paricCheda 1 - anukUla tarka nirUpaNam (part 2)

Continued from here.

The siddhikAra in reply says:

संबन्धानुभवस्य ज्ञानद्वारकसंबन्धेनाप्युपपत्तेरतिरिक्तसंबन्धकल्पने मानाभावात्, As the experience of the relationship (between desire and its objects) is possible through the medium of cognition is possible, there is no basis to overrule that and postulate another relationship.

ज्ञानाधीनसंबन्धान्तरस्याननुभवात् | There is no experience of a relationship different from than one born as a result of knowledge. 

ज्ञाने त्विन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिना न संबन्धानुभवोपपत्ति:, इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादीनामतीन्द्रियत्वेन तेषामनुमित्यादिनोपस्थितिं विनैव घटज्ञानमित्यादि संबन्धानुभवात् |   However, in the case of cognition, there is no experience of the cognition's relationship being a result of the contact with sense organs. As the contact between sense organs and the object is itself not a perceptible experience, the relationship perceived in the cognition of pots etc, is without the presence of an inferential cognition of the contact (of the pot) with sense organs.

स्मृतौ तु अनुभवाधीनसंबन्धस्य शङ्कैव नास्ति; अनुभवस्य तदानीमसत्त्वात्, उभयोरपि ज्ञानत्वेन तुल्यवदेव संबन्धसंभवाच्च | There is no possibility to even doubt that the relationship of memory with its object is subject to experience, because the experience itself does not exist when it is recalled. Both (memory and experience) are equivalent, in the sense both are dependent on the relationship between cognition and the object.

A person sees silver and a stone. However he desires silver and not stone. If the cognition is the cause of desire, then a person on seeing the stone and silver simultaneously should desire both simultaneously, but he only desires only silver. Why?

This simultaneous cognition is termed samUhAlambanam. In nyAya, multiple attributes cannot originate simultaneously in the Atma, they can only occur in sequence. So two cognitions (jnAna is considered to be a visheSha guNa of the Atma) cannot originate in the Atma simultaneously, they can only do so in sequence. To account for the simultaneous cognition of multiple objects, they postulate a different type of cognition termed samUhAlambana jnAna.

Thus, if the relationship that desire has with its object is that desire is born from the cognition of the object, the object of the cognition must be the object of the desire. In the case of samUhAlambana jnAna, there are multiple objects to the cognition, but the object of desire is not necessarily every object of the samUhAlambana jnAna.

The nyAyAmRtakAra raises such an objection, to which the siddhikAra says
नच - समूहालम्बनजन्यैकविषयेच्छायामुभयविष्यत्वापत्ति:, जनकज्ञानस्योभयविषयत्वादिति - वाच्यम्;
Do not argue thus - the object of one desire born from a group cognition must be multiple, because the cognition that gives rise to desire has multiple objects.

The same problem lies in the nyAyAmRtakAra's position too. He says that the cognition which arises from the contact of the senses with object must have a real relationship with its object. Desire is born from the cognition of the object. If the cognition is of a group, desire also must be of the entire group.

अतिरिक्तसंबन्धपक्षेऽपि तुल्यत्वात् | Because the problem exists even for the position that postulates that the relationship (of desire with object) is different (to the relationship between cognition and its object). 

This argument only works when arguing against an opponent (jalpa katha), not when teaching a student (vAda katha). Now he gives an answer for vAda.

The cognition of silver is considered to be the cause for desire, because it has silver as its object (rajata viShayatvena kAraNa). The samUhAlambana jnAna is the cause of silver desire not because it has the group of objects as its object, but because it has silver as its object.
The kAraNatAvacChedaka dharma (the reason for the cognition to be the cause of desire) of the cognition is rajata viShayatva, having silver as its object. The relationship between desire and its object is svajanakatAvacchedaka viShayatva (having the thing as the object of a cognition that gives rise to desire). It is only the rajata viShayatva of the cognition that leads to desire.

अथैकविषयावच्छेदेनैव ज्ञानस्य जनकत्वात् नोभयविषयत्वं, Now, the cognition (samUhAlambana jnAna) gives rise (to desire) because it objectifies (that) one object (whose desire it is the cause for) and thus, (desire) need not have multiple objects.

समं ममाऽपि; This explanation is the same for me too.

जनकज्ञाने जनकतावच्छेदकविषयत्वस्यैव संबन्धत्वात् | The (desire's) relationship with an object is it (the desire) being born from a cognition that objectifies that thing.

