paricCheda 1 - pratikarmavyavasthA (part 4)
तदुक्तं सम्क्षेपशारीरके - 'आश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी निर्विभागचितिरेव केवला | पूर्वसिद्धतमसो हि पश्चिमो नाश्रयो भवति नापि गोचर: ||'
Thus, it has been said in the samkshepa shAriraka - the locus and object of darkness (ignorance) is the partless consciousness alone. That which presupposes ignorance (the jIva) cannot be the locus or the object of ignorance.
'बहु निगद्य किमत्र वदाम्यहं शृणुत सङ्ग्रहमद्वयशासने | सकलवाङ्ग्मनसातिगता चिति: सकलवाङ्ग्मनसव्यवहारभाक् ||' इति च |
“Having said a lot, what else can I say here? I will therefore be brief in describing the advaita scripture. Consciousness, which is beyond the reach of mind and speech, is the illuminator of every activity involving mind and speech.”
तस्मादविद्यायां सत्यामपि शक्त्यभिभवाद्वा तूलाज्ञाननाशाद्वा अवस्थाविशेषप्रच्यवाद्वा, एकदेशनाशाद्वा, भीरुभटवदपसरणाद्वा, कटवत्संवेष्टनाद्वा, आवरणभङ्गानिर्मोक्षबाधानामुपपत्ति: |
Therefore even when ignorance persists - by the destruction of a particular power of ignorance, or by the destruction of a secondary ignorance, or by the end of a particular state of ignorance, or by the destruction of ignorance in one particular place, or like a fearful soldier running at the sight of the enemy (but not destroyed), or like a mat which is folded (but not removed) - the removal of the veil, the absence of moksha (during samsara) and sublation of a particular illusion are all possible.
ननु - अवस्थाविशेषाणामज्ञानाभिन्नत्वे एकाज्ञानपक्षक्षति:, अज्ञानभिन्नत्वे च साक्षात् ज्ञानेन निवृत्ति: भ्रमाद्युपादानत्वंच न स्यात्, तेषामिव रूप्यस्यैवोपदाननाशं विना नाशप्रसङ्गश्च, शुक्त्यज्ञानं नष्टमित्यनुभवविरोधश्चेति - चेन्न ;
The nyAyAmRtakAra asks:
अवस्थाविशेषाणामज्ञानाभिन्नत्वे एकाज्ञानपक्षक्षति:, If the different states of ignorance are the same as ignorance, then the position of ignorance being one is harmed (there are many states of ignorance, which is as good as saying that ignorance is not one).
अज्ञानभिन्नत्वे च साक्षात् ज्ञानेन निवृत्ति: भ्रमाद्युपादानत्वंच न स्यात्, if they are different from ignorance, they will not be directly removed by cognition. Also, if they are not ignorance, they cannot be the material cause of illusions.
तेषामिव रूप्यस्यैवोपदाननाशं विना नाशप्रसङ्गश्च, then, like them, it is possible to argue that the silver to be destroyed even without the destruction of its material cause.
To explain, if it is said that these special states of ignorance, are different from ignorance, and are removed by knowledge, then you must admit that it is possible for things other ignorance which are destroyed by knowledge. If so, the reason to postulate that it is ignorance of the shell which is the material cause for the silver, is lost. Why? Such a postulation is made by you because you need to explain how silver, which is something other than ignorance, is destroyed by knowledge. Therefore, you say that silver is not destroyed directly by knowledge, rather it is destroyed because its material cause, ignorance is destroyed by knowledge. Now if you agree things other than ignorance can also be destroyed by knowledge, let us say that silver is directly destroyed by knowledge.
In fact, you do not need to postulate a secondary ignorance at all.
शुक्त्यज्ञानं नष्टमित्यनुभवविरोधश्च moreover, this contradicts the experience "the ignorance of shell is destroyed".
इति चेन्न - The siddhikAra says: No.
यतोऽवस्था तावदवस्थावतोऽभिन्नैव For, the state of a thing and the thing itself are not different. Even if the body is one, it can have multiple states - youth, middle age, old age, etc. Similarly, even if ignorance is one, it can have multiple states.
अज्ञानैक्यं तु सर्वावस्थानुस्यूतैकाकारमादाय | However, ignorance is said to be one because in every state, there is one ignorance that is present in and through all states.
एवंचाज्ञानावस्थाया अज्ञानत्वेन न ज्ञानसाक्षान्निवर्त्यत्वाद्यनुपपत्ति: | Therefore, as the state of ignorance is ignorance itself, there is no untenability in them being directly removed by ignorance.
यत्त्ववस्थाविशेषाणामिव रूप्यस्यैवोपादाननिवृत्तिं विना निवृत्त्यापादानं, तदयुक्तम् ; Whereas, your statement - like in the case of states of ignorance, the sublation of silver would also end up becoming possible even without the destruction of ignorance - is not correct.
