paricCheda 1 - sopAdhikatva nirAsah (part 2)
The previous post in this chapter can be found here: http://www.advaitasiddhi.com/blog/pariccheda-1-sopadhikatva-nirasah-part-1.
The pUrvapakshi had argued previously that the inference establishing the unreality of the world is afflicted by the problem of upAdhi, or disturbing conditions. Two upAdhis were suggested:
1) स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं - an object that appears due to defects that are not sublated by the cognition that is considered to sublate the object.
2) स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं - being the object of negation in the sublating cognition which cognition is itself unsublated by the sublating cognition of the object.
The siddhikAra, in reply, says : - इति चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
ब्रह्मज्ञानमात्रबाध्ये देहात्मैक्ये मिथ्याभूते साध्याव्यापकत्वात्, The above two cannot be upAdhis because they do not pervade the sAdhya fully. For something to be an upAdhi, every instance of the sAdhya must contain the upAdhi. The notion that the body is the same as the Atma is accepted as mithyA, erroneous by both us and the dvaitin. Thus it is part of the sAdhya. However, both स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं and स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं do not apply in the case of taking the body to be the Atma. Why? Because it is sublated only due to brahma jnAna.
Let us see whether the first candidate for upAdhi, स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं, is applicable to the notion of body as Atma.
स्व= the notion that the body is the Atma
बाधकाभिमत = that which is considered to sublate it = ie brahma jnAna
अबाध्य = that which is unsublated by brahma jnAna. However, nothing is unsublated by brahma jnAna.
Thus स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं is not applicable to the erroneous notion of the body as Atma and therefore, cannot be upAdhi at all.
Let us consider the second candidate for upAdhi, स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं,
स्व = the notion that the body is the Atma
बाधक = that which sublates it = ie brahma jnAna
अबाध्य = but is unsublated by it = However, nothing is unsublated by brahma jnAna.
Therefore स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं does not apply to the erroneous notion of the body as Atma and therefore, cannot be upAdhi too.
Both definitions do not have sAdhya vyApyatvam, and therefore are not upAdhis.
पर्वतावयववृत्त्यन्यत्वादिवत् साधनवत्पक्षमात्रव्यावर्तकविशेषणत्वेन पक्षेतरत्वतुल्यत्वाच्च | "Being located anywhere except in a part of the mountain" cannot be cited as an upAdhi for the inference of fire, because all it does is exclude the instance of the paksha which contains the sAdhya. By definition, such an item will technically fall under the scope of upAdhi, but that is not taken as an upAdhi because no valid inference is possible then. This is dismissed on the same grounds as pakshetara, or "being other than the paksha". Similarly, the two upAdhis suggested by the pUrvapakshi exclude only the paksha containing the sAdhya, and nothing else, and thus cannot be taken as the upAdhi.
The pUrva pakshi says when a defect is already present in the inference, this rule does not apply.
He says:
नच बाधोन्नीतत्वात् सोऽप्युपाधि:, Do not argue thus - As the inference is already contradicted (by direct perception), these can serve as upAdhis.
बाधस्याग्रे निरसिष्यमाणत्वात् | Because, that the inference is not contradicted by perception will be proven shortly.
अपिच यद्व्यतिरेकस्य साध्यव्यतिरेकसाधकत्वं तस्यैव साध्यव्यापकत्वम् ; इतरांशे अनुकूलतर्काप्रसरात् | Moreover, only those qualifiers necessary to be present in order to prove the absence of the sAdhya through the absence of the upAdhi can serve as the upAdhi. The remaining qualifiers cited do not have supporting logic which justifies their presence.
To explain, it is sufficient to say that दोषप्रयुक्तभानत्व is the upAdhi (ie that which appears due to a defect) - the other qualifiers are redundant.
udayanAchArya in nyAya kusumAnjali cites an inference to prove the existence of God. He says that the world must have a Creator, because it happens to be created. क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकम्, कार्यत्वात्, घटवत्.
