paricCheda 1 - pratyakshasya Agama bAdhyatvam

अथ प्रत्यक्षस्यागमबाध्यत्वम्
The next chapter is the argument that perception can be overruled by shruti

किञ्च परीक्षितप्रमाणभावशब्दबाध्यमपि प्रत्यक्षम् | Perception is capable of being overruled by validated verbal testimony. The opponent objects to this.

ननु - प्रत्यक्षं यदि शब्दबाध्यं स्यात्तदा जैमिनिना 'तस्माद्धूम एवाग्नेर्दिवा ददृशे नार्चि' इत्याद्यर्थवादस्यात् 'अदितिर्द्यौ' रित्यादिमन्त्रस्य दृष्टविरोधेनाप्रामाण्ये प्राप्ते, गुणवादस्तु 'गुणादविप्रतिषेध: स्या' दित्यादिना गौणार्थता नोच्येत, 'तत्सिद्धिजातिसारूप्यप्रशंसाभूमलिङ्गसमवाया' इति तत्सिद्धिपेटिकायाम् 'यजमान: प्रस्तर' इत्यादेर्गौणार्थता च नोच्येत, त्वयापि प्रत्यक्षाविरोधाय तत्त्वम्पदयोर्लक्षणा नोच्येत, श्रुतिविरोधे प्रत्यक्षस्यैव प्रामाण्यसम्भवात्,

ननु - प्रत्यक्षं यदि शब्दबाध्यं स्यात्तदा If perception is capable of being overruled by verbal testimony, then,

जैमिनिना 'तस्माद्धूम एवाग्नेर्दिवा ददृशे नार्चि' इत्याद्यर्थवादस्य 'अदितिर्द्यौ ' रित्यादिमन्त्रस्य दृष्टविरोधेनाप्रामाण्ये प्राप्ते, गुणवादस्तु 'गुणादविप्रतिषेध: स्या' दित्यादिना गौणार्थता नोच्येत, Eulogistic statements such as "Therefore, it is smoke alone that is perceptible in daytime, not fire" and mantras which say "The sky is Aditi", etc. would end up overruling perception, and Jaimini would not have held that shruti cannot be contradictory to perception and attributed a figurative meaning to shruti when it is contradictory with that which is directly seen. 

'तत्सिद्धिजातिसारूप्यप्रशंसाभूमलिङ्गसमवाया' इति तत्सिद्धिपेटिकायाम् 'यजमान: प्रस्तर' इत्यादेर्गौणार्थता च नोच्येत, Jaimini, in the tatsiddhi peTikA of the mImAmsa sUtra-s (peTikA - a collection of adhikaraNas (topics) all having the same import), would not have outlined the six circumstances under which the shruti would take a figurative meaning, like in the case of the vedic sentence "The sacrificer is the prastara, (clump of darbha grass)".

Lord Jaimini prescribes six circumstances where the primary meaning of a word used in shruti is discarded, and a secondary, figurative meaning needs to be adopted:

1) tatsiddhi - where a thing performs the function of the other. For example, the vedic sentence 'yajamAna: prastara:' refers to the yajamAna (sacrificer) as a prastara, a clump of darbha grass. Here the prastara is a substitute for the sacrificer, and can be used in situations in place of the sacrificer when he is physically absent. 

2) jAti - where the same characteristic possessed by two things is the basis for a word referring to one thing directly is instead used to imply the other. For example, the vedic sentence 'agnir brAhmaNa:' refers to the brAhmaNa as agni on account of both agni and brAhmaNa being born from the mouth of virAT . Again the brAhmaNa is not fire in reality, only figuratively.

3) sArUpya - where similarity is the basis for comparison. For example, the vedic sentence 'Adityo yUpah' where the sacrificial post, the yUpa, which has been newly painted, is figuratively referred to as the sun because both shine brilliantly. This is a case of the yUpa being compared to the sun, again a figurative usage.

4) prashamsA - praise. For example, the vedic sentence 'apashavo vA anye go ashvebhya:', where the veda says that animals other than the cow and horse are not animals at all. The aim of the veda is not to actually claim that the other animals are not animals in fact, but to praise the cow and horse.

5) bhUma - if a majority of things share a common ground, then the usage of the word to convey the majority only also includes the minority. E.g. the sentence 'sRShTi: upadadhAti' - here, the word sRShTi refers to a kind of brick used in the construction of the yajnavedi, the sacrificial altar. There are several mantras that contain the word 'sRShTi:' which are recited during the construction of the altar (upadhAna). In addition to these mantras, a few other mantras that occur in the same location are also to be chanted. Thus on the basis that a majority of the mantras refer to a common ground (bhUma), the word sRShTi: refers to both the many mantras that explicitly contain with the word, and those few that do not.

