paricCheda 1 - pratikUlatarka nirAkaraNam (part 1)
ननु - मिथ्यात्वानुमानं प्रतिकूलतर्कपराहतम् |
The opponent objects: The mithyatva inference is defeated by contradicting logic.
Seven contradicting arguments that were presented by the opponent are being refuted by the siddhikAra.
First argument of the opponent :
तथाहि - विश्वं यदि कल्पितं स्यात्, सत्याधिष्ठानं स्यात्, न चैवम् ; सामान्यतो ज्ञातत्वे सत्यज्ञातविशेषवत्त्वस्याधिष्ठानप्रयोजकस्य निर्विशेषे निस्सामान्ये च ब्रह्मण्यसंभवादिति - चेन्न;
तथाहि - विश्वं यदि कल्पितं स्यात्, सत्याधिष्ठानं स्यात्, न चैवम् ;
Thus - if the world was an unreal superimposition, its substratum ought to be real, but that is not the case.
सामान्यतो ज्ञातत्वे सत्यज्ञातविशेषवत्त्वस्याधिष्ठानप्रयोजकस्य निर्विशेषे निस्सामान्ये च ब्रह्मण्यसंभवात् -
Because - Something can be a substratum only if its general characteristics happen to be known (e.g. the "this" of the illusion "this is silver" is known) and its special characteristics are unknown (e.g. the "shell" aspect of the valid cognition, "this is in fact a shell" is unknown). However, Brahman, because it is devoid of either general or special characteristics (it being attributeless according to the advaitin), cannot be a substratum.
The siddhikAra says
इति चेन्न ; If this is the argument, no.
स्वरूपेण ज्ञातत्वे सति विशेषेणाज्ञातत्वस्याधिष्ठानत्वप्रयोजकत्वेन अज्ञातविशेषवत्त्वस्याप्रयोजकत्वात् | The determinant of something being the substratum of an illusion is if the object's presence is known without knowing exactly what is that object in reality. The object possessing an unknown special characteristic does not make it suitable to be a substratum.
'पुरुषो न वे' ति संशयधर्मिण: स्थाणोरप्यन्यत्र ज्ञातस्थाणुत्वरूपविशेषवत्त्वात् तत्राज्ञातविशेषवत्त्वमपि न प्रयोजकम् ;
Even a pillar can sometimes be the object of a doubt "is it a person?", despite one knowing what a pillar is - this means that possessing an unknown attribute is not the determinant of whether something can be the substratum of an illusion.
Everyone knows what a pillar is ("pillar"-ness is not unknown), but it can still be mistaken for a person sometimes.
विशेषवत्त्वेनाज्ञातत्वस्यैव लघुत्वेन प्रयोजकत्वात् | Thus, briefly put, it is not knowing what a particular object happens to be (and not the presence of an unknown specificity in it) which determines whether it can the substratum of an illusion
Brahman thus qualifies to be the substratum for the illusion of the world.
तथाच निस्सामान्ये निर्विशेषे च ब्रह्मणि स्वप्रकाशत्वेन ज्ञानात् परिपूर्णत्वानन्दत्वादिना चाज्ञानादधिष्ठानत्वमुपपन्नम् | Therefore, Brahman, which is devoid of general or specific characteristics, being self-evident, is known, but it is not specifically known as infinite, blissful etc, and therefore it being a substratum is certainly tenable.
वस्तुतस्तु - कल्पितसामान्यविशेषवत्त्वं ब्रह्मण्यपि सुलभमेव ;
However, really speaking - it is also quite straight-forward to postulate an unreal attribute, whether general, or specific, in Brahman.
अकल्पितसामान्यविशेषवत्त्वं चाप्रसिद्धम् | However, what is not proven is it possessing a real attribute - general or specific.
नच कल्पने अन्योन्याश्रय:, कल्पितसामान्यविशेषाणां प्रवाहानादित्वात्,
Nor can it be said that unreality (and being a substratum of illusions) are mutually dependent (i.e. Brahman is a substratum of illusion, because of an unreal attribute, and the attribute is unreal because it is superimposed on Brahman) - because such unreal general or specific attributes (and their superimposition) are a beginningless sequence
सत्यत्वानन्दत्वादीनामेव कल्पितव्यक्तिभेदेन सामान्यत्वात्, परिपूर्णानन्दत्वादीनां च विशेषत्वात् - while (limited) existence and bliss etc are said to be general characteristics on account of them being found commonly across unreal individual objects, absolute existence and bliss are said to be special characteristics (only present in Brahman, because such infiniteness is not encountered elsewhere).
Therefore, one can imagine some characteristics as generic on the basis that they are known elsewhere, and some as unknown on the basis that one has never encountered them.
अत एव सामान्याकारज्ञानं विना संस्कारानुद्बोधात् कथमध्यास इति न वाच्यम् ;
Therefore, one cannot challenge the occurrence of superimposition by asserting that one cannot have the activation of a latent impression without a prior cognition of the generic attribute.
It has been argued that one of the causes of superimposition is the activation of prior latent impressions. When someone sees a rope, the shape of the rope triggers the latent impression of a snake seen in the past, and leading the person to see a snake in place of a rope. If it is admitted that the cognition of the generic attribute of the rope led to the activation of the latent impressions of the snake which led to the illusion of the snake, when were Brahman's generic attributes of infinite existence and bliss cognised for the superimposition of the world to occur? This was the argument of the opponent that is being refuted by the siddhikAra here.
सदात्मना स्वरूपज्ञानस्यैव सामान्यज्ञानत्वात् | Because when referring to the general characteristic of Brahman, it is the cognition of the existence of things that is being referred to.
न ह्यध्यसनीयं सदात्मना न भाति | No superimposed object appears as non-existent.
If Brahman's is known as existence and objects are known as existent, what is the difference?
एतावानेव विशेष: - यदधिष्ठानं स्वत एव सदात्मना भाति, अध्यसनीयं तु तत्संबन्धात् |
The difference is only this - the substratum is self evidently known as existence, the superimposed is known in relation to It.
The opponent makes an incidental objection which is being refuted next.
ननु - अधिष्ठानतिरोधानं विना भ्रमासंभव:, प्रकाशरूपतिरोधाने तु तदध्यस्ताविद्यादे: प्रकाशानुपपत्तिरिति - चेत्, न;
Illusion is not possible if the substratum is not hidden. But if the substratum (Brahman), of the nature of illumination, is hidden, superimposed objects like ignorance, etc (its product, the world) would not be revealed.
The siddhikAra says - No.
एकस्यैवानन्दाद्यात्मना तिरोहितस्य सदात्मना प्रकाशसंभवात् |
It is always possible for one aspect of the entity, as bliss, being hidden, but another aspect, as existence, being known.
Ignorance veils Brahman's nature as infinite bliss, but it is unable to hide its nature as existence.
तदुक्तं वार्त्तिककारपादै: - 'यत्प्रसादादविद्यादि सिध्यतीव दिवानिशम् | तमप्यपह्नुतेऽविद्या नाज्ञानस्यास्ति दुष्करम् ||' इति |
As has been said by vArttikakAra (sureshvarAchArya) - By whose blessing (Brahman's), is the existence of ignorance known, that very same entity is veiled by ignorance, like night and day. There is nothing impossible for ignorance.
नच - बाधकालेऽपि सद्विशेषाज्ञानमस्तीति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that even at the time of sublation, the ignorance of specific attributes of Existence continues to exist.
परिपूर्णानन्दत्वादे: सत एव विशेषत्वेन तदा तदज्ञानाभावात्, धर्मत्वमात्रस्यैव कल्पितत्वात् |
As Infinite bliss etc of the special aspects of Existence alone, at that time ( at the time of sublation), the ignorance of that aspect is rendered absent - their being attributes is the unreal bit (their being the nature of Brahman is real).
यद्वा - भ्रमविरोधिज्ञानाभाव एव तन्त्रं, न तु विशेषाज्ञानम् ;
Alternatively, the absence of a cognition that precludes illusion is all that is necessary for the occurrence of an illusion, and not the existence of ignorance of specific aspects of the substratum.
विश्वोपादानगोचाराज्ञानस्य श्रवणादिजन्यमात्ममात्रविषयकं वृत्तिरूपं ज्ञानं विरोधि, न तु चिद्रूपं स्वत:सिद्धं ज्ञानम् ; भ्रमविरोधिनश्च वृत्तिरूपस्य ज्ञानस्येदानीमभावोऽस्त्येव |
It is not the self-evident pure consciousness , but the cognition, of the form of a thought, that arises from listening, etc to vedAnta, and which has Atma alone (and nothing else) as its object, which removes the ignorance that is the material cause of the world.
Therefore, as such a mental cognition capable of removing illusion is absent now, the illusion persists.
ननु - आत्मानात्मनोर्द्रष्टृदृश्यत्वात्मानात्मत्वादिना भेदज्ञानात् कथमध्यस्ताधिष्ठानभाव - इति चेन्न ;
The opponent objects: As the difference between Atma and anAtma is already known on account of one being the witness and the other, the witnessed, one being the self and the other the non-self, how can the one be superimposed on the other?