In response, the buddhist argues that the world is not created by anyone with a body (unlike a pot, which is created by a potter, who has a body). Thus he cites an upAdhi in udayana's inference - शरीरजन्यत्वं. This pot was created by a person with a body.
The naiyyAyika argues that the qualifier 'by a body' is redundant. He could simply say that the world is not created, and therefore cannot have a Creator - क्षित्यादिकं नकर्तृजन्यम्, अजन्यत्वात्. Why was a redundant qualifier "by someone with a body" added?
The siddhikAra argues that the upAdhi suggested by the nyAyAmritakAra suffers from the same defect.
तथाच 'क्षित्यादिकं, न कर्तृजन्यम्, शरीराजन्यत्वा'दित्यत्र यथा शरीरविशेषणवैयर्थ्यान्न शरीरजन्यत्वम् कर्तृजन्यत्वव्यापकम्,
Just like in the case of the inference "The world is not a product of a Creator because it is not created by someone with a body", the qualifier "with a body" is redundant; Therefore, being a product of a Creator does not imply that the Creator has a body.
एवं 'वियदादिकं, न मिथ्या, स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वरहित्वा'दिति साध्यव्यतिरेकसाधने स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यभागस्य वैयर्थ्यात् स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं न मिथ्यात्वव्यापकम् |
Similarly in the pUrvapakshi's inference "the world is not unreal because the defects that cause it to appear are not unsublated by the cognition that is considered to sublate the world", there are redundant qualifiers. To prove the absence of unreality (the sAdhya), the portion "unsublated by the cognition that sublates it" is not necessary. It would have been sufficient to say that "world is not unreal because it does not appear due to any defects". Therefore, we can conclude that being unreal does not imply that "the object appears due to defects unsublated by a cognition considered to sublate it".
However, we cannot simply say "appearance due to defects" is an upAdhi because,
दोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वम् तु भवति साध्यव्यापकम्, तच्च साधनव्यापकमपीति नोपाधि: | While "appearance due to defects" pervades every instance of mithyA, it pervades every instance of the hetu, knowability, also. Therefore it cannot be an upAdhi.
Either you will have svarUpa asiddhi or you will not have upAdhi.
दृश्यत्वादिनैव मिथ्यात्ववत्तस्यापि साधनात् | Like drishyatva itself is unreal, "appearing due to defects" is also knowable, and thus is unreal itself.
एवं द्वितीयोपाधावपि 'स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रती'ति विशेषणं व्यतिरेकसाधने व्यर्थम् | Similarly, in the second (candidate for the) upAdhi, the qualifier "for the sublating cognition which is itself unsublated by the sublating cognition of the object" is a redundant qualifier. It would have been sufficient to merely say "being the object of negation".
विशेष्यभागस्तु साध्यसाधनयोर्व्यापक इति नोपाधि: | However, (similarly) if the qualified part alone is used (ie if only "being the object of negation" is the upAdhi), then both the sAdhya (unreality) and sAdhana (knowability) are pervaded by it, which means that it ends up as not an upAdhi.
The pUrvapakshi argues for another upAdhi
अतएवाधिष्ठानत्वाभिमतसमसत्ताकदोषवद्धेतुजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वमुपाधि: | For the same reason, being the object of a cognition that is caused by something containing a defect which is of the same order of reality as the substratum can be an upAdhi.
The substratum of the shell silver is the shell, which is vyAvahArika. The defect that causes the shell-silver to appear is the shininess of silver, which is also vyAvahArika. Sense organs which perceive the shininess of the shell cause one to perceive shell-silver.
However, the world is created by Ishvara, God. He can have no defects. The world cannot be said to be created by a defective God. Therefore the world is not created by a God (Brahman) which contains a defect which is of the same order of reality as the world's substratum, Brahman.