6) linga samavAya - presence of indicatory attributes. The sentence 'prANabhRt upadadhAti' - here prANAbhRt refers to another kind of brick used in the yajnavedi construction. Only the first mantra chanted when constructing the vedi contains the word prANAbhrt, the remaining mantras contain only the word prANa. Thus by prANabhRt, not only is the mantra containing the exact word prANabhRt meant, but also other mantras containing the word prANa.

The opponent continues:

त्वयापि प्रत्यक्षाविरोधाय तत्त्वम्पदयोर्लक्षणा नोच्येत, श्रुतिविरोधे प्रत्यक्षस्यैव अप्रामाण्यसम्भवात्, If you (the advaitin) had really held that, in places where shruti and perception are contradictory to each other, it is perception alone that is rendered invalid, you (the advaitin) too would not have taken the implied meaning of the terms "You" and "That" in the mahAvAkya "You are That" in order to avoid a contradiction with perception.

He assumes a reply that the advaitin would give and refutes it next.

नच - तात्पर्यलिङ्गानामुपक्रमादीनामत्र सत्त्वान्नद्वैतश्रुतीनाममुख्यार्थत्वमिति - वाच्यम्;

You may say "In this case (the mahAvAkya), as the indicatory marks of import (tAtparya linga) such as the beginning (and etc.) are present, shruti statements that talk of absolute Oneness cannot be said to take a non-primary meaning (amukhyArtham)", but that would be incorrect, because:

'यजमान: प्रस्तर' इत्यादावपूर्वत्वाद्येकैकलिङ्गस्य तात्पर्यग्राहकस्य विद्यमानत्वात्  | Because, in vedic statements such as "the sacrificer is the prastara", a single indicatory mark of import - uniqueness - exists. You may say that multiple indicatory marks would be required, but:

एकैकलिङ्गस्य तात्पर्यनिर्णायकत्वे लिङ्गानन्तरमनुवादकमेव, त्वन्मते प्रत्यक्षसिद्धे भेदे श्रुतिरिव, किं बाहुल्येन इति
Even if there is one indicatory mark, that should be sufficient to prove the import of the shruti, and any other indicatory mark would only serve as a repetition of it. You agree that repetition should be ignored - for in the context of shruti statements that refer to difference, you argue that shruti is not conveying difference as real, rather it is merely repeating difference that is perceived.

In summary, the opponent is arguing that multiple indicatory marks are not required to indicate the intention of shruti. Even one indicatory mark is sufficient to convey import. Such an individual, indicatory mark is present in the vedic sentence "the sacrificer is the prastara", thus conveying that such a meaning must be the import of the shruti. If that is the import of shruti, the sacrificer must be said to be the lump of grass in a direct sense. However, the principles of mImAmsa rule that shruti is only figuratively comparing the sacrificer to the lump of grass. Hence, the advaitin must admit that when shruti and perception contradict, it is shruti that needs to discard its primary meaning and take a secondary meaning - perception is incontrovertible. If shruti statements such as "There is no multiplicity here whatsoever" are cited to prove the world's unreality, it must be admitted that such a statement is only being made in a secondary, figurative sense. The world is very much real.

The siddhikAra replies:
- चेन्न; No.
The basic argument that is going to be advanced by the siddhikAra is that the instances where the meaning of shruti was adjusted were cases where the direct meaning was in contradiction with perception, whereas advaita shruti is not in contradiction with perception at all.

वाक्यशेषप्रमाणान्तरसंवादार्थक्रियादिपरीक्षापरीक्षितस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य प्राबल्येन व्यवहारदशायामेव एतद्विरुद्धार्थग्राहिणो 'धूम एवाग्नेर्दिवा ददृशे' 'अदितिद्यौ' 'र्यजमान: प्रस्तर' इत्यादेस्तद्विरुद्धेनामुख्यार्थत्वेऽपि अद्वैतागमस्य परीक्षितप्रमाणाविरोधाभावेन मुख्यार्थत्वोपपत्ते: |

वाक्यशेषप्रमाणान्तरसंवादार्थक्रियादिपरीक्षापरीक्षितस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य प्राबल्येन The tests for the validity of perception are if a) the subsequent words in a sentence (correspond to what was perceived), b) other means of knowledge corrorborate it, and c) the objects of perception fulfil a practical utility
व्यवहारदशायामेव एतद्विरुद्धार्थग्राहिणो 'धूम एवाग्नेर्दिवा ददृशे' 'अदितिद्यौ' 'र्यजमान: प्रस्तर' इत्यादेस्तद्विरुद्धेनामुख्यार्थत्वेऽपि and because a contradiction with such a validated perception is observed even in a transactional sense in vedic sentences such as "In the day, the smoke alone is seen", "the sky is the Aditi", and "the sacrificer is the prastara", etc., it is said that those shruti sentences take a non-primary meaning.

