paricCheda 1 - anukUlatarka nirUpaNam (part 3)
Continued from here.
वृत्तिगतोत्पत्ति विनाशजडत्वादिभिस्तदम्स्पर्शात् | That consciousness is untouched by the properties of cognitions such as birth, death, inertness etc.
तदेव च नानाविधोपाधिसंबन्धान्नानाविध्व्यवहारभाक् भवति नभ इव घटमणिमल्लिकाद्युपाधिभेदेन; तच्चाज्ञानसाधकत्वात्स्वरूपतो नाज्ञाननिवर्तकं, वृत्त्युपरक्तं त्वज्ञाननिवर्तकमिति न वृत्तेरनुपयोग: |
It is That alone, when associated with different types of adjuncts, appears to take on different functions, like space in different enclosures such jars, pots, earthen-ware, etc. As it is That (consciousness) which reveals ignorance, It cannot by itself destroy ignorance. However when That (consciousness) is associated with cognition it can can remove ignorance, thus cognitions too serve a purpose.
तथाच सर्वाज्ञानसाधके साक्षिचैतन्ये तस्मिन् घटादेरध्यास इति काऽनुपपत्ति:? Therefore, what is inappropriate about saying that pots etc are superimposed on the witness consciousness which reveals every kind of ignorance?
तदुक्तं सुरेश्वराचार्यै: - 'सर्वतीर्थदृशां सिद्धि: स्वाभिप्रेतस्य वस्तुन: | यदभ्युपगमादेव तत्सिद्धिर्वार्यते कुत: ||' इति |
Thus, sureshvarAchArya (said in his vArttika) - The basis (witness consciousness), upon which, all proponents of various philosophical systems establish their positions, how can that be denied by anyone?
Unless one has certainty that "I know X", X will be doubtful. This is not possible unless the witness consciousness reveals that "I know that I know X". Only if the witness consciousness is accepted, can anything be proven.
He has also said that to say the eyes etc. are pramANam, sAkshi has to be accepted.
'सर्वतीर्थदृशां तावत्सामान्यं मानलक्षणम् | अज्ञातार्थावगमनं त्वदुक्ते तन्न युज्यते ||'
Every philosophical system accepts a common definition of proof, that is, they reveal something that is not otherwise known. However, without accepting a witness-consciousness, that definition would be not be possible.
There are two possibilities:
'स्वत: सिद्धोऽथवासिद्धो देहादिस्ते भवन् भवेत् | प्रमाणानां प्रमाणत्वं नोभयत्रापि लभ्यते ||'
Are the objects of cognition, such as the body etc, self-evident or not self-evident according to you? In either case, the validity of valid cognitions is not possible.
'प्रमाणान्यन्तरेणापि देहादिश्चेत् प्रसिध्यति | वद प्रमाणै: कोन्वर्थो न हि सिद्धस्य साधनम् ||'
If the body etc (objects) are self-evident, pray tell what is the use of means of knowledge that reveal the known?
'स्वतोऽसिद्धे प्रमेये तु नासतो व्यञ्जिका प्रमा | नाभिव्यनक्ति सविता शशशृङ्गं स्फुरन्नपि |'
If the known are not self-evident, then cognitions would end up revealing non-existent entities. The sun, despite being of the nature of illumination, cannot illuminate a hare's horn.
The nyAyAmRtakAra says that there is a contradiction between this view and the view of the panchadashI. In the panchadashI, vidyAraNya svAminah had said that there are two types of cognitions - "This is a pot" and "The pot is known" - the former cognition has the pot as its object, in the latter, both pot and pot-cognition are the object.
इति नच - 'घटोऽयमित्यसौ उक्तिराभासस्य प्रसादत: | विज्ञातो घट इत्युक्तिर्ब्रह्मानुभवतो भवेत् ||' इति वदता वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितस्य घटानधिष्ठानचैतन्यस्य घटानुभवत्वोक्ति विरोध इति - वाच्यम् |
Nor can it be argued that - "(The verse from the panchadashI) 'The consciousness reflected in the thought reveals the pot as "this is a pot". The cognition "the pot is known" is revealed by the witness consciousness.' is contradicted by the statement that illumination of the pot is not the consciousness delimited by the cognition, which is not the substratum of the pot.
If it is said that the substratum of the pot reveals the pot, it contradicts vidyAraNya svAminah's comment that it is the consciousness reflected in the thought that reveals the pot.
The siddhikAra says: No.
वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यस्य घटाधिष्ठानचैतन्येन सह भेदाभावात्, चैतन्यस्यैकत्वात् | There is no difference between the consciousness reflected in cognition and pot-substratum consciousness, as the consciousness is one.
Even if the upAdhi-s (delimiters / adjuncts) are two, as they are in the same place, the upahita (the delimited) will not be different.
यथाचैकस्यैव चैतन्यस्य सर्वभासकत्वं तथा विस्तरेणोपपादितं 'नाभाव उपलब्धेरित्यस्मिन्नधिकरणे' भाष्यकृद्भि: |
The manner in which it is possible for the one consciousness to illuminate all has been elaborately proven by the bhAshyakAra in the chapter titled "It is not absence, because it is perceived".
When refuting the Buddhist, in the nAbhAva upalabdhe: adhikaraNa (it is not absence, for it is perceived), the bhAShyakAra has explained in detail how the one consciousness reveals everything. The Buddhist holds that cognition is self-evident. The bhAShyakAra argues that cognition is not self-evident in the sense that it reveals itself, because in the absence of things to reveal, the thought itself is not revealed. It needs a consciousness to reveal the presence of cognition. That consciousness is self-evident, in the sense that it does not need anything else to reveal it. It is the revealer of everything.
The nyAyAmRtakAra makes another argument.
ननु - दृश्यत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या मिथ्यात्वमित्यर्थापत्तिर्विवक्षिता, किं वा सत्यत्वे दृश्यत्वं न स्यादित्यनुकूलतर्कमात्रम् |
What is intended here? The arthApatti that as there is no way to explain the perceptibility of objects (Akshepaka), they must be mithyA (Akshepya)? Or, alternatively is it merely a supporting logic for the inference of the world's unreality that if the world was real, it would not be cognised?
नाद्य:, तत्सामग्र्यभावात् | It cannot be the first, as the causes of arthApatti are not present.
तथाहि - आक्षेप्यस्योपपादकत्वं ; प्रमाणाविरुद्धत्वं, आक्षेपकस्यानुपपद्यमानत्वं, प्रमितत्वंचेत्यर्थापत्तिसामग्री |
The causes of arthApatti are
1) The Akshepya (the thing proven) must result in the Akshepaka (the reason).
2) The Akshepya must not be contradicted by some other valid means of knowledge.
3) The Akshepaka must not be otherwise possible (without the presence of the Akshepya).
4) There needs to be certainty that the Akshepaka is present.
In the arthApatti, "fat Devadatta does not eat during the day, hence he must be eating at night". The Akshepaka is Devadatta being "fat". The Akshepya is "he must be eating at night".
1) Him eating at night results in him being fat.
2) His eating at night is not contradicted by other means of knowledge.
3) Him being fat is not otherwise possible without him eating at night (as it is known that he does not eat during the day).
4) That he is fat is a matter of perception.
The opponent continues:
प्रकृते चाक्षेप्यसंबन्धिनो मिथ्यात्वं नाक्षेपकस्य संबन्धस्योपपादकत्वम्, प्रत्युत प्रतिकूलमेव |
In our context, the Akshepya, the mithyAtva of the seen world, does not result in the Akshepaka, the connection between consciousness and the world. Rather if there was no connection between consciousness and the world, it would not be seen. It contradicts, not implies.
नचाध्यस्तत्वरूपसंबन्धस्य न तत्प्रतिकूलम्; Nor can it be argued that an unreal connection (between consciousness and the world) does not overrule (the world's cognisability).
तस्याद्याप्यसिद्धेरनाक्षेपकत्वात् | Because, as that too (the untenability of the connection between consciousness and the world) has not been proven, it cannot be the proof (of the world's unreality).
That is, the nature of the connection between consciousness and the world has not been proven beyond doubt, hence it cannot be used to prove the unreality of the world. Hence the first criterion for the arthApatti of the unreality of the world due to the cognisability of the world, has failed.
