्याप्तिग्रहोपपत्ते: | Like (the logician's) space, which is neither created, nor a product of God (and thus to simply argue for "not being created" would have been sufficient), unqualified Brahman too, being both ultimately real and not a substratum, there is a concomitance between two.
The hetu in the opponent's inference for the world's absolute reality could simply have been - "because it is not a substratum" and not "because it is not a substratum for apparent reality".
The siddhikAra extends this argument further to say that not only is this a redundant qualifier, it also leads to asiddhi.
तथा चैकामसिद्धिं परिहरतो द्वितीयासिद्ध्यापत्ति: | Thus, in trying to remedy one asiddhi, it leads to a second asiddhi.
स्वरुपासिद्धिपरिहारार्थं विशेषणं प्रक्षिपतो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरित्यर्थ:, व्याप्तावनुपयोगस्य दर्शितत्वात् |
The qualifier introduced to remove svarUpAsiddhi (to ensure that the paksha has the hetu), has led to vyApyatvAsiddhi (asiddhi caused by a redundant qualifier in the hetu), that it does not help to establish concomitance, has already been proven.
किञ्च व्यावहारिकसत्त्वमात्रेणैवोपपत्ते: उक्तहेतोरप्रयोजकत्वम् ; The said hetu also does not prove the sAdhya, because all it proves is empirical reality.
परमार्थसत्त्वे बाधानुपपत्तिलक्षणप्रतिकूलतर्कपराघाताच्च | There is also the contrarian logic that if the world was ultimately real, it would not be sublatable (so the usage in the paksha is untenable).
The opponent objects:
ननु - ब्रह्मण्यसत्प्रातिभासिकव्यावृत्तिरूपं हेतुं प्रति व्यावर्तकतया प्रयोजकत्वेन परमार्थसत्त्वं क्लृप्तं; अपृथिवीव्यावृत्तिं प्रति पृथिवीत्वस्येवासद्व्यावृत्तिं प्रति तद्विरुद्धसत्त्वस्यैव प्रयोजकत्वात् |
With regards to Brahman, its absolute reality is the necessary condition for the exclusion of apparent reality and non-existence, and thus a hetu of the nature of the exclusion of apparent reality and non-existence establishes ultimate existence. This is similar to the characteristic of earth being the necessary condition to the exclusion for the characteristics of the other four elements. Thus for the negation of non-existence what is required is its opposite, existence.
ज्ञानत्वानन्दत्वादिकं तु न तत्प्रयोजकम् ; साक्षादसत्त्वाविरोधित्वात्, प्रपञ्चे तदभावाच्च; तथाच ब्रह्मविश्वसाधारणं, परमार्थसत्त्वमेव तत्प्रयोजकम् ।
Neither consciousness, nor bliss, imply the exclusion of non-existence, because they do not directly negate non-existence. Moreover, they are not present in the world. Therefore, the only quality that is common to the world and Brahman, which can be the basis for the exclusion of non-existence, is ultimate existence.
न च - विश्वमिथ्यात्वात्परमार्थसत्त्वमपि न विश्वसाधारणम्, ज्ञानत्वानन्दत्वादिति - वाच्यम् ; अन्योन्याश्रयापत्ते:
Nor can it be argued that as the world is mithyA, ultimate existence is not present in the world, like consciousness or bliss, because that leads to the fallacy of mutual dependence. In order to prove mithyAtva, we will require it not have ultimate existence and in order to prove ultimate existence, we will have to say the world is mithyA.
To such an argument, the siddhikAra responds:
- इति चेत्, अयुक्तमेतत्; नहि प्रातिभासिकासतोरेका व्यावृत्तिरुभयी वा समव्याप्ता; येनैकप्रयोजकप्रयोज्या भवेत्, किन्तु प्रातिभासिकव्यावृत्तिप्रयोजकं ब्रह्मविश्वासत्साधरणमेव वक्तव्यम् ;
If so, it is untenable. Neither the exclusion of apparent reality or non-existence, on their own or together, imply ultimate existence, or vice versa, for the absence of one to prove the other and vice-versa. Rather, the exclusion of apparent reality requires a feature common to Brahman, the world and the non-existent.
असत्यपि प्रातिभासिकत्वाभावात्, एवमसद्व्यावृत्तावपि प्रयोजकं ब्रह्मविश्वप्रातिभासिकसाधरणमेव वक्तव्यम् ; प्रातिभासिकेऽप्यसत्त्वाभावात् |
For the non-existent too lack apparent reality, and thus the exclusion of non-existence requires a feature common to Brahman, the world and the apparently real.
तथाच तत्प्रयोजकद्वयसमावेशादेव ब्रह्मण्युभयव्यावृत्युपपत्तौ नीलत्वघटत्वरूपावच्छेदकद्वयसमावेशोपपन्ननीलघटत्ववन्नातिरिक्तप्रयोजककल्पनायामस्ति किञ्चिन्मानमिति कृतबुद्धय एव विदांकुर्वन्तु |
Therefore, it is only because Brahman contains the two features that it is possible to exclude apparent reality and the non-existence from it. It is only by the presence of the two qualifiers of blueness and potness that it is possible to postulate (the existence of) a blue pot. There is no basis to postulate that there is another implying factor necessary. This is something to be considered by the discerning.
