paricCheda 1 - pratikUlatarka nirAkaraNam (part 2)
ननु - अविद्याध्यासस्यानादित्वेन दोषाद्यनपेक्षावदधिष्ठानानपेक्षापि स्यादिति - चेन्न ;
The opponent argues - As the superimposition of ignorance is beginningless, it does not require any defective cause, similarly it can also mean that the superimposition requires no substratum either.
The siddhikAra says - no.
जनकत्वेनाधिष्ठानानपेक्षायामप्याश्रयत्वेन तदपेक्षानियमात् | Even if the substratum is not needed for the rise of ignorance (it being beginningless), it necessarily requires a substratum for its locus.
परममहत्त्वादेराश्रयापेक्षावत् अध्यासस्य साधिष्ठानकत्वनियमेनात्रापि परतन्त्रत्वस्य समत्वात्, भास्यस्याविद्याध्यासस्य भासकतयाप्यधिष्ठानपेक्षणाच्च |
Like when it was accepted that classifications of size into parama mahat etc requires a locus, ignorance too needs a substratum because both are dependent on other things. Moreover, the superimposed ignorance being inert, requires the substratum to reveal it.
अविद्यावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्याविद्यादिसकलद्वैतद्रष्टृत्वात् तस्यैव चान्त:करणावच्छेदेन प्रमातृत्वात्, भ्रमप्रमयो: सामानाधिकरण्योपपत्तेर्भ्रमस्य समानाधिकरणप्रमानिवर्त्यत्वमुपपद्यते |
The consciousness delimited ignorance is the witness all duality, including ignorance itself. That alone when delimited by the mind becomes the knower. As incorrect and correct knowledge are admitted to share a common locus, it follows that the right knowledge of the locus leads to the sublation of the wrong knowledge.
ननु देहेन्द्रियादिकं विना कथमन्त:करणाध्यास:?
The opponent asks - how can there be a superimposition of the mind without the body and the sense organs?
काऽत्रानुपपत्ति: ? Why is this untenable?
अधिष्ठानापरोक्षत्वं हि अपरोक्षभ्रमे कारणम्, The perceptability of the substratum is the cause for direct misperception.
तत् यत्राधिष्ठानं स्वतो नापरोक्षम्, यथा शुक्त्याद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यम्, तत्र तदपरोक्षतार्थं देहेन्द्रियाद्यपेक्षा, Where the substratum is not self illuminated directly, like in the case of the shell-delimited consciousness etc, there is a requirement for the presence of the body, sense organs etc, for its direct perception.
प्रकृतेचाविद्यावच्छिन्नम् चैतन्यमधिष्ठानम्, तत्र चैतन्यस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वेनाविद्यायाश्च तदध्यस्तत्वेन तेनैव साक्षिणा अपरोक्षत्वात् कुत्र देहेन्द्रियाद्यपेक्षा? In the current situation, it is consciousness delimited by ignorance which is the substratum, and as consciousness is self-revealing, and as ignorance is superimposed on it, and it is itself directly illumined by the witness, why is there a requirement for the body and sense organs?
अथैवं प्रलये देहेन्द्रियाद्यभावेऽप्यज्ञानसद्भावेनान्त:करणाध्यासप्रसङ्ग:, (If this is the argument of the siddhAntin) There is no body and sense organs during pralaya, but it is said that ignorance exists then, there should be the superimposition of the mind.
The siddhAntin replies: न; No.
तदा देहेन्द्रियादिसर्जनविलम्बहेतुनैव तद्विलम्बसम्भवात्, During pralaya, the cause for the delay in the creation of the body and senses is the cause for the delay in the manifestation of the mind too.
अन्यथा तदा देहेन्द्रियादिकमपि कुतो नोत्पद्येत? Otherwise, why should the body and sense organs etc not be created during pralaya as well?
नच- दोषादीनामध्यस्तत्वेन तदभावस्य तात्त्विकत्वात्, अतात्तिवकत्वेन तात्त्विककार्यप्रतिबन्धस्यायुक्तत्वात् बौद्धेन दुष्टतया कल्पितस्य वेदजन्यज्ञानस्येव कल्पितदोषजन्यस्य द्वैतविज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यापात इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - As defects are superimposed, their absence must be real. Because defects are unreal, they cannot prevent reality from eventually being known. The negation of imaginary defects of the Veda postulated by the Buddhist, confers validity to the Vedas, similarly the negation of imaginary defects in the perception of duality should reinstate their validity.
बौद्धकल्पितस्य प्रातिभासिकदोषस्य व्यावहारिकवेदापेक्षया न्यूनसत्ताकत्वेन तदप्रामाण्याप्रयोजकत्वेऽप्यविद्याख्यदोषद्वैतप्रपञ्चयो: समसत्ताकत्वेन कार्यकरणभावनियमेन च कारणीभूताविद्याख्यदोषाभावे कार्यभूतद्वैतप्रपञ्चतद्विज्ञानयोरभावनियमेन नाविद्यामिथ्यात्वेन द्वैतज्ञानसत्यतापात:
The defects postulated by the Buddhist are apparent reality (prAtibhAsika), and of a lower order of reality compared to the Veda which is empirical reality (vyAvahArika), and therefore cannot invalidate the Veda. However, the defect that is ignorance is of the same order of reality as the world of duality. There is also a cause effect relationship between the two. Hence, when the causal defect, ignorance, is rendered absent, the effect, the world, and its perception, must as a rule, be absent too. Thus the mithyAtva of ignorance does not lead to the validity of the cognition of duality.
- कारणमिथ्यात्वे कार्यमिथ्यात्वस्यावश्यकत्वात्, ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाध्यत्वरूपव्यावहारिकत्वस्य बाध्याबाध्यसाधारणस्य मिथ्यात्वसिद्ध्यनपेक्षत्वात् न सत्त्वविभागासिद्धि: |
For, if the cause is unreal, the effect will be unreal too. Empirical reality, defined as being unsublated by any cognition apart from the cognition of Brahman, is true for both the sublated (the world) and the unsublated (Brahman). Therefore, to say something is empirically real, does not presuppose the establishment of something mithyA beforehand. Therefore, the three-fold classification of reality is quite appropriate.
ननु - दोषादीनां रूप्यादिभ्रमहेतूनां पारमार्थिकसत्त्वमौत्सर्गिकप्रामाण्येन सिद्धमिति परमार्थसतामेव तेषां हेतुत्वमिति - चेन्न ;
The opponent argues - As the defects that are the causes of illusions such as shell silver, are revealed by a general pramANa that reveals the absolutely real (pAramArthika), they too must be absolutely real. The siddhikAra says, no.
व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यस्य साक्षिणा ग्रहणेऽपि त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपतात्त्विकप्रामाण्यं न केनापि गृह्यत इति प्रत्यक्षबाधोद्धारे प्रागेवाभिहितत्वात् |
We have already said previously (in the pratyaksha bAdhoddhAra chapter) that even if the empirical reality of something is known by the inner witness, its ultimate reality of the nature of non-sublatability in all three periods of time, is not possible to be known.
नच - रूप्याद्यध्यासे दोषादीनामधिष्ठानसमसत्ताकत्वम् दृष्टमिति इहापि तथेति - वाच्यम् ; साधर्म्यसमजात्युत्तरत्वात् |
Nor can it be argued thus - As in the superimposition of shell-silver, defects such as shininess, etc are of the same order of reality as the substratum (shell), here too, the same must be true (i.e the defect of ignorance is of the same order of reality as Brahman).
The siddhikAra - not so. This is a futile rejoinder of the nature of sAdharmya sama (parity through similarity). Just because the shell and its defect are of the same order of reality does not mean that Brahman and ignorance too are of the same order of reality.
वस्तुतस्तु सर्वत्र चैतन्यस्यैवाधिष्ठानत्वेन कुत्रापि दोषादीनामधिष्ठानसमसत्ताकत्वाभावात् | In reality, the substratum everywhere is consciousness alone. Hence, nowhere can defects be of the same order of reality as the substratum.
नच - बाधकज्ञानं सत्यमेव वक्तव्यम्, अन्यथा बाधपरम्पराया अनवस्थापत्तेरिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - The sublating cognition must be admitted to be real alone, because otherwise, it will lead to infinite regress of sublation.
If the sublating cognition is unreal, its unreality will need another sublating cognition, which will need another and so on, ad infinitum.
वेदान्तवाक्यजन्यचरमचित्तवृत्ते: कतकरजोन्यायेन स्वपरबाधकतयाऽनवस्थाया अभावात् |
The final cognition born from vedAntic sentences is like the seeds of the clearing nut - which after sinking the impurities, itself sinks - that cognition after sublating all mithyA entities, sublates itself too, thereby the charge of inifinite regress does not apply.
दृश्यत्वमात्रेण युगपत्कृत्स्नबाधसंभवात् | Everything that is cognisable can be sublated, on the very basis of its cognisability.
नहि गुहायां न शब्द इति शब्द: स्वं न निषेधेति ; अन्यथा स्वस्य स्वेनानिषेधे तत्राप्यनवस्थापत्ति:,
शब्दमात्रनिषेधानुभवविरोधाच्च |
On cannot argue that the words "there is no sound in the cave" uttered in a cave is denying the lack of every sound, except the ones produced by the words themselves. If it did not deny itself too, there will be an infinite regress there also. Its own denial would require another sentence, whose denial would require another sentence, etc., ad infinitum. It also contradicts the experience of the absence of all sound.