The nyAyAmRtakAra says Ishvara's desire will not have any object as a result. There is no cognition that gives rise to Ishvara's desire. In the nyAya system, Ishvara's cognition (jnAna), desire (icChA), and effort (kRti) are all eternal. As Ishvara's desire is eternal, nothing can give rise to it. 
In response, the siddhikAra says
नच नित्येश्वरेच्छाया विषयत्वसंबन्धानुपपत्ति: Nor does this mean that Ishvara's desire will end up not having a relationship with its object (as it is not created from a cognition).
तस्या: अस्माभिरनङ्गीकारात्, Because that is not accepted by us.

According to advaita, Ishvara's desire is a modification of mAya, and not eternal. His cognition is svarUpa chaitanya (consciousness) and thus eternal, but Ishvara's desire is a modification in mAyA and not eternal. The shruti also has statements such as tadaikshata, sokAmayata etc. Thus even for Him, cognition leads to desire.

From a nyAya perspective, the challenge is addressed next. A permanent cognition and permanent desire are not known in the world. Ishvara's existence is proven by inference in nyAya. In the anumAna for Ishvara it is said that Ishvara can create the world only in association with jnAna, icChA and kRti. Instead of proving the existence of each of these through some other means, the naiyyAyika holds that it is more parsimonious to postulate their permanence in Ishvara. That is, if they are not taken as permanent, it will lead to further speculations as to why he got the desire to create, what is its cause etc. To avoid these speculations, which will add to further assumptions, these are simply assumed to be eternal.

तार्किकाणामपि तत्साधकमानबलेन विलक्षणसंबन्धकल्पनेऽपि जन्यज्ञानजन्येच्छयोरुक्तप्रकारेणैव विषयताभ्युपगमात्,
For the logicians too, from the strength of the means used to prove that (the existence of eternal desire) if one postulates a different relationship (between eternal desire and eternal cognition), it is possible for impermanent desires to be related to objects through the stated manner through impermanent cognitions.

To explain, as Ishvara's cognition is different from any living being's cognition, His desire too can be different from the desire of anyone else. There is no requirement therefore that the relationship between our desire and objects should be the same relationship as the one between Ishvara's desire and objects.

नच - पुत्रादिधीजन्यसुखादे: पुत्रादिविषयत्वापत्ति:, इच्छान्यायादिति - वाच्यम्; वैषम्यात् |
Nor can it be argued (as was done by the nyAyAmRtakAra) that - Like the rule in case of desires,  happiness born from the cognition of children, etc will end up having children, etc. as its object.

There is a difference between the two situations. Only a few things are considered saviShayaka - jnAna, icchA, kRti, samskAra, dveSha. Things other than these cannot have saviShayatva. What is the difference?

ज्ञानजन्यत्वस्य समानात्वेऽपि इच्छादावेव सविषयत्वप्रतीति:, न तु सुखादौ | Even though both are generated by cognition, it is only desire that appears to have an object, whereas happiness does not. 

वस्तुस्वाभाव्यात् त्वयाप्यस्यैवार्थस्य वक्तव्यत्वात् | Because of the nature of the thing, you too will have to concede that. 

अन्यथा स्फटिके जपाकुसुमसन्निधानाल्लौहित्यवल्लोष्टेऽप्यापाद्येत | Otherwise, one could query why a lump of clay does not appear red when a red flower is placed next to it, whereas a transparent crystal appears so. 

The opponent tries a different argument. The import of the portion of vedas dealing with rituals i dharma and adharma (that which leads to puNya and pApa). There has to be some relationship between dharma and the import.

अथ धर्मे तात्पर्यस्यानध्यासात्तात्पर्यसंबन्धो न स्यात् , न; If it is said - just like without import being superimposed on dharma, it is possible for dharma to be the import (objects need not be superimposed on consciousness) - No.

What is tAtparya?