प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धं चेदमाक्षेप्यम् | Moreover, this Akshepya (world's unreality) itself is contradicted by perception.
There is a rule termed bhUyonugraha nyAya, which is a corollary of the utilitarian principle, which postulates that if there are two contradictory ideas - one whose validity benefits many things, another whose validity only serves a single purpose, and only one of the two can be valid - it is better to sacrifice the validiyt of the one which benefits the fewer, in order to preserve the one that supports many.
नाप्येकस्य दृश्यत्वस्योपपत्तये प्रमितानेकस्य त्यागो युक्त: | (Invoking the bhUyonugraha nyAya), In order to preserve a single cognisability, it is inappropriate to sacrifice (the validity of) many cognitions accepted as valid.
आक्षेपकं च न दृगध्यस्तत्वं ; तस्यैव फलत आक्षेप्यत्वात् | The proof (Akshepaka) cannot be "being superimposed on the seer", because that is the very thing to be proved (how can you use the superimposition of the world to be the proof for the unreality of the world, which is nothing but superimposition in other words?).
नापि दृग्विषयत्वरूपो दृग्संबन्ध:, तवासिद्धे: | Nor can it be "a connection with consciousness of the nature of being the object of consciousness", because for you, consciousness has no objects at all.
दृगधीनसिद्धिकत्वम्; दृग्विषयत्वातिरिक्तस्य तस्यासिद्धे: | Nor can it be "its relevation being dependent upon consciousness", because it is not something other than being the object of the seer (which has already been denied).
Thus far, the first option, i.e, the arthApatti of mithyAtva based on dRshyatva, was denied. Next he is going to refute the second option, i.e, the absence of a connection between consciousness and objects is an anukUla tarka, a supportive reasoning, for the inference of the world's mithyAtva.
नान्त्य:, सत्त्वेऽप्युक्तरीत्या सम्बन्धान्तरेणैव दृश्यत्वस्योपपन्नतया अनुपपत्तेरभावादिति It is not the latter (either). Even if the world was real, as its cognisability is possible even if there is a different, real connection (between consciousness and the seen world), cognisability is possibile, and therefore the implausibility of a connection between the seer and seen, is absent.
To this argument, the siddhikAra says:
- चेन्न ; अनुकूलतर्कस्यैव प्रक्रान्तत्वेनार्थापत्तिर्वेत्यादिविकल्पानवकाशात्, उभयथाप्यदोषाच्च | No. When this has been brought up in the context of supportive reasoning, there is no scope to raise the possibility of whether it has been done for the purpose of arthApatti (to prove the world's unreality). Even so, there are no defects in either alternative (whether proving mithyAtva using arthApatti, or using the untenability of a connection between consciousness and objects as a supportive reasoning).
The four criteria outlined by the nyAyAmRtakAra are not restricted to arthApatti alone, they are relevant for inferences too. However, the unique criterion specific to arthApatti is vyatireka vyApti - the negative concomitance - if Devadatta did not eat at night, he wouldn't be well-nourished.
The naiyyAyikas who accept vyatireka vyApti, don't postulate a separate pramANa called arthApatti. The advaitins do not admit to vyatireka vyApti as a cause for anumAna. The reason is because it is acceptable for the presence of hetu to be used to imply the presence of sAdhya. However to use the absence of the sAdhya to imply the absence of the hetu, as a basis for the existence of the sAdhya is a step too far.
तथाहि - सत्यत्वे दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धानुपपत्ति: | If the world is real, there would have to be a real connection between the seen and seer, but that is not possible.
मिथ्यात्वं च तदुपपादकम्, न तत्संबन्धप्रतिकूलम्; If the world is mithyA, then a superimposed relationship between consciousness and objects is possible. That would not be contradictory to such a relationship.
When the shell-silver is mithyA and the shell is real, and there is the possibility of an unreal relationship between the two. A real silver and real shell have no real connection. So why is it argued that the world being mithyA is contradictory to a superimposed relationship between the world and Brahman? While a real connection between two objects requires both to be real, an unreal connection does not necessarily require both entities to be real.
मिथ्यत्वेऽपि शुक्तिरुपस्येदमंशोऽध्यस्तत्वरूपसंबन्धदर्शनेन संबन्धसामान्ये प्रतिकूलत्वाभावात् | Even if the world was mithyA, as the shell silver is seen to have a superimposed relationship with the consciousness delimited by "this", one cannot say in general that all relationships are contradicted.
Looking at it from the perspective of the arthApatti, the advaitin's Akshepaka is cognisability, ie being the object of consciousness, and using that, superimposition is being proven. Thus the charge that the advaitin is using mithyAtva to prove mithyAtva does not stand.
आक्षेपकोऽपि दृग्विषयत्वरूपो दृक्संबन्ध एव अध्यासरूपस्य दृग्विषयत्वस्य ममाऽपि संप्रतिपत्ते:, It is acceptable to me also to use the Akshepaka of a being an object of consciousness, of the nature of being connected with consciousness, to prove that the connection is unreal.
तात्त्विकस्यैव तस्य निषेधात् | The reality of that is what is being negated.
The nyAyAmRtakAra had argued that the Akshepaka needs to be proven and a superimposed objectification by consciousness is not proven. However, the Akshepaka is being an object of consciousess, and that is already known. It so happens to be unreal.
न चाध्यस्तत्वस्याद्याप्यसिद्धि:; It cannot be said that a superimposed relationship is unproven.
This is a kind of inference called parisheSha anumAna. Once all other explanations for an observed phenomenon have been invalidated, whatever remains must be true. There would be no explanation for the observed phenomenon, if we do not accept the last remaining explanation.
We observe the world, thus that the world is the object of consciousness is proven. Now, when we try to examine the nature of the connection between consciousness and the world, we have invalidated any possibility of a real relationship. Therefore, what remains - that the relationship between consciousness and the world is an unreal one - must be true.
दृक्संबन्धसामान्यस्याक्षेपकस्य प्रसक्तविशेषनिषेधेऽप्यधस्तत्वरूपविशेषपर्यवसानेनासिद्ध्यभावात् | For the Akshepaka of a general connection with consciousness, as every specific qualifier (explanation) has been negated, the only qualifier that remains is being a superimposed connection, and therefore it cannot be held that an unreal relationship remains unproven.
न हि अध्यस्तसंबन्धत्वेनाक्षेपकता, किं तु संबन्धत्वेन | The arthApatti is not done on the basis of the Akshepaka being an unreal connection, rather, it is done merely on the basis of it being a connection.
सा चाध्यस्तत्वसंबन्धसंभावनयाप्यबाधित एवेति | Now, if the connection happens to be unreal, that in itself does not invalidate the arthApatti.
नच - घटस्य ज्ञानमिति धीसिद्धसंबन्धसामान्यस्याध्यस्तत्वं न विशेष:, न हि रूप्यस्य शुक्तिरिति प्रतीतिरस्तीति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be alleged that the qualifier of the connection cannot be "being unreal", because the usage "The pot's cognition" indicates merely a connection (unqualified), (whereas in the case of unreal connections), there is no usage like "the silver's shell".
The opponent argues that where there is a superimposition such as a shell-silver, the real shell appears as the unreal silver, and not as the silver's shell, whereas in the case of a pot (which is real, according to the opponent) and cognitions (real), the cognition appears as "pot's cognition".
रूप्यस्य शुक्तिरिति प्रतीत्यभावेऽपि रूप्यस्य शुक्तिरधिष्ठानमिति प्रतीत्या अध्यस्तत्वस्य संबन्धविशेषत्वसिद्धे:, Even though no one says 'silver's shell', as it is possible for the cognition 'silver's substratum is the shell' to occur, that is sufficient to qualify their relationship
चैत्रस्य मित्र इति प्रतीत्यभावेऽपि चैत्रस्य पिता मित्र इति प्रतीतिवत् , For example, even though no one says 'Chaitra's Mitra', it is possible to say 'Chaitra's father is Mitra'.
If the relationship of son is possible there, why not relationship of superimposition here? The sixth case-ending can be used only with a word that denotes a relationship. The word Chaitra does not denote a relationship, but the word father denotes a relationship, hence the sixth case-ending can be used in that context.