यद्यपि बाधकज्ञानं वृत्त्युपरक्तचैतन्यरूपं स्वत: सत्यमेव ; तथापि तदवच्छेदिकाया वृत्तेर्दृश्यत्वेन मिथ्यात्वात् बाधोपपत्ति: |
Even though, from an intrinsic standpoint (ie as consciousness) the sublating cognition, of the nature of consciousness associated with thought, is real; as the delimiter, the thought, is cognisable, the sublating cognition too is unreal, and can be sublated.
Fifth argument of the opponent
ननु - बन्धस्यात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वरूपमिथ्यात्वे तदभावार्थं यत्नो न स्यात् ; अत्यन्ताभावस्यासाध्यत्वात्,
If bondage is unreal, of the nature being the counterpositive of absence, no effort needs to be undertaken to get rid of bondage. For, eternal absence cannot be achieved.
अत एव न तत्प्रतीत्यभावार्थमपि यत्न: ; तस्या अपि मिथ्यात्वात्,
Thus, there is no need to strive for the disappearance of the perception of bondage too. For that too is unreal.
अन्यथा मोक्षेऽपि बन्धप्रतीत्या तद्दशायामपि प्रातिभासिकबन्धापातात् |
Otherwise, it will mean that bondage can appear during liberation too - for an apparently real (prAtibhAsika) bondage will appear during liberation too.
अथ पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण मिथ्यात्वम्, स्वरूपेण तु निवृत्तिरेव, न ;
Therefore, if unreality only means that something is not really present, whereas its cessation is absolute absence (ie even an unreal appearance is not admitted) - No.
तस्या: स्वरूपाबाधेनाप्युपपत्तेरिति because such an appearance can continue even when it is not sublated.
- चेन्न; सत्यस्य ब्रह्मणो निवृत्त्यदर्शनेन स्वरूपतो मिथ्यात्वाभावे निवृत्त्ययोगात् मिथ्यात्वं निवृत्त्यनुकूलमेव |
The siddhikAra says - no. As the sublation of the real Brahman is not possible, when it is said that something is not mithyA it cannot be sublated - it follows that if something is mithyA it will certainly be sublated.
नच तदर्थं प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्ति:, अधिष्ठानसाक्षात्कारानान्तरं तथैव ;
Nor is an effort to remove bondage useless. Once the substratum has been directly perceived, that may be true (one need not strive to remove bondage once the knowledge of Brahman has arisen).
तत: पूर्वं तु कण्ठगतविस्मृतचामीकरप्राप्त्य इव भ्रमबाधकज्ञानोत्पत्तये प्रवृत्युपपत्ते: |
However, before that, like someone "finding" a lost necklace around their neck, the effort for the rise of a cognition that can sublate illusion is fruitful certainly.
अत्यन्ताभावाधिकरणे च प्रतियोगिवत्तन्निवृत्तिरप्युपादितैव |
The sublation of an object, like the appearance of the object in the locus of its absence has already been explained previously - in the chapter on the second definition of mithyAtva.
नच - त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगिनि तुच्छे निवृत्तिर्न दृष्टेति कथं तादृशि प्रपञ्चे सा स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - If absolutely absent entities such as tucCha (a hare's horn for example), which are absent in all three periods of time, are not sublatable, how can the world, which is said to be of the same nature, capable of being sublatable?
यथाकथञ्चित् सजातीयेऽदर्शनस्याप्रयोजकत्वात् | If there is similarity in one respect, it does not necessarily imply that it is not sublatable.
अन्यथा अनुत्पन्ने निवृत्तिर्न दृष्टेति प्रागभावेऽपि न निवर्तेत | Otherwise, it can be argued on the basis of everything that is birthless, is deathless too, that prior-absence (prAgabhava) which has no beginning, should have no end too. However, a beginningless prior-absence does end when its counterpositive is born.
तस्मात् स्वभावविशेष एव तुच्छनित्यविलक्षणो निवृत्तिप्रयोजक इति वाच्यम् | Therefore, it must be admitted that there must be something specific to the nature of things other than tucCha and Brahman, which determines their sublatability.
सा च निवृत्तिरधिकरणस्वरूपेति पक्षे घटनाशार्थम् मुद्गरपातादाविव मननादौ प्रवृत्तिरूहनीया | Where it is held that the sublation is of the nature of the substratum (i.e. the absence of a thing is its locus), actions undertaken for manana etc (shravaNa, manana, nididhyAsana) for the sublation of ignorance play the same role as the hammer-blow etc., for the destruction of a pot.
अतिरिक्तेति पक्षे त्वनिर्वचनीया, पञ्चमप्रकारा चरमवृत्तिरूपा वा सा; सर्वथा जन्यैवेतिकाप्यनुपपत्ति: | Where the sublation is held to be different to the substratum, i.e., it is either unclassifiable (into sat or asat) or if belongs to the fifth category of reality (as stipulated by AnandabodhAchArya - 1) neither sat, 2) nor asat, 3) nor sadasat, 4) nor different from sadasat), or if it is a final cognition - in either of these categories, as such a sublation arises, there is no defect (in holding that some effort is needed for it to arise, and therefore such efforts are fruitful).
Sixth argument of the opponent
ननु - बन्धस्य ब्रह्मण्यध्यस्तत्वे तन्निदिध्यासनसाध्यतत्साक्षात्कारनिवर्त्यत्त्वं श्रवणादिनियमादृष्टसापेक्षब्रह्मज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वम् च न स्यात् ;
The opponent argues - If bondage is superimposed on Brahman, its sublation due to the direct experience of Brahman which is itself a product of meditation on Brahman, would not be possible. Its sublation due to the cognition of Brahman arising from listening to the scriptures in the prescribed manner, leading to the accrual of spiritual merit, (as suggested in the vivaraNa) - would not occur.
नहि देवतानिदिध्यासनसाध्यतत्साक्षात्कारनिवर्त्यं दुरितं तत्राध्यस्तम् ; This is because the sin that is destroyed by the direct experience of a deity due to the meditation upon the deity, is not said to be superimposed on the deity.
न वा दूरागमनादिनियमादृष्टसापेक्षसेतुदर्शननिवर्त्यं दुरितं तत्राध्यस्तमिति ; Nor is the sin (of slaying a Brahmana), which is removed by the merit accruing from the long pilgrimage undertaken to Rameshvaram (setu) in the prescribed manner (walking barefoot from the location of the commission of the sin, to Rameshvaram), superimposed on Rameshvaram.
If the sins that are removed by the perception of the deity and the perception of Rameshvaram are not superimposed on the deity and Rameshvaram, why is the advaitin insisting that the bondage which is destroyed by the direct experience of Brahman superimposed on Brahman?
The siddhikAra responds:
- चेन्न ; No.
आत्माध्यस्तगौरत्वादे: शुक्त्याद्यध्यस्तरूप्यादेश्च तत्तसाक्षात्कारनिवर्त्यत्वदर्शनेन प्रपञ्चस्यापि ब्रह्मण्यधस्ततया तत्साक्षात्कारनिवर्त्यत्वस्यावश्यकत्वात् |
Fairness, etc. which are superimposed upon the self ("I am fair"), and the silver, etc. that are superimposed upon the shell, etc., are seen to be sublated upon the direct experience of the substratum of each, it must necessarily follow that the world, which is superimposed on Brahman, is sublated by the direct perception of Brahman.
नहि शुक्त्याद्यध्यस्तं रूप्यादि शुक्त्यादिज्ञानं विना निवर्तते | The shell-silver superimposed on the shell, will not be sublated without the perception of the shell.
देवतादर्शनादिना तु प्रायश्चित्तसमयकक्ष्येण दुरितस्य कारणात्मनावस्थानमात्रं क्रियते, however, the expiation of sin that takes place in the instant of the cognition of deities, does not destroy sin, it merely reverts it back into a causal state.
नतु शुक्तिज्ञानेन रूप्यस्येव निवृत्ति: ; It is not a sublation like in the case of the silver, upon the cognition of the shell.
अधिष्ठानाज्ञानरूपोपादानकस्यारोपितस्य तन्निवृत्तिं विना निवृत्त्ययोगात्, अज्ञाननिवृत्तिश्चाधिष्ठानज्ञानादेवेत्युक्तं प्राक् |
Without the destruction of the ignorance of the substratum which is the material cause for the superimposition, the sublation of the superimposed object is not possible. Further, that the sublation of ignorance is only possible due to the cognition of the substratum, has been previously said.
श्रवणादिनियमादृष्टम् च न मुक्तिं प्रति कारणम्, किंतु ब्रह्मापरोक्ष्यं प्रति |
The accrued merit from listening to the scriptures in the prescribed manner is not the cause of liberation, rather, it is the cause for the direct experience of Brahman.
Injunctions are of three types -
1) apUrva - that which is not knowable by anything other than Veda.