The naiyyAyika who does not hold to the aupauruSheyatva of any sentence says tAtparya is vakturicChA, the intention of the speaker. This is not therefore different from the icChA example that we explained before.
However, there is no vaktA for those that hold that Veda is apauruSheya. They say:

तात्पर्यं हि तत्प्रतीत्युद्देश्यकत्वम्, प्रतीतेश्च ज्ञेयान्तरेणेव धर्मेणाऽपि संबन्धोऽध्यास एव, प्रतीतिद्वारा च धर्मतात्पर्ययो: संबन्ध इत्यनुपपत्त्यभावात् |

तात्पर्यं हि तत्प्रतीत्युद्देश्यकत्वम् Import is the understanding which is set out to be revealed (by the word).
प्रतीतेश्च ज्ञेयान्तरेणेव धर्मेणाऽपि संबन्धोऽध्यास एव, The relationship of understanding with dharma, is like the relationship between understanding and objects, a superimposed one.
प्रतीतिद्वारा च धर्मतात्पर्ययो: संबन्ध इत्यनुपपत्त्यभावात् | Thus there is nothing wrong in postulating a relationship between dharma and import through the means of understanding.

Just like the relationship between objects and desire is through cognition, the relationship between import and dharma is through understanding. 

नच - ज्ञानस्य प्रकाशत्वेन प्रदीपसाम्येऽपि आन्तरत्वेन तद्वैलक्षण्यमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् ; अत इच्छादिवद्विप्रकृष्टेनापि संबन्ध: स्यात्, अन्यथा प्रदीपवदेवाध्यासिकसंबन्धोऽपि न स्यात्, परोक्षवृत्तौ विप्रकृष्टसंबन्धदर्शनाच्चेति - वाच्यम् ;

Don't argue thus नच - ज्ञानस्य प्रकाशत्वेन प्रदीपसाम्येऽपि आन्तरत्वेन तद्वैलक्षण्यमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् ; Even though cognition when viewed as illumination is similar to a lamp, as it is internal, a difference must be conceded.
(That is, you cannot say that like the light from a lamp illuminates only those objects that it directly comes into contact with, consciousness illuminates only those it is in direct contact with, not through a vRtti)

अत इच्छादिवद्विप्रकृष्टेनापि संबन्ध: स्यात्, Therefore, like desire etc., its relationship with objects is also remote (through some other medium). 

अन्यथा प्रदीपवदेवाध्यासिकसंबन्धोऽपि न स्यात्, Otherwise, like a lamp, consciousness' relationship with objects cannot be unreal.
The relationship between light and its object is samyoga sambandha, if consciousness and light are not different, consciousness too must have a samyoga sambandha with its object.

Therefore a difference between the two must be accepted.
परोक्षवृत्तौ विप्रकृष्टसंबन्धदर्शनाच्चेति - वाच्यम् ; In the case of an indirect thought (like inference of a smoke which is not seen directly),  a remote relationship is seen (without postulating an unreal relationship between those thoughts and their objects).

The siddhikAra says - Don't say this because

देशकालविप्रकर्षाभावस्य संबन्धसामान्यप्रयोजकत्वे संभवत्यान्तरप्रतियोगिकसंबन्धभिन्नसंबन्ध एवास्य प्रयोजकत्वमिति कल्पनाबीजाभावात् | As the absence of a spatial and temporal distance is necessary for any real relationship, there is no basis to claim that such a rule is only true for all relationships except an internal relationship.

If you say such a rule is true only for external objects, but is not true where one of the two is internal, some unique reason has to be prescribed for this. Thus, two reasons have to be prescribed (something for external, and something for internal) in your explanation, whereas only one reason needs to be prescribed for my explanation. Thus my explanation is simpler than yours.

इच्छायास्तु नेष्यमाणेन साक्षात्संबन्ध:, किं तु ज्ञानद्वारक: परंपरासंबन्ध एवेत्युक्तम् | It was said that desire does not have a direct relationship with the desired object, rather it is through the medium of cognition, and thus it is a transitive relationship.

There are two entities involved in cognition - consciousness and thought. Consciousness and objects have a superimposed relation. In direct cognition, thought, object and consciousness are all directly related. In indirect cognition, thought and the object are not in direct contact. Thus consciousness delimited by thought is not directly in contact with the object.

परोक्षस्थलेतु यद्यप्यधिष्ठानचैतन्येन साक्षादेव संबन्ध:; तथापि विषयाकारवृत्त्या साक्षात्संबन्धाभावात् वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्येन विषयस्य परंपरासंबन्ध एव |
In the case of indirect cognitions, while the relationship between the object with its substratum consciousness is direct, as the sambandha between thought and its object is not direct, the relationship between consciousness delmited by the thought and the object too is only transitive (remote).