आक्षेप्यमत्र प्रमाणाविरुद्धमेव; The Akshepya (mithyAtva) is not contradictory to any means of knowledge.
अध्यक्षादिविरोधस्य प्रागेव परिहृतत्वात् | And any contradiction by perception etc has already been refuted.
आक्षेपके च प्रमितत्वमनपेक्षितमेव अप्रमितेनापि प्रतिबिम्बेन बिम्बाक्षेपदर्शनात् | The Akshepaka need not be validated because even an unreal reflection proves the existence of a real original.
तर्कपरतायामपि नाप्रयोजकता; Even if this is taken as reasoning (anukUla tarka), it does no fail. There is an underlying concomitance.
The opponent had asked why should the object be mithyA for it to be seen. Why cannot the object be real and it be seen? To answer this, the siddhikAra says:
सत्यत्वे संबन्धानुपपत्तेर्भवदुक्तन्यायखण्डनेन प्रथमत एवोपपादितत्वात् | Your reason has been refuted in the beginning by saying that if the world is real, there can be no relationship with consciousness.
The opponent had asked - you should first prove that if the object is real, it will not be cognisable. Only then can it be argued that as the world has cognisability, it cannot be real. Why does reality prove the absence of cognisability?
The siddhikAra says:
दृश्यत्वाभावस्यापादकमत्र सत्त्वमनिर्वाच्यत्वाभावो वा त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वं वा उभयथाऽपि न दोष: | The nature of reality which would have proven the absence of cognisability in the world, is the absence of anirvAcyatva or the the absence of sublatability in any period of time. There is no defect in either option.
नचानिर्वाच्यत्वाभावस्य तुच्छे परोक्षधीवेद्यतया दृश्येऽपि सत्त्वेन व्यभिचार:, Nor can it be alleged, that as the tucCha which has the absence of anirvAcyatva, is known by an indirect cognition, and therefore, even though real (being not anirvAcya), it is known - and thus there is a vyabhichAra to the rule postulated.
The siddhikAra says no. tucCha is not known, because while words can refer to it, there is no object corresponding to the words that can be the object of thought. Such a vRtti is called a vikalpa vRtti.
कारणसामर्थ्येन तत्र तदाकारवृत्तिसमुल्लासेऽपि दृक्संबन्धरूपस्य दृश्यत्वस्य तुच्छविरोधनस्तत्राभावात्, तुच्छाकारताया वृत्तिगत्वेऽपि वृत्तिसंबन्धस्य तुच्छगतत्वाभावोपपत्ते: | Even though there is the the causal capability to refer to that as that (ie words reveal the tucCha has tucCha), knowability of the nature of being connected with consciousess, which would have invalidated it being tucCha, is absent there. Even though there is a vRtti that revals it to be tucCha, there is no connection between the vRtti and the tucCha.
नापि - यथा सतो ब्रह्मण: स्वव्यवहृत्या संबन्ध:, तथा घटादेरपि सत एव स्वज्ञानेन संबन्धोस्त्विति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued that, just like the real Brahman has a connection with activities involving it, a pot, being real, must have a similar relationship with its cognition.
दृष्टान्ते ब्रह्मण्यध्यासस्यैव व्यवहृतिसंबन्धत्वात् | Because, in the example, any connection of Brahman with activities is only because they are superimposed on it.
तथाच उभयसंबन्धिसत्त्वे विषयविषयिभावानुपपत्ति: नाप्रयोजकत्वादिना परिभूयते | Therefore, the postulate that when "both the elements in a relationship are real, a subject-object relationship between them is not possible" has not been disproven as a result of aprayojakatvam (the inability to prove).
एतेन - आध्यासिक: संबन्धो नाम अध्यस्तसंबन्धो वा, अध्यस्तत्वमेव वा, आद्ये संबन्धस्य मिथ्यात्वेऽपि संबन्धिनो दृश्यस्य दृश इव मिथ्यात्वानुपपत्ति: | द्वितीये ज्ञानस्याप्यध्यस्तत्वेन तत्र अध्यासानुपपत्ति: स्वज्ञानपरंपरायामध्यासस्वीकारे अनवस्था चेति - निरस्तम्,
By this, the following argument has been disproven - "Does a superimposed relationship mean that the relationship is a superimposition, or is it superimposition itself? If the former, even if the relationship is unreal, objects of consciousness can be real, like consciousness. If the latter, as the cognition of a object is also superimposed, the object cannot be superimposed on it. If every cognition is supermiposed on its own cognition, it will lead to infinite regress."
What does a superimposed relationship between the seer and seen mean? Does it mean that the relationship between the seer and seen is superimposed? Or does it mean that seen is superimposed on seer?
If the former, even if the relationship between the seer and seen is superimposed, it does not necessarily imply the superimposed nature of the seen. The seer is not accepted to be superimposed, so why should the seen be superimposed?
If the latter, what is the seer? If it means the cognition, then the seen cannot be superimposed on it, because the cognition itself is superimposed. If it is argued that that is possible, the question becomes what is the cognition superimposed upon. If it is superimposed on another cognition that reveals it, then what is that cognition superimposed upon? This will lead to the postulation of an infinite series of cognitions which are both the substratum of their objects, and are superimposed on the cognitions to which they are the objects.
The siddhikAra says this is wrong.
ज्ञानं हि वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यम्, Because jnAna is actually consciousness delimited by cognition.
तत्रावच्छेदिकाया वृत्तेर्जडाया अध्यस्तत्वेऽप्यवच्छेद्यस्य चैतन्यस्य प्रकाशरूपस्य अनध्यस्तत्वेन तत्र दृश्यस्याध्यासात् दृश्यमिथ्यात्वेऽप्यनवस्थाविरहस्योपपत्ते: |
There, even if the delimiting cognition being inert, is superimposed, the delimited consciousness, being of the nature of illumination is not superimposed, and thus there, if even if the seen is superimposed and therefore it is mithyA, the charge of infinite regress is avoided.
अत एव - शाब्दवृत्तिविषयो ब्रह्म न वृत्तौ कल्पितमविद्याविषयो ब्रह्माविद्यायां न कल्पितं यथा, तथा दृश्यं न दृशि कल्पितम् ; तथाच दृक्दृश्यादेस्तात्त्विक एव संबन्ध:, सामान्यसंबन्धेनैवातिप्रसङ्गे निरस्ते विशेषजिज्ञासा विशेषोक्तिश्च विशेषविशेषजिज्ञासादिवदनर्थिकैवेति - निरस्तम्,
That is why the following is refuted - "Just like (1) Brahman, which is the object of a cognition born from words, is not superimposed on the cognition, and (2) Brahman, the object of ignorance, is not superimposed on ignorance, objects of cognition are not superimposed on the seer. Thus, it follows that the relationship between the seer and seen is real alone. When it is possible to avoid any cognition revealing any object by merely postulating that there is a relationship between the cognition and the object, there is no need to enquire into the nature of the relationship, nor is there a need to define the relationship. Such an endeavour would serve no useful purpose, because every qualifier can have its own qualification and so on and so forth."
The nyAyAmRtakAra is saying that when we say there is a real sambandha between the seer and seen, there are no problems. It may be asked why does this particular cognition reveal this particular object, and not something else (atiprasanga), to which the reply is because this cognition and this object have some connection. There is no purpose served in trying to determine the nature of that relationship. Even if we enquire into it and come up with some specific feature in that cognition, another question can be raised, what makes this cognition have this specific feature that it allows it to cognise this object? This will only lead to a fruitless enquiry with no end.
The siddhikAra says no.
वृत्त्यविद्ययो: ब्रह्मणोऽनध्यासेऽपि तयोरेव ब्रह्मण्यध्यासात् संबन्धोपपत्ते:, अतस्तत्रतात्त्विकसंबन्धाभावात्, कथं तद्दृष्टान्तेन दृग्दृश्ययोरपि तत्त्विकसंबन्ध इत्युच्यते?
Even though Brahman is not superimposed on cognition and ignorance, it is they (cognition and ignorance) that are superimposed on Brahman, and so a connection with them is possible because of that (superimposition). Therefore, as there is no real relationship present, how can those examples prove a real relationship between the seer and the seen?