2) niyama - when there are two alternatives for an action, and only one is prescribed in a Vedic ritual, that is a niyama vidhi. For example, in the darsha pUrNamAsa sacrifice, the sacrificial offering, the puroDASha, is prepared using paddy. To prepare the puroDASha, the husk has to be removed from paddy. This leads to the question, how should the husk be removed - it can be either by a mortar and pestle (avahananam), or one can scratch it out using your fingernails, or one can grind the paddy using a stone (ashmakuTTanam) etc. Faced with these alternatives, the Veda says - व्रीहीनवहन्ति - one should (only) remove it with the mortar and pestle. This is a niyama vidhi.
3) parisankhyA vidhi - permission. For example, एकादश्यां फलाहारम् कुर्यात् - One may eat fruits only during the ekAdashI, the 11th day of the fortnight. While this is couched in the form of a permission, what is intended is that one should observe fasting during the ekAdashI - and if there are elderly people or children, they are permitted to eat fruits, if they are unable to fast on that day.
ननु - अवघातसाध्यवैतुष्यान्यापूर्वस्येव श्रवणादिसाध्यापरोक्ष्यान्यमुक्तेरेव तत्साध्यत्वम् ;
The opponent says - like the apUrva, the spiritual merit accruing from the dehusking of the paddy by the grinding, is different from it, the liberation that accrues from the direct perception generated through listening to the scriptures must be different to the direct perception.
अन्यथा श्रवणनियमादृष्टसाध्ये साक्षात्कारे श्रवणनिरपेक्षस्योपायान्तरस्याप्रसक्त्या तत्प्रसक्त्यधीननियमविध्ययोगात्,
Otherwise, for the direct experience that is achieved by the spiritual merit accruing from listening to the scriptures in the prescribed manner, there being no other means apart from the listening, it would be inappropriate to hold that there is a niyama vidhi with respect to listening, as that would imply having some sort of choice.
नच - परोक्षज्ञानं श्रवणात्, अपरोक्षं तु नियमादृष्टादिति युक्तम् ;
Nor can it be said that indirect knowledge is through listening, whereas direct knowledge is through the spiritual merit.
श्रवणादिविधौ परोक्षज्ञानप्रवाहरूपनिदिध्यासनसाध्यापरोक्षस्यैव दृशिनोद्देशात्,
For, in the injunction for shravaNa etc, it has been said that the continuous flow of indirect knowledge as part of meditation leads to the direct experience of Brahman.
त्वन्मते परोक्षज्ञाने कामनाया अयोगेन तस्योद्देश्यत्वायोगाच्चेति
In your philosophy, desiring (only) for indirect knowledge is not sufficient, for that to be the object of the injunction, is not correct.
The siddhikAra says.
- चेन्न ; no.
तत्र क्रत्वर्थस्य नियमापूर्वस्य परमापूर्वसाधकत्वेऽपि पुरुषार्थहिरण्यधारणादिनियमादृष्टस्य तदभाववत् श्रवणादिसाध्यसाक्षात्कारान्यफलाभावेऽपि तेनैव फलवत्त्वोपपत्ते:,
There, even though the object of the subsidiary injunction, the spiritual merit accruing from following the subsidiary injunction (the niyama apUrva), serves to aid the achievement of the ultimate spiritual merit of the main sacrifice, there is a difference in the case of the instruction that everyone should wear some item of gold, it achieves its aim directly, without a niyama apUrva. Similarly, even though nothing apart from shravaNa etc can lead to the result of direct experience, it too leads to its result directly (without the necessity to postulate an intervening apUrva).
'सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेश्वव' दिति न्यायात्, 'सर्वं कर्माखिलं पार्थ ज्ञाने परिसमाप्यते' इति स्मृतेश्च |
However this does not mean that spiritual merit serves no purpose in the case of moksha - as has been said in the brahma sUtra "there is the requirement of every spiritual merit for this", and the gIta, "every action of any kind ends in knowledge".
अत्र सर्वाखिलपदाभ्यां कर्मशब्दवाच्यापूर्वमात्रस्य ज्ञाने समाप्तिर्दर्शिता ; मोक्षस्याविद्यानिवृत्तिरूपस्य ज्ञानातिरिक्तासाध्यत्वनियमाच्च |
Here, the terms "every" and "any" are used to indicate that both action and spiritual merit culminate ultimately in knowledge alone. Moksha, of the nature of cessation of ignorance, is incapable of being the result of anything apart from right knowledge.
ज्ञाने त्वंसंभावनादिनिवृत्त्या प्रतिबन्धकदुरितनिवृत्त्या च दृष्टादृष्टाम्शोपयोग: |
However, to overcome defects such as doubts about the impossibility of liberation etc., and to remove the obstacles such as sin, etc., to the rise of knowledge, both direct and indirect means are needed.
सामान्यपुरस्कारेण च प्रसक्तस्य साधनान्तरस्य निवृत्ति: सर्वत्र नियमविधे: फलम्, विशेषरूपेण त्वपूर्वविधित्वमेव |
The difference between niyama vidhi and apUrva vidhi is this - when all the other means by something can be generally achieved are to be denied, a niyama vidhi is used. However, if something is to be specifically performed, an apUrva vidhi is used.
यथाहि 'व्रीहीन्वहन्ती' त्यादावपूर्वसाधनीभूतव्रीहिवैतुष्ये विशिष्यावघातातिरिक्तसाधनान्तराप्रसक्तावपि व्रीहिवैतुष्यमात्रे प्रसक्तस्य नखविदलनादेर्निवृत्ति:, विशिष्य कार्यकारणभावबोधनात्,
Just like - with respect to the removal of the paddy husk, which leads to the accrual of spiritual merit, as known through the injunction, 'dehusk the paddy with a mortar', there is no basis to say that spiritual merit would accrue from any other means apart from beating the padding with a mortar and pestle, but the injunction's purpose lies in prohibiting the other possible means of dehusking such as peeling the husk with one's figernails etc., by implying the cause-effect relationship between the specific means of dehusking and the accrual of spiritual merit -
तथा निर्विशेषब्रह्मात्माभेदसाक्षात्कारप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तौ श्रवणाद्यतिरिक्तसाधनान्तराप्रसक्तावप्यात्मज्ञानमात्रप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तौ सान्ख्यादिशास्त्रस्यापि प्रसक्ते: तन्निवृत्तिर्विशिष्य वेदान्तवाक्यविचारविधानादिति परमगंभीरोऽयं ग्रन्थार्थ: |
Similarly - with respect to the removal of obstacles to the direct cognition of the identity between the undifferentiated Brahman and the self, there is no basis to say that there are other means to it apart from listening to the scriptures, there are other philosophies, such as sAnkhya, etc., that purport to provide means to remove the obstacles to the self. The purpose of the injunction to enquire into the meaning of Vedantic sentences is to deny that liberation will follow from resorting to other philosophies and to enjoin resorting to Vedanta alone. This is the profound meaning of the vivaraNa passage.
Seventh argument of the opponent
ननु - यदि विश्वं कल्पितं स्यात्,
If the world was a superimposition
तदा 'जन्माद्यस्य यत' इति सूत्रे 'यतो वा इमानी'त्यादिश्रुतौ च जन्माद्युक्ति:,
The statements of creation, etc in the sUtra "that from which this takes birth etc." and the Shruti "from which are all these beings born",
'ईक्षतेर्नाशब्द'मिति सूत्रे 'तदैक्षते'त्यादिश्रुतौ च ईश्वरस्येक्षापूर्वककर्तृत्वोक्ति:,
The statements of Ishvara's planned creation of the universe, as discerned from the sUtra "on account of seeing, no, it cannot be the unsaid pradhAna", and Vedic sentences such as "He saw", etc.,
'लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्य'मिति सूत्रे 'आप्तकामस्य का स्पृहे'त्यादिश्रुतौ च प्रयोजनाभावेऽपि लीलया सृष्ट्यादियुक्ति:,
The statements of the world's creation, despite having no purpose (for Ishvara), was undertaken as sport, as known through the sUtra " like observed in the world, it is a mere play", and the shruti "what purpose is served by creation for one who is fulfilled".
The sentence आप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा occurs in the Agama prakaraNa of mANDUkya kArikA by gauDapAdAchArya, but the madhva tradition holds that to be part of shruti itself.
'वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वादि'ति सूत्रे 'पुण्येन पुण्यं लोकं नयती'त्यादिश्रुतौ च कर्मसाक्षेपत्वेनावैषम्योक्ति:,
The statements of the creator creating the universe on the basis of karma and not on the basis of favouritism in the sUtra "Creation is not out of favouritism or lack of compassion, but dependant on (karma)", and the Shruti "He leads the jIva to the glorious worlds on account of his spiritual merit"
'तेजोऽतस्तथा ह्याहे'तिसूत्रे 'वायोरग्नि'रित्यादुश्रुतौ च तेजआदेर्वाय्वादिजन्यत्वोक्ति:,
The statements talking of the creation of fire etc from wind etc in the sUtra "fire is created from that (wind), because it has been said thus", and the shruti "from the wind, fire was born"
'विपर्ययेण तो क्रमोऽत उपपद्यते चे'ति सूत्रे 'पृथिव्यप्सु प्रलीयत' इत्यादिस्मृतौ च पृथिव्यादीनामबादौ लयोक्तिरित्याद्ययुक्तं स्यात्,
The statements talking of the dissolution of earth etc into water etc. in the sUtra "it resolves into its cause, in the reverse order of its origin" and the smRti "into the water does earth resolve"
All of these statements would be incompatible.