इदमनिदं न भवतीति पुरोवर्त्यपुरोवर्तिनोर्भेदग्रहेऽपीदं रजतमित्यध्यासवत् सन् घट इत्याद्यध्यासो भविष्यति |
Even if one is aware this proximable object, shell, cannot be that non-proximate object, silver, it is possible, just like in the case of the silver illusion, for the superimposition "The pot exists" to occur.
न हि रूपान्तरेण भेदग्रहो रूपान्तरेणाध्यासविरोधी;
Just because if one thing is known to be different to another thing, it does not mean that the two things are not mistaken for each other. It is not sufficient to know that the rope and snake are different, one must know that this object in front is a rope, for one to not mistake it for a snake.
सन्घट इत्यादिप्रत्यये च सद्रूपस्यात्मनो घटाद्यनुविद्धतया भानान्न तस्य घटाद्यध्यासाधिष्ठानतानुपपत्ति:,
As existence appears along with the pot in the perception "The pot exists", there is no untenability in the pot being superimposed on existence - one does not recognise that existence is an entity independent of the pot, rather, one sees existence along with the pot and one says that the pot is existent
सद्रूपेण च सर्वज्ञानविषयतोपपत्तेर्न रूपादिहीनस्याप्यात्मन: कालस्येव चाक्षुषत्वानुपपत्ति: |
Like in the case of time being an object of sight, it is plausible for the formless self too to be the object every cognition.
Second argument of the opponent
When a rope is mistaken for snake, a real snake must have been seen somewhere.
If Brahman is mistaken for the world, is there a real world that has been seen elsewhere?
ननु - विश्वं यदि कल्पितं स्यात्तदा सत्यप्रधानं स्यात्, न चैवम् ; तस्मात् न कल्पितमिति - चेन्न ;
The opponent argues - if the world is an unreal superimposition, there must be a real one somewhere, but that's not the case. Therefore the world cannot be a superimposition.
The siddhikAra replies - No.
अत्रापि प्रधानस्य सजातीयस्य सत्त्वात्, पूर्वप्रपञ्चसजातीयस्यैवोत्तरप्रपञ्चस्याध्यसनात् |
The original too is an illusion here. The world which was previously present was also an illusion and served as the model for the subsequent world illusion.
अध्यासो हि स्वकारणतया संस्कारमपेक्षते, न तु संस्कारविषयस्य सत्यताम् ; अनुपयोगात् |
All that a superimposition requires is a latent impression of the illusory object, not that the cause of the illusory illusion be real. Such a condition (ie the cause of the latent impression to be real) is unnecessary.
नच - प्रमाजन्य एव संस्कारो भ्रमहेतु:, अतो विषयसत्यत्वमावश्यकमिति - वाच्यम्; मानाभावात्, विपरीते लाघवाच्च |
Nor it can be argued that the latent impression that gives rise to an illusion be formed by a valid cognition, which would necessitate the object of the cognition be real - there is no proof for such a requirement, it is also superfluous to assume such a requirement.
अतएव - अध्यस्तसजातीयं पूर्वमध्यस्तापेक्षयाऽधिकसत्ताकमपेक्षणीयमित्यपि - निरस्तम् ;
For the same reason the following argument stands refuted - "the object seen previously, which serves as a model for the superimposed object, must necessarily have a higher order of reality than the superimposed object".
सत्यतावतधिकसत्ताया अप्यनुपयोगात् |
Like the requirement of reality for the original, the requirement for it to possess a higher order of reality also serves no purpose.
पूर्वं तु ज्ञानमात्रमपेक्षते, तच्चास्त्येव | All that is needed that it is cognised before, and that much is certainly admitted.
ननु - एवमधिष्ठानस्यापि ज्ञानमात्रमेव हेतु:,
The opponent argues - if that is the case, why should the substratum be real? Let the substratum's cognition be sufficient for the illusion.
न तु तदिति न सदधिष्ठानापेक्षा स्यादिति शून्यवादापत्तिरिति - चेन्न ;
As there is no requirement for that too, there would be no need for the substratum to be real, leading to the nihilism of shUnyavAda Buddhism
The siddhikAra refutes this argument.
अधिष्ठानस्य ज्ञानद्वारा भ्रमाहेतुत्वेऽप्यज्ञानद्वारा भ्रमहेतुत्वेन सत्त्वनियमात् | The cognition of the substratum is not the cause of the illusion, rather it is the ignorance of the substratum that leads to the illusion. As a result, the substratum must be real.
भ्रमोपादानाज्ञानविषयो ह्यधिष्ठानमित्युच्यते, तच्च सत्यमेव;
The substratum is that which happens to be the object of the ignorance which is the material cause of an illusion. That (the substratum) must certainly be real.
असत्यस्य सर्वस्याप्यज्ञानकल्पितत्वेनाज्ञानाविषयत्वात् ,
For everything that is unreal is a product of ignorance, and cannot be the object of ignorance.
As unreal objects are products of ignorance, they cannot be the object of ignorance. The object of ignorance therefore must be real. The object of ignorance is the substratum of the illusion, therefore the substratum of the illusion must be real.
तदसत्यत्वे तज्ज्ञानस्य भ्रमाबाधकत्वप्रसङ्गात्, जगति भ्रमबाधव्यवस्था च न स्यात् |
If the substratum too was unreal, its cognition cannot sublate the illusion, and there would be no means to account for sublation observed in the world.
बाधेन हि किञ्चिद्विरुद्धं तत्त्वमुपदर्शयता एव आरोपितमतत्त्वं बाधनीयम्, उभयाध्यासे तु किं केन बाध्यते?
It is only when the sublating cognition reveals something in opposition to the illusion, will the illusion be revealed to be unreal and thus be sublated. If both were unreal, which will sublate which?
अत एव भगवता भाष्यकारेण - 'सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्ये'त्युक्तम् ||
It is for this reason that the divine commentator (shankarAchArya) had said 'mixing the real with the unreal'.
ननु - एतत्प्रपञ्चसाध्यार्थक्रियाकारिण: प्रपञ्चान्तरस्याभावेन स्वोचितार्थक्रियाकारिणोऽस्य न मिथ्यात्वमिति - चेन्न;
The opponent argues - As there is no other world which has created this world and conferred it with utility, this world intrinsically possesses utility and cannot be unreal.
The siddhikAra says no.
स्वाप्नमायादौ व्यभिचारात्, स्वोचितार्थक्रियाकारित्वस्य पारमार्थिकसत्त्वाप्रयोजकत्वात् |
This rule breaks down for dream and magic. They have their own utility, but that does not mean that they are ultimately real.
नापि श्रुत्यादिसिद्धोत्पत्त्यादिमत्त्वं सत्त्वे तन्त्रम् ;
The creation of the world as revealed in the Vedas does not confer reality to the world.
स्वप्नप्रपञ्चे व्यभिचारात् , For the Vedas talk of the creation of a dream world too, and this rule breaks down as a result.
तस्यापि "न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्त्यथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथस्सृजत" इत्यादिश्रुत्योत्पत्त्यादिप्रपादानात् |
Even the creation of the dream world is talked about in shruti "There are no chariots there, nor horses, nor paths, but chariots, horses and paths are created".
नच कल्पाद्यभ्रमायोग ; कल्पान्तरीयसंस्कारस्य तत्र हेतुत्वात् |
Nor can it be allged that at the beginning of creation, there can be no illusion, as there is no previous creation which can be the basis for the latent impressions of the first world - because creation is beginningless, there always was a previous age when the world existed.
न च जन्मान्तरीयसंस्कारस्य कार्यजनकत्वे अतिप्रसङ्ग:,
Nor can it be argued that latent impressions from a previous birth can lead to a situation of excess - ie everything that was present in the previous birth would immediately be known in the current birth - because:
अदृष्टादिवशेन क्वचिदुद्बोधेऽप्यन्यत्रानुद्बोधोपपत्ते:,
As a result of puNya / pApa (adRShTa), even if some latent impressions are activated, others are not.
कार्योर्न्नेयधर्माणाम् यथाकार्यमुन्न्यनात्, अन्यथा जातस्य स्तन्यपानादौ प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् |
It is only by observing the effect, can we infer that there must be some reason for their existence. Otherwise, there would be no way one can explain how newborns instinctively seek out their mother's milk.
ननु - चैत्रेण मैत्रे संस्काराध्यासेऽपि मैत्रस्य भ्रमादर्शनात् जगद्भ्रमहेतुसंस्कारस्य सत्त्वं दुर्वारम्,
The opponent argues - If Chaitra erroneously supposes that Maitra has some latent impressions, it does not lead to Maitra seeing an illusion. Similarly, it is impossible to deny that if this world is unreal, the latent impressions that gave rise to the illusion must have arisen from the cognition of a real world.
नच स्वेनाध्यस्तात्संस्काराद्भ्रमः, भ्रमात् पूर्वं स्वस्य कार्यानुमेयसंस्काराध्यासनियमाभावादिति
Not can it be argued that only one's own illusory cognitions have led to the latent impressions that give rise to further illusions - Because prior to the occurrence of an illusion, there is no basis to infer the presence of illusory latent impressions, for they can only be inferred when the effect, the illusion has occurred.