प्रसिद्धविशेषे बाधिते सामान्यस्यैव बाधकशंकया अतिप्रसङ्गे प्राप्ते विशेषजिज्ञासाया विशेषोक्तेश्च साफल्यात् न ते निरर्थिके |
As all, well-known types of relationship are negated, one starts doubting whether a relationship in general itself exists, and therefore the doubt arises whether any knowledge can reveal any object. Hence, the desire to know the nature of the connection, and the requirement to address it are important, and cannot be said to serve no purpose.
एतेन - संबन्धस्य प्रामाणिकत्वे यथाकथञ्चन लक्षणं भविष्यति | तथाहि - संयोगसमवायान्तर्भावे तल्लक्षणमेव लक्षणं भविष्यति, तदनन्तर्भावे तु तदुभयभिन्नसम्बन्धत्वमेव लक्षणमस्त्विति - निरस्तम् ;
With this, the following has been refuted - if the connection is real, let its definition be anything. If it is one of samyoga or samavAya, then that itself can be its definition. If it is different from them, then let the definition be some other relation other than those two.
उक्तयुक्त्या प्रामाणिक संबन्धस्य संयोगसमवायान्तर्भावस्य च दूषितत्वात् | Because, based on the reason mentioned previously (the two related entities need to be at the same place and time for their relation to be real), a real relationship that is one of samyoga or samavAya has been rejected, as defective.
तदुभयबहिर्भूतसंबन्धत्वं तु वयमपि न निराकुर्म:, किं तु तस्य प्रामाणिकत्वम् | We do not deny that it is a relationship different (from samyoga and samavAya). Rather, we deny its reality.
किंच दृग्दृश्ययो: न तात्त्विकसंबन्ध:, संबन्धिभिन्नत्वे अनवस्थानात् | Moreover, the relationship between the seer and the seen cannot be real, because if it were different from the related entities, it would lead to infinite regress.
How does the relationship relate the two entities if it is different from them? If through another relationship, then that would require another relationship etc leading to infinite regress.
नच दृश्यत्वान्तरहीनस्य दृश्यत्वादेरिव संबन्धस्यापि स्वनिर्वाहकत्वं क्वचित् भविष्यतीति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus "Just like cognisability does not require another cognisability for its functioning, ie to imply that something is cognised, a relationship sometimes does not require another relationship to relate the entities".
If cognisability was not cognised it would not be mithyA, so something should make it cognisable. Is it itself, or something else? If it is something else, that should require something else cognise it, leading to infinite regress too. The opponent says kvacit, sometimes, because in the case of samyoga, it is accepted that a samyoga requires a samavAya for a samyoga relationship to exist between two entities. So sometimes you need something else, sometimes nothing else apart from the relationship itself is needed.
The siddhikAra says no.
दृश्यत्वमपि दृकसंबन्ध एव | (We say that) cognisability functions because it too is a relationship with consciousness.
तस्य च स्वनिर्वाहकत्वं न मायिकत्वं विनेति नास्माकं प्रतिकूलमभ्यधायि देवानांप्रियेण ; अभिन्नत्वे संबन्धत्वायोगात् |
Its functioning is not possible without mAyA (it being illusory), and therefore, it does not contradict us, simple-minded fellow! If the relationship is the same as the entity, then it cannot be relate the entity.
नचैवमाध्यासिकसंबन्धत्वेऽप्येतद्दोषप्रसङ्ग:, तस्य मायिकत्वेन मायायाश्चाघटितघटनापटीयस्त्वेन सर्वानुपपत्तेर्भूषणत्वात् |
Don't argue that the same problem exists if the relationship is superimposed, because it is illusory, and the nature of mAya is to make the seemingly impossible, possible. Its very impossibility is its attribute.
नच - अतिप्रसङ्गनिराकरणार्थं दृग्दृश्ययो: संबन्धनिर्वचनं प्रकृतं, न तु विषयत्वनिर्वचनम्, अतो विषयत्वखण्डनमनुक्तोपालम्भनमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "We are discussing the nature of the relationship to address the possible charge that cognition can reveal any object. We are not discussing what makes objects cognisable. Therefore, to use this discussion to deny the possibility of objectification, is refuting something that was not stated by us."
विषयत्वखण्डनेन निरुच्यमानप्रकृतसंबन्धस्यैव खण्डनात् |
Because by the refutation of objectification of objects by cognition, it is the refutation of the connection between objects and consciousness that is being spoken here.
नच - विषयित्वानिरुक्तावपि विषयिण: सत्यत्ववत् विषयत्वानिरुक्तावपि विषय: सत्य: स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "Just like it is accepted that the subject is real, even when we do not seek to define what makes it the subject, let us say that the object is real even when we do not define the nature of what makes it the object."
विषयित्वानिरुक्तावपि विषयाध्यासेनैव तदुपपत्त्या विषयिण: सत्यत्वं युक्तम्, विषयत्वानिरुक्तौ तु विषयस्य सत्यत्वं न युक्तम् ;
Because, even though we have not defined what makes it the subject, we say that the subject is real because of the object being superimposed upon it (as any superimposition requires a real substratum), without defining what makes an object, it is not possible to state that the object too is real.
विषयिणोऽनध्यस्तत्वेन विषयाध्यासमन्तरेणान्यस्योपपादकस्याभावात् |
As the subject is not the one superimposed, apart from the object being defined as that which is superimposed on the subject, there is no other definition for what constitutes being an object. The shell silver does not have an existence apart from being superimposed on the substratum.
यत्र तु विषयिण: एवाध्यास: तत्र विषय: सत्य एव ; यथा ज्ञानविषयो ब्रह्म |
However, where the subject is the one superimposed, there the object is real, for example, where Brahman is the object of the cognition of Brahman.
नचोभयाध्यास:, शून्यवादप्रसङ्गात् |
Both cannot be superimposed, because that leads to shUnyavAda.
अन्यतराध्यासे च विनिगमकमनुवृत्तत्वव्यावृत्तत्वप्रकाशत्वजडत्वादिकमेव |
In determining which is superimposed on which, the reasoning adopted to choose which is real and which is superimposed is one of invariance (is real) and variance (is unreal), and consciousness (is real) and inertness (is unreal)
.
The substratum is the one that is unchanging and the superimposed is the one that is changing. Like in the varying cognitions of the same rope as "this rope", "this snake", "this crack in the ground", the "this" delimited consciousness is the one common factor unchanging in all different cognitions.
तस्माद्विषयिणो नित्यदृशोऽनध्यासात् विषयस्यैवात्राध्यास: |
Therefore, as the subject is of the nature of the eternal consciousness (hence, unvarying and self-luminous), it is the object alone that is superimposed here.
नच - 'प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वविषयावरणे' - त्यादियुक्त्या दृग्विषयत्वरूपदृश्यत्वस्य हेतुकरणेन च त्वयाऽपि विषयत्वं निर्वाच्यमेवेति - वाच्यम्;
Nor can it be argued thus - Statements such as "Every valid cognition is preceded by the object of the cognition being veiled" (in the panchapAdikAvivaraNam) employ cognisability of the nature of being the object of consciousness, as a means to establish ignorance, thus it follows that the advaitin too has a responsibility to define the nature of what constitues being an object of consciousness".
The burden of defining what constitutes being an object of consciousness, does not lie merely with the dvaitin, it is the advaitin's too, because prior advaita AchArya's have used statements such as "being the object of valid cognitions", as a means to establish the existence of ignorance that precedes the rise of valid cognitions.
तत्त्वतोऽनिर्वाच्यत्वेऽप्यध्यस्तत्वेन घटादिसमकक्षनिर्वाच्यत्वस्य संभवात्
Because even if I do not define that objectification as something real, if I define it as something that is superimposed, that definition of a similar type to pots etc is sufficient for me, but not for you.
The advaitin can get away with defining the nature of objectification in the same way as the nature of objects, ie as being anirvachanIya (neither real nor unreal) and superimposed.
ननु - कथं प्रमाणज्ञानविषयोऽध्यस्त इति - चेन्न;
If it is argued - How can the objects of valid cognitions be unreal? - No.
प्रपञ्चविषयकज्ञाने तत्त्वावेदकत्वलक्षण्प्रामाण्याभावादिति गृहाण |
Because, the validity of the cognitions of the world's objects does not lie in revealing their objects as absolutely unsublatable.