अज्ञान एव ज्ञानस्य साक्षाद्विरोधावधारणेनाज्ञानावस्थायास्तदभिन्नाया: ज्ञानसाक्षान्निवर्त्यत्वार्हत्वात्,
As it is ignorance alone that is directly in opposition to knowledge, states of ignorance, being non-different to ignorance, are capable of being directly removed by knowledge.
न तु रूप्यादीनाम् ; अनीदृक्त्वात् | And not silver etc, for it is not so (i.e. the illusory silver is not directly in opposition to knowledge).
Until now the position that “ignorance is one” was being discussed. Now the position that “ignorance is many” will be discussed.
अनेकाज्ञानपक्षे तु शङ्कापि नोदेति | These doubts do not exist if it is held that ignorance is many.
The nyAyAmRtakAra raises doubts in this position. There are several types of ignorance associated with every object. If a particular pot knowledge removes a particular pot ignorance, as the other types of ignorance veiling that same pot still exist, how is the pot seen? If all the types of ignorance with respect to the pot are removed, then the pot would always be seen.
ननु - अस्मिन्पक्षे एकया वृत्त्या सर्वतदज्ञानस्य निवृत्ति:, उत एकतदज्ञानस्य ;
In this system, does one cognition remove all types of ignorance, or does it remove only one ignorance?
आद्ये पुन: शुक्ते: कदाप्यप्रकाशो न स्यात्, अन्त्ये वृत्तिकालेऽपि प्रकाशो न स्यात्, एकस्यावरणस्य निवृत्तावप्यावरणान्तरानिवृत्तेरिति
If the former, the shell would never be not seen. If the latter, even after the rise of the cognition, the shell would not be seen, because even if one covering is removed, the other coverings would remain.
The siddhikAra says:
चेन्न ; If this is the argument, no.
एकया वृत्त्या एकाज्ञाननाशेऽपि तयैवावरणान्तराणां प्रतिरुद्धत्वात् यावत् सा तिष्ठति तावत्प्रकाश:, तस्यामपगतायां पुनरप्रकाशश्चोपपद्यते ;
Even though only one ignorance associated with the object is destroyed by one cognition, and prevents other types of ignorance from obscuring the object, and so, for as long as that cognition lasts, the object is illuminated. Once that cognition resolves, the object is no longer illuminated.
अज्ञानस्य ज्ञानप्रागभाव स्थानीयत्वात् | Because the place occupied by ignorance (in my system) is (similar to) the prior absence of cognition (in your system).
Before we know an object, we say we do not know it. The cause of not knowing according to the tArkika is jnAna prAgabhAva, or the prior absence of knowledge. There must be several jnAna prAgabhAva-s present in the object - because that object is going to be known multiple times by the same knower. Then why do we say that the object is seen when any one jnAnaprAgabhAva ends? We say the nature of jnAna is to obstruct the action of other jnAna prAgabhAva-s which would otherwise lead one to conclude that "I do not know the object".
यथा तव एकं ज्ञानमेकमेव प्रागभावं नाशयति, तन्नाशरूपेणोदयात् प्रागभावान्तरनिबन्धनमज्ञातत्वादिव्यवहारं च प्रतिबध्नाति ; तथा ममाप्येकं ज्ञानमेकमेवाज्ञानं निवर्तयति, अज्ञानान्तरनिबन्धनं च प्रयोजनं प्रतिबध्नातीति किमनुपपन्नम् ?
Just like in your system, one cognition ends only one prior absence of cognition. As the nature of cognition arising is the end of prior absence of cognition, it prevents other prior absences of cognition of that object from leading to activities such as "not known" etc – In the same way, in my system, one cognition ends only one ignorance, and it prevents the other types of ignorance (from doing the same activities). What can be wrong with this?
A question may be asked - what does pratibandhaka / obstacle mean? The tArkika may define it as kAraNIbhUta abhAva pratiyogitva. If the absence of A is a cause for B, then A is a pratibandhaka/obstacle of B. The siddhAntin had said, when ignorance is present, the resulting activity is that the person does not know that object, i.e. ajnAta vyavahAra.
When knowledge arises, it acts as an obstacle for the activity of not knowing the object. The opponent may argue that if knowledge is an obstacle to ajnAta vyavahAra, the absence of knowledge should lead to ajnAta vyavahAra. However, we say that the cause of ajnAta vyavahAra is ignorance in our system, not the absence of knowledge. Therefore, ignorance should not be called a pratibandhaka. To refute such a doubt, the siddhikAra says:
अत्र च प्रतिबन्धपदेन कार्यानुपपत्तिप्रयोजकत्वं कारणाभावप्रतिबन्धकसाधारणमभिहितम् |
The word pratibandhaka here means that which is the cause for something not happening. An obstacle defined either as the absence of a cause or the presence of the something preventing a result, share the common characteristic of non-production of result.