न हि कल्पिते तत्तद्विरोधशङ्का तन्निराकरणं च युक्तमिति
If the world was a superimposition, neither can a doubt about contradiction between various statements about creation, nor its refutation, would be appropriate.
The siddhikAra responds:
- चेन्न ; No.
प्रपञ्चस्य कल्पितस्यापि व्यावहारिकसत्त्वाभ्युपगमेन तद्दशायां विरोधशङ्कातत्परिहारयोरुचितत्वात्, इन्द्रजालादावध्यस्तेऽप्यैन्द्रजालिकादेरीक्षापूर्वकस्रष्टृत्वादेर्दर्शनाच्च |
Even if the world was a superimposition, as it is admitted to be empirically real, as long as one is operating from that state, doubts about the validity of creation statements and the refutation of such doubts are all appropriate. It has been observed that even if the magical act is an illusion, its creation is in accordance with the magician's plan / conceptualisation.
यथाच कल्पितस्यापि जन्माद्युपपत्तिस्तथाऽनिर्वचनीयवादे वक्ष्यते |
The possibility of the birth etc of superimposed objects will be discussed in a later chapter on anirvachanIya vAda.
स्वप्नेऽपि सृष्ट्यादे: श्रुत्या प्रतिपादनाच्च |
The creation of dream objects etc has been spoken of in the shruti too.
अध्यस्तस्यापि सर्पस्य भयकम्पादिजनकत्ववत् वाय्वादीनां तेजआदिजनकत्वमप्युपपन्नम् ;
Like the unreal snake is capable of striking fear, despite being superimposed, it is possible for wind etc., to lead to the creation of fire etc.
'तदभिध्यानादेव तु तल्लिङ्गात्स' इति सूत्रे च तत्तद्भावापन्नस्य ब्रह्मण एव कारणत्वाभिधानात् |
In the sUtra "It is He alone, who through profound meditation on each thing, created it, as is known from the indicatory marks", it has been said that it is Brahman alone, taking on the form of each intermediate cause (i.e Brahman in the form of wind creates fire, and Brahman in the form of fire creates water, and so on and so forth) creates each effect.
अबादौ पृथिव्यादिलयोक्तिरपि तत्तद्भावपन्नचैतन्ये व्याख्येयेति नाधिष्ठानातिरिक्ते लयोक्ति: |
It has been commented that statements on the resolution of earth into water etc, is into the consciousness that takes on that form. Resolution cannot be into anything else but the substratum of the object.
वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यप्रयोजनादिशङ्कापरिहारादिकं तूपासनावस्थायाम् |
The statements given to resolve doubts regarding favouritism, lack of compassion, purpose of creation etc, is to establish faith for meditative purposes.
In the BSB 2.1.13 there is a discussion along the following lines - the world is a creation of Ishvara. As the effect is non-different from the cause, objects such as pots etc must be non-different from Ishvara. Similarly, it is argued that the jIva and Ishvara are also non-different. Therefore, it must follow that jIva the experiencer is the same as the world, which is an object of experience. When such a doubt is raised, the sUtrakAra responds that there are many worldly examples such as the ocean and waves where, despite being non-different in essence, there are differences observed empirically. This is a sUtra that provides an answer using an example where the change is a modification of the cause. Because this may lead to the student misunderstanding that the world is a modification of Brahman, the next sUtra 2.1.14, clarifies that it in fact is an appearance of Brahman.
'भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत्स्याल्लोकवदि'ति आपातत: परीणामवादाभ्युपगमेन, 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्य' इति तु विवर्तवादे परमसिद्धान्तदशायां न शङ्का न चोत्तरम् ;
In the sUtra -"If it is said that they will end up non-different from the experiencer, then such has been observed in the world" - the doubt was provisionally answered on the basis of creation as transformation (pariNAma vAda), the ultimate position as provided in the sUtra "there is the absence of difference between the effect and the cause, on account of texts about origin, etc", following which, there is no doubt requiring a refutation.
मायाविन इवेश्वरस्य स्वप्नप्रतिबिम्बभूतजीवभ्रमयितृत्वेन सर्वविरोधनिरासोपपत्ते: |
Ishvara, the wielder of mAya, is able to delude the jIva, who is none other than a dream reflection of Himself. Thus no contradiction can be said to exist.
ननु - ईश्वरस्य सपरिकरस्य जीवेनाध्यस्तत्वात् कथं भ्रमयितृत्वम् | न;
If it is asked - As Ishvara, along with his retinue is a superimposition by the jIva, how can He delude the jIva? - No.
अविद्योपहितचित एवानादेरीश्वरत्वेनान्त:करणोपहितजीवकल्पितत्वायोगात्,
As Ishvara, who is consciousness, delimited by ignorance, is beginningless, is not a creation of the jIva, who is consciousness, delimited by the mind.
This answer has been given from the position where Ishvara is delimited by ignorance, and the jIva is delimited by the mind.
जीवकल्पितत्वपक्षेऽपि तादृग्धर्मविशिष्टतयैव कल्पनेन तस्य भ्रमयितृत्वाद्युपपत्ते:,
Even if it is said that jIva superimposes the Ishvara, as He is superimposed as being endowed with that attribute (of wielding mAyA, and being capable of deluding the jIva), it is possible for the jIva to consider himself deluded by Ishvara.
'परिकल्पितोऽपि मरणाय भवेदुरगो यथा न तु नभो मलिन' मिति न्यायात् | From the principle, "It is possible to die as a result of an imagined snake, like it is possible to imagine that the sky is dirty".
ननु - न जीवानां वाय्वादिभ्योऽग्न्याद्युत्पत्तिरिति भ्रमोऽस्ति, य: स्वाप्नभ्रम इव श्रुतेरालम्बनं स्यात्,
The opponent says - jIvAs do not have an illusion of wind etc creating fire etc., which (creation) like the dream illusion, is based on shruti statements to that effect.
न च भ्रान्तिं विना कल्पितमस्ति ; न चैतद्वाक्यजभ्रान्तिकल्पितमेव एतद्वाक्यालम्बनम् ; It is not possible for something to be superimposed without delusion. Nor it can be said that being based on a shruti statement means that it is a superimposition arising as a result of the delusion born from the shruti statement.
वेदस्य भ्रमजनकत्वप्रसङ्गात्, because that would led to the Veda being capable of producing delusions
अनुवादे तु न दोष:, however if it is merely repeating something that is generally held, then it is not problem
न चेश्वर एव तत्कल्पक:, तस्य भ्रान्तत्वप्रसङ्गात्, it cannot be Ishvara who did the superimposition, because it would mean that He was deluded.
तदभ्युपगमेऽपि न विस्तार:, भ्रान्तेर्देहेन्द्रियादिकार्यत्वात् तेषां च पृथिव्यादिकार्यत्वात् पृथिव्याद्युत्पत्ते: प्राक् भ्रान्त्ययोगादिति even if it was possible, it does not resolve the problem. As the illusions are the products of the body and mind, and the body and mind are products of the elements such as earth etc., therefore to suggest that prior to the creation of earth, illusion was possible is untenable.
To this, the siddhikAra says: चेन्न No.
भ्रान्तिमात्रे देहेन्द्रियाद्यपेक्षाया: प्रागेव निरासात्, In the fifth pratikUla tarka, we have already refuted the presupposition of a body for the occurrence of an illusion.
ईश्वराध्यस्तवाय्वादिहेतुकाग्न्याद्युत्पत्त्यालम्बनत्वेन वेदस्य भ्रमाजनकत्वात्,
By holding that the creation of fire from wind is on the basis of a superimposition by Ishvara, it does not mean that the Vedas are deluding anyone -
अध्यस्तस्य चाध्यस्तत्वेन स्फुरणान्न मायाविन इव ईश्वरस्य भ्रान्तत्वप्रसङ्ग: | Because if the Vedas talk of a superimposition as a superimposition, it does not lead to the Ishvara being deluded - just like in the case of a magician (who cannot be called deluded if he creates an illusion).
न चाध्यस्तत्वे उत्पत्त्याद्यनुपपत्ति:, अनध्यस्तस्य क्वाप्युत्पत्त्याद्यदर्शनेनाध्यस्तस्यैव तदुपपादकत्वात्,
Nor can it be said that because something is a superimposition, it cannot be born. As an unsuperimposed entity is never seen to be created, it follows that if something is superimposed, it must be created.
सत्कार्यवादासत्कार्यवादिनिषेधेनानिर्वचनीयकार्यवादमात्रे कार्यकारणभावपर्यवसानात् |
By the refutation both satkArya vAda (existence of an effect prior to its creation) and asatkArya vAda (non-existence of the effect prior to its creation), it is anirvachanIya kArya vAda (that the effect is neither sat nor asat) alone that is the basis for all cause-effect relationships.
तदेवं कृत्स्नस्य प्रपञ्चस्याद्वये ब्रह्मणि कल्पनोपपत्तेर्न प्रतिकूलतर्कपराहति: ||
Thus as it is tenable for the entire universe to be superimposed on the non-dual Brahman, all contrarian arguments can be refuted.
इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ ब्रह्मणि प्रपञ्चकल्पनोपपादनेन प्रतिकूलतर्कनिराकरणम् ||
This concludes the chapter refuting the opponent's contrarian arguments by establishing the superimposition of the world on Brahman.
The opponent argues - As the superimposition of ignorance is beginningless, it does not require any defective cause, similarly it can also mean that the superimposition requires no substratum either.
The siddhikAra says - no.
जनकत्वेनाधिष्ठानानपेक्षायामप्याश्रयत्वेन तदपेक्षानियमात् | Even if the substratum is not needed for the rise of ignorance (it being beginningless), it necessarily requires a substratum for its locus.
परममहत्त्वादेराश्रयापेक्षावत् अध्यासस्य साधिष्ठानकत्वनियमेनात्रापि परतन्त्रत्वस्य समत्वात्, भास्यस्याविद्याध्यासस्य भासकतयाप्यधिष्ठानपेक्षणाच्च |
Like when it was accepted that classifications of size into parama mahat etc requires a locus, ignorance too needs a substratum because both are dependent on other things. Moreover, the superimposed ignorance being inert, requires the substratum to reveal it.
अविद्यावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्याविद्यादिसकलद्वैतद्रष्टृत्वात् तस्यैव चान्त:करणावच्छेदेन प्रमातृत्वात्, भ्रमप्रमयो: सामानाधिकरण्योपपत्तेर्भ्रमस्य समानाधिकरणप्रमानिवर्त्यत्वमुपपद्यते |
The consciousness delimited ignorance is the witness all duality, including ignorance itself. That alone when delimited by the mind becomes the knower. As incorrect and correct knowledge are admitted to share a common locus, it follows that the right knowledge of the locus leads to the sublation of the wrong knowledge.
ननु देहेन्द्रियादिकं विना कथमन्त:करणाध्यास:?
The opponent asks - how can there be a superimposition of the mind without the body and the sense organs?
काऽत्रानुपपत्ति: ? Why is this untenable?
अधिष्ठानापरोक्षत्वं हि अपरोक्षभ्रमे कारणम्, The perceptability of the substratum is the cause for direct misperception.
तत् यत्राधिष्ठानं स्वतो नापरोक्षम्, यथा शुक्त्याद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यम्, तत्र तदपरोक्षतार्थं देहेन्द्रियाद्यपेक्षा, Where the substratum is not self illuminated directly, like in the case of the shell-delimited consciousness etc, there is a requirement for the presence of the body, sense organs etc, for its direct perception.
प्रकृतेचाविद्यावच्छिन्नम् चैतन्यमधिष्ठानम्, तत्र चैतन्यस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वेनाविद्यायाश्च तदध्यस्तत्वेन तेनैव साक्षिणा अपरोक्षत्वात् कुत्र देहेन्द्रियाद्यपेक्षा? In the current situation, it is consciousness delimited by ignorance which is the substratum, and as consciousness is self-revealing, and as ignorance is superimposed on it, and it is itself directly illumined by the witness, why is there a requirement for the body and sense organs?
अथैवं प्रलये देहेन्द्रियाद्यभावेऽप्यज्ञानसद्भावेनान्त:करणाध्यासप्रसङ्ग:, (If this is the argument of the siddhAntin) There is no body and sense organs during pralaya, but it is said that ignorance exists then, there should be the superimposition of the mind.
The siddhAntin replies: न; No.
तदा देहेन्द्रियादिसर्जनविलम्बहेतुनैव तद्विलम्बसम्भवात्, During pralaya, the cause for the delay in the creation of the body and senses is the cause for the delay in the manifestation of the mind too.
अन्यथा तदा देहेन्द्रियादिकमपि कुतो नोत्पद्येत? Otherwise, why should the body and sense organs etc not be created during pralaya as well?
नच- दोषादीनामध्यस्तत्वेन तदभावस्य तात्त्विकत्वात्, अतात्तिवकत्वेन तात्त्विककार्यप्रतिबन्धस्यायुक्तत्वात् बौद्धेन दुष्टतया कल्पितस्य वेदजन्यज्ञानस्येव कल्पितदोषजन्यस्य द्वैतविज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यापात इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - As defects are superimposed, their absence must be real. Because defects are unreal, they cannot prevent reality from eventually being known. The negation of imaginary defects of the Veda postulated by the Buddhist, confers validity to the Vedas, similarly the negation of imaginary defects in the perception of duality should reinstate their validity.
बौद्धकल्पितस्य प्रातिभासिकदोषस्य व्यावहारिकवेदापेक्षया न्यूनसत्ताकत्वेन तदप्रामाण्याप्रयोजकत्वेऽप्यविद्याख्यदोषद्वैतप्रपञ्चयो: समसत्ताकत्वेन कार्यकरणभावनियमेन च कारणीभूताविद्याख्यदोषाभावे कार्यभूतद्वैतप्रपञ्चतद्विज्ञानयोरभावनियमेन नाविद्यामिथ्यात्वेन द्वैतज्ञानसत्यतापात:
The defects postulated by the Buddhist are apparent reality (prAtibhAsika), and of a lower order of reality compared to the Veda which is empirical reality (vyAvahArika), and therefore cannot invalidate the Veda. However, the defect that is ignorance is of the same order of reality as the world of duality. There is also a cause effect relationship between the two. Hence, when the causal defect, ignorance, is rendered absent, the effect, the world, and its perception, must as a rule, be absent too. Thus the mithyAtva of ignorance does not lead to the validity of the cognition of duality.
- कारणमिथ्यात्वे कार्यमिथ्यात्वस्यावश्यकत्वात्, ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाध्यत्वरूपव्यावहारिकत्वस्य बाध्याबाध्यसाधारणस्य मिथ्यात्वसिद्ध्यनपेक्षत्वात् न सत्त्वविभागासिद्धि: |
For, if the cause is unreal, the effect will be unreal too. Empirical reality, defined as being unsublated by any cognition apart from the cognition of Brahman, is true for both the sublated (the world) and the unsublated (Brahman). Therefore, to say something is empirically real, does not presuppose the establishment of something mithyA beforehand. Therefore, the three-fold classification of reality is quite appropriate.
ननु - दोषादीनां रूप्यादिभ्रमहेतूनां पारमार्थिकसत्त्वमौत्सर्गिकप्रामाण्येन सिद्धमिति परमार्थसतामेव तेषां हेतुत्वमिति - चेन्न ;
The opponent argues - As the defects that are the causes of illusions such as shell silver, are revealed by a general pramANa that reveals the absolutely real (pAramArthika), they too must be absolutely real. The siddhikAra says, no.
व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यस्य साक्षिणा ग्रहणेऽपि त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपतात्त्विकप्रामाण्यं न केनापि गृह्यत इति प्रत्यक्षबाधोद्धारे प्रागेवाभिहितत्वात् |
We have already said previously (in the pratyaksha bAdhoddhAra chapter) that even if the empirical reality of something is known by the inner witness, its ultimate reality of the nature of non-sublatability in all three periods of time, is not possible to be known.
नच - रूप्याद्यध्यासे दोषादीनामधिष्ठानसमसत्ताकत्वम् दृष्टमिति इहापि तथेति - वाच्यम् ; साधर्म्यसमजात्युत्तरत्वात् |
Nor can it be argued thus - As in the superimposition of shell-silver, defects such as shininess, etc are of the same order of reality as the substratum (shell), here too, the same must be true (i.e the defect of ignorance is of the same order of reality as Brahman).
The siddhikAra - not so. This is a futile rejoinder of the nature of sAdharmya sama (parity through similarity). Just because the shell and its defect are of the same order of reality does not mean that Brahman and ignorance too are of the same order of reality.
वस्तुतस्तु सर्वत्र चैतन्यस्यैवाधिष्ठानत्वेन कुत्रापि दोषादीनामधिष्ठानसमसत्ताकत्वाभावात् | In reality, the substratum everywhere is consciousness alone. Hence, nowhere can defects be of the same order of reality as the substratum.
नच - बाधकज्ञानं सत्यमेव वक्तव्यम्, अन्यथा बाधपरम्पराया अनवस्थापत्तेरिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - The sublating cognition must be admitted to be real alone, because otherwise, it will lead to infinite regress of sublation.
If the sublating cognition is unreal, its unreality will need another sublating cognition, which will need another and so on, ad infinitum.
वेदान्तवाक्यजन्यचरमचित्तवृत्ते: कतकरजोन्यायेन स्वपरबाधकतयाऽनवस्थाया अभावात् |
The final cognition born from vedAntic sentences is like the seeds of the clearing nut - which after sinking the impurities, itself sinks - that cognition after sublating all mithyA entities, sublates itself too, thereby the charge of inifinite regress does not apply.
दृश्यत्वमात्रेण युगपत्कृत्स्नबाधसंभवात् | Everything that is cognisable can be sublated, on the very basis of its cognisability.
नहि गुहायां न शब्द इति शब्द: स्वं न निषेधेति ; अन्यथा स्वस्य स्वेनानिषेधे तत्राप्यनवस्थापत्ति:,
शब्दमात्रनिषेधानुभवविरोधाच्च |
On cannot argue that the words "there is no sound in the cave" uttered in a cave is denying the lack of every sound, except the ones produced by the words themselves. If it did not deny itself too, there will be an infinite regress there also. Its own denial would require another sentence, whose denial would require another sentence, etc., ad infinitum. It also contradicts the experience of the absence of all sound.