Continued in the next post here.
वृत्तिगतोत्पत्ति विनाशजडत्वादिभिस्तदम्स्पर्शात् | That consciousness is untouched by the properties of cognitions such as birth, death, inertness etc.
तदेव च नानाविधोपाधिसंबन्धान्नानाविध्व्यवहारभाक् भवति नभ इव घटमणिमल्लिकाद्युपाधिभेदेन; तच्चाज्ञानसाधकत्वात्स्वरूपतो नाज्ञाननिवर्तकं, वृत्त्युपरक्तं त्वज्ञाननिवर्तकमिति न वृत्तेरनुपयोग: |
It is That alone, when associated with different types of adjuncts, appears to take on different functions, like space in different enclosures such jars, pots, earthen-ware, etc. As it is That (consciousness) which reveals ignorance, It cannot by itself destroy ignorance. However when That (consciousness) is associated with cognition it can can remove ignorance, thus cognitions too serve a purpose.
तथाच सर्वाज्ञानसाधके साक्षिचैतन्ये तस्मिन् घटादेरध्यास इति काऽनुपपत्ति:? Therefore, what is inappropriate about saying that pots etc are superimposed on the witness consciousness which reveals every kind of ignorance?
तदुक्तं सुरेश्वराचार्यै: - 'सर्वतीर्थदृशां सिद्धि: स्वाभिप्रेतस्य वस्तुन: | यदभ्युपगमादेव तत्सिद्धिर्वार्यते कुत: ||' इति |
Thus, sureshvarAchArya (said in his vArttika) - The basis (witness consciousness), upon which, all proponents of various philosophical systems establish their positions, how can that be denied by anyone?
Unless one has certainty that "I know X", X will be doubtful. This is not possible unless the witness consciousness reveals that "I know that I know X". Only if the witness consciousness is accepted, can anything be proven.
He has also said that to say the eyes etc. are pramANam, sAkshi has to be accepted.
'सर्वतीर्थदृशां तावत्सामान्यं मानलक्षणम् | अज्ञातार्थावगमनं त्वदुक्ते तन्न युज्यते ||'
Every philosophical system accepts a common definition of proof, that is, they reveal something that is not otherwise known. However, without accepting a witness-consciousness, that definition would be not be possible.
There are two possibilities:
'स्वत: सिद्धोऽथवासिद्धो देहादिस्ते भवन् भवेत् | प्रमाणानां प्रमाणत्वं नोभयत्रापि लभ्यते ||'
Are the objects of cognition, such as the body etc, self-evident or not self-evident according to you? In either case, the validity of valid cognitions is not possible.
'प्रमाणान्यन्तरेणापि देहादिश्चेत् प्रसिध्यति | वद प्रमाणै: कोन्वर्थो न हि सिद्धस्य साधनम् ||'
If the body etc (objects) are self-evident, pray tell what is the use of means of knowledge that reveal the known?
'स्वतोऽसिद्धे प्रमेये तु नासतो व्यञ्जिका प्रमा | नाभिव्यनक्ति सविता शशशृङ्गं स्फुरन्नपि |'
If the known are not self-evident, then cognitions would end up revealing non-existent entities. The sun, despite being of the nature of illumination, cannot illuminate a hare's horn.
The nyAyAmRtakAra says that there is a contradiction between this view and the view of the panchadashI. In the panchadashI, vidyAraNya svAminah had said that there are two types of cognitions - "This is a pot" and "The pot is known" - the former cognition has the pot as its object, in the latter, both pot and pot-cognition are the object.
इति नच - 'घटोऽयमित्यसौ उक्तिराभासस्य प्रसादत: | विज्ञातो घट इत्युक्तिर्ब्रह्मानुभवतो भवेत् ||' इति वदता वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितस्य घटानधिष्ठानचैतन्यस्य घटानुभवत्वोक्ति विरोध इति - वाच्यम् |
Nor can it be argued that - "(The verse from the panchadashI) 'The consciousness reflected in the thought reveals the pot as "this is a pot". The cognition "the pot is known" is revealed by the witness consciousness.' is contradicted by the statement that illumination of the pot is not the consciousness delimited by the cognition, which is not the substratum of the pot.
If it is said that the substratum of the pot reveals the pot, it contradicts vidyAraNya svAminah's comment that it is the consciousness reflected in the thought that reveals the pot.
The siddhikAra says: No.
वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यस्य घटाधिष्ठानचैतन्येन सह भेदाभावात्, चैतन्यस्यैकत्वात् | There is no difference between the consciousness reflected in cognition and pot-substratum consciousness, as the consciousness is one.
Even if the upAdhi-s (delimiters / adjuncts) are two, as they are in the same place, the upahita (the delimited) will not be different.
यथाचैकस्यैव चैतन्यस्य सर्वभासकत्वं तथा विस्तरेणोपपादितं 'नाभाव उपलब्धेरित्यस्मिन्नधिकरणे' भाष्यकृद्भि: |
The manner in which it is possible for the one consciousness to illuminate all has been elaborately proven by the bhAshyakAra in the chapter titled "It is not absence, because it is perceived".
When refuting the Buddhist, in the nAbhAva upalabdhe: adhikaraNa (it is not absence, for it is perceived), the bhAShyakAra has explained in detail how the one consciousness reveals everything. The Buddhist holds that cognition is self-evident. The bhAShyakAra argues that cognition is not self-evident in the sense that it reveals itself, because in the absence of things to reveal, the thought itself is not revealed. It needs a consciousness to reveal the presence of cognition. That consciousness is self-evident, in the sense that it does not need anything else to reveal it. It is the revealer of everything.
The nyAyAmRtakAra makes another argument.
ननु - दृश्यत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या मिथ्यात्वमित्यर्थापत्तिर्विवक्षिता, किं वा सत्यत्वे दृश्यत्वं न स्यादित्यनुकूलतर्कमात्रम् |
What is intended here? The arthApatti that as there is no way to explain the perceptibility of objects (Akshepaka), they must be mithyA (Akshepya)? Or, alternatively is it merely a supporting logic for the inference of the world's unreality that if the world was real, it would not be cognised?
नाद्य:, तत्सामग्र्यभावात् | It cannot be the first, as the causes of arthApatti are not present.
तथाहि - आक्षेप्यस्योपपादकत्वं ; प्रमाणाविरुद्धत्वं, आक्षेपकस्यानुपपद्यमानत्वं, प्रमितत्वंचेत्यर्थापत्तिसामग्री |
The causes of arthApatti are
1) The Akshepya (the thing proven) must result in the Akshepaka (the reason).
2) The Akshepya must not be contradicted by some other valid means of knowledge.
3) The Akshepaka must not be otherwise possible (without the presence of the Akshepya).
4) There needs to be certainty that the Akshepaka is present.
In the arthApatti, "fat Devadatta does not eat during the day, hence he must be eating at night". The Akshepaka is Devadatta being "fat". The Akshepya is "he must be eating at night".
1) Him eating at night results in him being fat.
2) His eating at night is not contradicted by other means of knowledge.
3) Him being fat is not otherwise possible without him eating at night (as it is known that he does not eat during the day).
4) That he is fat is a matter of perception.
The opponent continues:
प्रकृते चाक्षेप्यसंबन्धिनो मिथ्यात्वं नाक्षेपकस्य संबन्धस्योपपादकत्वम्, प्रत्युत प्रतिकूलमेव |
In our context, the Akshepya, the mithyAtva of the seen world, does not result in the Akshepaka, the connection between consciousness and the world. Rather if there was no connection between consciousness and the world, it would not be seen. It contradicts, not implies.
नचाध्यस्तत्वरूपसंबन्धस्य न तत्प्रतिकूलम्; Nor can it be argued that an unreal connection (between consciousness and the world) does not overrule (the world's cognisability).
तस्याद्याप्यसिद्धेरनाक्षेपकत्वात् | Because, as that too (the untenability of the connection between consciousness and the world) has not been proven, it cannot be the proof (of the world's unreality).
That is, the nature of the connection between consciousness and the world has not been proven beyond doubt, hence it cannot be used to prove the unreality of the world. Hence the first criterion for the arthApatti of the unreality of the world due to the cognisability of the world, has failed.