In nyAya, the sense of hearing is actually space. However it is space delimited within the ear (कर्णशष्कुल्यवच्छिन्नं आकाश:) that is responsible for hearing. What is the relationship between that ear space and sound heard outside? It is not a direct relationship. According to nyAya, the sound heard outside, creates sound waves. Each wave creates a subsequent wave in its adjacent space, which creates the next sound wave, and so and so forth, until it reaches the space delimited within the ear. Thus the ear does not hear an outside sound outside, rather it hears a sound from a soundwave within the ear-enclosed space, which is a remote product of the original sound created outside. 

Similarly thought is within the mind. The consciousness delimited by thought is also internal. It cannot have a direct relationship with the object. Its association with the object is through thought. In the case of sound even though sound occurs in space, it is not the sound outside that is heard, but the sound in the space enclosed by the ear which is heard. Similarly, even though the mountain fire is also superimposed on consciousness, it is inferred by the consciousness delimited by a remote cognition.

So an unreal sambandha between the consciousness and the remote object is still postulated.

The opponent then argues:

ननु - तवापि मते ज्ञेयस्य न स्वज्ञानेऽध्यस्तत्वनियम:, 
In your system too, cognition and its object need not have a superimposed relationship always.
1) अनध्यस्तस्य तुच्छस्य 
Absolutely absent entities (tucCha) are not superimposed (on cognition);
The advaitin argues that the world is neither sat, nor asat. By asat, tucCha is meant. To say that something is not asat, one must know what asat is. If the relationship between objects and their cognition is superimposed, the relationship between asat and its cognition must also be superimposed. However, if it is superimposed, it would be mithyA, and not tucCha. Therefore the relationship between cognition and objects cannot be superimposed. 

2) पञ्चमप्रकारत्वपक्षे अविद्यानिवृत्ते: 
In the sub-school which says that the dissolution of ignorance has a fifth order of reality, that and its cognition are not superimposed.
AnandabodhAchArya argued that avidyAnivRtti (dissolution) cannot belong to any of the four known ontological categories (sat, asat, sadasat, sadasat vilakshaNam) and hence must belong to a new, fifth category of reality. If avidyAnivRtti has occurred, one must know that it has occurred, for which it must be cognised. If the relationship between cognitions and their object is superimposed, the relationship between the cognition of avidyAnivRtti and avidyAnivRtti must also be superimposed. If it is superimposed, then avidyAnivRtti must be mithyA, not of a fifth order of reality.

3) भावाद्वैतपक्षे अभावस्य च दृग्रूपत्वेऽपि स्वज्ञानेऽनध्यासात्,
Absence in (maNDana miSra's) bhAvAdvaita school is not considered to be superimposed on its cognition, even if its cognition is of the nature of consciousness.
maNDana miSra in his brahmasiddhi argued that upon the dawn of knowledge the world is rendered absent. That is, during moksha, the absence of the world is present. However, this does not militate against advaita, because with advaita what is meant is the absence of anything existent (bhAva) apart from Brahman. This does not rule out the existence of absence (abhAva). Hence, bhAvAdvaita. The nyAyAmRtakAra argues that if abhAva was mithyA, it too must be rendered absent upon the dawn of knowledge. Therefore, in this position, it must be true that the relationship between cognition and abhAva is something other that a superimposed one.

There are two readings to this sentence of the nyAyAmRta - दृग्रूपत्वेऽपि and अदृग्रूपत्वेऽपि, both of which are acceptable. In the former, the meaning is - even if their cognition is of the nature of consciousness, the objects are not superimposed on those cognitions. In the latter, the meaning is - even if the object themselves are not the witnessing consciousness, ie even the objects belong to the category of the dRshya, the seen, they are not superimposed on their cognitions.
Both readings can thus be understood.

4) अपरोक्षैकरसे ब्रह्मण्यध्यस्तस्य व्यावहारिकस्यातीतादेर्नित्यातीन्द्रियस्य च परोक्षानुभवरूपे स्वज्ञानेऽनध्यासात्,
Past objects and objects that are eternally beyond the range of the senses, which despite both being empirically real entities superimposed on Brahman, of the nature of pure direct consciousness, are remotely experienced, and therefore cannot be superimposed on their cognitions.

The nyAyAmRtakAra argues that the shruti says that consciousness is always known directly (यत्साक्षाद् अपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म). Thus, everything that is superimposed on it must also directly perceived. However, many objects within empirical reality are remotely cognised (those that are always remote such as those objects which are beyond the reach of the senses, or those that are sometimes remote, such as the memory of those objects seen in the past). Therefore, if all objects are superimposed on consciousness, which is ultimately the same as cognition, how can one account for the difference between the direct cognition of some objects and the indirect cognition of some other objects? Therefore one must admit that the relationship between cognition and remote objects is not one of superimposition, it is something else that explains why they are experienced remotely.