अत्र च ब्रह्मणोऽपि बौद्धकल्पितदोषवद्धेतुजन्यक्षणिकत्वादिज्ञानविषयत्वात् समव्याप्तिसिद्ध्यर्थमधिष्ठानसमसत्ताकेति विशेषणम्,
Here, the buddhist postulates an imaginary defect (momentariness) in Brahman and says that such a defect causes the world. That defect is not of the same order of reality as Brahman. Therefore, this upAdhi cannot be said to exist in the world. To ensure that the paksha is fully pervaded by the hetu, we added the qualifier "being of the same order of reality as the substratum". Thus it is not a redundant qualifier here.
नतु पक्षमात्रव्यावृत्त्यर्थं, And not merely to exclude the paksha with a view of proving that this is an upAdhi and thus disproving the advaitin.
अतो न पक्षेतरतुल्यतेत्यपास्तम् | Thus to claim that such an adjective is equivalent to the qualifier "being other than the paksha" is not true.
The siddhikAra in reply argues:
ब्रह्मणीव ब्रह्मणि कल्पिते क्षणिकत्वादावपि मिथ्याभूते धर्मे अधिष्ठानसमसत्ताकदोषवद्धेतुजन्यज्ञानाविषयत्वमुपाधे: साध्याव्याप्ते:, The attribute of momentariness is imagined in Brahman. That is, it is unreal. The cognition that perceives such an attribute in Brahman is not generated by a cause that is of the same order of reality as the substratum, Brahman. It is an erroneous cognition. Thus the attribute of momentariness which is accepted as unreal (ie the sAdhya is present), does not contain the upAdhi. Therefore this does not pervade every instance of the sAdhya and hence cannot be termed an upAdhi.
व्यतिरेकसाधने व्यर्थविशेषणत्वस्योक्तत्वाच्च | Further, as argued previously, it is sufficient to say that the world is not the object of a cognition that is born from a defective source, the rest of the adjectives are redundant.
The pUrvapakshi suggests other upAdhis:
नापि श्रुतितात्पर्याविषयत्वमुपाधि:, श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्वस्य ब्रह्ममात्रनिष्ठतया तदाभावस्य साधनव्यापकत्वात् | "Not being the object of a shruti sentence with ultimate import" cannot be an upAdhi too. The pUrvapakshi argues that shell-silver is not the ultimate import of the shruti, but the world is so, at least according to groups like the pUrvamImAmsakas. Thus this can be an upAdhi.
The siddhikAra says no. The ultimate import of scripture is to only reveal Brahman - thus everything knowable is not the object of shruti. Hence, every aspect of the hetu is pervaded by this and therefore cannot be the upAdhi.
नापि प्रातिभासिकत्वमुपाधि: Being a prAtibhAsika object also cannot be the upAdhi.
तद्धि ब्रह्ममज्ञानेतरबाध्यत्वम्, तस्य च देहात्मैक्ये मिथ्याभुतेऽप्यसत्त्वेन साध्याव्याप्ते:, Because being prAtibhAsika implies that it is sublated by something other than brahmajnAna. This is not present in every instance of the sAdhya - the notion of taking the body to be the Atma is not prAtibhAsika, but is accepted as mithyA. Therefore prAtibhAsikatva does not pervade every instance of the sAdhya and cannot be an upAdhi.
व्यतिरेके व्यर्थविशेषणत्वाच्च | If you want to use "being sublated by anything other than brahmajnAna" as an upAdhi, it would be sufficient to merely say "being sublated", the rest is redundant.
नापि प्रातिभासमात्रशरीरत्वमुपाधि:, Existence merely at the time of cognition is not an upAdhi either.
दृष्टिसृष्टिपक्षे साधनव्यापकत्वात् In the view that creation is perception, it pervades the hetu.
परेषामसिद्धेश्चेति | In the dvaita school on the other hand, the concept of prAtibhAsika itself does not exist as according to them the shell-silver is aLika / asat - ie non-existent. Thus arguing that such a thing is an upAdhi would be impossible, as it is non-existent itself.