प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धं चेदमाक्षेप्यम् | Moreover, this Akshepya (world's unreality) itself is contradicted by perception.
There is a rule termed bhUyonugraha nyAya, which is a corollary of the utilitarian principle, which postulates that if there are two contradictory ideas - one whose validity benefits many things, another whose validity only serves a single purpose, and only one of the two can be valid - it is better to sacrifice the validiyt of the one which benefits the fewer, in order to preserve the one that supports many.
नाप्येकस्य दृश्यत्वस्योपपत्तये प्रमितानेकस्य त्यागो युक्त: | (Invoking the bhUyonugraha nyAya), In order to preserve a single cognisability, it is inappropriate to sacrifice (the validity of) many cognitions accepted as valid.
आक्षेपकं च न दृगध्यस्तत्वं ; तस्यैव फलत आक्षेप्यत्वात् | The proof (Akshepaka) cannot be "being superimposed on the seer", because that is the very thing to be proved (how can you use the superimposition of the world to be the proof for the unreality of the world, which is nothing but superimposition in other words?).
नापि दृग्विषयत्वरूपो दृग्संबन्ध:, तवासिद्धे: | Nor can it be "a connection with consciousness of the nature of being the object of consciousness", because for you, consciousness has no objects at all.
दृगधीनसिद्धिकत्वम्; दृग्विषयत्वातिरिक्तस्य तस्यासिद्धे: | Nor can it be "its relevation being dependent upon consciousness", because it is not something other than being the object of the seer (which has already been denied).
Thus far, the first option, i.e, the arthApatti of mithyAtva based on dRshyatva, was denied. Next he is going to refute the second option, i.e, the absence of a connection between consciousness and objects is an anukUla tarka, a supportive reasoning, for the inference of the world's mithyAtva.
नान्त्य:, सत्त्वेऽप्युक्तरीत्या सम्बन्धान्तरेणैव दृश्यत्वस्योपपन्नतया अनुपपत्तेरभावादिति It is not the latter (either). Even if the world was real, as its cognisability is possible even if there is a different, real connection (between consciousness and the seen world), cognisability is possibile, and therefore the implausibility of a connection between the seer and seen, is absent.
To this argument, the siddhikAra says:
- चेन्न ; अनुकूलतर्कस्यैव प्रक्रान्तत्वेनार्थापत्तिर्वेत्यादिविकल्पानवकाशात्, उभयथाप्यदोषाच्च | No. When this has been brought up in the context of supportive reasoning, there is no scope to raise the possibility of whether it has been done for the purpose of arthApatti (to prove the world's unreality). Even so, there are no defects in either alternative (whether proving mithyAtva using arthApatti, or using the untenability of a connection between consciousness and objects as a supportive reasoning).
The four criteria outlined by the nyAyAmRtakAra are not restricted to arthApatti alone, they are relevant for inferences too. However, the unique criterion specific to arthApatti is vyatireka vyApti - the negative concomitance - if Devadatta did not eat at night, he wouldn't be well-nourished.
The naiyyAyikas who accept vyatireka vyApti, don't postulate a separate pramANa called arthApatti. The advaitins do not admit to vyatireka vyApti as a cause for anumAna. The reason is because it is acceptable for the presence of hetu to be used to imply the presence of sAdhya. However to use the absence of the sAdhya to imply the absence of the hetu, as a basis for the existence of the sAdhya is a step too far.
तथाहि - सत्यत्वे दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धानुपपत्ति: | If the world is real, there would have to be a real connection between the seen and seer, but that is not possible.
मिथ्यात्वं च तदुपपादकम्, न तत्संबन्धप्रतिकूलम्; If the world is mithyA, then a superimposed relationship between consciousness and objects is possible. That would not be contradictory to such a relationship.
When the shell-silver is mithyA and the shell is real, and there is the possibility of an unreal relationship between the two. A real silver and real shell have no real connection. So why is it argued that the world being mithyA is contradictory to a superimposed relationship between the world and Brahman? While a real connection between two objects requires both to be real, an unreal connection does not necessarily require both entities to be real.
मिथ्यत्वेऽपि शुक्तिरुपस्येदमंशोऽध्यस्तत्वरूपसंबन्धदर्शनेन संबन्धसामान्ये प्रतिकूलत्वाभावात् | Even if the world was mithyA, as the shell silver is seen to have a superimposed relationship with the consciousness delimited by "this", one cannot say in general that all relationships are contradicted.
Looking at it from the perspective of the arthApatti, the advaitin's Akshepaka is cognisability, ie being the object of consciousness, and using that, superimposition is being proven. Thus the charge that the advaitin is using mithyAtva to prove mithyAtva does not stand.
आक्षेपकोऽपि दृग्विषयत्वरूपो दृक्संबन्ध एव अध्यासरूपस्य दृग्विषयत्वस्य ममाऽपि संप्रतिपत्ते:, It is acceptable to me also to use the Akshepaka of a being an object of consciousness, of the nature of being connected with consciousness, to prove that the connection is unreal.
तात्त्विकस्यैव तस्य निषेधात् | The reality of that is what is being negated.
The nyAyAmRtakAra had argued that the Akshepaka needs to be proven and a superimposed objectification by consciousness is not proven. However, the Akshepaka is being an object of consciousess, and that is already known. It so happens to be unreal.
न चाध्यस्तत्वस्याद्याप्यसिद्धि:; It cannot be said that a superimposed relationship is unproven.
This is a kind of inference called parisheSha anumAna. Once all other explanations for an observed phenomenon have been invalidated, whatever remains must be true. There would be no explanation for the observed phenomenon, if we do not accept the last remaining explanation.
We observe the world, thus that the world is the object of consciousness is proven. Now, when we try to examine the nature of the connection between consciousness and the world, we have invalidated any possibility of a real relationship. Therefore, what remains - that the relationship between consciousness and the world is an unreal one - must be true.
दृक्संबन्धसामान्यस्याक्षेपकस्य प्रसक्तविशेषनिषेधेऽप्यधस्तत्वरूपविशेषपर्यवसानेनासिद्ध्यभावात् | For the Akshepaka of a general connection with consciousness, as every specific qualifier (explanation) has been negated, the only qualifier that remains is being a superimposed connection, and therefore it cannot be held that an unreal relationship remains unproven.
न हि अध्यस्तसंबन्धत्वेनाक्षेपकता, किं तु संबन्धत्वेन | The arthApatti is not done on the basis of the Akshepaka being an unreal connection, rather, it is done merely on the basis of it being a connection.
सा चाध्यस्तत्वसंबन्धसंभावनयाप्यबाधित एवेति | Now, if the connection happens to be unreal, that in itself does not invalidate the arthApatti.
नच - घटस्य ज्ञानमिति धीसिद्धसंबन्धसामान्यस्याध्यस्तत्वं न विशेष:, न हि रूप्यस्य शुक्तिरिति प्रतीतिरस्तीति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be alleged that the qualifier of the connection cannot be "being unreal", because the usage "The pot's cognition" indicates merely a connection (unqualified), (whereas in the case of unreal connections), there is no usage like "the silver's shell".
The opponent argues that where there is a superimposition such as a shell-silver, the real shell appears as the unreal silver, and not as the silver's shell, whereas in the case of a pot (which is real, according to the opponent) and cognitions (real), the cognition appears as "pot's cognition".
रूप्यस्य शुक्तिरिति प्रतीत्यभावेऽपि रूप्यस्य शुक्तिरधिष्ठानमिति प्रतीत्या अध्यस्तत्वस्य संबन्धविशेषत्वसिद्धे:, Even though no one says 'silver's shell', as it is possible for the cognition 'silver's substratum is the shell' to occur, that is sufficient to qualify their relationship
चैत्रस्य मित्र इति प्रतीत्यभावेऽपि चैत्रस्य पिता मित्र इति प्रतीतिवत् , For example, even though no one says 'Chaitra's Mitra', it is possible to say 'Chaitra's father is Mitra'.
If the relationship of son is possible there, why not relationship of superimposition here? The sixth case-ending can be used only with a word that denotes a relationship. The word Chaitra does not denote a relationship, but the word father denotes a relationship, hence the sixth case-ending can be used in that context.
आक्षेप्यमत्र प्रमाणाविरुद्धमेव; The Akshepya (mithyAtva) is not contradictory to any means of knowledge.