अद्वैतागमस्य परीक्षितप्रमाणाविरोधाभावेन मुख्यार्थत्वोपपत्ते: | Whereas as shruti statements conveying the absolute Oneness of reality do not contradict any other validated means of knowledge, one must attribute their meaning to be conveyed in a direct, literal sense.

प्रत्यक्षादेर्हि परीक्षया व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यमात्रं सिद्धम् ; तच्च नाद्वैतागमेन बाध्यते, बाध्यते तु तात्त्विकं प्रामाण्यम्, तत्तु परीक्षया न सिद्धमेव, अतो न विरोध: |
The validity of perception that is established by testing is only a transactional validity. Such a validity does not contradict advaita shruti-s. If there was an absolutely valid means of knowledge that had contradicted advaita-shruti, one would have to concede that the latter was invalid. However, no means of testing of perception can prove its ultimate validity (ie no means of testing perception can prove that its object is unsublated in all three periods of time). Therefore, there is no contradiction at all between a perception whose domain is transactional, and advaita-shruti whose domain is transcendental.

'धूम एवाग्ने' रित्यादेस्तु मुख्यार्थत्वे प्रत्यक्षादेर्व्यावहारिकम् प्रामाण्यं व्याहन्येत | अतो विरोधात्तत्रामुख्यार्थत्वमिति विवेक: | If vedic sentences such as "In the day, smoke alone is seen" were to convey their meaning in a literal sense, the validity of perception in a transactional sense itself would be called into question. That would be a contradiction, and therefore in such instances, shruti is said to take a figurative meaning.

यत्तु - प्रत्यक्षाविरोधाय तत्त्वंपदयोर्लक्षणा नाश्रीयेतेति - तन्न; If it is said "There would be no need to resort to the implied meanings of "You" and "That" in order to avoid a contradiction with perception, (because according to the advaitin, there is no contradiction in the first place)" - that would be incorrect.


षड्विधलिङ्गैर्गतिसामान्येन चाखण्ड एवावधार्यमाणस्य तात्पर्यस्यानुपपत्ते: जीवेशगतसर्वज्ञत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वादीनामैक्यान्वयेऽनुपपत्तेश्च तात्पर्यविषयीभूताखण्डप्रतीतिनिर्वाहाय लक्षणाङ्गीकरणस्यैवोचितत्वात्, तात्पर्यवीषयीभूतान्वयनिर्वाहाय लक्षणाश्रयणस्य सर्वत्र दर्शनात् |
षड्विधलिङ्गैर्गतिसामान्येन चाखण्ड एवावधार्यमाणस्य तात्पर्यस्यानुपपत्ते: It has been determined, by means of the six indicatory marks of import being in unison, that the ultimate import of shruti is to convey the absolute impartite Oneness of jIva and Brahman. 
जीवेशगतसर्वज्ञत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वादीनामैक्यान्वयेऽनुपपत्तेश्च (In the absence of taking the implied meaning), the identity of the jIva, endowed with limited knowledge, with Ishvara, endowed with omniscience, cannot  be logically conveyed in the sentence.
तात्पर्यविषयीभूताखण्डप्रतीतिनिर्वाहाय लक्षणाङ्गीकरणस्यैवोचितत्वात्, तात्पर्यवीषयीभूतान्वयनिर्वाहाय लक्षणाश्रयणस्य सर्वत्र दर्शनात् | Therefore, it is for the right understanding of that impartite Oneness, which happens to be the ultimate import of shruti that the the terms "You", referring to the jIva, and "That", referring to Brahman, take their implied meanings (and not in a bid to avoid contradiction with perception). For, it is commonly accepted everywhere, that in order to logically convey the import of scripture, implication is resorted to.

नच - एवं सति अमुख्यार्थत्वं स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that if implication is resorted to, the primary meaning is given up.

तद्धि प्रतीयमानार्थपरित्यागेनार्थान्तरपरत्वं वा, अशक्यार्थत्वं वा | That (giving up the primary meaning) can either mean that the apparent meaning is discarded and something else is adopted, or that an indirect meaning denoted by the word is conveyed.

नाद्य:, सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतीयमानस्यैक्यस्यात्यागात्।
The former does not apply here, because the apparent meaning of the sentence "You are that" arrived at by observing that the case-endings of the terms are the same, is one of identity -  which is not given up by us.

नान्त्यः, जहदजहल्लक्षणाश्रयणेन शक्यैकदेशपरित्यगेऽपि 'सोऽयं देवदत्त' इत्यादिवाक्य एव शक्यैकदेशस्यान्वयाभ्युपगमात्, विशेषणबाधेन विशेष्यमात्रान्वयस्यैवात्र लक्षणाशब्देन व्यपदेशात् |
Nor can it be the latter, because even though by means of jahadajahallakshaNA, a part of the primary denoted meaning of the word is discarded, our interpretation of the sentence adopts another part of the primary denoted meaning, like in the case of the sentence "He is the very same Devadatta (that was seen previously)". The meaning of the term lakshaNA, or implication, in this context is that while the qualifiers are given up, the underlying object is retained in arriving at the sentence meaning of identity. It is not that something else altogether is taken up instead of the primary meaning.