This concludes the chapter on upAdhi.
The pUrvapakshi had argued previously that the inference establishing the unreality of the world is afflicted by the problem of upAdhi, or disturbing conditions. Two upAdhis were suggested:
1) स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं - an object that appears due to defects that are not sublated by the cognition that is considered to sublate the object.
2) स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं - being the object of negation in the sublating cognition which cognition is itself unsublated by the sublating cognition of the object.
The siddhikAra, in reply, says : - इति चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
ब्रह्मज्ञानमात्रबाध्ये देहात्मैक्ये मिथ्याभूते साध्याव्यापकत्वात्, The above two cannot be upAdhis because they do not pervade the sAdhya fully. For something to be an upAdhi, every instance of the sAdhya must contain the upAdhi. The notion that the body is the same as the Atma is accepted as mithyA, erroneous by both us and the dvaitin. Thus it is part of the sAdhya. However, both स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं and स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं do not apply in the case of taking the body to be the Atma. Why? Because it is sublated only due to brahma jnAna.
Let us see whether the first candidate for upAdhi, स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं, is applicable to the notion of body as Atma.
स्व= the notion that the body is the Atma
बाधकाभिमत = that which is considered to sublate it = ie brahma jnAna
अबाध्य = that which is unsublated by brahma jnAna. However, nothing is unsublated by brahma jnAna.
Thus स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं is not applicable to the erroneous notion of the body as Atma and therefore, cannot be upAdhi at all.
Let us consider the second candidate for upAdhi, स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं,
स्व = the notion that the body is the Atma
बाधक = that which sublates it = ie brahma jnAna
अबाध्य = but is unsublated by it = However, nothing is unsublated by brahma jnAna.
Therefore स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं does not apply to the erroneous notion of the body as Atma and therefore, cannot be upAdhi too.
Both definitions do not have sAdhya vyApyatvam, and therefore are not upAdhis.
पर्वतावयववृत्त्यन्यत्वादिवत् साधनवत्पक्षमात्रव्यावर्तकविशेषणत्वेन पक्षेतरत्वतुल्यत्वाच्च | "Being located anywhere except in a part of the mountain" cannot be cited as an upAdhi for the inference of fire, because all it does is exclude the instance of the paksha which contains the sAdhya. By definition, such an item will technically fall under the scope of upAdhi, but that is not taken as an upAdhi because no valid inference is possible then. This is dismissed on the same grounds as pakshetara, or "being other than the paksha". Similarly, the two upAdhis suggested by the pUrvapakshi exclude only the paksha containing the sAdhya, and nothing else, and thus cannot be taken as the upAdhi.
The pUrva pakshi says when a defect is already present in the inference, this rule does not apply.
He says:
नच बाधोन्नीतत्वात् सोऽप्युपाधि:, Do not argue thus - As the inference is already contradicted (by direct perception), these can serve as upAdhis.
बाधस्याग्रे निरसिष्यमाणत्वात् | Because, that the inference is not contradicted by perception will be proven shortly.
अपिच यद्व्यतिरेकस्य साध्यव्यतिरेकसाधकत्वं तस्यैव साध्यव्यापकत्वम् ; इतरांशे अनुकूलतर्काप्रसरात् | Moreover, only those qualifiers necessary to be present in order to prove the absence of the sAdhya through the absence of the upAdhi can serve as the upAdhi. The remaining qualifiers cited do not have supporting logic which justifies their presence.
To explain, it is sufficient to say that दोषप्रयुक्तभानत्व is the upAdhi (ie that which appears due to a defect) - the other qualifiers are redundant.
udayanAchArya in nyAya kusumAnjali cites an inference to prove the existence of God. He says that the world must have a Creator, because it happens to be created. क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकम्, कार्यत्वात्, घटवत्.