- चेन्न ; The siddhikAra says no
शुक्तिरूप्यस्य कुण्डलाजनकत्ववच्चैत्राध्यस्तसंस्कारस्य मैत्रभ्रमाजनकत्वेऽपि
Even though an illusory latent impression present in Chaitra cannot give rise to an illusion in Maitra, just like an illusory silver cannot be used to create an earring,
वणिग्वीथीस्थरूप्यस्य कुण्डलजनकत्वत् स्वेनाध्यस्तस्य संस्क्सारस्य वियदाद्यध्यासजनकत्वोपपत्ते:
It is possible for the latent impressions formed by one's own illusory cognitions can give rise to the illusion of the world (consisting of elements such as space etc), just like the silver located in the market can be used to create an earring.
तत्प्रतीत्यभावेऽपि तदध्यासस्य पूर्वं सत्त्वात् कृत्स्नस्यापि व्यावहारिकपदार्थस्याज्ञातसत्त्वाभ्युपगमात् |
As the existence of empirical objects is admitted, even when one may not be aware of them, even if one does not cognise the latent impression, its existence is admitted, as the illusory experience that give rise to did take place.
ननु - प्रातिभासिकरूप्ये त्रैकालिकनिषेधस्य त्वन्मते व्यावहारिकविषयत्ववद्व्यावहारिकप्रपञ्चेऽपि 'नेह नाने'ति त्रैकालिकनिषेधस्य पारमार्थिकप्रपञ्चान्तरविषयताऽवश्यं वाच्येति - चेन्न ;
The opponent argues - In your system, the object of negation in all three periods of time of the prAtibhAsika silver, is the vyAvahArika silver. Like that, the negation of the vyAvahArika world too by the shruti words "there is no multiplicity whatsoever" must be some other, ultimately real, world.
The siddhikAra says - no. This has been addressed in the chapter on the second mithyAtva already.
भ्रमबाधवैयधिकरण्यापत्तेनास्य पक्षस्यानङ्गीकारपराहतत्वात् | This position is not acceptable to us and has been refuted already citing that it will lead to the illusion and sublating cognition having two different objects.
How can the object of the illusion be an illusory silver and the object of the sublating cognition be an empirical silver? If their objects are different, the sublating cognition will not be able to negate the illusion.
अङ्गीकारेऽपि व्यावहारिकनिषेधे पारमार्थिकनिषेधत्वं न संभवति ; अप्रतीतस्य निषेधायोगात् |
Even if it were to be accepted, the object of the negation of vyAvahArika word, cannot be an ultimately real world, because something which is not seen cannot, be the object of negation.
An ultimately real world is not seen for the shruti to negate it.
प्रतीत्या सहाध्यासातिरिक्तसंबन्धाभावेन पारमार्थिके प्रतीत्वाभावात् | As there is no other relationship other than a superimposition between cognition and its object (see the chapter on the untenability of a relationship between cognitions their objects), there is no possibility for the cognition of an ultimately real object.
The third argument
A requirement for superimposition is similarity, sAdRshya, between the substratum and the superimposition, and similarity between the original (snake) and the illusion (illusory snake).
ननु - प्रधानाधिष्ठानयो: सादृश्याभावात्कथमध्यास: ?
How can there be a superimposition, when there is no similarity between the original (world) and the superimposed world?
Similarity, or sAdRshya is an attribute, a guNa. Two attributes can have similarity, as mentioned in the panchapAdikA - केतकीगन्धसदृश: सर्पगन्ध: the fragrance of a snake is similar to the fragrance of a ketaki flower. However the attributes themselves are attribute-less, nirguNa. Thus it is possible for nirguNa entities to have similarity.
अथ निर्गुणयोरपि गुणयो: सादृश्यवदत्रापि किञ्चित्सादृश्यम् भविष्यतीतिम् तन्न ;
If it is said like the nirguNa guNa-s have similarity, let there be some similarity here too - then no.
निर्धर्मके ब्रह्मणि तस्याप्यध्यासाधीनत्वेनान्योन्याश्रयात् |
As brahman is without attributes, for it to have some similarity which is itself an attribute, such a similarity will have to be superimposed on it. Thus, there is a situation where similarity, which is required to explain superimposition, is itself superimposed leading to the defect of mutual dependence.
superimposition is of two kinds - sopAdhika and nirupAdhika.
यद्यपि सादृश्यम् सोपाधिकाध्यासे न कारणम्, व्यभिचारात् ; तथापि निरुपाधिकाध्यासेऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तस्यावश्यमपेक्षणीयत्वात्
Even though similarity is not a requirement for a sopAdhika superimposition, as it does not serve a purpose there, there is definitely a requirement for similarity in nirupAdhika superimposition. This can be confirmed by anvaya-vyatireka. Whenever there is nirupAdhika adhyAsa, there is similarity, when there is no similarity, there is no nirupAdhika adhyAsa.
सोपाधिकेऽपि 'रक्त: स्फटिक' इत्यादौ द्रव्यत्वादिना सादृश्यस्य सत्वाच्चेति
Even in the case of sopAdhika superimpositions like the 'red crystal', there is a similarity between the two entities, on account of both being dravya-s, material entities.
- चेन्न; अविद्याध्यसस्यानादित्वेन कारणानपेक्षस्य सादृश्यानपेक्षत्वात्,
The siddhikAra says no. As superimposed nescience is beginning-less, it cannot have a cause, and thus there is no requirement for similarity.
अन्त:करणाध्यासेऽप्यविद्यासंबन्धित्वस्यैव सादृश्यस्य विद्यमानत्वात् |
Even in the case of the superimposition of the mind (which has a beginning), the similarity that it possesses with Brahman is that both are related to ignorance.
वस्तुतस्तु - न भ्रमे सादृश्यापेक्षानियम:, निरुपाधिकेऽपि 'पीत: शङख' इत्यादौ व्यभिचारात् |
Actually, there is no requirement for similarity for an illusion. Even in the case of nirupAdhika superimpositions like a "yellow conch", there is no similarity between yellowness and conch.
'रक्त: स्फटिक' इत्यादावपि द्रव्यत्वादिना सादृश्यमस्तीत्यपि न;
In the case of the red crystal etc, one cannot argue for similarity on the basis of materialness.
प्रधानमात्रवृत्तितया प्रागवगतमध्याससमये चाधिष्ठानवृत्तितया गृहीतं यत् तदेव हि सादृश्यम् विपर्ययप्रयोजकमिति त्वयापि वाच्यम्, नतु प्रागेव प्रधानाधिष्ठानोभयवृत्तितया गृहीतम् ; तस्य सांशयिकत्वात् |
That which is known prior to the illusion to only exist in the original, and is seen to exist at the time of the illusion in the substratum - only such a feature can be the similarity which is capable of serving as a cause for an illusion. This you also will have to accept. On the other hand, that which is known beforehand to be present in both the source and the substratum cannot lead to an illusion, because it will be subject to doubt.
द्रव्यत्वादि च लोहितालोहितवृत्तितया प्राग्गृहीतमिति न विपर्ययप्रयोजकम् | As materialness is known to be present substances that are red or otherwise, it cannot lead to illusory cognitions.
किंच सादृश्यम् न स्वतो भ्रमकारणम् ; मानाभावात्, किंतु संस्कारोद्बोधेन सामग्रीसंपादकतया, संस्कारोद्बोधश्च न सादृश्यैकनियत:, अदृष्टादिनापि तत्संभवात् |
Moreover, similarity is not independently a cause of illusion, as there is no proof for that. Rather, it is through the activation of latent tendencies, it gives rise to the causes of the illusion. However, the activation of latent tendencies is not because of similarity alone. It can be activated even by an unknown causes.
तदुक्तम् - 'सादृशादृष्टचिन्ताद्या: स्मृतिबीजस्य बोधका: |' इति |
It has been said, "the cause of latent tendencies to be activated is similarity, an unknown cause, mental effort, etc"
चिन्तादिकं च प्रणिधानसूत्रे व्याख्यातम् |
Concentration etc have been spoken of in the praNidhAna sUtra of nyAya sutras (3rd adhyAya).
तथाचान्यत: संस्कारोद्बोधे सति सादृश्यमनुपयोगि |
Therefore, if there are other factors present, activation of latent tendencies can take place even without similarity.
तदुक्तं विवरणे - 'निरुपाधिकभ्रमकार्यदर्शनमेव गुणावयवसामान्याभावेऽपि केतकीगन्धसदृश: सर्पगन्ध इतिवत् सादृश्यान्तरं वा, शङ्खीपीतिमादाविव कारणान्तरं वा कल्पयती' ति |
As has been argued in the vivaraNa - "A nirupAdhika illusion is seen to be produced even in the absence of a similarity of attributes or parts, like in the case of the (illusory) similarity of the ketaki flower's fragrance with the snake's fragrance, or due to some other similarity, or some other cause, like in the case of the yellow conch."
Fourth argument
ननु - दोषं विना भ्रमस्वीकारे तदप्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वापत्ति:, दोषजन्यत्वस्वीकारे तु दोषस्याप्यध्यसनीयत्वेनानवस्थापत्तिरिति - चेन्न ;
The opponent says - if an illusion was possible even without a defect, it would lead to the incorrectness of cognition being something intrinsic to cognitions. If it was said that defects are the cause of incorrect cognitions, then as defects themselves are superimposed, it would lead to infinite regress.
The siddhikAra says no.
अनाद्यविद्याध्यासस्य दोषानपेक्षत्वात् | The superimposition of beginningless nescience does not require a defect.
