paricCheda 1 - anukUla tarka nirUpaNam (part 4)
Continued from here.
अतएव - यादृशं विषयत्वं ते वृत्तिं प्रति चिदात्मन: | तादृशं विषयत्वं मे दृश्यस्यापि दृशं प्रतीति - निरस्तम्;
It for this reason that the following statement stands refuted - "Whatever is the nature of objectification present for the Self with respect to the impartite cognition, the same objectification I confer upon the seen objects in relation to the seer".
The self does not become an object of the cognition even there, it is the witness of the cognition. Thus even there it is the cognition alone that is superimposed, not the seer.
चिदात्मनोऽनाध्यासेऽपि वृत्तेस्तत्राध्यस्तत्वेन तद्दृष्टान्तेन प्रकृतेऽप्यनध्यासस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् |
It cannot be said that as the self is not superimposed, the current context is not a case of superimposition, because even if the self is not superimposed, the cognition of the self is superimposed.
The nyAyAmRtakAra's argument is presented next:
स्यादेतत् - मिथ्यात्वंनिर्ब्रुवता तत्साधनं दृश्यत्वादिकं निर्वक्त्तव्यमेव, नहि घटाद्यसङ्कीर्णाकारज्ञानं विना तद्विलक्षणव्यवहार: ;
The one seeking to establish mithyAtva must certainly define the means to establish it, such as cognisability, etc. Without a cognition clearly outlining the pot shape, one cannot distinguish it from other objects.
अथ अनिरुक्तासङ्कीर्णाकारज्ञानमात्रेण तदुपपत्ति:, तर्हि तुल्यं ममापि |
If one argues that even when one is not able to articulate what distinguishes one object from the other, it is possible to know that they are different, then the same holds true in my case too.
One is able to differentiate a pot from a cloth, but one may struggle to explain the difference. But if that is the case for the advaitin, that is the same as for the dvaitin in this situation - even without being to articulate the nature of the relationship between the seer and seen, the objectification of the seen is possible.
इयांस्तु विशेष:, यत्तव स आकार: सद्विलक्षण:, मम तु त्वन्मतिसिद्धप्रातिभासिकवैलक्षण्यसाधकमानसिद्धसत्ताक:,
This much is the difference though - the AkAra of the cognition, by which a thing becomes the object of the cognition, is for you different from sat, whereas for me it is the same means to prove that it is a sat that happens to be different from what you consider to be prAtibhAsika.
न हि लक्षणोक्त्यनुक्तिभ्यां सदसद्वैलक्षण्यरूपानिर्वचनीयत्वहानिलाभौ ;
The failure to define something does not mean it is inexplicable as real or unreal.
ब्रह्मण्यपि श्रौतस्यापि जगत्कारणत्वादिलक्षणस्य कारणत्वखण्डनरीत्या असंभवात्,
In the khaNDanakhaNDakhAdya, SriharSha argues that causation itself is impossible, therefore defining Brahman as the cause of the world etc as done in the shruti would also be impossible. However that does not make Brahman unreal.
त्वयैव - 'कीदृक्तत्प्रत्यगिति चेत्तादृगीदृगिति द्वयम् | यत्र न प्रसरत्येतत्प्रत्यगित्यवधारये'तिब्रह्मणोऽपि दुर्निरूपत्वोक्तेश्च,
On the basis of what you too have said - "What is that inner self? To such a question, know that It is that which cannot be defined as either "this" or "that" - Brahman is also inexpressible.
प्रपञ्चेऽपि त्वदुक्तानिर्वाच्यत्वसमकक्षलक्षणसंभवाच्च,
Thus the definition of inexpressibility that you say is present in Brahman can be said to be in the world too.
'यत्कटिनं सा पृथिवी'तयादिश्रुत्या पृथिव्यादीनामपि लक्षणत्वोक्तेश्च |
Whereas, the world too can be defined on the basis of what was stated in the shruti "The earth is that which is firm".
तस्मादनिर्वाच्यत्वं न सत्त्वविरोधि | Therefore inexpressibly does not overrule reality.