नित्यत्वं चोपाधि:, तुच्छप्रातिभासिकयोर्नित्यत्वव्यतिरेके साध्यव्यतिरेकदर्शनात् |
Moreover, the opponent's inference suffers from the flaw of eternality being the upAdhi (vitiating condition). Eternality is present in the example (Brahman), but not in the paksha (the world). This is so because where the sAdhya is present, i.e in objects which are neither non-existent, nor apparently real, it is possible for the eternality to be absent.
Following this, the nyAyAmRtakAra, considers six alternatives to the hetu, which will be considered.
Alternative hetu 1
अत एवानिषेध्यत्वेन प्रमां प्रति साक्षाद्विषयत्वादित्यपि न हेतु: | Therefore, "without being sublated, it is the direct object of valid knowledge" also cannot be the hetu.
किञ्च प्रमात्वं तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वं तत्त्वावेदकत्वं वा | The validity of cognition is because it contains an attribute that exists in the object, or because it reveals something real.
आद्ये दृष्टान्तस्य साधनवैकल्यम् | नहि परमार्थसत: शुद्धस्य ब्रह्मण: सप्रकारकज्ञानविषयत्वम् | In the former case, the hetu is not present in the example. Pure Brahman which is ultimately real, cannot be the object of an attributive cognition.
नच धर्मवतो दृष्तान्ततेत्युक्तं ; तस्य पक्षकुक्षिनिक्षिप्तत्वेन निश्चितसाध्यवत्त्वाभावात् | Nor can the example be Brahman with attributes, because it is included within the paksha, its reality is not certain.
द्वितीये तत्त्वावेदकत्वस्याबधितविषयत्वरूपत्वेन साध्याविशेषपर्यवसानाद्धेतुग्रहे सिद्धसाधनम् | हेत्वग्रहे तु स्वरूपासिद्धि: I
In the second, as revealing something real is of the nature of having a sublatable object, it is no different from the sAdhya. If the sAdhya itself is the hetu, and the hetu is known, then it is stating the obvious. If the hetu is not known, then it is svarUpAsiddhi (hetu is not present in the paksha).
Alternative hetu 2
यत्तु - प्रमाविषयत्वमात्रेणैव परमार्थत्वोपपत्तौ विशेषणे व्यर्थे; इति | तन्न; Alternatively - if "being the object of valid cognition" is the hetu for proving ultimate reality, the other adjectives being redundant - that is incorrect.
पुरोवर्तिनं रजततया जानामीत्याद्यनुव्यवसायरूपप्रमाविषये प्रातिभासिके व्यभिचारवारकत्वात् साक्षात्पदस्य, तत्रैव च मिथ्यात्वप्रमिते: साक्षाद्विषये व्यभिचारवारकत्वात् अनिषेध्यत्वेनेत्यस्य नह्यनुव्यवसायमिथ्यात्वप्रमे भ्रमे भवत: |
The meta cognition (cognition of the cognition) "I know the object in front of me as silver", may be a valid one (for it is true that I think so) but its object is an apparently real one. To avoid such a vyabhichAra, the qualifier "direct" may be added. However, as the direct object of the cognition is unreal, to avoid vyabhichAra, even if the qualifier "unsublated" is added, a valid meta cognition cannot become invalid.
To explain, even if the said qualifiers are added, the issue is that the meta cognition, which is valid would be rendered invalid, which would be wrong.
Alternative hetu 3
नाप्यनिषेध्यत्वेनेश्वरं प्रति साक्षादपरोक्षत्वं हेतु:, Nor can the hetu be "is the object of God's direct perception (of a thing) as unsublated".
सत्यत्वसिद्धिं विना अनिषेध्यत्वेनेत्यस्यासिद्धे: | तथा चान्योन्याश्रय: | Because, without first establishing what is real, it is not possible to know what unsublatability means, and therefore there is the defect of mutual dependence.
नचेश्वरज्ञानविषयस्य प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वे तस्य भ्रान्तत्वप्रसङ्ग:, मिथ्याभूतस्य मिथ्यात्वेनैव ग्रहणात् ऐन्द्रजालिकवत् भ्रान्तत्वायोगात्, Nor can it be alleged that if the world, which is the object of God's cognition, is unreal, he comes deluded - because, like the case of the magician, knowing an unreal entity as unreal cannot make one deluded.
अन्यथा सविषयकभ्रमज्ञातृत्वेन भ्रान्तस्य दुर्वारत्वापत्ते: | If that is not accepted, then it would be impossible to avoid the charge of delusion just because one knows the object of an illusory cognition (seeing an unreal reflection does not make one deluded).
अथ - निषेध्यत्वेन ज्ञाने तत्पालनार्थमीश्वरस्य प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् - न; ऐन्द्रजालिकप्रवृत्तिवदीश्वरप्रवृत्तेरपि तथाविधत्वात् |
Therefore, if it is argued that God will have no motivation to preserve an unreal object, no. God's motivation to protect the unreal is as true as a magician's motivation to preserve his magic trick.