अध्यक्षादिविरोधस्य प्रागेव परिहृतत्वात् | And any contradiction by perception etc has already been refuted.
आक्षेपके च प्रमितत्वमनपेक्षितमेव अप्रमितेनापि प्रतिबिम्बेन बिम्बाक्षेपदर्शनात् | The Akshepaka need not be validated because even an unreal reflection proves the existence of a real original.
तर्कपरतायामपि नाप्रयोजकता; Even if this is taken as reasoning (anukUla tarka), it does no fail. There is an underlying concomitance.
The opponent had asked why should the object be mithyA for it to be seen. Why cannot the object be real and it be seen? To answer this, the siddhikAra says:
सत्यत्वे संबन्धानुपपत्तेर्भवदुक्तन्यायखण्डनेन प्रथमत एवोपपादितत्वात् | Your reason has been refuted in the beginning by saying that if the world is real, there can be no relationship with consciousness.
The opponent had asked - you should first prove that if the object is real, it will not be cognisable. Only then can it be argued that as the world has cognisability, it cannot be real. Why does reality prove the absence of cognisability?
The siddhikAra says:
दृश्यत्वाभावस्यापादकमत्र सत्त्वमनिर्वाच्यत्वाभावो वा त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वं वा उभयथाऽपि न दोष: | The nature of reality which would have proven the absence of cognisability in the world, is the absence of anirvAcyatva or the the absence of sublatability in any period of time. There is no defect in either option.
नचानिर्वाच्यत्वाभावस्य तुच्छे परोक्षधीवेद्यतया दृश्येऽपि सत्त्वेन व्यभिचार:, Nor can it be alleged, that as the tucCha which has the absence of anirvAcyatva, is known by an indirect cognition, and therefore, even though real (being not anirvAcya), it is known - and thus there is a vyabhichAra to the rule postulated.
The siddhikAra says no. tucCha is not known, because while words can refer to it, there is no object corresponding to the words that can be the object of thought. Such a vRtti is called a vikalpa vRtti.
कारणसामर्थ्येन तत्र तदाकारवृत्तिसमुल्लासेऽपि दृक्संबन्धरूपस्य दृश्यत्वस्य तुच्छविरोधनस्तत्राभावात्, तुच्छाकारताया वृत्तिगत्वेऽपि वृत्तिसंबन्धस्य तुच्छगतत्वाभावोपपत्ते: | Even though there is the the causal capability to refer to that as that (ie words reveal the tucCha has tucCha), knowability of the nature of being connected with consciousess, which would have invalidated it being tucCha, is absent there. Even though there is a vRtti that revals it to be tucCha, there is no connection between the vRtti and the tucCha.
नापि - यथा सतो ब्रह्मण: स्वव्यवहृत्या संबन्ध:, तथा घटादेरपि सत एव स्वज्ञानेन संबन्धोस्त्विति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued that, just like the real Brahman has a connection with activities involving it, a pot, being real, must have a similar relationship with its cognition.
दृष्टान्ते ब्रह्मण्यध्यासस्यैव व्यवहृतिसंबन्धत्वात् | Because, in the example, any connection of Brahman with activities is only because they are superimposed on it.
तथाच उभयसंबन्धिसत्त्वे विषयविषयिभावानुपपत्ति: नाप्रयोजकत्वादिना परिभूयते | Therefore, the postulate that when "both the elements in a relationship are real, a subject-object relationship between them is not possible" has not been disproven as a result of aprayojakatvam (the inability to prove).
एतेन - आध्यासिक: संबन्धो नाम अध्यस्तसंबन्धो वा, अध्यस्तत्वमेव वा, आद्ये संबन्धस्य मिथ्यात्वेऽपि संबन्धिनो दृश्यस्य दृश इव मिथ्यात्वानुपपत्ति: | द्वितीये ज्ञानस्याप्यध्यस्तत्वेन तत्र अध्यासानुपपत्ति: स्वज्ञानपरंपरायामध्यासस्वीकारे अनवस्था चेति - निरस्तम्,
By this, the following argument has been disproven - "Does a superimposed relationship mean that the relationship is a superimposition, or is it superimposition itself? If the former, even if the relationship is unreal, objects of consciousness can be real, like consciousness. If the latter, as the cognition of a object is also superimposed, the object cannot be superimposed on it. If every cognition is supermiposed on its own cognition, it will lead to infinite regress."
What does a superimposed relationship between the seer and seen mean? Does it mean that the relationship between the seer and seen is superimposed? Or does it mean that seen is superimposed on seer?
If the former, even if the relationship between the seer and seen is superimposed, it does not necessarily imply the superimposed nature of the seen. The seer is not accepted to be superimposed, so why should the seen be superimposed?
If the latter, what is the seer? If it means the cognition, then the seen cannot be superimposed on it, because the cognition itself is superimposed. If it is argued that that is possible, the question becomes what is the cognition superimposed upon. If it is superimposed on another cognition that reveals it, then what is that cognition superimposed upon? This will lead to the postulation of an infinite series of cognitions which are both the substratum of their objects, and are superimposed on the cognitions to which they are the objects.
The siddhikAra says this is wrong.
ज्ञानं हि वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यम्, Because jnAna is actually consciousness delimited by cognition.
तत्रावच्छेदिकाया वृत्तेर्जडाया अध्यस्तत्वेऽप्यवच्छेद्यस्य चैतन्यस्य प्रकाशरूपस्य अनध्यस्तत्वेन तत्र दृश्यस्याध्यासात् दृश्यमिथ्यात्वेऽप्यनवस्थाविरहस्योपपत्ते: |
There, even if the delimiting cognition being inert, is superimposed, the delimited consciousness, being of the nature of illumination is not superimposed, and thus there, if even if the seen is superimposed and therefore it is mithyA, the charge of infinite regress is avoided.
अत एव - शाब्दवृत्तिविषयो ब्रह्म न वृत्तौ कल्पितमविद्याविषयो ब्रह्माविद्यायां न कल्पितं यथा, तथा दृश्यं न दृशि कल्पितम् ; तथाच दृक्दृश्यादेस्तात्त्विक एव संबन्ध:, सामान्यसंबन्धेनैवातिप्रसङ्गे निरस्ते विशेषजिज्ञासा विशेषोक्तिश्च विशेषविशेषजिज्ञासादिवदनर्थिकैवेति - निरस्तम्,
That is why the following is refuted - "Just like (1) Brahman, which is the object of a cognition born from words, is not superimposed on the cognition, and (2) Brahman, the object of ignorance, is not superimposed on ignorance, objects of cognition are not superimposed on the seer. Thus, it follows that the relationship between the seer and seen is real alone. When it is possible to avoid any cognition revealing any object by merely postulating that there is a relationship between the cognition and the object, there is no need to enquire into the nature of the relationship, nor is there a need to define the relationship. Such an endeavour would serve no useful purpose, because every qualifier can have its own qualification and so on and so forth."
The nyAyAmRtakAra is saying that when we say there is a real sambandha between the seer and seen, there are no problems. It may be asked why does this particular cognition reveal this particular object, and not something else (atiprasanga), to which the reply is because this cognition and this object have some connection. There is no purpose served in trying to determine the nature of that relationship. Even if we enquire into it and come up with some specific feature in that cognition, another question can be raised, what makes this cognition have this specific feature that it allows it to cognise this object? This will only lead to a fruitless enquiry with no end.
The siddhikAra says no.
वृत्त्यविद्ययो: ब्रह्मणोऽनध्यासेऽपि तयोरेव ब्रह्मण्यध्यासात् संबन्धोपपत्ते:, अतस्तत्रतात्त्विकसंबन्धाभावात्, कथं तद्दृष्टान्तेन दृग्दृश्ययोरपि तत्त्विकसंबन्ध इत्युच्यते?
Even though Brahman is not superimposed on cognition and ignorance, it is they (cognition and ignorance) that are superimposed on Brahman, and so a connection with them is possible because of that (superimposition). Therefore, as there is no real relationship present, how can those examples prove a real relationship between the seer and the seen?