साद्यध्यासस्य चाविद्यादोषजन्यत्वात् नाप्रमाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वम् ; नाप्यनवस्था |
Just because a superimposition with a beginning is said to occur because of ignorance, it does not lead to the incorrectness of cognitions arising due to internal causes. Nor does it lead to infinite regress.
अन्यथा तार्किकाणामप्यनादिप्रमा गुणं विनापीति प्रामाण्यपरतस्तवं भज्येत |
Otherwise the naiyyAyika, who believes in the validity of cognitions requiring external sources for validation, (prAmANya paratastva) will stand refuted, for a beginningless, valid cognition can occur without the requirement for it to originate from a guNa, a valid quality.
The naiyyAyika, unlike the advaitin, holds that the a cognition is valid only if it arises from a guNa, a quality. It is invalid if it arises from a doSha, a defect - that is the validity or invalidity of cognitions is not intrinsic to cognition, it is established by factors outside the cognitions themselves. This refers to prAmANya paratastva and aprAmANya paratastva.
The advaitin holds that the validity of cognition is intrinsic to the cognition - the validity of a cognition exists when the cognition arises; however, the invalidity of the cognition is established by external factors. This is prAmANya svatastva, aprAmANya paratastva.
जन्यप्रमामात्रस्य गुणजन्यत्वं तु जन्याध्यासमात्रस्य दोषजन्यत्वेन समम् |
If prAmANya paratastva means that only valid cognitions that arise, require being born from a guNa, then it is equally possible for only superimpositions that arise to require being born from a defect.
ननु - लाघवेन प्रथमोपस्थितत्वेन च प्रवृत्तिमात्रम् प्रति संसर्गधिय इव धूममात्रं प्रति वह्नेरिव च अध्यासमात्रं प्रति दोषादीनाम् जनकत्वादविद्याध्यासोऽपि कथं क्लृप्तकारणेन विना भवतु?
The opponent asks - Out of simplicity, it is admitted that all actions towards something requires a cognition of relationship, because that is what is observed first (the act to go towards the silver is because there is the cognition of silver, "there"), the cognition of all smoke requires the presence of fire. Likewise, it must be admitted that all superimpositions require a defect for their rise. How then is it being said that the superimposition of ignorance is without cause?
अन्यथा संसर्गधीरपि प्रवृत्तिविशेषे वह्निरपि धूमविशेषे हेतुरिति स्यात् ; तथाचाख्यातिवादश्चानुमानमात्रोच्छेदश्चापद्येताम् |
Otherwise, we will have to also concede that the cognition of relationship only leads to some actions towards a thing, and only some types of smoke are caused by fire. This will lead to erroneous cognitions arising in accordance with akhyAtivAda (which states that in the cognition of error, the action towards the object is not caused due to the cognition of the relationship of the observed object with the place), and inferences being invalidated.
किंच अविद्यारूपविषयस्यानादित्वेऽपि तत्प्रतीतेर्दोषाजन्यत्वे प्रामाणयापात:,
Moreover, even if nescience as an object is beginningless, if the cognition of nescience is not born of defective sources, it would lead to that cognition becoming valid.
अप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकस्य दोषजन्यत्वस्याभावात्, for it would mean that the invalidity of cognitions is not because they arise from defective sources.
अथ भेदवदविद्याख्यदोषस्य स्वपरनिर्वाहकत्वम्, Thus, if like difference, it is said that the defect called ignorance achives its own ends.
It has been argued that the "difference" between two objects is different from the two objects themselves. If that is the case, a question may be asked - is the difference itself different to the two objects, or the same? It cannot be the same, for then looking at the object would be looking at difference, and no one cognises difference by simply seeing the one object. So it must be different. What is the cause of the difference between difference and the two objects?
It cannot be admitted to be another difference, because such a postulation would lead to infinite regress. Therefore, it must be admitted that the difference between difference and the two objects is established by the difference itself.
The opponent says that if the advaitin shows difference as an example of how a thing can achieve its own end and other ends, and argues that ignorance too, causes the superimposition of everything upon Brahman, including itself -
एवमपि भिन्न इतिवत्, 'अज्ञानज्ञात'मिति व्यवहारो भवतु ; Even so, like "difference is different", let the knowledge "ignorance is known" happen because of ignorance itself.
प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरस्य स्वविषयधीहेतुत्वम् कुत: ? स्वस्य स्वस्मात् पूर्ववृत्तित्वासंभवादिति - But that would be impossible - because how would it be possible for something whose existence is merely its appearance, be said to be the cause of its own cognition? For something to be a cause it has to exist before its effect. But here, ignorance cannot exist before itself for it to cause its own cognition.
- चेन्न; अध्यासत्वस्य लघुत्वेऽपि प्रथमोपस्थितत्वेऽपि न दोषजन्यतायां तन्त्रत्वम् ;
The siddhikAra says No. Even if it is said that it is more parsimonious for it to be so, and even if it is first seen - every superimposition does not require a defective source.
दोषस्यापि दृश्यत्वेनाध्यसनीयतयाऽनवस्थापत्ते: | As the defect is cognised, it must be superimposed itself. Therefore, to hold that superimposition can only occur from a defective source, and the defect in the source requires another superimposition, which leads to another defective source, and so on. This will lead to infinite regress.
यथा नित्यज्ञानवादिनां ज्ञानत्वस्य न शरीरजन्यतादाववच्छेदकत्वम्, Just like those that believe that there is a category of cognition which is permanent hold that not all cognitions are produced within a body.
न वा गुणजन्यत्वस्य प्रामाण्यप्रयोजकत्वम् ; बाधकबलात्, Nor is the validity of cognition dependent on it being born from a source that is defect-free. For that is later invalidated.
तद्वत् जन्याध्यासं प्रत्येव दोषादीनां कारणत्वम् ; Like that, it is only a superimposition that arises that can be said to be born from a defective source (a beginningless superimposition is not born from a defective source, because it is not born).
गुणाजन्यत्वेऽप्यबाधितविषयतया नित्यज्ञानप्रामाण्यवत् दोषाजन्यत्वेऽपि बाधितविषयतयाऽनाद्यध्यासस्याप्यप्रामाण्योपपत्ति: | Like in the case of a permanent cognition, even if it not born from a guNa, it is considered valid because it is never contradicted, so also, even if the superimposition of beginningless ignorance is not born from a defective source, it is invalid because it is subsequently sublated.
The invalidity of superimpositions is not because they arise from a defective source, but because they are sublated.
बाधितविषयत्वेऽपि न दोषजन्यत्वमवच्छेदकम् ; दोषजन्यत्वेऽप्यवच्छेदकान्तरान्वेषणेऽनवस्थापातात् | Something which is sublated does not imply that it originates from a defective source. Because, to find what leads to something being from a defective source, will require an investigation for the presence of some other factor, which will require some other factor, and so on, leading to infinite regress.
बाधितविषयस्य दोषाजन्यवृत्तित्वेऽपि दोषजन्यत्वस्य तद्व्याप्यत्वोपपत्ते: | Even if sublatability exists in an object which is not born from a defective source, being born from a defective source can imply that it is sublatable.
अत एव शबरस्वामिना 'यस्य दुष्टं करणं यत्र च मिथ्येति प्रत्यय: स एवासमीचीनो नान्य' इति वदता दुष्टकरणजन्यत्वमन्तरेणापि अर्थान्यथात्वमप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकमुक्तम् |
Hence shabara svAmi (the commentator to the pUrvamImAmsA sUtra-s of Jaimini) had said - "Where cognitions originate from defective sources, and where cognitions are illusory, only those are invalid, and not others", meaning that even if the instrument for the rise of a cognition is not defective, if a thing appears as something else (ie false), it is sufficient to imply the invalidity of the cognition.
अविद्याध्यासरूपस्य साक्षिचैतन्यस्याविद्याजन्यत्वानभ्युपगमात् न प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वव्याघात:,
As the witnessing consciousness, which is essentially pure consciousness in which nescience is superimposed, cannot be said to be a product of ignorance, the argument that the cognition of ignorance is impossible for its existence is its appearance alone, does not apply.
The opponent had said that if the superimposition of ignorance was a result of ignorance, the cognition of ignorance would be a result of the superimposition. Therefore, to know ignorance would require superimposition, and superimposition would require ignorance. It would either lead to mutual dependence or infinite regress.
The siddhAntin argues that the cognition of ignorance is not because of ignorance itself, rather it is by the witness-consciousness, which though delimited by ignorance, is not a product of ignorance. Rather, like the cognition of pot being a result of the existence of pot, the cognition of ignorance, is simply a result of it being there as an object of the witness-consciousness.
'अहमज्ञ' इत्याद्यभिलापकारणीभूतवृत्तिरूपाध्यासं प्रति त्ववैद्याया: कारणत्वमस्त्येव, घटादीनामिव स्वप्रत्यक्षं प्रति | The causation of a superimposition of the type "I am ignorant", which being a verbalisation, is in the form of a thought, due to ignorance only (ie such a verbalised, thought form of superimposition, is caused by ignorance only), like saying that the pot is the cause of its own appearance.
वह्निविशिष्टधियोस्तु बाधकाभावात् सामान्येनैव धूमप्रवृत्ती प्रति हेतुतेति न पूर्वोक्तदोषापात: |
However, in the case of the cognition of the fire endowed mountain, as there is nothing to contradict the knowledge that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, to make such an inference would not suffer from the aforesaid flaws.