तथा चोक्तं वाचास्पतिमिश्रै: - 'प्रस्तरादिवाक्यमन्यशेषत्वादमुख्यार्थम्, अद्वैतवाक्यं त्वनन्यशेषत्वान्मुख्यार्थमेव  | This has been echoed by the revered Vachaspati Misra - "Sentences such as 'the sacrificer is the prastara' take a figurative meaning, being subordinate to some other (injunctive) sentence, whereas as sentences speaking of advaita (Oneness) independently convey their import, they take a primary meaning.  
उक्तं हि शाबरभाष्ये - 'न विधौ पर: शब्दार्थ इती' ति  || As has been argued in the 'Shabara bhAShya' - "The injunction cannot take a secondary meaning". 
यथाचापूर्वत्वाद्येकैकतात्पर्यलिङ्गेन 'यजमान प्रसतर' इत्याद्यर्थवादवाक्यानां न स्वार्थपरत्वं तथा वक्ष्याम: | We will later show how sentences such as "the sacrificer is the prastara", etc., by merely containing single indications of import such as uniqueness,  cannot take their meaning just based on the direct meaning of their words. 

It was said that sentences that are subordinate to some other sentences do not take a primary meaning, whereas sentences that are not subordinate to other sentences do take a primary meaning. The opponent objects to this. He argues:
ननु - अन्यशेषत्वानन्यशेषत्वे नामुख्यार्थत्वमुख्यार्थवयो: प्रयोजके, किं तु मानान्तरविरोधाविरोधौ; अन्यशेषेऽपि मानन्तरविरोधे 'इयं गौ: क्रय्या बहुक्षीरे' त्यादौ लोके 'सोऽरोदी' दित्यादौ च वेदे प्रस्तरादिवाक्यवदमुख्यवृत्तेरनाश्रयणात्,

ननु - अन्यशेषत्वानन्यशेषत्वे नामुख्यार्थत्वमुख्यार्थवयो: प्रयोजके, किं तु मानान्तरविरोधाविरोधौ; Being subordinate to another, or not, does not imply the sentence takes a secondary or primary meaning. Rather it is dependent on whether the sentence is contradicted by some other means of knowledge or not.

अन्यशेषेऽपि मानन्तराविरोधे 'इयं गौ: क्रय्या बहुक्षीरे' त्यादौ लोके, 'सोऽरोदी' दित्यादौ च वेदे प्रस्तरादिवाक्यवदमुख्यवृत्तेरनाश्रयणात्, Because, even ordinary sentences such as "This cow ought to be bought because it gives a large quantity of milk", which happens to be subordinate (to the intended instruction to buy the cow), or vedic sentences such as "He wept" (which is subordinate to the prohibition of offering silver in a sacrifice), it is not accepted that they take a secondary meaning, like in the case of the sentence "the sacrificer is the prastara".

The opponent is referring to a sentence in the veda, which occurs in the context of a prohibition of offering silver as dakshiNA in a sacrifice. The veda recalls a story where "He (Rudra) wept", and those tears formed silver. The opponent argues that the sentence "He wept" is subordinate to the prohibition, but it takes a primary meaning. Similarly, the sentence advertising the qualities of the cow ("It gives a lot of milk") is made to encourage the buyer to purchase it. Thus, it too is subordinate to the intention of the speaker that the buyer purchases it from him. In both cases, the sentences take the direct meanings of the words, despite being subordinate to some other sentence. 

अनन्यशेषेऽपि 'सोमेन यजेते' त्यादौ वैयधिकरण्येनान्वये विरुद्धत्रिकद्वयापत्त्या सामानाधिकरण्येनान्वये प्रत्यक्षाविरोधाय च सोमवता योगेनेति मत्वर्थलक्षणाया आश्रयणात् |
And conversely, sentences such as "one should sacrifice with the soma juice" which are not subordinate to another on account of them being Injunctions, it is accepted that the sentence meaning is arrived at by employing possessive indication i.e. 'matvartha'  lakshaNA and interpreted as "by the sacrifice containing the use of soma, (one attains heaven)", and other interpretations such as sAmAnAdhikaraNya anvaya (colocated connection) and vaiyadhikaraNya anvaya (non-colocated connection) are discarded on account of being contrary to perception and leading to the contradiction of three pairs, respectively.

The details of why matvartha lakshaNA is applicable whereas sAmAnAdhikaraNya anvaya and vaiyadhikaraNa anvaya are not, is not particularly relevant to the main discussion here. Suffice it to say, even in injunctions such as 'somena yajeta', which are not subordinate to any other sentence, the sentence meaning is arrived at by implication (lakshaNA). 