सत्त्वेऽप्यद्बुधत्वातनिर्वचनीयत्वोपपत्ते: | For even when real, if something is wonderful, it may not be expressible.
नच निर्वाच्यत्वमपि सत्त्वप्रयोजकम् ; नहि शुक्तिरूप्यस्यापीतरभेदसाधकं रूप्यत्वं प्रातीतिकजातिरूपतया सुवचमपि सत्यम् ।
Nor is expressibility the proof of reality. One can define the shell-silver in contrast to the real silver by saying that it belongs to the class of apparent things, but that does not make it real.
किंच ब्रह्मण आनन्दत्वज्ञानत्वसत्यत्वस्वप्रकाशत्वादि खण्डनोक्तरीत्या दुर्वचमिति ब्रह्म तत्त्वतोऽनानन्दाद्यात्मकं स्यात् |
Moreover, as was said in the khaNDana Brahman's bliss, consciousness, reality, self revealing nature cannot be defined, and that would end up making Brahman's nature to not truly be bliss, etc.
तस्मादिक्षुक्षीरादिमाधुर्यवदनिर्वाच्यमपि विषयत्वं सदेवेति,
Therefore, like the difference between the sweetness of sugarcane and milk which cannot be articulated, objectification despite being inexpressible, is real.
By inexpressibility, what is meant is the inexpressibility as real or unreal, not inexpressibility in general. The siddhikAra responds
अत्रोच्यते - दृश्यत्वादेरनिर्वाच्यत्वं किं सत्त्वेन, उत स्वरूपेण |
Here it is being said - Does the inexpressibility of cognisability etc refer to its reality, or does it mean that its nature cannot be expressed? That is, are you saying that cognisability's reality cannot be expressed, or can its nature not be expressed?
नाद्य:, सत्त्वेनानिर्वाचनीयत्वेऽपि तत्तदाभासलक्षणानालिङ्गितत्वमात्रेण हेतुत्वोपपत्ते: तन्निर्वचनानपेक्षणात् |
Its not the first, because even if its reality cannot be defined, as long as the reason is free from all possible defects, it can prove an outcome, and there is no reason to define the reality of the reason.
न द्वितीय:, तात्त्विकातात्त्विकसाधरणेन दृक्संबन्धत्वादिना रूपेण दृग्विषयत्वस्य निर्वक्तुम्शक्यत्वात् |
It is not the second either, because being an object of consciousness, whether real or unreal, is capable of being defined as having a relationship with consciousness.
लक्षणोक्त्यनुक्त्योर्न सदसद्वैलक्षण्यरूपानिर्वाच्यत्वहानिलाभकरत्वमिति यदवोच:, तदपि न ;
The statement that the ability or inability to define the relationship is harmful / supportive of its inexpressibility of the nature being different from the real and unreal, is also not true.
पूर्वोक्तव्यापकानुलब्धिसहिताया लक्षणानिरुक्ते: उक्तरूपानिर्वचनीयत्वप्रयोजकत्वात् |
Because that which proves the inexpressibility of the stated nature is the inability to define the relationship when the two entities being related are not present in the same time and space.
यत्त्वानन्दत्वादिना धर्मेण कीदृगित्यादिना स्वरूपेण च दुर्निरूपत्वात् ब्रह्मणोऽप्यनिर्वचनीयत्वप्रसङ्ग इति तन्न;
It is not true that as the nature of its attribute bliss, and the nature of Brahman of being a particular type could not be explained, Brahman too would end up being unreal.
आनन्दत्वादिधर्मवत्तया दीर्निरूपत्वेऽपि दु:खप्रत्यनीकत्वाद्युपलक्षितस्वरूपस्य सत्त्वेन निर्वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् |
Even though the nature of bliss as an attribute of Brahman cannot be stated, but as it can be stated as that entity which is indicated by the absence of sorrow. That characteristic is only a temporary indicator, it is not an intrinsic attribute of Brahman.
नचैवं प्रपञ्चे सत्वं शक्यनिर्वचनम् बाधकसद्भावात् |
Nor can it be argued that the world's reality can be stated in the same way, because there are contradicting reasons for it (there is sorrow in the world).