To be continued.
The opponent objects: The mithyatva inference is defeated by contradicting logic.
Seven contradicting arguments that were presented by the opponent are being refuted by the siddhikAra.
First argument of the opponent :
तथाहि - विश्वं यदि कल्पितं स्यात्, सत्याधिष्ठानं स्यात्, न चैवम् ; सामान्यतो ज्ञातत्वे सत्यज्ञातविशेषवत्त्वस्याधिष्ठानप्रयोजकस्य निर्विशेषे निस्सामान्ये च ब्रह्मण्यसंभवादिति - चेन्न;
तथाहि - विश्वं यदि कल्पितं स्यात्, सत्याधिष्ठानं स्यात्, न चैवम् ;
Thus - if the world was an unreal superimposition, its substratum ought to be real, but that is not the case.
सामान्यतो ज्ञातत्वे सत्यज्ञातविशेषवत्त्वस्याधिष्ठानप्रयोजकस्य निर्विशेषे निस्सामान्ये च ब्रह्मण्यसंभवात् -
Because - Something can be a substratum only if its general characteristics happen to be known (e.g. the "this" of the illusion "this is silver" is known) and its special characteristics are unknown (e.g. the "shell" aspect of the valid cognition, "this is in fact a shell" is unknown). However, Brahman, because it is devoid of either general or special characteristics (it being attributeless according to the advaitin), cannot be a substratum.
The siddhikAra says
इति चेन्न ; If this is the argument, no.
स्वरूपेण ज्ञातत्वे सति विशेषेणाज्ञातत्वस्याधिष्ठानत्वप्रयोजकत्वेन अज्ञातविशेषवत्त्वस्याप्रयोजकत्वात् | The determinant of something being the substratum of an illusion is if the object's presence is known without knowing exactly what is that object in reality. The object possessing an unknown special characteristic does not make it suitable to be a substratum.
'पुरुषो न वे' ति संशयधर्मिण: स्थाणोरप्यन्यत्र ज्ञातस्थाणुत्वरूपविशेषवत्त्वात् तत्राज्ञातविशेषवत्त्वमपि न प्रयोजकम् ;
Even a pillar can sometimes be the object of a doubt "is it a person?", despite one knowing what a pillar is - this means that possessing an unknown attribute is not the determinant of whether something can be the substratum of an illusion.
Everyone knows what a pillar is ("pillar"-ness is not unknown), but it can still be mistaken for a person sometimes.
विशेषवत्त्वेनाज्ञातत्वस्यैव लघुत्वेन प्रयोजकत्वात् | Thus, briefly put, it is not knowing what a particular object happens to be (and not the presence of an unknown specificity in it) which determines whether it can the substratum of an illusion
Brahman thus qualifies to be the substratum for the illusion of the world.
तथाच निस्सामान्ये निर्विशेषे च ब्रह्मणि स्वप्रकाशत्वेन ज्ञानात् परिपूर्णत्वानन्दत्वादिना चाज्ञानादधिष्ठानत्वमुपपन्नम् | Therefore, Brahman, which is devoid of general or specific characteristics, being self-evident, is known, but it is not specifically known as infinite, blissful etc, and therefore it being a substratum is certainly tenable.
वस्तुतस्तु - कल्पितसामान्यविशेषवत्त्वं ब्रह्मण्यपि सुलभमेव ;
However, really speaking - it is also quite straight-forward to postulate an unreal attribute, whether general, or specific, in Brahman.
अकल्पितसामान्यविशेषवत्त्वं चाप्रसिद्धम् | However, what is not proven is it possessing a real attribute - general or specific.
नच कल्पने अन्योन्याश्रय:, कल्पितसामान्यविशेषाणां प्रवाहानादित्वात्,
Nor can it be said that unreality (and being a substratum of illusions) are mutually dependent (i.e. Brahman is a substratum of illusion, because of an unreal attribute, and the attribute is unreal because it is superimposed on Brahman) - because such unreal general or specific attributes (and their superimposition) are a beginningless sequence
सत्यत्वानन्दत्वादीनामेव कल्पितव्यक्तिभेदेन सामान्यत्वात्, परिपूर्णानन्दत्वादीनां च विशेषत्वात् - while (limited) existence and bliss etc are said to be general characteristics on account of them being found commonly across unreal individual objects, absolute existence and bliss are said to be special characteristics (only present in Brahman, because such infiniteness is not encountered elsewhere).
Therefore, one can imagine some characteristics as generic on the basis that they are known elsewhere, and some as unknown on the basis that one has never encountered them.
अत एव सामान्याकारज्ञानं विना संस्कारानुद्बोधात् कथमध्यास इति न वाच्यम् ;
Therefore, one cannot challenge the occurrence of superimposition by asserting that one cannot have the activation of a latent impression without a prior cognition of the generic attribute.
It has been argued that one of the causes of superimposition is the activation of prior latent impressions. When someone sees a rope, the shape of the rope triggers the latent impression of a snake seen in the past, and leading the person to see a snake in place of a rope. If it is admitted that the cognition of the generic attribute of the rope led to the activation of the latent impressions of the snake which led to the illusion of the snake, when were Brahman's generic attributes of infinite existence and bliss cognised for the superimposition of the world to occur? This was the argument of the opponent that is being refuted by the siddhikAra here.
सदात्मना स्वरूपज्ञानस्यैव सामान्यज्ञानत्वात् | Because when referring to the general characteristic of Brahman, it is the cognition of the existence of things that is being referred to.
न ह्यध्यसनीयं सदात्मना न भाति | No superimposed object appears as non-existent.
If Brahman's is known as existence and objects are known as existent, what is the difference?
एतावानेव विशेष: - यदधिष्ठानं स्वत एव सदात्मना भाति, अध्यसनीयं तु तत्संबन्धात् |
The difference is only this - the substratum is self evidently known as existence, the superimposed is known in relation to It.
The opponent makes an incidental objection which is being refuted next.
ननु - अधिष्ठानतिरोधानं विना भ्रमासंभव:, प्रकाशरूपतिरोधाने तु तदध्यस्ताविद्यादे: प्रकाशानुपपत्तिरिति - चेत्, न;
Illusion is not possible if the substratum is not hidden. But if the substratum (Brahman), of the nature of illumination, is hidden, superimposed objects like ignorance, etc (its product, the world) would not be revealed.
The siddhikAra says - No.
एकस्यैवानन्दाद्यात्मना तिरोहितस्य सदात्मना प्रकाशसंभवात् |
It is always possible for one aspect of the entity, as bliss, being hidden, but another aspect, as existence, being known.
Ignorance veils Brahman's nature as infinite bliss, but it is unable to hide its nature as existence.
तदुक्तं वार्त्तिककारपादै: - 'यत्प्रसादादविद्यादि सिध्यतीव दिवानिशम् | तमप्यपह्नुतेऽविद्या नाज्ञानस्यास्ति दुष्करम् ||' इति |
As has been said by vArttikakAra (sureshvarAchArya) - By whose blessing (Brahman's), is the existence of ignorance known, that very same entity is veiled by ignorance, like night and day. There is nothing impossible for ignorance.
नच - बाधकालेऽपि सद्विशेषाज्ञानमस्तीति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that even at the time of sublation, the ignorance of specific attributes of Existence continues to exist.
परिपूर्णानन्दत्वादे: सत एव विशेषत्वेन तदा तदज्ञानाभावात्, धर्मत्वमात्रस्यैव कल्पितत्वात् |
As Infinite bliss etc of the special aspects of Existence alone, at that time ( at the time of sublation), the ignorance of that aspect is rendered absent - their being attributes is the unreal bit (their being the nature of Brahman is real).
यद्वा - भ्रमविरोधिज्ञानाभाव एव तन्त्रं, न तु विशेषाज्ञानम् ;
Alternatively, the absence of a cognition that precludes illusion is all that is necessary for the occurrence of an illusion, and not the existence of ignorance of specific aspects of the substratum.
विश्वोपादानगोचाराज्ञानस्य श्रवणादिजन्यमात्ममात्रविषयकं वृत्तिरूपं ज्ञानं विरोधि, न तु चिद्रूपं स्वत:सिद्धं ज्ञानम् ; भ्रमविरोधिनश्च वृत्तिरूपस्य ज्ञानस्येदानीमभावोऽस्त्येव |
It is not the self-evident pure consciousness , but the cognition, of the form of a thought, that arises from listening, etc to vedAnta, and which has Atma alone (and nothing else) as its object, which removes the ignorance that is the material cause of the world.
Therefore, as such a mental cognition capable of removing illusion is absent now, the illusion persists.
ननु - आत्मानात्मनोर्द्रष्टृदृश्यत्वात्मानात्मत्वादिना भेदज्ञानात् कथमध्यस्ताधिष्ठानभाव - इति चेन्न ;
The opponent objects: As the difference between Atma and anAtma is already known on account of one being the witness and the other, the witnessed, one being the self and the other the non-self, how can the one be superimposed on the other?
इदमनिदं न भवतीति पुरोवर्त्यपुरोवर्तिनोर्भेदग्रहेऽपीदं रजतमित्यध्यासवत् सन् घट इत्याद्यध्यासो भविष्यति |
Even if one is aware this proximable object, shell, cannot be that non-proximate object, silver, it is possible, just like in the case of the silver illusion, for the superimposition "The pot exists" to occur.