However, for the sake of completion, an explanation is provided below. Those not interested in such minutiae, can ignore the section between the two sets of asterisks below.

In the case of sAmAnAdhikaraNya anvaya, the injunction 'somena yajeta' is interpreted as 'somena yAgena iShTam bhAvayet' ("Through the sacrifice, the soma, one ought to achieve the desired object"). Here, the words soma and yAga, have the same case-ending, which means that they both refer to the same object - that is they are the same. This is incorrect, for the word soma refers to the creeper and the word yAga refers to the sacrifice. Thus, a sAmAnAdhikaraNya anvaya of the injunction contradicts perception.

If it was instead argued that one ought to interpret the sentence in such a way that the case-endings of soma and yAga are different (vaiyadhikaraNya anvaya), this is achieved by splitting the injunction into two sub-clauses - 'somena yAgam bhAvayet' (perform the sacrifice with soma), and 'yAgena iShTam bhAvayet' (attain one's desires through the sacrifice). Here, the word yAga in the first sub-clause is in the second case and in the second sub-clause, it is in the third case - thhus the problem of contradicting perception is avoided. However, we have another contradiction in that the word yAga ends up having three attributes in the first sub-clause which contradict the attributes the same word has in the second sub-clause. 

To explain, in the first sub-clause 'somena yAgam bhAvayet', meaning - by means of the soma, one ought to perform the sacrifice - the word yAga, is
a) the pradhAna, the primary (to perform the sacrifice, soma is used)  
b) the anuvAdya, it is statement of a known thing. 
c) the uddeshya, the object (of the clause).

Whereas, in the second sub-clause 'yAgena iShTam bhAvayet', meaning - by means of the sacrifice, one ought to attain heaven - the same word yAga is
a) the guNa, secondary (heaven is the primary, sacrifice is the secondary)
b) the vidheya, that which is prescribed to attain the unknown / unattained (the performance of the sacrifice is prescribed).
c) the upAdeya, the means (the sacrifice is the means to attain heaven).

Now pradhAnatva is contradictory to guNatva, anuvAdyatva is contradictory to vidheyatva, and uddeshyatva is contradictory to upAdeyatva. Therefore, an interpretation of the injunction into two sub-clauses is also unacceptable. 

There this injunction is interpreted using matvartha lakshaNA, that is, the possessive suffix 'matup',  is applied thus - somavatA yAgena iShTam bhAvayet to mean 'the desired heaven is to be attained using the sacrifice endowed with  / containing soma'.

एवं विचारविधायके - 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासे' ति सूत्रे 'तद्विजिज्ञासास्वे' ति श्रुतौ मानान्तराविरोधेन विध्यन्वयाय जिज्ञासाशब्देन विचारलक्षणाया: 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मे' त्यादौ चामुख्यार्थताया: स्वीकृतत्वात्, सर्वस्यापि वाक्यस्यावाच्ये ब्रह्मणि लक्षणाया एवेष्टत्वेनामुख्यार्थत्वनिषेधायोगाच्च, अन्वयानुपपत्तेस्तात्पर्यानुपपत्तेर्वा लक्षणाबीजस्य विध्यविधिसाधारणत्वाच्च, शाबरं तु वचनमर्थवादमुख्यत्वाय विधौ न लक्षनेत्येवंपरम् ;
Therefore, in the sUtra 'Now then an enquiry into Brahman', which is an injunction to enquire, and the shruti 'May you enquire into That', the meaning of the word jijnAsa is interpreted as 'enquiry', so that it does not contradict what is otherwise known and so that the syntactical connection in the context of an injunction is possible (that is, it is not possible to enjoin someone to 'desire knowledge of' anything, which is the primary meaning of the word jijnAsa. In vedic sentences like 'Everything is verily Brahman', it is accepted that the secondary meaning is taken - for it is accepted by the advaitin that all sentences that refer to Brahman, which is beyond the reach of words, do so by implication - therefore it is not possible to deny secondary meanings in such sentences. (If it is argued that an enquiry into Brahman is not an injunction), irrespective of whether a sentence is an injunction or not, the basis for resorting to implication is either if the syntactical connection of primary meanings is impossible or if the primary meaning is not the import of the sentences. In the case of the quotation by Shabara, it is to say that arthavAda (eulogistic passages) take secondary meaning that he says that in injunctions one cannot use secondary meanings.

तस्मान्न प्रत्यक्षं शब्दबाध्यं Therefore, perception is incapable of being sublated by verbal cognition. 