अतएव - कटिनस्पर्शत्त्वादिना पृथिवीत्वादीनां निर्वचनमस्त्येव, सत्त्वेऽप्यद्भुतत्वादिना अनिर्वाच्यत्वोपपत्तिरिति - निरस्तम् ;
Hence the following statement is refuted - "The earth etc can certainly be defined as that which is firm to touch. Despite this, it is possible to say it is inexpressible, because it happens to be wonderful."
नहि निरुक्तविरहमात्रेणानिर्वाच्यत्वं ब्रूम:, किंतु सत्त्वादिना निरुक्तिविरहेण |
We don't merely say that something is inexpressible because one it is not possible to define it - rather, we say that it say it is inexpressible as being real or unreal.
स च प्रपञ्चे बाधकादस्त्येव |
As the world is sublated, such an inexpressibility does exist for the world.
नच - ज्ञाने विषयस्यध्यस्तत्वे तदज्ञानजन्यं तज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्यं चाध्यासं प्रति विषयत्वं तदनुविद्धतया प्रतीत्यभावश्च न सम्भवतीति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "If objects are superimposed on cognitions, then the ignorance of cognitions will be the cause for the objects and the knowledge of cognitions will sublate them, but then the substratum of superimpositions would need to appear along with the superimposed object too. However, no one sees the cognition along with the object".
चैतन्यमात्राज्ञानजन्यत्वात् |
Because it is the ignorance of consciousness alone that leads to the superimposition of the world.
तज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वाच्च घटादिप्रपञ्चस्येत्युक्तत्वात् |
It has already been said that the cognition of that consciousness leads to the sublation of the world, pots etc.
सदिति प्रतीयमानाधिष्ठानचैतन्यानुविद्धतया प्रतीयमानत्वमप्यस्तेव |
However, the appearance of the substratum consciousness along with the world does occur, because the world appears as existing. The existence that appears in the cognition of the world is the substratum consciousness.
तस्मात्सत्यत्वे दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धत्वानुपपत्तिर्दृढैव ||
Therefore, the untenability of a real relationship between consciousness and its objects is certain.
इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वानुकूलतर्कनिरूपणम् ||
अतएव - यादृशं विषयत्वं ते वृत्तिं प्रति चिदात्मन: | तादृशं विषयत्वं मे दृश्यस्यापि दृशं प्रतीति - निरस्तम्;
It for this reason that the following statement stands refuted - "Whatever is the nature of objectification present for the Self with respect to the impartite cognition, the same objectification I confer upon the seen objects in relation to the seer".
The self does not become an object of the cognition even there, it is the witness of the cognition. Thus even there it is the cognition alone that is superimposed, not the seer.
चिदात्मनोऽनाध्यासेऽपि वृत्तेस्तत्राध्यस्तत्वेन तद्दृष्टान्तेन प्रकृतेऽप्यनध्यासस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् |
It cannot be said that as the self is not superimposed, the current context is not a case of superimposition, because even if the self is not superimposed, the cognition of the self is superimposed.
The nyAyAmRtakAra's argument is presented next:
स्यादेतत् - मिथ्यात्वंनिर्ब्रुवता तत्साधनं दृश्यत्वादिकं निर्वक्त्तव्यमेव, नहि घटाद्यसङ्कीर्णाकारज्ञानं विना तद्विलक्षणव्यवहार: ;
The one seeking to establish mithyAtva must certainly define the means to establish it, such as cognisability, etc. Without a cognition clearly outlining the pot shape, one cannot distinguish it from other objects.
अथ अनिरुक्तासङ्कीर्णाकारज्ञानमात्रेण तदुपपत्ति:, तर्हि तुल्यं ममापि |
If one argues that even when one is not able to articulate what distinguishes one object from the other, it is possible to know that they are different, then the same holds true in my case too.
One is able to differentiate a pot from a cloth, but one may struggle to explain the difference. But if that is the case for the advaitin, that is the same as for the dvaitin in this situation - even without being to articulate the nature of the relationship between the seer and seen, the objectification of the seen is possible.
