paricCheda 1 - dvitIya mithyAtva vichAra: (part 7)

The previous posts in this topic are available here:

We have been looking at the second definition of mithyAtvam, प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं. In the previous post, the objection that this definition of mithyAtva was in effect a definition of asat was raised and refuted. Now the naiyyAyika pUrvapakshi raises a few objections to this definition (this is not raised by the nyAyAmritakAra). In classical nyAya tradition, each word in the definition is analysed, faults identified and refinements proposed to the definition.

नन्वेवं सति यावत्सदधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम् पर्यवसितम् | That being so, the result is that the definition of mithyAtva is equivalent to the absolute absence of a thing in any real substratum.

Space according to the naiyyAyika has no substratum, AdhAra, ie it does not have AdhAra Adheya  (locus-object) relationship with anything. It does not however mean that space is a non-existent entity in nyAya. As defined, the definition of mithyAtva (the absence of an object in a real substratum) would also apply to space (as the absolute absence of space is present in all substrata, according to the naiyyAyika). However, the naiyyAyika would be unwilling to accept that space a mithyA object. If not mithyA, what kind of an object is space in nyAya?

The absence of AdhAra Adheya sambandha for an object is technically called avritti in nyAya. Thus, according to the logician, space is avritti, not mithyA.

A syllogism where the sAdhya is present universally is called kevala anvayi. As the absence of space in a locus is universal, the naiyyAyika calls the atyantAbhAva of AkAsha as kevalAnvayi.

तथाच केवलान्वय्यत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिषु अवृत्तिषु गगनादिषु तार्किकाणाम् सिद्धसाधनम् ; that being so, this definition suffers from siddhasAdhanam.  The absolute absence of space in every substratum, which happens to be kevala anvayi, is classified as avritti according to the logicians, and already known. One need not postulate a new category of mithyA to describe avritti.

यदधिकरणं यत्सत् तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं तस्य मिथ्यात्वमिति विवक्षायां, therefore, to avoid this defect, the following refinement is made: if in the particular substratum of an object, the absolute absence of the object is present, the object is to be understood as mithyA.

The naiyyAyika says there is a further defect even after this refinement. If an object is in a substratum, then the substratum and the object have a relationship, a sambandha, based on which, the object is present in that locus. The object is not present in that substratum with any other sambandha.

One sambandha is called samyoga, when the object and the substratum are in physical contact. Another sambandha is called samavAya, where the object-substratum pair have a part-whole, cause-effect, or attribute-substance relationship. When a pot is on the ground, it has samyoga sambandha with the ground. On the other hand, the relationship between the pot and clay is samavAya sambandha. When considering clay as the substratum of the pot, the pot is "present" in the clay with samavAya sambandha, but not with samyoga sambandha. Therefore, according to the naiyyAyika, it is well established that between every object and its locus, there exists a sambandha, along with which, the object is present in a substratum, and another sambandha along with which, the object is not present in the same substratum.

Thus, if the definition of mithyA is that a specific object is not present in a specific substratum in all three periods of time, that is already well known to the naiyyAyika - he already knows that every object is not present in its substratum with a particular sambandha.

अधिकरणपदेनावृत्तिनिराकरणेऽपि संयोगसंबन्धेन समवायसंबन्धेन वा यत् घटाधिकरणम् समवायसंबन्धेन संयोगसंबन्धेन वा घटस्य तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितया सर्वेषु वृत्तिमत्सु दुरुद्धरं सिद्धसाधनम् ।

अधिकरणपदेनावृत्तिनिराकरणेऽपि Even though the avritti of the word substratum in the definition was remedied, संयोगसंबन्धेन समवायसंबन्धेन वा यत् घटाधिकरणम् because a pot and its locus can either have samyoga sambandha or samavAya sambandha respectively
समवायसंबन्धेन संयोगसंबन्धेन वा घटस्य तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितया it establishes the absence of the pot in that locus along with the samavAyA or samyoga sambandha respectively. That is, if the pot is present with samyoga sambandha is present, it is absent with samavAya sambandha and vice versa.
सर्वेषु वृत्तिमत्सु दुरुद्धरं सिद्धसाधनम् this condition will be met for every object and its locus. Therefore even this refined definition will suffer from siddhasAdhanam.

येन संबन्धेन यद्यस्याधिकरणं तेन संबन्धेन तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वमिति विवक्षायां, Suppose this definition is further refined such that if an object having a specific relationship with a specific locus is absolutely absent in that locus with that relationship, then that object is mithyA -

अव्याप्यवृत्तिषु संयोगदिषु सिद्धसाधनम् this too suffers from the defect of siddha sAdhanam, in the case of the samyoga sambandha being both present and absent, like in the case of avyApvya vritti.