यद्यपि बाधकज्ञानं वृत्त्युपरक्तचैतन्यरूपं स्वत: सत्यमेव ; तथापि तदवच्छेदिकाया वृत्तेर्दृश्यत्वेन मिथ्यात्वात् बाधोपपत्ति: |
Even though, from an intrinsic standpoint (ie as consciousness) the sublating cognition, of the nature of consciousness associated with thought, is real; as the delimiter, the thought, is cognisable, the sublating cognition too is unreal, and can be sublated.
Fifth argument of the opponent
ननु - बन्धस्यात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वरूपमिथ्यात्वे तदभावार्थं यत्नो न स्यात् ; अत्यन्ताभावस्यासाध्यत्वात्,
If bondage is unreal, of the nature being the counterpositive of absence, no effort needs to be undertaken to get rid of bondage. For, eternal absence cannot be achieved.
अत एव न तत्प्रतीत्यभावार्थमपि यत्न: ; तस्या अपि मिथ्यात्वात्,
Thus, there is no need to strive for the disappearance of the perception of bondage too. For that too is unreal.
अन्यथा मोक्षेऽपि बन्धप्रतीत्या तद्दशायामपि प्रातिभासिकबन्धापातात् |
Otherwise, it will mean that bondage can appear during liberation too - for an apparently real (prAtibhAsika) bondage will appear during liberation too.
अथ पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण मिथ्यात्वम्, स्वरूपेण तु निवृत्तिरेव, न ;
Therefore, if unreality only means that something is not really present, whereas its cessation is absolute absence (ie even an unreal appearance is not admitted) - No.
तस्या: स्वरूपाबाधेनाप्युपपत्तेरिति because such an appearance can continue even when it is not sublated.
- चेन्न; सत्यस्य ब्रह्मणो निवृत्त्यदर्शनेन स्वरूपतो मिथ्यात्वाभावे निवृत्त्ययोगात् मिथ्यात्वं निवृत्त्यनुकूलमेव |
The siddhikAra says - no. As the sublation of the real Brahman is not possible, when it is said that something is not mithyA it cannot be sublated - it follows that if something is mithyA it will certainly be sublated.
नच तदर्थं प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्ति:, अधिष्ठानसाक्षात्कारानान्तरं तथैव ;
Nor is an effort to remove bondage useless. Once the substratum has been directly perceived, that may be true (one need not strive to remove bondage once the knowledge of Brahman has arisen).
तत: पूर्वं तु कण्ठगतविस्मृतचामीकरप्राप्त्य इव भ्रमबाधकज्ञानोत्पत्तये प्रवृत्युपपत्ते: |
However, before that, like someone "finding" a lost necklace around their neck, the effort for the rise of a cognition that can sublate illusion is fruitful certainly.
अत्यन्ताभावाधिकरणे च प्रतियोगिवत्तन्निवृत्तिरप्युपादितैव |
The sublation of an object, like the appearance of the object in the locus of its absence has already been explained previously - in the chapter on the second definition of mithyAtva.
नच - त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगिनि तुच्छे निवृत्तिर्न दृष्टेति कथं तादृशि प्रपञ्चे सा स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - If absolutely absent entities such as tucCha (a hare's horn for example), which are absent in all three periods of time, are not sublatable, how can the world, which is said to be of the same nature, capable of being sublatable?
यथाकथञ्चित् सजातीयेऽदर्शनस्याप्रयोजकत्वात् | If there is similarity in one respect, it does not necessarily imply that it is not sublatable.
अन्यथा अनुत्पन्ने निवृत्तिर्न दृष्टेति प्रागभावेऽपि न निवर्तेत | Otherwise, it can be argued on the basis of everything that is birthless, is deathless too, that prior-absence (prAgabhava) which has no beginning, should have no end too. However, a beginningless prior-absence does end when its counterpositive is born.
तस्मात् स्वभावविशेष एव तुच्छनित्यविलक्षणो निवृत्तिप्रयोजक इति वाच्यम् | Therefore, it must be admitted that there must be something specific to the nature of things other than tucCha and Brahman, which determines their sublatability.
सा च निवृत्तिरधिकरणस्वरूपेति पक्षे घटनाशार्थम् मुद्गरपातादाविव मननादौ प्रवृत्तिरूहनीया | Where it is held that the sublation is of the nature of the substratum (i.e. the absence of a thing is its locus), actions undertaken for manana etc (shravaNa, manana, nididhyAsana) for the sublation of ignorance play the same role as the hammer-blow etc., for the destruction of a pot.
अतिरिक्तेति पक्षे त्वनिर्वचनीया, पञ्चमप्रकारा चरमवृत्तिरूपा वा सा; सर्वथा जन्यैवेतिकाप्यनुपपत्ति: | Where the sublation is held to be different to the substratum, i.e., it is either unclassifiable (into sat or asat) or if belongs to the fifth category of reality (as stipulated by AnandabodhAchArya - 1) neither sat, 2) nor asat, 3) nor sadasat, 4) nor different from sadasat), or if it is a final cognition - in either of these categories, as such a sublation arises, there is no defect (in holding that some effort is needed for it to arise, and therefore such efforts are fruitful).
Sixth argument of the opponent
ननु - बन्धस्य ब्रह्मण्यध्यस्तत्वे तन्निदिध्यासनसाध्यतत्साक्षात्कारनिवर्त्यत्त्वं श्रवणादिनियमादृष्टसापेक्षब्रह्मज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वम् च न स्यात् ;
The opponent argues - If bondage is superimposed on Brahman, its sublation due to the direct experience of Brahman which is itself a product of meditation on Brahman, would not be possible. Its sublation due to the cognition of Brahman arising from listening to the scriptures in the prescribed manner, leading to the accrual of spiritual merit, (as suggested in the vivaraNa) - would not occur.
नहि देवतानिदिध्यासनसाध्यतत्साक्षात्कारनिवर्त्यं दुरितं तत्राध्यस्तम् ; This is because the sin that is destroyed by the direct experience of a deity due to the meditation upon the deity, is not said to be superimposed on the deity.
न वा दूरागमनादिनियमादृष्टसापेक्षसेतुदर्शननिवर्त्यं दुरितं तत्राध्यस्तमिति ; Nor is the sin (of slaying a Brahmana), which is removed by the merit accruing from the long pilgrimage undertaken to Rameshvaram (setu) in the prescribed manner (walking barefoot from the location of the commission of the sin, to Rameshvaram), superimposed on Rameshvaram.
If the sins that are removed by the perception of the deity and the perception of Rameshvaram are not superimposed on the deity and Rameshvaram, why is the advaitin insisting that the bondage which is destroyed by the direct experience of Brahman superimposed on Brahman?
The siddhikAra responds:
- चेन्न ; No.
आत्माध्यस्तगौरत्वादे: शुक्त्याद्यध्यस्तरूप्यादेश्च तत्तसाक्षात्कारनिवर्त्यत्वदर्शनेन प्रपञ्चस्यापि ब्रह्मण्यधस्ततया तत्साक्षात्कारनिवर्त्यत्वस्यावश्यकत्वात् |
Fairness, etc. which are superimposed upon the self ("I am fair"), and the silver, etc. that are superimposed upon the shell, etc., are seen to be sublated upon the direct experience of the substratum of each, it must necessarily follow that the world, which is superimposed on Brahman, is sublated by the direct perception of Brahman.
नहि शुक्त्याद्यध्यस्तं रूप्यादि शुक्त्यादिज्ञानं विना निवर्तते | The shell-silver superimposed on the shell, will not be sublated without the perception of the shell.
देवतादर्शनादिना तु प्रायश्चित्तसमयकक्ष्येण दुरितस्य कारणात्मनावस्थानमात्रं क्रियते, however, the expiation of sin that takes place in the instant of the cognition of deities, does not destroy sin, it merely reverts it back into a causal state.
नतु शुक्तिज्ञानेन रूप्यस्येव निवृत्ति: ; It is not a sublation like in the case of the silver, upon the cognition of the shell.
अधिष्ठानाज्ञानरूपोपादानकस्यारोपितस्य तन्निवृत्तिं विना निवृत्त्ययोगात्, अज्ञाननिवृत्तिश्चाधिष्ठानज्ञानादेवेत्युक्तं प्राक् |
Without the destruction of the ignorance of the substratum which is the material cause for the superimposition, the sublation of the superimposed object is not possible. Further, that the sublation of ignorance is only possible due to the cognition of the substratum, has been previously said.
श्रवणादिनियमादृष्टम् च न मुक्तिं प्रति कारणम्, किंतु ब्रह्मापरोक्ष्यं प्रति |
The accrued merit from listening to the scriptures in the prescribed manner is not the cause of liberation, rather, it is the cause for the direct experience of Brahman.
Injunctions are of three types -
1) apUrva - that which is not knowable by anything other than Veda.
2) niyama - when there are two alternatives for an action, and only one is prescribed in a Vedic ritual, that is a niyama vidhi. For example, in the darsha pUrNamAsa sacrifice, the sacrificial offering, the puroDASha, is prepared using paddy. To prepare the puroDASha, the husk has to be removed from paddy. This leads to the question, how should the husk be removed - it can be either by a mortar and pestle (avahananam), or one can scratch it out using your fingernails, or one can grind the paddy using a stone (ashmakuTTanam) etc. Faced with these alternatives, the Veda says - व्रीहीनवहन्ति - one should (only) remove it with the mortar and pestle. This is a niyama vidhi.