इयांस्तु विशेष:, यत्तव स आकार: सद्विलक्षण:, मम तु त्वन्मतिसिद्धप्रातिभासिकवैलक्षण्यसाधकमानसिद्धसत्ताक:,
This much is the difference though - the AkAra of the cognition, by which a thing becomes the object of the cognition, is for you different from sat, whereas for me it is the same means to prove that it is a sat that happens to be different from what you consider to be prAtibhAsika.
न हि लक्षणोक्त्यनुक्तिभ्यां सदसद्वैलक्षण्यरूपानिर्वचनीयत्वहानिलाभौ ;
The failure to define something does not mean it is inexplicable as real or unreal.
ब्रह्मण्यपि श्रौतस्यापि जगत्कारणत्वादिलक्षणस्य कारणत्वखण्डनरीत्या असंभवात्,
In the khaNDanakhaNDakhAdya, SriharSha argues that causation itself is impossible, therefore defining Brahman as the cause of the world etc as done in the shruti would also be impossible. However that does not make Brahman unreal.
त्वयैव - 'कीदृक्तत्प्रत्यगिति चेत्तादृगीदृगिति द्वयम् | यत्र न प्रसरत्येतत्प्रत्यगित्यवधारये'तिब्रह्मणोऽपि दुर्निरूपत्वोक्तेश्च,
On the basis of what you too have said - "What is that inner self? To such a question, know that It is that which cannot be defined as either "this" or "that" - Brahman is also inexpressible.
प्रपञ्चेऽपि त्वदुक्तानिर्वाच्यत्वसमकक्षलक्षणसंभवाच्च,
Thus the definition of inexpressibility that you say is present in Brahman can be said to be in the world too.
'यत्कटिनं सा पृथिवी'तयादिश्रुत्या पृथिव्यादीनामपि लक्षणत्वोक्तेश्च |
Whereas, the world too can be defined on the basis of what was stated in the shruti "The earth is that which is firm".
तस्मादनिर्वाच्यत्वं न सत्त्वविरोधि | Therefore inexpressibly does not overrule reality.
सत्त्वेऽप्यद्बुधत्वातनिर्वचनीयत्वोपपत्ते: | For even when real, if something is wonderful, it may not be expressible.
नच निर्वाच्यत्वमपि सत्त्वप्रयोजकम् ; नहि शुक्तिरूप्यस्यापीतरभेदसाधकं रूप्यत्वं प्रातीतिकजातिरूपतया सुवचमपि सत्यम् ।
Nor is expressibility the proof of reality. One can define the shell-silver in contrast to the real silver by saying that it belongs to the class of apparent things, but that does not make it real.
किंच ब्रह्मण आनन्दत्वज्ञानत्वसत्यत्वस्वप्रकाशत्वादि खण्डनोक्तरीत्या दुर्वचमिति ब्रह्म तत्त्वतोऽनानन्दाद्यात्मकं स्यात् |
Moreover, as was said in the khaNDana Brahman's bliss, consciousness, reality, self revealing nature cannot be defined, and that would end up making Brahman's nature to not truly be bliss, etc.
तस्मादिक्षुक्षीरादिमाधुर्यवदनिर्वाच्यमपि विषयत्वं सदेवेति,
Therefore, like the difference between the sweetness of sugarcane and milk which cannot be articulated, objectification despite being inexpressible, is real.
By inexpressibility, what is meant is the inexpressibility as real or unreal, not inexpressibility in general. The siddhikAra responds
अत्रोच्यते - दृश्यत्वादेरनिर्वाच्यत्वं किं सत्त्वेन, उत स्वरूपेण |
Here it is being said - Does the inexpressibility of cognisability etc refer to its reality, or does it mean that its nature cannot be expressed? That is, are you saying that cognisability's reality cannot be expressed, or can its nature not be expressed?
नाद्य:, सत्त्वेनानिर्वाचनीयत्वेऽपि तत्तदाभासलक्षणानालिङ्गितत्वमात्रेण हेतुत्वोपपत्ते: तन्निर्वचनानपेक्षणात् |
Its not the first, because even if its reality cannot be defined, as long as the reason is free from all possible defects, it can prove an outcome, and there is no reason to define the reality of the reason.