To explain, let us consider the example of a monkey on a tree. The monkey and the tree have samyoga sambandha. A particular monkey is sitting on a particular tree. Therefore, it is already accepted that this specific monkey-tree samyonga sambandha has an abhAva everywhere else apart from this tree. Within this tree also, the samyoga sambandha is present only on the top of the tree, and not in the bottom. Thus the monkey with samyoga sambandha is present in the top of the tree and absent in the bottom. When an object is both present and absent in the same location, it is termed avyApya vritti in nyAya. This is already known, thus defining mithyA in this manner leads to siddha sAdhanam due to avyApya vritti.

The siddhikAra says:
इति चेन्न if this is the argument, no.

येन रूपेण यदधिकरणतया यत् प्रतिपन्नं तेन रूपेण तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वस्य प्रतिपन्नपदेन सूचितत्वात् | If a particular object that appears in a particular locus is not present in that locus, then that object is said to be mithyA. This is indicated by the word pratipannam in the definition of mithyA.

There is a flaw in the naiyyayika's argument. It must be noted that the contact of the monkey with the tree is in the top part of the tree, not the bottom. The substratum should be taken as the top of the tree, not the tree in general. It will be avyApya vritti only if the monkey is both in contact and not in contact with the same part of the tree.

तच्च रूपम् संबन्धविशेष: अवच्छेदकविशेषश्च | The locus is qualified in two ways - by sambandha and by localisation (avacChedaka)

नहि संबन्धविशेषमन्तरेण भूतले घटाधिकरणता प्रतीयते | The ground appears as the substratum for the pot only with a particular sambandha, and not without.

अवच्छेदकविशेषमन्तरेण वा वृक्षे कपिसम्योगाधिकरणता | The locus of the contact of the monkey with the tree is limited to a specific location.

तथाच येन सम्बन्धविशेषेण येन चावच्छ्चेदकविशेषेण यदधिकरणताप्रतीतिर्यत्र भवितुमर्हति, तेनैव सम्बन्धविशेषेण तेनैव चावच्छ्चेदकविशेषेण तदधिकरणकात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं तस्य मिथ्यात्वमिति पर्यवसते क्व सिद्धसाधनम् | Therefore as the object which appears in a particular spot, with a particular sambandha in a particular locus, is absolutely absent in that spot, with that sambandha in that locus, resulting in its mithyAtvam, where is the siddhasAdhanam that you speak of?

No need to refine the definition
Until now, the siddhikAra had refined the definition of mithyAtva in response to the naiyyAyika's objection. Now, his argument shifts to dropping the assumptions inherently made thus far. Therefore, the existing definition of mithyAtvam can be accepted as is, without any refinement.

1) The adhikaraNa qualifier is not required in the definition.
The naiyyAyika had said, AkAsha is avritti, it has no substratum. Hence he had argued that its absence was in every substratum.

यदि पुन: ध्वंसप्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वमिवात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वमाकाशादौ न स्यात् However, If instead we say - when space's destruction or creation is not accepted by the naiyyAyika, its absence also must not be accepted.

साधकमानाभावस्य तुल्यत्वात् Because, just like in the case of destruction or creation, there is no proof for the absolute absence of space either. The naiyyAyika can say there is pramANa for atyantAbhAvam using the four pramANas at his disposal - pratyaksha, anumAna, upamAna, shabda. There is no scope for upamAna or shabda here, leaving only pratyaksha and anumAna.

इहाकाशो नास्तीति प्रत्यक्षप्रतीत्यसम्भवात् One cannot use pratyaksha pramANa to say that "there is no space here". Because to prove the absence of something, the pratiyogi must have the yogyatA of pratIti. That is, the pratiyogi must be visible to begin with, so that its absence can also be perceived. There has to be yogyAnupalabdhi. According to nyAya, space cannot be seen. How can its absence be perceived? There is no pratyaksha basis for concluding that space has absence.

अनुमाने चानुकूलतर्काभावात्, There is no anukUla tarka, or supportive logic that can be used to argue for the absence of space. What harm ensues if space's absence is denied?

According to the founder of nyAya shAstra, Gautama, anukUla tarka can be of three kinds. Proving the cause through its effect (sheShavat), proving the effect through the cause (pUrvavat) and proving one through an unrelated other (sAmAnyato driShTa). The last of three, sAmAnyato driShTa, is quite difficult to prove.