प्रसिद्धविशेषे बाधिते सामान्यस्यैव बाधकशंकया अतिप्रसङ्गे प्राप्ते विशेषजिज्ञासाया विशेषोक्तेश्च साफल्यात् न ते निरर्थिके |
As all, well-known types of relationship are negated, one starts doubting whether a relationship in general itself exists, and therefore the doubt arises whether any knowledge can reveal any object. Hence, the desire to know the nature of the connection, and the requirement to address it are important, and cannot be said to serve no purpose.
एतेन - संबन्धस्य प्रामाणिकत्वे यथाकथञ्चन लक्षणं भविष्यति | तथाहि - संयोगसमवायान्तर्भावे तल्लक्षणमेव लक्षणं भविष्यति, तदनन्तर्भावे तु तदुभयभिन्नसम्बन्धत्वमेव लक्षणमस्त्विति - निरस्तम् ;
With this, the following has been refuted - if the connection is real, let its definition be anything. If it is one of samyoga or samavAya, then that itself can be its definition. If it is different from them, then let the definition be some other relation other than those two.
उक्तयुक्त्या प्रामाणिक संबन्धस्य संयोगसमवायान्तर्भावस्य च दूषितत्वात् | Because, based on the reason mentioned previously (the two related entities need to be at the same place and time for their relation to be real), a real relationship that is one of samyoga or samavAya has been rejected, as defective.
तदुभयबहिर्भूतसंबन्धत्वं तु वयमपि न निराकुर्म:, किं तु तस्य प्रामाणिकत्वम् | We do not deny that it is a relationship different (from samyoga and samavAya). Rather, we deny its reality.
किंच दृग्दृश्ययो: न तात्त्विकसंबन्ध:, संबन्धिभिन्नत्वे अनवस्थानात् | Moreover, the relationship between the seer and the seen cannot be real, because if it were different from the related entities, it would lead to infinite regress.
How does the relationship relate the two entities if it is different from them? If through another relationship, then that would require another relationship etc leading to infinite regress.
नच दृश्यत्वान्तरहीनस्य दृश्यत्वादेरिव संबन्धस्यापि स्वनिर्वाहकत्वं क्वचित् भविष्यतीति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus "Just like cognisability does not require another cognisability for its functioning, ie to imply that something is cognised, a relationship sometimes does not require another relationship to relate the entities".
If cognisability was not cognised it would not be mithyA, so something should make it cognisable. Is it itself, or something else? If it is something else, that should require something else cognise it, leading to infinite regress too. The opponent says kvacit, sometimes, because in the case of samyoga, it is accepted that a samyoga requires a samavAya for a samyoga relationship to exist between two entities. So sometimes you need something else, sometimes nothing else apart from the relationship itself is needed.
The siddhikAra says no.
दृश्यत्वमपि दृकसंबन्ध एव | (We say that) cognisability functions because it too is a relationship with consciousness.
तस्य च स्वनिर्वाहकत्वं न मायिकत्वं विनेति नास्माकं प्रतिकूलमभ्यधायि देवानांप्रियेण ; अभिन्नत्वे संबन्धत्वायोगात् |
Its functioning is not possible without mAyA (it being illusory), and therefore, it does not contradict us, simple-minded fellow! If the relationship is the same as the entity, then it cannot be relate the entity.
नचैवमाध्यासिकसंबन्धत्वेऽप्येतद्दोषप्रसङ्ग:, तस्य मायिकत्वेन मायायाश्चाघटितघटनापटीयस्त्वेन सर्वानुपपत्तेर्भूषणत्वात् |
Don't argue that the same problem exists if the relationship is superimposed, because it is illusory, and the nature of mAya is to make the seemingly impossible, possible. Its very impossibility is its attribute.
नच - अतिप्रसङ्गनिराकरणार्थं दृग्दृश्ययो: संबन्धनिर्वचनं प्रकृतं, न तु विषयत्वनिर्वचनम्, अतो विषयत्वखण्डनमनुक्तोपालम्भनमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "We are discussing the nature of the relationship to address the possible charge that cognition can reveal any object. We are not discussing what makes objects cognisable. Therefore, to use this discussion to deny the possibility of objectification, is refuting something that was not stated by us."
विषयत्वखण्डनेन निरुच्यमानप्रकृतसंबन्धस्यैव खण्डनात् |
Because by the refutation of objectification of objects by cognition, it is the refutation of the connection between objects and consciousness that is being spoken here.
नच - विषयित्वानिरुक्तावपि विषयिण: सत्यत्ववत् विषयत्वानिरुक्तावपि विषय: सत्य: स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "Just like it is accepted that the subject is real, even when we do not seek to define what makes it the subject, let us say that the object is real even when we do not define the nature of what makes it the object."
विषयित्वानिरुक्तावपि विषयाध्यासेनैव तदुपपत्त्या विषयिण: सत्यत्वं युक्तम्, विषयत्वानिरुक्तौ तु विषयस्य सत्यत्वं न युक्तम् ;
Because, even though we have not defined what makes it the subject, we say that the subject is real because of the object being superimposed upon it (as any superimposition requires a real substratum), without defining what makes an object, it is not possible to state that the object too is real.
विषयिणोऽनध्यस्तत्वेन विषयाध्यासमन्तरेणान्यस्योपपादकस्याभावात् |
As the subject is not the one superimposed, apart from the object being defined as that which is superimposed on the subject, there is no other definition for what constitutes being an object. The shell silver does not have an existence apart from being superimposed on the substratum.
यत्र तु विषयिण: एवाध्यास: तत्र विषय: सत्य एव ; यथा ज्ञानविषयो ब्रह्म |
However, where the subject is the one superimposed, there the object is real, for example, where Brahman is the object of the cognition of Brahman.
नचोभयाध्यास:, शून्यवादप्रसङ्गात् |
Both cannot be superimposed, because that leads to shUnyavAda.
अन्यतराध्यासे च विनिगमकमनुवृत्तत्वव्यावृत्तत्वप्रकाशत्वजडत्वादिकमेव |
In determining which is superimposed on which, the reasoning adopted to choose which is real and which is superimposed is one of invariance (is real) and variance (is unreal), and consciousness (is real) and inertness (is unreal)
.
The substratum is the one that is unchanging and the superimposed is the one that is changing. Like in the varying cognitions of the same rope as "this rope", "this snake", "this crack in the ground", the "this" delimited consciousness is the one common factor unchanging in all different cognitions.
तस्माद्विषयिणो नित्यदृशोऽनध्यासात् विषयस्यैवात्राध्यास: |
Therefore, as the subject is of the nature of the eternal consciousness (hence, unvarying and self-luminous), it is the object alone that is superimposed here.
नच - 'प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वविषयावरणे' - त्यादियुक्त्या दृग्विषयत्वरूपदृश्यत्वस्य हेतुकरणेन च त्वयाऽपि विषयत्वं निर्वाच्यमेवेति - वाच्यम्;
Nor can it be argued thus - Statements such as "Every valid cognition is preceded by the object of the cognition being veiled" (in the panchapAdikAvivaraNam) employ cognisability of the nature of being the object of consciousness, as a means to establish ignorance, thus it follows that the advaitin too has a responsibility to define the nature of what constitues being an object of consciousness".
The burden of defining what constitutes being an object of consciousness, does not lie merely with the dvaitin, it is the advaitin's too, because prior advaita AchArya's have used statements such as "being the object of valid cognitions", as a means to establish the existence of ignorance that precedes the rise of valid cognitions.
तत्त्वतोऽनिर्वाच्यत्वेऽप्यध्यस्तत्वेन घटादिसमकक्षनिर्वाच्यत्वस्य संभवात्
Because even if I do not define that objectification as something real, if I define it as something that is superimposed, that definition of a similar type to pots etc is sufficient for me, but not for you.
The advaitin can get away with defining the nature of objectification in the same way as the nature of objects, ie as being anirvachanIya (neither real nor unreal) and superimposed.
ननु - कथं प्रमाणज्ञानविषयोऽध्यस्त इति - चेन्न;
If it is argued - How can the objects of valid cognitions be unreal? - No.
प्रपञ्चविषयकज्ञाने तत्त्वावेदकत्वलक्षण्प्रामाण्याभावादिति गृहाण |
Because, the validity of the cognitions of the world's objects does not lie in revealing their objects as absolutely unsublatable.
Continued in the next post here.