न द्वितीय:, तात्त्विकातात्त्विकसाधरणेन दृक्संबन्धत्वादिना रूपेण दृग्विषयत्वस्य निर्वक्तुम्शक्यत्वात् |
It is not the second either, because being an object of consciousness, whether real or unreal, is capable of being defined as having a relationship with consciousness.
लक्षणोक्त्यनुक्त्योर्न सदसद्वैलक्षण्यरूपानिर्वाच्यत्वहानिलाभकरत्वमिति यदवोच:, तदपि न ;
The statement that the ability or inability to define the relationship is harmful / supportive of its inexpressibility of the nature being different from the real and unreal, is also not true.
पूर्वोक्तव्यापकानुलब्धिसहिताया लक्षणानिरुक्ते: उक्तरूपानिर्वचनीयत्वप्रयोजकत्वात् |
Because that which proves the inexpressibility of the stated nature is the inability to define the relationship when the two entities being related are not present in the same time and space.
यत्त्वानन्दत्वादिना धर्मेण कीदृगित्यादिना स्वरूपेण च दुर्निरूपत्वात् ब्रह्मणोऽप्यनिर्वचनीयत्वप्रसङ्ग इति तन्न;
It is not true that as the nature of its attribute bliss, and the nature of Brahman of being a particular type could not be explained, Brahman too would end up being unreal.
आनन्दत्वादिधर्मवत्तया दीर्निरूपत्वेऽपि दु:खप्रत्यनीकत्वाद्युपलक्षितस्वरूपस्य सत्त्वेन निर्वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् |
Even though the nature of bliss as an attribute of Brahman cannot be stated, but as it can be stated as that entity which is indicated by the absence of sorrow. That characteristic is only a temporary indicator, it is not an intrinsic attribute of Brahman.
नचैवं प्रपञ्चे सत्वं शक्यनिर्वचनम् बाधकसद्भावात् |
Nor can it be argued that the world's reality can be stated in the same way, because there are contradicting reasons for it (there is sorrow in the world).
अतएव - कटिनस्पर्शत्त्वादिना पृथिवीत्वादीनां निर्वचनमस्त्येव, सत्त्वेऽप्यद्भुतत्वादिना अनिर्वाच्यत्वोपपत्तिरिति - निरस्तम् ;
Hence the following statement is refuted - "The earth etc can certainly be defined as that which is firm to touch. Despite this, it is possible to say it is inexpressible, because it happens to be wonderful."
नहि निरुक्तविरहमात्रेणानिर्वाच्यत्वं ब्रूम:, किंतु सत्त्वादिना निरुक्तिविरहेण |
We don't merely say that something is inexpressible because one it is not possible to define it - rather, we say that it say it is inexpressible as being real or unreal.
स च प्रपञ्चे बाधकादस्त्येव |
As the world is sublated, such an inexpressibility does exist for the world.
नच - ज्ञाने विषयस्यध्यस्तत्वे तदज्ञानजन्यं तज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्यं चाध्यासं प्रति विषयत्वं तदनुविद्धतया प्रतीत्यभावश्च न सम्भवतीति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "If objects are superimposed on cognitions, then the ignorance of cognitions will be the cause for the objects and the knowledge of cognitions will sublate them, but then the substratum of superimpositions would need to appear along with the superimposed object too. However, no one sees the cognition along with the object".
चैतन्यमात्राज्ञानजन्यत्वात् |
Because it is the ignorance of consciousness alone that leads to the superimposition of the world.
तज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वाच्च घटादिप्रपञ्चस्येत्युक्तत्वात् |
It has already been said that the cognition of that consciousness leads to the sublation of the world, pots etc.
सदिति प्रतीयमानाधिष्ठानचैतन्यानुविद्धतया प्रतीयमानत्वमप्यस्तेव |
However, the appearance of the substratum consciousness along with the world does occur, because the world appears as existing. The existence that appears in the cognition of the world is the substratum consciousness.
तस्मात्सत्यत्वे दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धत्वानुपपत्तिर्दृढैव ||
Therefore, the untenability of a real relationship between consciousness and its objects is certain.
इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वानुकूलतर्कनिरूपणम् ||