In response, the buddhist argues that the world is not created by anyone with a body (unlike a pot, which is created by a potter, who has a body). Thus he cites an upAdhi in udayana's inference - शरीरजन्यत्वं. This pot was created by a person with a body.
The naiyyAyika argues that the qualifier 'by a body' is redundant. He could simply say that the world is not created, and therefore cannot have a Creator - क्षित्यादिकं नकर्तृजन्यम्, अजन्यत्वात्. Why was a redundant qualifier "by someone with a body" added?
The siddhikAra argues that the upAdhi suggested by the nyAyAmritakAra suffers from the same defect.
तथाच 'क्षित्यादिकं, न कर्तृजन्यम्, शरीराजन्यत्वा'दित्यत्र यथा शरीरविशेषणवैयर्थ्यान्न शरीरजन्यत्वम् कर्तृजन्यत्वव्यापकम्,
Just like in the case of the inference "The world is not a product of a Creator because it is not created by someone with a body", the qualifier "with a body" is redundant; Therefore, being a product of a Creator does not imply that the Creator has a body.
एवं 'वियदादिकं, न मिथ्या, स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वरहित्वा'दिति साध्यव्यतिरेकसाधने स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यभागस्य वैयर्थ्यात् स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं न मिथ्यात्वव्यापकम् |
Similarly in the pUrvapakshi's inference "the world is not unreal because the defects that cause it to appear are not unsublated by the cognition that is considered to sublate the world", there are redundant qualifiers. To prove the absence of unreality (the sAdhya), the portion "unsublated by the cognition that sublates it" is not necessary. It would have been sufficient to say that "world is not unreal because it does not appear due to any defects". Therefore, we can conclude that being unreal does not imply that "the object appears due to defects unsublated by a cognition considered to sublate it".
However, we cannot simply say "appearance due to defects" is an upAdhi because,
दोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वम् तु भवति साध्यव्यापकम्, तच्च साधनव्यापकमपीति नोपाधि: | While "appearance due to defects" pervades every instance of mithyA, it pervades every instance of the hetu, knowability, also. Therefore it cannot be an upAdhi.
Either you will have svarUpa asiddhi or you will not have upAdhi.
दृश्यत्वादिनैव मिथ्यात्ववत्तस्यापि साधनात् | Like drishyatva itself is unreal, "appearing due to defects" is also knowable, and thus is unreal itself.
एवं द्वितीयोपाधावपि 'स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रती'ति विशेषणं व्यतिरेकसाधने व्यर्थम् | Similarly, in the second (candidate for the) upAdhi, the qualifier "for the sublating cognition which is itself unsublated by the sublating cognition of the object" is a redundant qualifier. It would have been sufficient to merely say "being the object of negation".
विशेष्यभागस्तु साध्यसाधनयोर्व्यापक इति नोपाधि: | However, (similarly) if the qualified part alone is used (ie if only "being the object of negation" is the upAdhi), then both the sAdhya (unreality) and sAdhana (knowability) are pervaded by it, which means that it ends up as not an upAdhi.
The pUrvapakshi argues for another upAdhi
अतएवाधिष्ठानत्वाभिमतसमसत्ताकदोषवद्धेतुजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वमुपाधि: | For the same reason, being the object of a cognition that is caused by something containing a defect which is of the same order of reality as the substratum can be an upAdhi.
The substratum of the shell silver is the shell, which is vyAvahArika. The defect that causes the shell-silver to appear is the shininess of silver, which is also vyAvahArika. Sense organs which perceive the shininess of the shell cause one to perceive shell-silver.
However, the world is created by Ishvara, God. He can have no defects. The world cannot be said to be created by a defective God. Therefore the world is not created by a God (Brahman) which contains a defect which is of the same order of reality as the world's substratum, Brahman.