5) स्मर्यमाणस्य च स्मृतिरूपे स्वज्ञानेऽनध्यासात्,
The recollected is not superimposed on its cognition, recollection 

6) प्रातिभासिकस्य च प्रातिभासिके स्वज्ञानेऽनध्यासात्, त्वन्मते भ्रमरूपज्ञानस्यापि कल्पितत्वादिति

The apparently real object (shell-silver) is not superimposed on the cognition of the apparently real (cognition of shell-silver), because n your system, the cognition of illusion is itself superimposed.

In anirvachanIya khyAti, both silver and its appearance are adhyAsa. The former is arthAdhyAsa, the latter is jnAnAdhyAsa. Both are prAtibhAsika, apparently real. Thus one cannot be superimposed on the other.

- चेत्; मैवम् ; The siddhikAra responds: Not so.

1) तुच्छस्याज्ञेयत्वेन ज्ञाने अध्यासाभावाद् tucCha can never be known, hence it cannot be superimposed. 

How can one talk of sadasat vilakshaNatvam if asat can never be known? The answer is that it is not known through a valid or invalid cognitions, rather, it is known through a vikalpa vRtti (shabdajnAnAnupAti vastu shUnya). That is, it is known as the non-existent object corresponding to word's such as hare's horn etc. When we hear the word hare's horn, we understand what the meaning is, but there is no corresponding object relating to the word. Any cognition shows the existence of something (even absence shows the presence of absence). However vikalpa does not show the existence of hare's horn. With such a verbal cognition, it is possible to talk of asat, and through that, one can refer to that which is different from asat. 

ज्ञेयस्य हि ज्ञानेऽध्यास:, तुच्छस्य तु न ज्ञेयतेत्यग्रे वक्ष्यते |
Only the known is superimposed on jnAna (consciousness), but tucCha is not the object of jnAna. This will be further explained (in the chapter anirvacanIyatve arthApatti pramANam)

2) पञ्चमप्रकाराविद्यानिवृत्तेरपि प्रतियोग्यधिकरणे ध्वंसस्यापि तत्र वृत्तेरवश्यंभावात् अध्यास एव संबन्ध: | As there is necessarily cognition of avidyAnivritti, which belongs to the fifth ontological category, and dhvamsa (destruction) located in the locus of the counterpositive, both are certainly superimposed. 

In nyAya, the destruction (dhvamsa) of the pot is located in the pot-shards. The destruction of the pot, therefore appears along with the appearance of the pot-shards. Just like the pot-shards are superimposed on consciousness, the destruction of the pot is also so superimposed. The same is the case for avidyAnivRtti.

3) वस्तुतस्त्वविद्यानिवृत्ते: पञ्चामप्रकारत्वं च भावाद्वैतं चानभ्युपगमपराहतम् | However, really speaking, avidyAnivRtti's belonging to the fifth category of reality and bhavAdvaita are not accepted (as siddhAnta) and one does not need address the defects in those systems.

यथाचाविद्यानिवृत्तेर्ब्रह्मरूपत्वं सर्वाद्वैतं च तथोपरिष्टाद्वक्ष्यते | That avidyAnivritti and abhAva in bhAvAdvaita  are of the nature of Brahman itself will be explained later. 

When the rope is directly seen (pratyaksha), the snake illusion also is directly seen. If the rope is remote (paroksha), the snake is also remote. Thus, we can infer a general rule that the directness or indirectness of the illusion is dependent on the directness or indirectness of the substratum.
Brahman is the substratum of illusion. It is always directly perceived. Then why are some objects of the world directly perceived and others not directly perceived?

If to remedy this, it is said that the objects are superimposed on thought, which can be direct or indirect, leading to the direct or indirect cognition of objects, such an argument is not acceptable to the advaitin. This is the vijnAnavAdin's position. This is also called sAkArajnAnavAda. The vRtti (thought) takes the AkAra of objects and that is why objects appear as such. 
The siddhikAra answers this objection.