3) parisankhyA vidhi - permission. For example, एकादश्यां फलाहारम् कुर्यात् - One may eat fruits only during the ekAdashI, the 11th day of the fortnight. While this is couched in the form of a permission, what is intended is that one should observe fasting during the ekAdashI - and if there are elderly people or children, they are permitted to eat fruits, if they are unable to fast on that day.
ननु - अवघातसाध्यवैतुष्यान्यापूर्वस्येव श्रवणादिसाध्यापरोक्ष्यान्यमुक्तेरेव तत्साध्यत्वम् ;
The opponent says - like the apUrva, the spiritual merit accruing from the dehusking of the paddy by the grinding, is different from it, the liberation that accrues from the direct perception generated through listening to the scriptures must be different to the direct perception.
अन्यथा श्रवणनियमादृष्टसाध्ये साक्षात्कारे श्रवणनिरपेक्षस्योपायान्तरस्याप्रसक्त्या तत्प्रसक्त्यधीननियमविध्ययोगात्,
Otherwise, for the direct experience that is achieved by the spiritual merit accruing from listening to the scriptures in the prescribed manner, there being no other means apart from the listening, it would be inappropriate to hold that there is a niyama vidhi with respect to listening, as that would imply having some sort of choice.
नच - परोक्षज्ञानं श्रवणात्, अपरोक्षं तु नियमादृष्टादिति युक्तम् ;
Nor can it be said that indirect knowledge is through listening, whereas direct knowledge is through the spiritual merit.
श्रवणादिविधौ परोक्षज्ञानप्रवाहरूपनिदिध्यासनसाध्यापरोक्षस्यैव दृशिनोद्देशात्,
For, in the injunction for shravaNa etc, it has been said that the continuous flow of indirect knowledge as part of meditation leads to the direct experience of Brahman.
त्वन्मते परोक्षज्ञाने कामनाया अयोगेन तस्योद्देश्यत्वायोगाच्चेति
In your philosophy, desiring (only) for indirect knowledge is not sufficient, for that to be the object of the injunction, is not correct.
The siddhikAra says.
- चेन्न ; no.
तत्र क्रत्वर्थस्य नियमापूर्वस्य परमापूर्वसाधकत्वेऽपि पुरुषार्थहिरण्यधारणादिनियमादृष्टस्य तदभाववत् श्रवणादिसाध्यसाक्षात्कारान्यफलाभावेऽपि तेनैव फलवत्त्वोपपत्ते:,
There, even though the object of the subsidiary injunction, the spiritual merit accruing from following the subsidiary injunction (the niyama apUrva), serves to aid the achievement of the ultimate spiritual merit of the main sacrifice, there is a difference in the case of the instruction that everyone should wear some item of gold, it achieves its aim directly, without a niyama apUrva. Similarly, even though nothing apart from shravaNa etc can lead to the result of direct experience, it too leads to its result directly (without the necessity to postulate an intervening apUrva).
'सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेश्वव' दिति न्यायात्, 'सर्वं कर्माखिलं पार्थ ज्ञाने परिसमाप्यते' इति स्मृतेश्च |
However this does not mean that spiritual merit serves no purpose in the case of moksha - as has been said in the brahma sUtra "there is the requirement of every spiritual merit for this", and the gIta, "every action of any kind ends in knowledge".
अत्र सर्वाखिलपदाभ्यां कर्मशब्दवाच्यापूर्वमात्रस्य ज्ञाने समाप्तिर्दर्शिता ; मोक्षस्याविद्यानिवृत्तिरूपस्य ज्ञानातिरिक्तासाध्यत्वनियमाच्च |
Here, the terms "every" and "any" are used to indicate that both action and spiritual merit culminate ultimately in knowledge alone. Moksha, of the nature of cessation of ignorance, is incapable of being the result of anything apart from right knowledge.
ज्ञाने त्वंसंभावनादिनिवृत्त्या प्रतिबन्धकदुरितनिवृत्त्या च दृष्टादृष्टाम्शोपयोग: |
However, to overcome defects such as doubts about the impossibility of liberation etc., and to remove the obstacles such as sin, etc., to the rise of knowledge, both direct and indirect means are needed.
सामान्यपुरस्कारेण च प्रसक्तस्य साधनान्तरस्य निवृत्ति: सर्वत्र नियमविधे: फलम्, विशेषरूपेण त्वपूर्वविधित्वमेव |
The difference between niyama vidhi and apUrva vidhi is this - when all the other means by something can be generally achieved are to be denied, a niyama vidhi is used. However, if something is to be specifically performed, an apUrva vidhi is used.
यथाहि 'व्रीहीन्वहन्ती' त्यादावपूर्वसाधनीभूतव्रीहिवैतुष्ये विशिष्यावघातातिरिक्तसाधनान्तराप्रसक्तावपि व्रीहिवैतुष्यमात्रे प्रसक्तस्य नखविदलनादेर्निवृत्ति:, विशिष्य कार्यकारणभावबोधनात्,
Just like - with respect to the removal of the paddy husk, which leads to the accrual of spiritual merit, as known through the injunction, 'dehusk the paddy with a mortar', there is no basis to say that spiritual merit would accrue from any other means apart from beating the padding with a mortar and pestle, but the injunction's purpose lies in prohibiting the other possible means of dehusking such as peeling the husk with one's figernails etc., by implying the cause-effect relationship between the specific means of dehusking and the accrual of spiritual merit -
तथा निर्विशेषब्रह्मात्माभेदसाक्षात्कारप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तौ श्रवणाद्यतिरिक्तसाधनान्तराप्रसक्तावप्यात्मज्ञानमात्रप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तौ सान्ख्यादिशास्त्रस्यापि प्रसक्ते: तन्निवृत्तिर्विशिष्य वेदान्तवाक्यविचारविधानादिति परमगंभीरोऽयं ग्रन्थार्थ: |
Similarly - with respect to the removal of obstacles to the direct cognition of the identity between the undifferentiated Brahman and the self, there is no basis to say that there are other means to it apart from listening to the scriptures, there are other philosophies, such as sAnkhya, etc., that purport to provide means to remove the obstacles to the self. The purpose of the injunction to enquire into the meaning of Vedantic sentences is to deny that liberation will follow from resorting to other philosophies and to enjoin resorting to Vedanta alone. This is the profound meaning of the vivaraNa passage.
Seventh argument of the opponent
ननु - यदि विश्वं कल्पितं स्यात्,
If the world was a superimposition
तदा 'जन्माद्यस्य यत' इति सूत्रे 'यतो वा इमानी'त्यादिश्रुतौ च जन्माद्युक्ति:,
The statements of creation, etc in the sUtra "that from which this takes birth etc." and the Shruti "from which are all these beings born",
'ईक्षतेर्नाशब्द'मिति सूत्रे 'तदैक्षते'त्यादिश्रुतौ च ईश्वरस्येक्षापूर्वककर्तृत्वोक्ति:,
The statements of Ishvara's planned creation of the universe, as discerned from the sUtra "on account of seeing, no, it cannot be the unsaid pradhAna", and Vedic sentences such as "He saw", etc.,
'लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्य'मिति सूत्रे 'आप्तकामस्य का स्पृहे'त्यादिश्रुतौ च प्रयोजनाभावेऽपि लीलया सृष्ट्यादियुक्ति:,
The statements of the world's creation, despite having no purpose (for Ishvara), was undertaken as sport, as known through the sUtra " like observed in the world, it is a mere play", and the shruti "what purpose is served by creation for one who is fulfilled".
The sentence आप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा occurs in the Agama prakaraNa of mANDUkya kArikA by gauDapAdAchArya, but the madhva tradition holds that to be part of shruti itself.
'वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वादि'ति सूत्रे 'पुण्येन पुण्यं लोकं नयती'त्यादिश्रुतौ च कर्मसाक्षेपत्वेनावैषम्योक्ति:,
The statements of the creator creating the universe on the basis of karma and not on the basis of favouritism in the sUtra "Creation is not out of favouritism or lack of compassion, but dependant on (karma)", and the Shruti "He leads the jIva to the glorious worlds on account of his spiritual merit"
'तेजोऽतस्तथा ह्याहे'तिसूत्रे 'वायोरग्नि'रित्यादुश्रुतौ च तेजआदेर्वाय्वादिजन्यत्वोक्ति:,
The statements talking of the creation of fire etc from wind etc in the sUtra "fire is created from that (wind), because it has been said thus", and the shruti "from the wind, fire was born"
'विपर्ययेण तो क्रमोऽत उपपद्यते चे'ति सूत्रे 'पृथिव्यप्सु प्रलीयत' इत्यादिस्मृतौ च पृथिव्यादीनामबादौ लयोक्तिरित्याद्ययुक्तं स्यात्,
The statements talking of the dissolution of earth etc into water etc. in the sUtra "it resolves into its cause, in the reverse order of its origin" and the smRti "into the water does earth resolve"
All of these statements would be incompatible.