न हि रूपान्तरेण भेदग्रहो रूपान्तरेणाध्यासविरोधी;
Just because if one thing is known to be different to another thing, it does not mean that the two things are not mistaken for each other. It is not sufficient to know that the rope and snake are different, one must know that this object in front is a rope, for one to not mistake it for a snake.
सन्घट इत्यादिप्रत्यये च सद्रूपस्यात्मनो घटाद्यनुविद्धतया भानान्न तस्य घटाद्यध्यासाधिष्ठानतानुपपत्ति:,
As existence appears along with the pot in the perception "The pot exists", there is no untenability in the pot being superimposed on existence - one does not recognise that existence is an entity independent of the pot, rather, one sees existence along with the pot and one says that the pot is existent
सद्रूपेण च सर्वज्ञानविषयतोपपत्तेर्न रूपादिहीनस्याप्यात्मन: कालस्येव चाक्षुषत्वानुपपत्ति: |
Like in the case of time being an object of sight, it is plausible for the formless self too to be the object every cognition.
Second argument of the opponent
When a rope is mistaken for snake, a real snake must have been seen somewhere.
If Brahman is mistaken for the world, is there a real world that has been seen elsewhere?
ननु - विश्वं यदि कल्पितं स्यात्तदा सत्यप्रधानं स्यात्, न चैवम् ; तस्मात् न कल्पितमिति - चेन्न ;
The opponent argues - if the world is an unreal superimposition, there must be a real one somewhere, but that's not the case. Therefore the world cannot be a superimposition.
The siddhikAra replies - No.
अत्रापि प्रधानस्य सजातीयस्य सत्त्वात्, पूर्वप्रपञ्चसजातीयस्यैवोत्तरप्रपञ्चस्याध्यसनात् |
The original too is an illusion here. The world which was previously present was also an illusion and served as the model for the subsequent world illusion.
अध्यासो हि स्वकारणतया संस्कारमपेक्षते, न तु संस्कारविषयस्य सत्यताम् ; अनुपयोगात् |
All that a superimposition requires is a latent impression of the illusory object, not that the cause of the illusory illusion be real. Such a condition (ie the cause of the latent impression to be real) is unnecessary.
नच - प्रमाजन्य एव संस्कारो भ्रमहेतु:, अतो विषयसत्यत्वमावश्यकमिति - वाच्यम्; मानाभावात्, विपरीते लाघवाच्च |
Nor it can be argued that the latent impression that gives rise to an illusion be formed by a valid cognition, which would necessitate the object of the cognition be real - there is no proof for such a requirement, it is also superfluous to assume such a requirement.
अतएव - अध्यस्तसजातीयं पूर्वमध्यस्तापेक्षयाऽधिकसत्ताकमपेक्षणीयमित्यपि - निरस्तम् ;
For the same reason the following argument stands refuted - "the object seen previously, which serves as a model for the superimposed object, must necessarily have a higher order of reality than the superimposed object".
सत्यतावतधिकसत्ताया अप्यनुपयोगात् |
Like the requirement of reality for the original, the requirement for it to possess a higher order of reality also serves no purpose.
पूर्वं तु ज्ञानमात्रमपेक्षते, तच्चास्त्येव | All that is needed that it is cognised before, and that much is certainly admitted.
ननु - एवमधिष्ठानस्यापि ज्ञानमात्रमेव हेतु:,
The opponent argues - if that is the case, why should the substratum be real? Let the substratum's cognition be sufficient for the illusion.
न तु तदिति न सदधिष्ठानापेक्षा स्यादिति शून्यवादापत्तिरिति - चेन्न ;
As there is no requirement for that too, there would be no need for the substratum to be real, leading to the nihilism of shUnyavAda Buddhism
The siddhikAra refutes this argument.
अधिष्ठानस्य ज्ञानद्वारा भ्रमाहेतुत्वेऽप्यज्ञानद्वारा भ्रमहेतुत्वेन सत्त्वनियमात् | The cognition of the substratum is not the cause of the illusion, rather it is the ignorance of the substratum that leads to the illusion. As a result, the substratum must be real.
भ्रमोपादानाज्ञानविषयो ह्यधिष्ठानमित्युच्यते, तच्च सत्यमेव;
The substratum is that which happens to be the object of the ignorance which is the material cause of an illusion. That (the substratum) must certainly be real.
असत्यस्य सर्वस्याप्यज्ञानकल्पितत्वेनाज्ञानाविषयत्वात् ,
For everything that is unreal is a product of ignorance, and cannot be the object of ignorance.
As unreal objects are products of ignorance, they cannot be the object of ignorance. The object of ignorance therefore must be real. The object of ignorance is the substratum of the illusion, therefore the substratum of the illusion must be real.
तदसत्यत्वे तज्ज्ञानस्य भ्रमाबाधकत्वप्रसङ्गात्, जगति भ्रमबाधव्यवस्था च न स्यात् |
If the substratum too was unreal, its cognition cannot sublate the illusion, and there would be no means to account for sublation observed in the world.
बाधेन हि किञ्चिद्विरुद्धं तत्त्वमुपदर्शयता एव आरोपितमतत्त्वं बाधनीयम्, उभयाध्यासे तु किं केन बाध्यते?
It is only when the sublating cognition reveals something in opposition to the illusion, will the illusion be revealed to be unreal and thus be sublated. If both were unreal, which will sublate which?
अत एव भगवता भाष्यकारेण - 'सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्ये'त्युक्तम् ||
It is for this reason that the divine commentator (shankarAchArya) had said 'mixing the real with the unreal'.
ननु - एतत्प्रपञ्चसाध्यार्थक्रियाकारिण: प्रपञ्चान्तरस्याभावेन स्वोचितार्थक्रियाकारिणोऽस्य न मिथ्यात्वमिति - चेन्न;
The opponent argues - As there is no other world which has created this world and conferred it with utility, this world intrinsically possesses utility and cannot be unreal.
The siddhikAra says no.
स्वाप्नमायादौ व्यभिचारात्, स्वोचितार्थक्रियाकारित्वस्य पारमार्थिकसत्त्वाप्रयोजकत्वात् |
This rule breaks down for dream and magic. They have their own utility, but that does not mean that they are ultimately real.
नापि श्रुत्यादिसिद्धोत्पत्त्यादिमत्त्वं सत्त्वे तन्त्रम् ;
The creation of the world as revealed in the Vedas does not confer reality to the world.
स्वप्नप्रपञ्चे व्यभिचारात् , For the Vedas talk of the creation of a dream world too, and this rule breaks down as a result.
तस्यापि "न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्त्यथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथस्सृजत" इत्यादिश्रुत्योत्पत्त्यादिप्रपादानात् |
Even the creation of the dream world is talked about in shruti "There are no chariots there, nor horses, nor paths, but chariots, horses and paths are created".
नच कल्पाद्यभ्रमायोग ; कल्पान्तरीयसंस्कारस्य तत्र हेतुत्वात् |
Nor can it be allged that at the beginning of creation, there can be no illusion, as there is no previous creation which can be the basis for the latent impressions of the first world - because creation is beginningless, there always was a previous age when the world existed.
न च जन्मान्तरीयसंस्कारस्य कार्यजनकत्वे अतिप्रसङ्ग:,
Nor can it be argued that latent impressions from a previous birth can lead to a situation of excess - ie everything that was present in the previous birth would immediately be known in the current birth - because:
अदृष्टादिवशेन क्वचिदुद्बोधेऽप्यन्यत्रानुद्बोधोपपत्ते:,
As a result of puNya / pApa (adRShTa), even if some latent impressions are activated, others are not.
कार्योर्न्नेयधर्माणाम् यथाकार्यमुन्न्यनात्, अन्यथा जातस्य स्तन्यपानादौ प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् |
It is only by observing the effect, can we infer that there must be some reason for their existence. Otherwise, there would be no way one can explain how newborns instinctively seek out their mother's milk.
ननु - चैत्रेण मैत्रे संस्काराध्यासेऽपि मैत्रस्य भ्रमादर्शनात् जगद्भ्रमहेतुसंस्कारस्य सत्त्वं दुर्वारम्,
The opponent argues - If Chaitra erroneously supposes that Maitra has some latent impressions, it does not lead to Maitra seeing an illusion. Similarly, it is impossible to deny that if this world is unreal, the latent impressions that gave rise to the illusion must have arisen from the cognition of a real world.
नच स्वेनाध्यस्तात्संस्काराद्भ्रमः, भ्रमात् पूर्वं स्वस्य कार्यानुमेयसंस्काराध्यासनियमाभावादिति
Not can it be argued that only one's own illusory cognitions have led to the latent impressions that give rise to further illusions - Because prior to the occurrence of an illusion, there is no basis to infer the presence of illusory latent impressions, for they can only be inferred when the effect, the illusion has occurred.
- चेन्न ; The siddhikAra says no
शुक्तिरूप्यस्य कुण्डलाजनकत्ववच्चैत्राध्यस्तसंस्कारस्य मैत्रभ्रमाजनकत्वेऽपि
Even though an illusory latent impression present in Chaitra cannot give rise to an illusion in Maitra, just like an illusory silver cannot be used to create an earring,
वणिग्वीथीस्थरूप्यस्य कुण्डलजनकत्वत् स्वेनाध्यस्तस्य संस्क्सारस्य वियदाद्यध्यासजनकत्वोपपत्ते:
It is possible for the latent impressions formed by one's own illusory cognitions can give rise to the illusion of the world (consisting of elements such as space etc), just like the silver located in the market can be used to create an earring.