4) अपरोक्षैकरसे ब्रह्मण्यध्यस्तस्यातीतादेरनुमित्यादिरूपज्ञाने अनाध्यासेऽपि यस्मिन्श्चैतन्ये तदध्यस्तं तदेव चैतन्यमनुमित्यादिरूपवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नमिति नाध्यासानुपपत्ति:
Past objects, and inferred objects etc which are superimposed on the directly perceived Brahman are not superimposed on the memory and inferential knowledge etc by which they are known. However, the consciousness on which the objects are superimposed is the same consciousness which is delimited by indirect cognitions such as inference etc.

अतिप्रसङ्गपरिहारार्थं चैतन्यस्य विषयसंबन्धे वृत्त्युपरागापेक्षायामपि नाधिष्ठानत्वे तदपेक्षा | To remove the over-extension error (if consciousness and objects have a direct sambandha, as consciousness is one, everyone should see an object, when anyone sees it), if it is said that the relationship between consciousness and objects requires a thought, that is not needed for consciousness to be the substratum for the superimposition of objects on it.

Now, it may be asked how can remote objects and consciousness have a direct superimposed relationship if the cognition that reveals them is remote? To such a question, it is being said:

5) and 6) एवमेव नित्यपरोक्षस्थले स्मृतिस्थलेऽपि प्रातिभासिकस्य प्रातिभासिक्यां वृत्तावनध्यासेऽप्यधिष्ठानविषयकवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तचैतन्य एवाध्यास इति न काप्यनुपपत्ति: | Therefore, while the objects that are eternally beyond direct perception, those objects recalled by memory, and those illusory objects seen by cognition of empirically real objects, are not admitted to be superimposed on the the thoughts that objectify them, it is possible for them to be superimposed on the substratum consciousness of objects that becomes manifest as a result of the cognition of the objects.

नच - रूप्यादिकमिदमंशावच्छिन्नचैतन्येऽध्यस्तं, भासते च अविद्यावृत्ति प्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्येनेति विषयिणि ज्ञाने विषयस्याध्यास: कथमिति - वाच्यम्      

Nor can it be argued thus - The illusory silver is superimposed on the consciousness that is delimited by the unknown object, known to the seer simply as 'this' (when a person sees silver, he first senses that there is some object there, he does not first know what it is. Thus it is called the consciousness which appears to him as something, called 'this'.) However it appears to him due to the consciousness reflected in the avidyA vritti. That being the case how is it argued that the object is superimposed on the subject's consciousness? 

The substratum is different, the revealing consciousness is different. The advaitin had said that consciousness and objects have a superimposed relationship. However, the superimposed relationship silver is not with the consciousness that reveals it, the avidyA vritti ahacChinna chaitanya but with the shukti avacChinna chaitanya (consciousness delimited by the shell). How then can it be argued that objects are superimposed on the subject, as was argued in the adhyAsa bhAShya (अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्धर्माणां चाध्यासः

एकावच्छिन्न एवापरावाच्छेदेन निरपेक्षोपाधेरिवात्र भेदकत्वाभावात्, As it is the same consciousness that is delimited by one and delimited by the other, unlike in the case of nirapeksha upAdhi (independent adjunct), there is no difference in the two.

upAdhi-s (adjuncts) have been classified into sApeksha and nirapeksha. When there are two pots in the same place, they are sApeksha upAdhi. When the two pots are in different places, they are nirapeksha upAdhi. It is postulated that space delimited by the two pots in the first is the same, whereas in the latter, it is different.

The manovRtti (mental cognition) of "this" is located in the same place as the avidyAvRtti (of silver), thus the consciousness delimited by two upAdhi-s is the same.

One of the theories of error (khyAti vAda) is akhyAti vAda, postulated by the prAbhAkara mImAmsaka. According to him, there is no illusion at all. In the cognition of shell-silver, he says that the eyes reveal this, the silver is recalled by memory. Owing to a lack of discrimination between the perception of "this" and the memory of "silver", leads to the transaction "this is silver". He does not concede that a cognition of the nature "this is silver" arises.

Now, the advaitin accepts two vRtti-s in illusory cognitions - manovritti of "this" and avidyAvritti of "silver". It may be alleged that this position mirrors the prAbhAkAra-s position. vivaraNAchArya refutes this by saying that vRtti-s may be two, but jnAna is one. The phalam, the chaitanya that is reflected in the two vRtti-s is one.

अतएव अभियुक्तै: फलैक्यादैक्यं ज्ञानस्योच्यते | Therefore, (as both avidyAvRtti and manovRtti are present in the same place), the manifested consciousness is one and hence cognition is one.