न हि कल्पिते तत्तद्विरोधशङ्का तन्निराकरणं च युक्तमिति
If the world was a superimposition, neither can a doubt about contradiction between various statements about creation, nor its refutation, would be appropriate.
The siddhikAra responds:
- चेन्न ; No.
प्रपञ्चस्य कल्पितस्यापि व्यावहारिकसत्त्वाभ्युपगमेन तद्दशायां विरोधशङ्कातत्परिहारयोरुचितत्वात्, इन्द्रजालादावध्यस्तेऽप्यैन्द्रजालिकादेरीक्षापूर्वकस्रष्टृत्वादेर्दर्शनाच्च |
Even if the world was a superimposition, as it is admitted to be empirically real, as long as one is operating from that state, doubts about the validity of creation statements and the refutation of such doubts are all appropriate. It has been observed that even if the magical act is an illusion, its creation is in accordance with the magician's plan / conceptualisation.
यथाच कल्पितस्यापि जन्माद्युपपत्तिस्तथाऽनिर्वचनीयवादे वक्ष्यते |
The possibility of the birth etc of superimposed objects will be discussed in a later chapter on anirvachanIya vAda.
स्वप्नेऽपि सृष्ट्यादे: श्रुत्या प्रतिपादनाच्च |
The creation of dream objects etc has been spoken of in the shruti too.
अध्यस्तस्यापि सर्पस्य भयकम्पादिजनकत्ववत् वाय्वादीनां तेजआदिजनकत्वमप्युपपन्नम् ;
Like the unreal snake is capable of striking fear, despite being superimposed, it is possible for wind etc., to lead to the creation of fire etc.
'तदभिध्यानादेव तु तल्लिङ्गात्स' इति सूत्रे च तत्तद्भावापन्नस्य ब्रह्मण एव कारणत्वाभिधानात् |
In the sUtra "It is He alone, who through profound meditation on each thing, created it, as is known from the indicatory marks", it has been said that it is Brahman alone, taking on the form of each intermediate cause (i.e Brahman in the form of wind creates fire, and Brahman in the form of fire creates water, and so on and so forth) creates each effect.
अबादौ पृथिव्यादिलयोक्तिरपि तत्तद्भावपन्नचैतन्ये व्याख्येयेति नाधिष्ठानातिरिक्ते लयोक्ति: |
It has been commented that statements on the resolution of earth into water etc, is into the consciousness that takes on that form. Resolution cannot be into anything else but the substratum of the object.
वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यप्रयोजनादिशङ्कापरिहारादिकं तूपासनावस्थायाम् |
The statements given to resolve doubts regarding favouritism, lack of compassion, purpose of creation etc, is to establish faith for meditative purposes.
In the BSB 2.1.13 there is a discussion along the following lines - the world is a creation of Ishvara. As the effect is non-different from the cause, objects such as pots etc must be non-different from Ishvara. Similarly, it is argued that the jIva and Ishvara are also non-different. Therefore, it must follow that jIva the experiencer is the same as the world, which is an object of experience. When such a doubt is raised, the sUtrakAra responds that there are many worldly examples such as the ocean and waves where, despite being non-different in essence, there are differences observed empirically. This is a sUtra that provides an answer using an example where the change is a modification of the cause. Because this may lead to the student misunderstanding that the world is a modification of Brahman, the next sUtra 2.1.14, clarifies that it in fact is an appearance of Brahman.
'भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत्स्याल्लोकवदि'ति आपातत: परीणामवादाभ्युपगमेन, 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्य' इति तु विवर्तवादे परमसिद्धान्तदशायां न शङ्का न चोत्तरम् ;
In the sUtra -"If it is said that they will end up non-different from the experiencer, then such has been observed in the world" - the doubt was provisionally answered on the basis of creation as transformation (pariNAma vAda), the ultimate position as provided in the sUtra "there is the absence of difference between the effect and the cause, on account of texts about origin, etc", following which, there is no doubt requiring a refutation.
मायाविन इवेश्वरस्य स्वप्नप्रतिबिम्बभूतजीवभ्रमयितृत्वेन सर्वविरोधनिरासोपपत्ते: |
Ishvara, the wielder of mAya, is able to delude the jIva, who is none other than a dream reflection of Himself. Thus no contradiction can be said to exist.
ननु - ईश्वरस्य सपरिकरस्य जीवेनाध्यस्तत्वात् कथं भ्रमयितृत्वम् | न;
If it is asked - As Ishvara, along with his retinue is a superimposition by the jIva, how can He delude the jIva? - No.
अविद्योपहितचित एवानादेरीश्वरत्वेनान्त:करणोपहितजीवकल्पितत्वायोगात्,
As Ishvara, who is consciousness, delimited by ignorance, is beginningless, is not a creation of the jIva, who is consciousness, delimited by the mind.
This answer has been given from the position where Ishvara is delimited by ignorance, and the jIva is delimited by the mind.
जीवकल्पितत्वपक्षेऽपि तादृग्धर्मविशिष्टतयैव कल्पनेन तस्य भ्रमयितृत्वाद्युपपत्ते:,
Even if it is said that jIva superimposes the Ishvara, as He is superimposed as being endowed with that attribute (of wielding mAyA, and being capable of deluding the jIva), it is possible for the jIva to consider himself deluded by Ishvara.
'परिकल्पितोऽपि मरणाय भवेदुरगो यथा न तु नभो मलिन' मिति न्यायात् | From the principle, "It is possible to die as a result of an imagined snake, like it is possible to imagine that the sky is dirty".
ननु - न जीवानां वाय्वादिभ्योऽग्न्याद्युत्पत्तिरिति भ्रमोऽस्ति, य: स्वाप्नभ्रम इव श्रुतेरालम्बनं स्यात्,
The opponent says - jIvAs do not have an illusion of wind etc creating fire etc., which (creation) like the dream illusion, is based on shruti statements to that effect.
न च भ्रान्तिं विना कल्पितमस्ति ; न चैतद्वाक्यजभ्रान्तिकल्पितमेव एतद्वाक्यालम्बनम् ; It is not possible for something to be superimposed without delusion. Nor it can be said that being based on a shruti statement means that it is a superimposition arising as a result of the delusion born from the shruti statement.
वेदस्य भ्रमजनकत्वप्रसङ्गात्, because that would led to the Veda being capable of producing delusions
अनुवादे तु न दोष:, however if it is merely repeating something that is generally held, then it is not problem
न चेश्वर एव तत्कल्पक:, तस्य भ्रान्तत्वप्रसङ्गात्, it cannot be Ishvara who did the superimposition, because it would mean that He was deluded.
तदभ्युपगमेऽपि न विस्तार:, भ्रान्तेर्देहेन्द्रियादिकार्यत्वात् तेषां च पृथिव्यादिकार्यत्वात् पृथिव्याद्युत्पत्ते: प्राक् भ्रान्त्ययोगादिति even if it was possible, it does not resolve the problem. As the illusions are the products of the body and mind, and the body and mind are products of the elements such as earth etc., therefore to suggest that prior to the creation of earth, illusion was possible is untenable.
To this, the siddhikAra says: चेन्न No.
भ्रान्तिमात्रे देहेन्द्रियाद्यपेक्षाया: प्रागेव निरासात्, In the fifth pratikUla tarka, we have already refuted the presupposition of a body for the occurrence of an illusion.
ईश्वराध्यस्तवाय्वादिहेतुकाग्न्याद्युत्पत्त्यालम्बनत्वेन वेदस्य भ्रमाजनकत्वात्,
By holding that the creation of fire from wind is on the basis of a superimposition by Ishvara, it does not mean that the Vedas are deluding anyone -
अध्यस्तस्य चाध्यस्तत्वेन स्फुरणान्न मायाविन इव ईश्वरस्य भ्रान्तत्वप्रसङ्ग: | Because if the Vedas talk of a superimposition as a superimposition, it does not lead to the Ishvara being deluded - just like in the case of a magician (who cannot be called deluded if he creates an illusion).
न चाध्यस्तत्वे उत्पत्त्याद्यनुपपत्ति:, अनध्यस्तस्य क्वाप्युत्पत्त्याद्यदर्शनेनाध्यस्तस्यैव तदुपपादकत्वात्,
Nor can it be said that because something is a superimposition, it cannot be born. As an unsuperimposed entity is never seen to be created, it follows that if something is superimposed, it must be created.
सत्कार्यवादासत्कार्यवादिनिषेधेनानिर्वचनीयकार्यवादमात्रे कार्यकारणभावपर्यवसानात् |
By the refutation both satkArya vAda (existence of an effect prior to its creation) and asatkArya vAda (non-existence of the effect prior to its creation), it is anirvachanIya kArya vAda (that the effect is neither sat nor asat) alone that is the basis for all cause-effect relationships.
तदेवं कृत्स्नस्य प्रपञ्चस्याद्वये ब्रह्मणि कल्पनोपपत्तेर्न प्रतिकूलतर्कपराहति: ||
Thus as it is tenable for the entire universe to be superimposed on the non-dual Brahman, all contrarian arguments can be refuted.
इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ ब्रह्मणि प्रपञ्चकल्पनोपपादनेन प्रतिकूलतर्कनिराकरणम् ||
This concludes the chapter refuting the opponent's contrarian arguments by establishing the superimposition of the world on Brahman.