सामान्यतो दृष्टमात्रेण ध्वंसप्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वस्यापि सिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् if sAmAnyato driShTa anukUla tarka was used to prove atyantAbhAva, the same can be used to prove the dhvamsa and prAgabhAva of space too.

तद्व्यतिरेकेण कस्यचित् कार्यस्यानुपपत्तेरभावाच्च By holding that space is never absent anywhere, no harm ensures anywhere.

Thus there is no reason to hold that space is universally absent, therefore we need not qualify the specific nature of the locus in mithyAtva's definition to exclude space.

2) The sambandha qualifier is not needed in the definition
एवं संयोगसंबन्धेन घटवति भूतले समवायसम्बन्धेन घटाभावसत्त्वे मानाभावात् There is no basis to claim that the pot is not present in the ground with a samavAya sambandha when the pot is present on the ground with a samyoga sambandha. If a pot is present on the ground, the pot cannot be absent at the same time in the same place. If you argue that the pot is not present with a samavAya sambandha, that is not true because the absence is of the samavAya sambandha, not the pot.

लाघवेन घटात्यन्ताभावत्वेनैव घटसामानाधिकरण्यविरोधित्वकल्पनात्
Applying the principle of parsimony, if an object is absent, it cannot be held to be present in the same place at the same time.

Therefore, if there is valid perception of a pot in any place at a particular time, one cannot have an equally valid perception of its absence in that place at that time. If the objects of knowledge are mutually contradictory, then their knowledge also will be contradictory.

There is no water in fire. This is known. When one sees fire,  no one gets a doubt if there is water in the fire. If the opponent's view is taken, then this rule will face harm.  

सम्बन्धविशेषप्रवेशे च गौरवात् घटसमवायमात्रविषयतया प्रतीतेरुपपत्तेः If the naiyyAyika insists on introducing an adjective of sambandha in the negation "there is no pot here with samavAya sambandha", all that does is to establish that samavAya sambandha is absent, not that the pot is absent.

The naiyyAyika had said that space is avritti, and the absence of it is present in all substrata. If the advaitin wants to argue that mithyAtva is the absence of an object in (all) substrata, then what is established is avritti, not mithyAtva. To this charge, the siddhikAra replies:
आधाराधेयभावस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वेन घटस्यावृत्तित्वशङ्कानुदयात् when the object-locus relationship between a pot and the ground on which it is located, is clearly knowable by direct perception, there is no possibility of a doubt arising whether the pot is avritti, ie has no substratum at all. The defect of arthAntara is possible only if the possibility of arthAntara is not contradictory to all other pramANa.

उक्तयुक्तेश्च न घटादेरत्यन्ताभावसामानाधिकरण्यम्; By the means of the yukti provided, it is not possible to establish that a pot and its absence are simultaneously present in one location.

3) The avacchedaka qualifier is not needed in the definition
The naiyyAyika had tried to establish using the monkey-samyoga example that it was possible for samyoga to exist in one part of the substratum, but be absent in another part of the substratum. The siddhikAra had suggested an avacChedaka (locative) qualifier to remedy this. Now he denies the need for an avacChedaka qualifier.

एवं संयोगतदभावयोर्नैकाधिकरण्यम् ; samyoga and its absence cannot be in one substratum. Why not?

'अग्रे वृक्ष: कपिसम्योगी मूले ने' ति प्रतीतेरग्रमूलयोरेव संयोगतदभाववत्तयोपपत्ते:, because when you say "the monkey is on the top of the tree, not at the bottom", only the tree-top is the substratum - the bottom is not. The agra vishiShTa vriksha - the top of the tree -  is different from mUla vishishta vriksa -  the bottom of the tree. Therefore, it is not possible to accept that in the same substratum there is both samyoga and samyoga abhAva.

If someone asks, "Is there a monkey on this tree?", one can only reply "yes". The reply is not "there is both a monkey and its absence". However, if someone asks, "Is there a monkey sitting at the root of the tree?", one can reply "no" without any hesitation. In this case, the question identifies the substratum as "the root of the tree". Thus what is explicit in one question is implicit in the other - the tree qualified by 'top-ness' and 'bottom-ness' are two different substrata.

तदा सन्मात्रनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वमेव मिथ्यात्वं मन्तव्यं | therefore, mithyAtvam should be understood as that which is the abhAva pratiyogi and which has sat (Brahman) as its substratum. No further refinement is required.

(To be continued).
Originally posted on 31st October, 2017.