नच - रूप्यादे: स्वज्ञानेऽध्यस्तत्वे रूप्यज्ञानस्य अज्ञाने भ्रमोत्पत्तिस्तज्ज्ञानेन तन्निवृत्तिरिति च स्यात्, अधिष्ठानाज्ञानज्ञानाभ्यामध्यासस्य जन्मनिवृत्त्योर्नियतत्वात्, ज्ञानं रजतमिति प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गाच्चेति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "If the shell silver etc is superimposed on the cognition of shell-silver, when one is ignorant of the cognition of shell-silver (the substratum) the illusion would arise, and by its knowledge (the cognition of shell-silver) the illusion would be destroyed, because of the rule that the ignorance of the substratum is the cause for illusions and the knowledge of the substratum is the cause for the sublation of illusions. It would also lead to the situation that the cognition that arises is "the cognition is silver", not "this is silver (because the substratum is partly seen in the illusion)".

The nyAyAmRtakAra is arguing based on a misunderstanding (or misstatement) of the advaitin's position that it is consciousness upon which illusions are superimposed (he is characterising the advaitin's position of dRshya being superimposed on dRk,  to mean objects being superimposed on cognition). Extending these too illusions, he argues that the object of illusions must be superimposed on illusory cognitions.

Extending this further he alleges that as the ignorance of the substratum leads to illusions, the ignorance of shell-silver cognition would lead to the appearance of shell-silver. Similarly, as the knowledge of the substratum destroys illusions, knowledge of shell-silver cognition would lead to the destruction of shell-silver.

The superimposition is between consciousness and objects, not cognitions and objects. The ignorance of shell undergoes modification into silver and silver cognition.

In the case of shell-silver illusion, the superimposition of the silver is not on the silver-cognition, but on the consciousness delimited by "this". At the time of the perception of silver as this, the consciousness delimited by "this" (idam amsha avacChinna chaitanya) happens to be the same as consciousness delimited by the cognition of silver (rajatAkAra vritti avacChinna chaitanya), being colocated, but the substratum of the silver is not the consciousness delimited by the cognition of silver, rather the substratum if consciousness delimited by "this".

रजताकारवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य रजतभ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वानभ्युपगमात्, इदमंशावच्छिन्नचैतन्यमेव तु रजतभ्रमाधिष्ठानम्, तच्च दैवाद्रजताकारवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यमपि, नैतावता भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वे तदपेक्षा |
Consciousness delimited by the cognition that takes the shape of silver is not admitted to be the substratum of the silver. Rather, it is the consciousness delimited by "this" alone that is the substratum to the illusory silver. It so happens that it is also the consciousness delimited by the cognition taking the shape of silver (at the time of the perception of the illusion). However by that much itself, it does not become the substratum.

Another argument was made by the nyAyAmRtakAra. In the illusion, "this is silver", the "this aspect" is known. If the consciousness delimited by "this" is the substratum of the silver, it is also known. Then how can it be argued that one was ignorant of the substratum, and that ignorance  caused the illusion? Here the substratum is known, but the illusion still occurs. Further, the knowledge of the substratum should destroy the illusion. Again, the substratum is known, but the illusion is not destroyed, it persists. Therefore, it must be accepted that the substratum of the illusion is not the "this" delimited consciousness.

To this, the siddhikAra replies, yes, the "this" delimited consciousness is the substratum, but the cause of the illusion of silver as "this" is the ignorance of "this" as shell. When "this" is known to be a shell, the illusion is destroyed.

Thus the general rule is - if the form of the substratum whose ignorance causes the illusion, becomes known, that is the knowledge that destroyes the illusion and not any general knowledge of the substratum.

तस्य च भ्रमविरोधिशुक्तित्वाद्याकारेणाज्ञानं भ्रमकारणम् | The cause of the illusion is the ignorance of consciousness delimited by "this" in its aspect as the shell that is in opposition to the illusion.

तेनाकारेण ज्ञानं भ्रमनिवर्तकम् | The knowledge of it in that aspect, removes the illusion.

It was argued by the nyAyAmRtakAra that saying that objects are superimposed on consciousness is like saying the silver is superimposed on the silver cognition. If that was true, one would have the knowledge "the cognition is silver" instead of "this is silver". The siddhikAra refutes this:
अतएव न ज्ञानं रजतमिति भ्रमाकारापत्ति:, वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नस्यैव ज्ञानत्वात्तस्यचाधिष्ठानत्वाभावात् | It is for this reason that there is no possibility of the illusion being of the nature "the cognition is silver", because knowledge is really consciousness delimited by cognition, and that is not the substratum.