In summary, the siddhikAra had cited Vachaspati Misra and Shabara to argue that subordinate sentences must be reinterpreted to be in line with the sentences that they depend upon, and therefore take a secondary meaning, whereas, sentences that are independent pramANas must be understood to take a primary meaning. The opponent refuted this by saying that being subordinate to another sentence or otherwise does not imply taking a primary meaning or otherwise - rather it is the presence or absence of a contradiction by another means of knowledge that implies a primary or secondary denotation. If verbal cognition, born from vedic sentences, is contradicted by perception, then it is the vedic sentence that ought to be reinterpreted, and not perception that is overruled.

The siddhikAra replies to this.

- इति चेन्न; भावानवबोधात् | If this is your argument, you have not understood our meaning.

तात्पर्यविषयीभूतार्थबोधकत्वम् हि मुख्यार्थत्वं, न शक्यार्थमात्रबोधकत्वम्; अन्यार्थतात्पर्यकत्वाच्चामुख्यार्थत्वम्; न लाक्षणिकत्वमात्रम्  | Primary meaning is that which is the true import of the sentence, and not the direct meaning of words alone. Secondary meaning is that which is something other than the true import of the sentence, and not the implied meaning alone.

तथा चाद्वैतागमस्य स्वतात्पर्यविषयीभूतार्थबोधकत्वनिर्वाहाय लक्षनाश्रयणेऽपि मुख्यार्थत्वमुपपन्नमित्यवोचाम |
Therefore we say that advaita shruti, if it resorts to implication in order to convey its true import, then it is still conveying its primary meaning.

एवं च 'सोमेन यजेते'-त्यादिविशिष्टविधेर्विशेषणे तात्पर्याभावान्मत्वर्थलक्षणायामपि स्वार्थापरित्यागाच्च नामुख्यार्थत्वम् |
Similarly, even though the import of the qualified injunction 'perform the sacrifice with soma', which is interpreted by possessive indication to mean 'perform the sacrifice endowed with soma', is not in the qualifier (soma) - because the interpretation does not abandon its import (which is an injunction to perform the sacrifice), the sentence cannot be said to convey a non-primary meaning.

जिज्ञासापदे तु ज्ञाधातुनेष्यमाणज्ञानलक्षणाङ्गीकारानङ्गीकारमतभेदेऽपि सन्प्रत्ययस्य विचारे जहल्लक्षणाभ्युपगमस्योभयत्र तुल्यत्वात् शक्यार्थपरित्यागेऽपि विधितात्पर्यनिर्वाहात् नामुख्यार्थत्वम् |

On the other hand, even though in relation to the term, jijnAsa - which, being formed by the root jnA- (to know) and the desiderative suffix -san, means a desire to know - there is a difference of opinion as to whether it is possible to desire knowledge or not; in either case, this word is interpreted through jahallakshaNA, to mean enquiry. That is, both schools accept that the primary denotative meaning is renounced. Despite this, as the desired sense of an 'injunction' is accomplished, we conclude that the sentence has not taken its secondary meaning.

न हि वाक्यार्थप्रतीत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या पदमात्रे लक्षणायामपि वाक्यस्यामुख्यार्थत्वम् ; प्रतीतस्यानन्यशेषत्वेन मुख्यार्थत्वात् |
If it is not possible to convey the meaning of a sentence without resorting to the secondary meaning of its constituent words, it does not result in the sentence meaning becoming secondary, because, as the meaning is not subordinate to anything else, it is primary.

यत्र पुन: प्रतीत एव वाक्यार्थोऽन्यविशेषत्वेन कल्प्यते, तत्र वाक्यस्यामुख्यार्थत्वमेव | However, where the meaning of the sentence is subordinate to something else, it is a secondary meaning, even if the meanings of all the words in the sentence are primary.

अन्यद्धि पदतात्पर्यमन्यच्च वाक्यतात्पर्यम् ; 'सैन्धवमानय' 'गङ्गायां वसन्ती' त्यादौ वाक्यतात्पर्यैक्येऽपि पदतात्पर्यभेदात्, 'विषं भुङ्क्ष्वे' त्यादौ पदतात्पर्याभेदेऽपि वाक्यतात्पर्यभेदात् |
The import of sentences and words are distinct. In the case of sentences like, 'Bring the saindhava', or 'They stay on the Ganga', the sentence-import is the same, despite the word-import being different (the word saindhava could refer to either salt or a horse, and the word ganga can either refer to the river, or its bank), whereas in sentences such as 'Consume poison', despite the word-import being the same, the sentence-import can be different (either a statement asking someone "to consume poison", or a statement enjoining the listener not to dine in someone's house because "it would be as good as consuming poison").

