paricCheda 1 - dvitIya mithyAtva vichAra: (part 6)

The previous posts in this topic are available here:

We are discussing the second definition of mithyAtvam, as postulated by vivaraNakAra, प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं - the counter-positive of the negation in all three periods of time of an object in the locus of its appearance. He had argued that the appearance of a mithyA object was a case of anirvachanIya khyAti - that is, an anirvachanIya object appears. The nyAyAmritakAra suggested that an already existing object that is present elsewhere appears at the location of an illusion, ie the illusion was a case of anyathA khyAti. The siddhikAra had argued against this. 

The nyAyAmritakAra makes this argument. According to the second definition of mithyAtva, a mithyA object is not present in any of the three periods of time in the locus of its appearance. Further, if the appearance is not a case of anyathAkhyAti, the object is not present anywhere else either. Thus the object is not present anywhere, anytime. Is this not asat?
He says:
ननु  - एवमत्यन्तासत्त्वापात: प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं ह्यन्यत्रासत्त्वेन संप्रतिपन्नस्य घटादे: सर्वत्र त्रैकालिक निषेधप्रतियोगित्वं पर्यवसितम् ;  is this not an instance of asat? The object is absent in all three periods of time in the locus of its appearance. It is not present elsewhere too. Thus objects that appear like pot, are not present in any place at any time.

अन्यथा तेषाम् सत्त्वापातात् , नहि तेषामन्यत्र सत्ता सम्भवतीति त्वदुक्तेश्च;  तथा कथमसद्वैलक्षण्यम्, नहि शशशृङ्गादेरितो अन्यदसत्त्वम् |
अन्यथा तेषाम् सत्त्वापातात् If they exist otherwise (i.e somewhere else)
नहि तेषामन्यत्र सत्ता सम्भवतीति त्वदुक्तेश्च it contradicts your own statement that they cannot exist somewhere else. (the siddhikAra had said that anyathAkhyAti was not a possibility, it was a case of anirvachanIya khyAti)
तथा कथमसद्वैलक्षण्यम् thus, how is mithyAtvam different from asat? 
नहि शशशृङ्गादेरितो अन्यदसत्त्वम् | if you say it is different from asat like a hare's horn, ie there is another definition of asat, then that is not possible.

The definition of asat
न च निरूपाख्यत्वमेव तदसत्त्वम्; निरूपाख्यत्वपदेनैव व्याख्यायमानत्वात् | If nirUpAkhyatvam, ie not being the object of any word, is the definition of asat, then, because the very fact that one is able to use the word "nirupAkhya" to describe such things, means that such a definition of asat results in a contradiction.

नाप्यप्रतीयमानत्वमसत्त्वम् ; असतोऽप्रतीतौ असद्वैलक्षण्यज्ञानस्यासत्प्रतीतिनिरासस्यासत्पदप्रयोगस्य चायोगात् | Nor is asat the absence of knowability. If asat itself cannot be known, how can asat vailakshaNyatvam, difference from asat, be known? Moreover, when a person uses the word asat, he must know what it denotes (whether it is correct or not is another matter), because without knowing the object referred to by the word asat, its usage itself will be invalid.  

नचापरोक्षतया अप्रतीयमानत्वम् तत् ; नित्यातिन्द्रियेष्वतिव्याप्ते: | Nor is it the absence of knowability by direct perception because there are things which happen to be beyond our senses, but are still not asat.

Thus, it appears that your mithyAtva is really not different from asat.

The siddhikAra's reply
The siddhikAra replies:
- इति चेन्मैवम् not so;
सर्वत्र त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं यद्यपि तुच्छानिर्वचनीया साधारणम् ; while the absolute absence of an object in all time and space is common to both asat and mithyA  
तथापि क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम् , asat is something that is incapable of being perceived as existing in any locus
तच्च शुक्तिरूप्ये प्रपञ्चे च बाधात् पूर्वं नास्त्येवेति न तुच्छत्वापत्ति:  |  whereas that is not the case with regard to shell-silver and the world before their sublation, thus their being asat is not true
नच बाधात् पूर्वं शुक्तिरूप्यम् प्रपञ्चो वा सत्त्वेन न प्रतीयते | as before their sublation, shell-silver and the world do appear to exist.

The pUrvapakshi says this is a new definition of asat according to the advaita siddhi. The faults that he had pointed to exist in the definition of mithyAtva offered by the previous teachers of advaita. The siddhikAra's position is that this definition is not his independent opinion, it has been indicated by the prior teachers too. This argument has been anticipated in the vivaraNam itself, which is why the vivaraNAchArya uses the word upAdhi in his definition. 

Until now, we have been translation upAdhi as locus, but its interpretation goes beyond just that. upAdhi = upa (samIpe) + AdhIyate svadharma: yena. That which causes the attributes that belong to itself to be perceived as belonging to a proximate object is upAdhi.

Brahman is the upAdhi with respect to the world, because the sat that is brahman appears as the sattA of the world. Therefore by the usage of upAdhi in the mithyAtva definition, vivaraNAchArya has indicated that asat cannot have sat pratIti.

एतदेव सदर्थकेनोपाधिपदेन सूचितम् | This has been indicated by the word upAdhi. The argument that this definition of asat is only the siddhikAra's and the faults pointed lie in pUrvAchArya's definition is refuted.

Though the world is asat, it happens to be the object of bhrama, wrong cognition - this is the shUnyavAdin's position. He does not recognise that asat vastu cannot be perceived, and therefore says that which is asat is also mithyA. What is the difference between the shUnyavAdin and the advaitin? It is the word upAdhi, which indicates a real substratum. We hold that illusion requires a real substratum, whereas the shUnyavAdin does not require a real substratum for an illusion. 

शून्यवादिभि: सदधिष्ठानभ्रमानङ्गीकारेण the shUnyavAdins do not acknowledge that an illusion must have a real substratum

कवचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वरूपासद्वैलक्षणस्य (क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यर्हत्वरूपस्य) शुक्तिरूप्ये प्रपञ्चे चानङ्गीकारात्  | therefore they do not acknowledge a difference between asat which is incapable of appearing as existing in any upAdhi, and the shell-silver / the world, which are capable of appearing as existing in some upAdhi. 

Originally posted on 25th October, 2017.
(To be continued)