अधिष्ठानतादात्म्येन चारोप्यप्रतीतिरिति इदं रजतमित्येव भ्रमाकार: | As superimpositions always appear identical to the substratum, the illusion can only be of the form: "this" is silver.

The nyAyAmRtakAra continues assuming that objects are superimposed on their cognitions.
ननु - घटादे: स्वसन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियजन्यस्वज्ञानात् पूर्वे सत्त्वेन तत्राध्यासो न युक्त: |
He says - "Known objects like pots etc, must exist prior to their cognition, because their cognition is born from the contact of the senses with those objects. Thus, to say they are superimposed there, is inappropriate."

नच - या घटेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षजा वृत्तिस्तया घटो नो प्रकाश्य: | येन च प्रकाश्यो घटाधिष्ठानचैतन्येन न तत्सन्निकर्षजमिति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued (by the advaitin) that - The pot is not illuminated by the cognition that is born from the contact of the senses with the pot. The consciousness that illuminates the pot is its substratum, which is not born from the contact with senses.

That is incorrect because:

वृत्त्यतिरिक्तज्ञाने मानाभावात् | There is no basis to claim that jnAna is anything but cognition.

अज्ञाननिवृत्तेरपि तत एव भावादिति The destruction of ignorance is only possible due to that alone.

 - चेन्न; the siddhikAra replies, this is not correct.

Cognitions (vRtti) is called jnAna only figuratively. The real meaning of jnAna is consciousness alone. In the vivaraNait is said अन्त:करणवृत्तौ ज्ञानत्वोपचारात् - mental cognitions are figuratively referred to as jnAna.

The advaitin's position is that there must be something other than the thought which makes one aware of the thought, that is consciousness. Further, knowing that one does not know something is also because of consciousness. Before one knows the unknown using the thought, there has to be something which tells him he doesn't know that thing. 

वृत्त्युदयात् प्रागज्ञातार्थसिद्ध्यर्थं वृत्त्यतिरिक्तज्ञानस्यावश्यमभ्युपेयत्वात् | Prior to the rise of cognition (to know a hitherto unknown object), one must certainly accept a jnAna (consciousness) other than the cognition itself to be aware of the existence of an unknown object.

अन्यथा तस्य साधकाभावेन शशशृङ्गतुल्यतया सन्निकर्षतज्जन्यज्ञानहेतुत्वेन प्राक् सत्त्वकल्पना निष्प्रामाणिकी स्यात् | If that consciousness is not accepted, there is nothing to prove the existence of the unknown object, and as its cognition is only born from the contact of that object with senses, prior to the rise of cognition, the postulation of the object's existence would be without basis.

तस्माद्यादृशस्यघटादेरिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाश्रयत्वेन ज्ञानकारणत्वं तादृशस्य साधकं किञ्चिन्मानमवश्यमभ्युपेयम् |
Therefore, in order for objects such as pots, etc. to be said to be one of the causes of their cognitions, on account of the contact of the senses with objects, there has to be some independent basis accepted for the existence of those objects. 

अन्यथाऽन्वयव्यतिरेकयोरग्रहेण कार्यकारणभावाग्रहात् सर्वमानमेयादिव्यवस्थोच्छिद्येत | Otherwise, as a cause-effect relationship is not known because co-presence and co-absence are not known, all empirical activity involving knowledge and the known is lost.

If that consciousness is not accepted, every activity in the world based on the knowledge of things would be harmed, for the cause effect relationship would be absent, as the existence of the cause (objects) prior to the effect (their cognitions) is not known, neither is the absence of the cause prior to the knowledge of the effect known.

Before the rise of knowledge of the object, one has to know that such an object exists. The knowledge of the object's existence leads to the knowledge of the object itself. The knowledge of the object itself cannot prove the existence of the object, because the object is admitted to be the cause of its cognition.

तच्च मानं न वृत्तिरूपं ; तदानीं वृत्तिकारणाप्रवृत्तेरिति तद्विलक्षणं नित्यं स्वप्रकाशमेकमेव लाघवात्, That basis (for the existence of objects) cannot be a cognition, because the cause for the cognitions is not present. By the principle of parsimony, it must be something different from the cognition, eternal, self evident and one.

(Continued here).