अत एव ' इयं गौ: क्रय्या बहुक्षीरे' त्यादि वाक्यार्थस्यावश्यम् क्रेतव्येति विधिशेषत्वेन तत्प्राशस्त्यलक्षकत्वात्, 'सोऽरोदी' दित्यादिवाक्यार्थस्य च 'बर्हिषि रजतं न देयं हिरण्यं दक्षिणे' ति विधिशेषत्वेन रजतनिन्दाद्वार तत्प्राशस्त्यलक्षकत्वात् 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानि' ति वाक्यार्थस्य 'शान्त उपासीते' ति शमविधिशेषत्वेनात्यनायाससिद्धत्वरूपतत्प्राशस्त्यलक्षकत्वादमुख्यत्वमेव |
Therefore, in the examples cited, such as -
"This cow is worth buying as it gives a lot of milk" is subordinate to the speaker's intent to get a buyer "to buy the cow" and should be taken as indirectly indicating the excellence of the cow.
"He wept" is subordinate to the injunction, "silver should not be given as a sacrificial gift, which must be gold", and indirectly indicates the excellence of the gift of gold through the medium of deprecation of silver.
"Brahman is verily everything" is subordinate to the injunction "Meditate with calmness", and serves to indirectly indicate the excellence of meditation with calmness, which consists in it being very easily accomplished.

अत एव - मानान्तरविरोध एव लक्षाणेति - अपास्तम् ; 'इयं गौ: क्रय्या बहुक्षीरे' त्यादिना प्राशस्त्यलक्षणायाम् व्यभिचारात्, किं तु परमतात्पर्यविषयीभूतार्थप्रतीतिनिर्वाहायैव सर्वार्थवादेषु लक्षणा, 
Therefore, the opponent's contention that - it is only when there is a contradiction with another means of knowledge that implication is resorted to - has been refuted. For an indirect indication of excellence occurs in the sentence "This cow should be bought as it gives a lot of milk", even when it is not contrary to any other cognition. Rather, we conclude that in all eulogistic passages, we resort to secondary meaning only for the purpose of bringing about the correct understanding of the import of the passage.

एतावांस्तु विशेष: - विधिप्राशस्त्ये लक्षणात: प्रागर्थवादवाक्यार्थज्ञानं, तस्य प्रमाणान्तरविरोधे बाध एव; यथा 'प्रजापतिरात्मनो वपामुदक्खिद' दित्यादौ | अत एव तत्र गुणवादमात्रम्, 
This is the only difference - Where the eulogistic passage occurring before an injunction is contradictory to another valid cognition, such as in the instance of "prajApati cut out his own marrow and offered it in sacrifice", then it is clearly rejected as false. In such cases it is only a guNavAda.

प्रमाणान्तरप्राप्तौ त्वनुवादमात्रम् 'अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषज' मित्यादौ | whereas, if it is repeating something already known, then it is an anuvAda, and not an authoritative means of knowledge, like in the vedic sentence "fire is the remedy for cold".
अत एव तदुभयत्राबाधिताज्ञातज्ञापकत्वरूपप्रामाण्यानिर्वाहादप्रामाण्यम् | Therefore, in both cases, as the meaning conveyed by them is contradicted, or is not something hitherto unknown, they are not considered a valid and authoritative means of knowledge.
यत्र पुन: प्रमाणान्तरप्राप्तिविरोधौ न स्तस्तत्र प्रामाण्यशरीरनिर्वहात् भूतार्थवादत्वम् - यथा 'इन्द्रो वृत्राय वज्रमुदयच्छ' दित्यादौ, अयमेव देवताधिकरणन्याय: | However, where the meaning is otherwise unknown and is uncontradicted by any other valid cognition, the validity and authoritativeness of the text is very much present, like in the instance of bhUtArthavAda. Like for example the sentence, "Indra killed Vritra with his thunderbolt" is not contradicted by another valid means of knowledge, nor does it reveal something otherwise known. This alone has been explained in the devatA adhikaraNa section of the brahma sUtra.

The opponent interjects:
ननु - 'तर्ह्यादित्यो यूप' इत्यादौ वाक्यार्थप्रतीत्यर्थमेव लक्षणाङ्गीकारादमुख्यार्थत्वम् न स्यात् ; "If that is the case, in sentences such as 'The sun is the sacrificial post', etc., their secondary interpretation (lakshaNA) would be accepted only to reveal the sentence-import, and it would not be possible to regard those sentences taking a secondary meaning".