तत्प्रतीत्यभावेऽपि तदध्यासस्य पूर्वं सत्त्वात् कृत्स्नस्यापि व्यावहारिकपदार्थस्याज्ञातसत्त्वाभ्युपगमात् |
As the existence of empirical objects is admitted, even when one may not be aware of them, even if one does not cognise the latent impression, its existence is admitted, as the illusory experience that give rise to did take place.
ननु - प्रातिभासिकरूप्ये त्रैकालिकनिषेधस्य त्वन्मते व्यावहारिकविषयत्ववद्व्यावहारिकप्रपञ्चेऽपि 'नेह नाने'ति त्रैकालिकनिषेधस्य पारमार्थिकप्रपञ्चान्तरविषयताऽवश्यं वाच्येति - चेन्न ;
The opponent argues - In your system, the object of negation in all three periods of time of the prAtibhAsika silver, is the vyAvahArika silver. Like that, the negation of the vyAvahArika world too by the shruti words "there is no multiplicity whatsoever" must be some other, ultimately real, world.
The siddhikAra says - no. This has been addressed in the chapter on the second mithyAtva already.
भ्रमबाधवैयधिकरण्यापत्तेनास्य पक्षस्यानङ्गीकारपराहतत्वात् | This position is not acceptable to us and has been refuted already citing that it will lead to the illusion and sublating cognition having two different objects.
How can the object of the illusion be an illusory silver and the object of the sublating cognition be an empirical silver? If their objects are different, the sublating cognition will not be able to negate the illusion.
अङ्गीकारेऽपि व्यावहारिकनिषेधे पारमार्थिकनिषेधत्वं न संभवति ; अप्रतीतस्य निषेधायोगात् |
Even if it were to be accepted, the object of the negation of vyAvahArika word, cannot be an ultimately real world, because something which is not seen cannot, be the object of negation.
An ultimately real world is not seen for the shruti to negate it.
प्रतीत्या सहाध्यासातिरिक्तसंबन्धाभावेन पारमार्थिके प्रतीत्वाभावात् | As there is no other relationship other than a superimposition between cognition and its object (see the chapter on the untenability of a relationship between cognitions their objects), there is no possibility for the cognition of an ultimately real object.
The third argument
A requirement for superimposition is similarity, sAdRshya, between the substratum and the superimposition, and similarity between the original (snake) and the illusion (illusory snake).
ननु - प्रधानाधिष्ठानयो: सादृश्याभावात्कथमध्यास: ?
How can there be a superimposition, when there is no similarity between the original (world) and the superimposed world?
Similarity, or sAdRshya is an attribute, a guNa. Two attributes can have similarity, as mentioned in the panchapAdikA - केतकीगन्धसदृश: सर्पगन्ध: the fragrance of a snake is similar to the fragrance of a ketaki flower. However the attributes themselves are attribute-less, nirguNa. Thus it is possible for nirguNa entities to have similarity.
अथ निर्गुणयोरपि गुणयो: सादृश्यवदत्रापि किञ्चित्सादृश्यम् भविष्यतीतिम् तन्न ;
If it is said like the nirguNa guNa-s have similarity, let there be some similarity here too - then no.
निर्धर्मके ब्रह्मणि तस्याप्यध्यासाधीनत्वेनान्योन्याश्रयात् |
As brahman is without attributes, for it to have some similarity which is itself an attribute, such a similarity will have to be superimposed on it. Thus, there is a situation where similarity, which is required to explain superimposition, is itself superimposed leading to the defect of mutual dependence.
superimposition is of two kinds - sopAdhika and nirupAdhika.
यद्यपि सादृश्यम् सोपाधिकाध्यासे न कारणम्, व्यभिचारात् ; तथापि निरुपाधिकाध्यासेऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तस्यावश्यमपेक्षणीयत्वात्
Even though similarity is not a requirement for a sopAdhika superimposition, as it does not serve a purpose there, there is definitely a requirement for similarity in nirupAdhika superimposition. This can be confirmed by anvaya-vyatireka. Whenever there is nirupAdhika adhyAsa, there is similarity, when there is no similarity, there is no nirupAdhika adhyAsa.
सोपाधिकेऽपि 'रक्त: स्फटिक' इत्यादौ द्रव्यत्वादिना सादृश्यस्य सत्वाच्चेति
Even in the case of sopAdhika superimpositions like the 'red crystal', there is a similarity between the two entities, on account of both being dravya-s, material entities.
- चेन्न; अविद्याध्यसस्यानादित्वेन कारणानपेक्षस्य सादृश्यानपेक्षत्वात्,
The siddhikAra says no. As superimposed nescience is beginning-less, it cannot have a cause, and thus there is no requirement for similarity.
अन्त:करणाध्यासेऽप्यविद्यासंबन्धित्वस्यैव सादृश्यस्य विद्यमानत्वात् |
Even in the case of the superimposition of the mind (which has a beginning), the similarity that it possesses with Brahman is that both are related to ignorance.
वस्तुतस्तु - न भ्रमे सादृश्यापेक्षानियम:, निरुपाधिकेऽपि 'पीत: शङख' इत्यादौ व्यभिचारात् |
Actually, there is no requirement for similarity for an illusion. Even in the case of nirupAdhika superimpositions like a "yellow conch", there is no similarity between yellowness and conch.
'रक्त: स्फटिक' इत्यादावपि द्रव्यत्वादिना सादृश्यमस्तीत्यपि न;
In the case of the red crystal etc, one cannot argue for similarity on the basis of materialness.
प्रधानमात्रवृत्तितया प्रागवगतमध्याससमये चाधिष्ठानवृत्तितया गृहीतं यत् तदेव हि सादृश्यम् विपर्ययप्रयोजकमिति त्वयापि वाच्यम्, नतु प्रागेव प्रधानाधिष्ठानोभयवृत्तितया गृहीतम् ; तस्य सांशयिकत्वात् |
That which is known prior to the illusion to only exist in the original, and is seen to exist at the time of the illusion in the substratum - only such a feature can be the similarity which is capable of serving as a cause for an illusion. This you also will have to accept. On the other hand, that which is known beforehand to be present in both the source and the substratum cannot lead to an illusion, because it will be subject to doubt.
द्रव्यत्वादि च लोहितालोहितवृत्तितया प्राग्गृहीतमिति न विपर्ययप्रयोजकम् | As materialness is known to be present substances that are red or otherwise, it cannot lead to illusory cognitions.
किंच सादृश्यम् न स्वतो भ्रमकारणम् ; मानाभावात्, किंतु संस्कारोद्बोधेन सामग्रीसंपादकतया, संस्कारोद्बोधश्च न सादृश्यैकनियत:, अदृष्टादिनापि तत्संभवात् |
Moreover, similarity is not independently a cause of illusion, as there is no proof for that. Rather, it is through the activation of latent tendencies, it gives rise to the causes of the illusion. However, the activation of latent tendencies is not because of similarity alone. It can be activated even by an unknown causes.
तदुक्तम् - 'सादृशादृष्टचिन्ताद्या: स्मृतिबीजस्य बोधका: |' इति |
It has been said, "the cause of latent tendencies to be activated is similarity, an unknown cause, mental effort, etc"
चिन्तादिकं च प्रणिधानसूत्रे व्याख्यातम् |
Concentration etc have been spoken of in the praNidhAna sUtra of nyAya sutras (3rd adhyAya).
तथाचान्यत: संस्कारोद्बोधे सति सादृश्यमनुपयोगि |
Therefore, if there are other factors present, activation of latent tendencies can take place even without similarity.
तदुक्तं विवरणे - 'निरुपाधिकभ्रमकार्यदर्शनमेव गुणावयवसामान्याभावेऽपि केतकीगन्धसदृश: सर्पगन्ध इतिवत् सादृश्यान्तरं वा, शङ्खीपीतिमादाविव कारणान्तरं वा कल्पयती' ति |
As has been argued in the vivaraNa - "A nirupAdhika illusion is seen to be produced even in the absence of a similarity of attributes or parts, like in the case of the (illusory) similarity of the ketaki flower's fragrance with the snake's fragrance, or due to some other similarity, or some other cause, like in the case of the yellow conch."
Fourth argument
ननु - दोषं विना भ्रमस्वीकारे तदप्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वापत्ति:, दोषजन्यत्वस्वीकारे तु दोषस्याप्यध्यसनीयत्वेनानवस्थापत्तिरिति - चेन्न ;
The opponent says - if an illusion was possible even without a defect, it would lead to the incorrectness of cognition being something intrinsic to cognitions. If it was said that defects are the cause of incorrect cognitions, then as defects themselves are superimposed, it would lead to infinite regress.
The siddhikAra says no.
अनाद्यविद्याध्यासस्य दोषानपेक्षत्वात् | The superimposition of beginningless nescience does not require a defect.