अत्र च ब्रह्मणोऽपि बौद्धकल्पितदोषवद्धेतुजन्यक्षणिकत्वादिज्ञानविषयत्वात् समव्याप्तिसिद्ध्यर्थमधिष्ठानसमसत्ताकेति विशेषणम्,
Here, the buddhist postulates an imaginary defect (momentariness) in Brahman and says that such a defect causes the world. That defect is not of the same order of reality as Brahman. Therefore, this upAdhi cannot be said to exist in the world. To ensure that the paksha is fully pervaded by the hetu, we added the qualifier "being of the same order of reality as the substratum". Thus it is not a redundant qualifier here.
नतु पक्षमात्रव्यावृत्त्यर्थं, And not merely to exclude the paksha with a view of proving that this is an upAdhi and thus disproving the advaitin.
अतो न पक्षेतरतुल्यतेत्यपास्तम् | Thus to claim that such an adjective is equivalent to the qualifier "being other than the paksha" is not true.
The siddhikAra in reply argues:
ब्रह्मणीव ब्रह्मणि कल्पिते क्षणिकत्वादावपि मिथ्याभूते धर्मे अधिष्ठानसमसत्ताकदोषवद्धेतुजन्यज्ञानाविषयत्वमुपाधे: साध्याव्याप्ते:, The attribute of momentariness is imagined in Brahman. That is, it is unreal. The cognition that perceives such an attribute in Brahman is not generated by a cause that is of the same order of reality as the substratum, Brahman. It is an erroneous cognition. Thus the attribute of momentariness which is accepted as unreal (ie the sAdhya is present), does not contain the upAdhi. Therefore this does not pervade every instance of the sAdhya and hence cannot be termed an upAdhi.
व्यतिरेकसाधने व्यर्थविशेषणत्वस्योक्तत्वाच्च | Further, as argued previously, it is sufficient to say that the world is not the object of a cognition that is born from a defective source, the rest of the adjectives are redundant.
The pUrvapakshi suggests other upAdhis:
नापि श्रुतितात्पर्याविषयत्वमुपाधि:, श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्वस्य ब्रह्ममात्रनिष्ठतया तदाभावस्य साधनव्यापकत्वात् | "Not being the object of a shruti sentence with ultimate import" cannot be an upAdhi too. The pUrvapakshi argues that shell-silver is not the ultimate import of the shruti, but the world is so, at least according to groups like the pUrvamImAmsakas. Thus this can be an upAdhi.
The siddhikAra says no. The ultimate import of scripture is to only reveal Brahman - thus everything knowable is not the object of shruti. Hence, every aspect of the hetu is pervaded by this and therefore cannot be the upAdhi.
नापि प्रातिभासिकत्वमुपाधि: Being a prAtibhAsika object also cannot be the upAdhi.
तद्धि ब्रह्ममज्ञानेतरबाध्यत्वम्, तस्य च देहात्मैक्ये मिथ्याभुतेऽप्यसत्त्वेन साध्याव्याप्ते:, Because being prAtibhAsika implies that it is sublated by something other than brahmajnAna. This is not present in every instance of the sAdhya - the notion of taking the body to be the Atma is not prAtibhAsika, but is accepted as mithyA. Therefore prAtibhAsikatva does not pervade every instance of the sAdhya and cannot be an upAdhi.
व्यतिरेके व्यर्थविशेषणत्वाच्च | If you want to use "being sublated by anything other than brahmajnAna" as an upAdhi, it would be sufficient to merely say "being sublated", the rest is redundant.
नापि प्रातिभासमात्रशरीरत्वमुपाधि:, Existence merely at the time of cognition is not an upAdhi either.
दृष्टिसृष्टिपक्षे साधनव्यापकत्वात् In the view that creation is perception, it pervades the hetu.
परेषामसिद्धेश्चेति | In the dvaita school on the other hand, the concept of prAtibhAsika itself does not exist as according to them the shell-silver is aLika / asat - ie non-existent. Thus arguing that such a thing is an upAdhi would be impossible, as it is non-existent itself.
This concludes the chapter on upAdhi.