The siddhikAra responds:
न स्याद्यद्यादित्यसदृशो यूप इति वाक्यार्थपर्यवसानं स्यात्, किन्तु गुणवृत्त्या प्रतीतस्यापि वाक्यार्थस्य यूपे पशुं बध्नातीति विधिशेषत्वेन तत्प्राशस्त्यलक्षकत्वमस्त्येव, तेनैवामुख्यत्वं, न त्वादित्यपदगौणतयेति तत्सिद्धिपेटिकायां सर्वोदाहरणेष्ववान्तरवाक्यार्थप्रतीतये गुणवृत्तिप्रकारा: प्रदर्शिता इति द्रष्टव्यम् |
न स्याद्यद्यादित्यसदृशो यूप इति वाक्यार्थपर्यवसानं स्यात्, It would not be possible to regard that sentence taking a secondary meaning, if the meaning that we had ended up with was that "the sacrificial post is like the sun".
किन्तु गुणवृत्त्या प्रतीतस्यापि वाक्यार्थस्य यूपे पशुं बध्नातीति विधिशेषत्वेन तत्प्राशस्त्यलक्षकत्वमस्त्येव, However, despite there being an appearance of the sentence-meaning being arrived at by a secondary denotation,  it is in-fact arrived at by noting that it is subordinate to the injunction, "The animal is tied to the post", thereby conveying that that sentence serves only to denote the excellence of the post (to which the animal is to be bound) by indirect indication.
तेनैवामुख्यत्वं, न त्वादित्यपदगौणतयेति It is through that alone that the sentence is regarded as taking a secondary meaning and not due to the comparison being figurative through the use of the word "sun".

तत्सिद्धिपेटिकायां सर्वोदाहरणेष्ववान्तरवाक्यार्थप्रतीतये गुणवृत्तिप्रकारा: प्रदर्शिता इति द्रष्टव्यम् | Thus, in every example used in the topics in the mImAmsa sUtra-s comprising tat-siddhi, etc., secondary denotation is resorted to for the sake of the comprehension of other sentences that appear in connection with the examples cited. 

कर्मप्राशस्त्यलक्षणा च सर्वार्थवादसाधारणी तत्रास्त्येवेति नामुख्यार्थत्वानुपपत्ति: | As all eulogistic passages contain within them an indirect indication of excellence of an underlying ritual, this (praise) is present there (in all the examples included within the tat-siddhi sUtra-s), and therefore a secondary meaning is not incongruous.

अत उपपन्नं प्रस्तरादिवाक्यवैषम्यमद्वैतवाक्यस्य | Therefore, it is appropriate to hold that sentences with an advaita-import are quite different from eulogistic passages such as "the sacrificer is the prastara", and the rule applicable in the latter cannot be applied in the former.

यच्चोक्तमर्थवादमुख्यार्थत्वाय विधौ न लक्षणेत्येवंपरं शबरस्वामिवचनमिति, तन्न; When it was said by the opponent that the sentence in the Shabara bhAShya "We cannot resort to a secondary meaning for an Injunction" actually meant that "eulogistic passages need to take a secondary meaning", that cannot be correct.

The siddhikAra quotes an instance from the third chapter and fourth section of the
pUrva mImAmsa sUtra-s. The discussion pertains to a sacrifice called the "ashva pratigraha iShTi" (the sacrifice in connection with the gift of the horse) and in this context, there is a eulogistic passage occurring in the veda. PrajApati donated horses to VaruNa and as a result, he lost the divinity within himself and was afflicted by disease. To rid himself of the disease, he offered four potshards of oblations to VaruNa, which relieved him of the problem.

In this context, there is an injunction which uses the term "yAvato ashvAn pratigRhNIyAt tAvato varuNAn catuShkapAlAn nirvapet", which literally means "as many horses one receives in gift, so many oblations of four-potshards ought to be offered to VaruNa". This interpretation is deemed incorrect in pUrva mImAmsa, because in the story, it is PrajApati who gifts the horse, is afflicted by the disease, and makes a remedial offering of four-potshards to VaruNa. Therefore, the term "pratigRhNIyAt", meaning 'receives' is reinterpreted as "pratigrAhayet", meaning "making someone receive", therefore ensuring that it is the donor of the horse who has the responsibility of offering the four-potshards to varuNa. 

अश्वप्रतिग्रहेष्टौ 'प्रतिगृह्णीया' दिति विधौ प्रतिग्राहयेदिति व्यवधारणकल्पनाया अर्थवादानुसारेण प्रयोजकव्यापारलक्षणाया अङ्गीकारात् ; In the context of the sacrifice in connection with the gift of the horse, the term "receives" in the injunction is interpreted as "makes one receive", to be in concordance with the prior eulogistic passage and thus, it is accepted that the sense of the causal in the injunction is arrived at by a secondary indication.

तस्माद्विधौ तात्पर्यवति वाक्ये प्रतीयमानवाक्यार्थातिरिक्तोऽन्य: शेषी नास्तीत्येवंपरं तद्वचनम् | Therefore, it must be admitted that the right meaning of the Shabara bhAShya sentence is that "In an injunction which is of definite import, there is no other predominant factor other than the meaning of the sentence." 

अत: सिद्धमद्वैतागमस्य लाक्षणिकत्वेऽपि मुख्यार्थत्वात् प्रत्यक्षबाधकत्वमिति शिवम् Therefore, it is established that even if advaita sentences in the veda are taken in their indicated secondary denotation, the meanings arrived at are primary, and hence they are capable of overruling direct perception.

 || इति प्रत्यक्षस्यागमबाध्यत्वम् ||