साद्यध्यासस्य चाविद्यादोषजन्यत्वात् नाप्रमाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वम् ; नाप्यनवस्था |
Just because a superimposition with a beginning is said to occur because of ignorance, it does not lead to the incorrectness of cognitions arising due to internal causes. Nor does it lead to infinite regress.
अन्यथा तार्किकाणामप्यनादिप्रमा गुणं विनापीति प्रामाण्यपरतस्तवं भज्येत |
Otherwise the naiyyAyika, who believes in the validity of cognitions requiring external sources for validation, (prAmANya paratastva) will stand refuted, for a beginningless, valid cognition can occur without the requirement for it to originate from a guNa, a valid quality.
The naiyyAyika, unlike the advaitin, holds that the a cognition is valid only if it arises from a guNa, a quality. It is invalid if it arises from a doSha, a defect - that is the validity or invalidity of cognitions is not intrinsic to cognition, it is established by factors outside the cognitions themselves. This refers to prAmANya paratastva and aprAmANya paratastva.
The advaitin holds that the validity of cognition is intrinsic to the cognition - the validity of a cognition exists when the cognition arises; however, the invalidity of the cognition is established by external factors. This is prAmANya svatastva, aprAmANya paratastva.
जन्यप्रमामात्रस्य गुणजन्यत्वं तु जन्याध्यासमात्रस्य दोषजन्यत्वेन समम् |
If prAmANya paratastva means that only valid cognitions that arise, require being born from a guNa, then it is equally possible for only superimpositions that arise to require being born from a defect.
ननु - लाघवेन प्रथमोपस्थितत्वेन च प्रवृत्तिमात्रम् प्रति संसर्गधिय इव धूममात्रं प्रति वह्नेरिव च अध्यासमात्रं प्रति दोषादीनाम् जनकत्वादविद्याध्यासोऽपि कथं क्लृप्तकारणेन विना भवतु?
The opponent asks - Out of simplicity, it is admitted that all actions towards something requires a cognition of relationship, because that is what is observed first (the act to go towards the silver is because there is the cognition of silver, "there"), the cognition of all smoke requires the presence of fire. Likewise, it must be admitted that all superimpositions require a defect for their rise. How then is it being said that the superimposition of ignorance is without cause?
अन्यथा संसर्गधीरपि प्रवृत्तिविशेषे वह्निरपि धूमविशेषे हेतुरिति स्यात् ; तथाचाख्यातिवादश्चानुमानमात्रोच्छेदश्चापद्येताम् |
Otherwise, we will have to also concede that the cognition of relationship only leads to some actions towards a thing, and only some types of smoke are caused by fire. This will lead to erroneous cognitions arising in accordance with akhyAtivAda (which states that in the cognition of error, the action towards the object is not caused due to the cognition of the relationship of the observed object with the place), and inferences being invalidated.
किंच अविद्यारूपविषयस्यानादित्वेऽपि तत्प्रतीतेर्दोषाजन्यत्वे प्रामाणयापात:,
Moreover, even if nescience as an object is beginningless, if the cognition of nescience is not born of defective sources, it would lead to that cognition becoming valid.
अप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकस्य दोषजन्यत्वस्याभावात्, for it would mean that the invalidity of cognitions is not because they arise from defective sources.
अथ भेदवदविद्याख्यदोषस्य स्वपरनिर्वाहकत्वम्, Thus, if like difference, it is said that the defect called ignorance achives its own ends.
It has been argued that the "difference" between two objects is different from the two objects themselves. If that is the case, a question may be asked - is the difference itself different to the two objects, or the same? It cannot be the same, for then looking at the object would be looking at difference, and no one cognises difference by simply seeing the one object. So it must be different. What is the cause of the difference between difference and the two objects?
It cannot be admitted to be another difference, because such a postulation would lead to infinite regress. Therefore, it must be admitted that the difference between difference and the two objects is established by the difference itself.
The opponent says that if the advaitin shows difference as an example of how a thing can achieve its own end and other ends, and argues that ignorance too, causes the superimposition of everything upon Brahman, including itself -
एवमपि भिन्न इतिवत्, 'अज्ञानज्ञात'मिति व्यवहारो भवतु ; Even so, like "difference is different", let the knowledge "ignorance is known" happen because of ignorance itself.
प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरस्य स्वविषयधीहेतुत्वम् कुत: ? स्वस्य स्वस्मात् पूर्ववृत्तित्वासंभवादिति - But that would be impossible - because how would it be possible for something whose existence is merely its appearance, be said to be the cause of its own cognition? For something to be a cause it has to exist before its effect. But here, ignorance cannot exist before itself for it to cause its own cognition.
- चेन्न; अध्यासत्वस्य लघुत्वेऽपि प्रथमोपस्थितत्वेऽपि न दोषजन्यतायां तन्त्रत्वम् ;
The siddhikAra says No. Even if it is said that it is more parsimonious for it to be so, and even if it is first seen - every superimposition does not require a defective source.
दोषस्यापि दृश्यत्वेनाध्यसनीयतयाऽनवस्थापत्ते: | As the defect is cognised, it must be superimposed itself. Therefore, to hold that superimposition can only occur from a defective source, and the defect in the source requires another superimposition, which leads to another defective source, and so on. This will lead to infinite regress.
यथा नित्यज्ञानवादिनां ज्ञानत्वस्य न शरीरजन्यतादाववच्छेदकत्वम्, Just like those that believe that there is a category of cognition which is permanent hold that not all cognitions are produced within a body.
न वा गुणजन्यत्वस्य प्रामाण्यप्रयोजकत्वम् ; बाधकबलात्, Nor is the validity of cognition dependent on it being born from a source that is defect-free. For that is later invalidated.
तद्वत् जन्याध्यासं प्रत्येव दोषादीनां कारणत्वम् ; Like that, it is only a superimposition that arises that can be said to be born from a defective source (a beginningless superimposition is not born from a defective source, because it is not born).
गुणाजन्यत्वेऽप्यबाधितविषयतया नित्यज्ञानप्रामाण्यवत् दोषाजन्यत्वेऽपि बाधितविषयतयाऽनाद्यध्यासस्याप्यप्रामाण्योपपत्ति: | Like in the case of a permanent cognition, even if it not born from a guNa, it is considered valid because it is never contradicted, so also, even if the superimposition of beginningless ignorance is not born from a defective source, it is invalid because it is subsequently sublated.
The invalidity of superimpositions is not because they arise from a defective source, but because they are sublated.
बाधितविषयत्वेऽपि न दोषजन्यत्वमवच्छेदकम् ; दोषजन्यत्वेऽप्यवच्छेदकान्तरान्वेषणेऽनवस्थापातात् | Something which is sublated does not imply that it originates from a defective source. Because, to find what leads to something being from a defective source, will require an investigation for the presence of some other factor, which will require some other factor, and so on, leading to infinite regress.
बाधितविषयस्य दोषाजन्यवृत्तित्वेऽपि दोषजन्यत्वस्य तद्व्याप्यत्वोपपत्ते: | Even if sublatability exists in an object which is not born from a defective source, being born from a defective source can imply that it is sublatable.
अत एव शबरस्वामिना 'यस्य दुष्टं करणं यत्र च मिथ्येति प्रत्यय: स एवासमीचीनो नान्य' इति वदता दुष्टकरणजन्यत्वमन्तरेणापि अर्थान्यथात्वमप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकमुक्तम् |
Hence shabara svAmi (the commentator to the pUrvamImAmsA sUtra-s of Jaimini) had said - "Where cognitions originate from defective sources, and where cognitions are illusory, only those are invalid, and not others", meaning that even if the instrument for the rise of a cognition is not defective, if a thing appears as something else (ie false), it is sufficient to imply the invalidity of the cognition.
अविद्याध्यासरूपस्य साक्षिचैतन्यस्याविद्याजन्यत्वानभ्युपगमात् न प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वव्याघात:,
As the witnessing consciousness, which is essentially pure consciousness in which nescience is superimposed, cannot be said to be a product of ignorance, the argument that the cognition of ignorance is impossible for its existence is its appearance alone, does not apply.
The opponent had said that if the superimposition of ignorance was a result of ignorance, the cognition of ignorance would be a result of the superimposition. Therefore, to know ignorance would require superimposition, and superimposition would require ignorance. It would either lead to mutual dependence or infinite regress.
The siddhAntin argues that the cognition of ignorance is not because of ignorance itself, rather it is by the witness-consciousness, which though delimited by ignorance, is not a product of ignorance. Rather, like the cognition of pot being a result of the existence of pot, the cognition of ignorance, is simply a result of it being there as an object of the witness-consciousness.
'अहमज्ञ' इत्याद्यभिलापकारणीभूतवृत्तिरूपाध्यासं प्रति त्ववैद्याया: कारणत्वमस्त्येव, घटादीनामिव स्वप्रत्यक्षं प्रति | The causation of a superimposition of the type "I am ignorant", which being a verbalisation, is in the form of a thought, due to ignorance only (ie such a verbalised, thought form of superimposition, is caused by ignorance only), like saying that the pot is the cause of its own appearance.
वह्निविशिष्टधियोस्तु बाधकाभावात् सामान्येनैव धूमप्रवृत्ती प्रति हेतुतेति न पूर्वोक्तदोषापात: |
However, in the case of the cognition of the fire endowed mountain, as there is nothing to contradict the knowledge that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, to make such an inference would not suffer from the aforesaid flaws.
To be continued.