Therefore, even if ignorance is present, the presence of knowledge can prevent the ajnAta vyavahAra, the activity of not knowing.
एवमवस्थाविशेषपक्षेऽपि प्रकाशाप्रकाशावुपपादनीयौ |
The same explanation can be used to explain the situation where there are multiple states of ignorance. Even if other states of ignorance are present, cognition acts as an obstacle to their activity.
एवममूर्तस्याज्ञानस्य यद्यपि दण्डादिना गवादीनामिवापसरणं करादिना कटादीनामिव संवेष्टनं च न संभवति; तथापि कार्याक्षमत्वसाम्येनापसरणसंवेष्टनपक्षौ योजनीयौ |
In this manner, despite ignorance being intangible and cannot be driven away like cows being driven away with a stick, or folded away like a mat folded by hand, those examples have been said with the intention of conveying the inability of ignorance from producing its effect (obscuring its object and leading to the activity of not knowing that which it veils).
Previously cognition was said to be a pratibandhaka, an obstacle to ignorance, now it is compared to an uttejaka, a catalyst.
यथाहि उत्तेजकाभावसहकृतस्य मणे: प्रतिबन्धकतायामुत्तेजकसत्त्वे प्रतिबन्धककार्याक्षमत्वम् ; तथा वृत्त्यभावसहकृतस्याज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकातायां वृत्तौ सत्यां तत्कार्यानुदय इति द्रष्टव्यम् |
Just like the inhibitor gemstone (chandrakAnta) in the absence of a catalyst (sUryakAnta) inhibits fire, but in the presence of the catalyst is unable to inhibit, ignorance in the absence of vRtti inhibits the illumination of the object, but in the presence of the vRtti is unable to prevent the illumination of the object.
The nyAyAmRtakAra raises another objection. If consciousness is self-evident, everyone should know it. If they do, everyone should be free. The advaitin could say that even though certain aspects are known, its nature as infinite bliss is not known. If that was the argument, he says
ननु चैतन्यस्य निरवयवत्वात् तस्यैकदेशेन प्रकाशो न युज्यते ; As consciousness is partless, it is not correct to say that one part is known (and another is not).
अथाकाश इव तत्तदर्थावच्छिन्नत्वमेकदेशशब्दार्थ:, If it is said that it is like space, and delimited by objects, and such a delimitation is being referred to as a part of consciousness,
तर्हि नागन्तुकपदार्थावच्छिन्नचैतन्यमनाद्यज्ञानस्य विषय: ;
Then, beginningless ignorance cannot be objectify consciousness delimited by objects that have not yet come into existence.
Suppose the advaitin argues that parts in consciousness are possible because of certain boundaries or delimiters. However, those delimiters are held by the advaitin to be imagined in consciousness out of ignorance. Therefore, those logical delimiters presuppose ignorance. So, before them, ignorance must have obscured pure consciousness fully. How can you say that a part of consciousness was known but part obscured by ignorance then when the parts themselves are imagined due to ignorance?
Nor can ignorance without an object be a veil.
प्रागनवच्छिन्नावरणमेवेदानीमवच्छिन्नावरणं जातमित्यपि न ;
Nor can it be said that in the beginning, unlimited consciousness was obscured, and now, limited consciousness is being obscured.
Because if the same veil covers both, by the destruction of the veil over limited consciousness, the veil over unlimited would be destroyed too.
एतेन व्यक्तित: पूर्वं जातिरिव विषयात्पूर्वमज्ञानमस्तीति निरस्तमिति
By this, like refuting the argument that the jAti can exist before a vyakti, saying that ignorance exists before the object also stands refuted.
The siddhikAra says
- चेन्न ; अनाद्यज्ञानविषये अनादिचैतन्ये तत्तदागन्तुकपदार्थावच्छेदाभ्युपगमात्,
No. The object of beginningless ignorance is the beginningless consciousness, and it is that consciousness which is said to be delimited by objects that have subsequently arrived.
'आश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी निर्विभागचितिरेव केवले'त्युक्तत्वात् |
As has been said in the samkshepa shAriraka, the locus and object of ignorance is the partless consciousness.
यदवच्छिन्नगोचरा च वृत्तिस्तदवच्छेदेनैवावरणापसरणात् नानवच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणभङ्गप्रसङ्ग: |
The delimited consciousness that is the object of the vRtti is the same delimited consciousness whose veil has been removed, and therefore, there is no scope for the veil in the undelimited consciousness to be removed by the vRtti.
अत एव वृत्तिविषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यात् प्रागज्ञानमस्तीत्यभिप्रायेण विषयात्प्रागज्ञानमस्तीति साधूक्तम् |
Therefore, with the view that ignorance has existed even prior to the consciousness delimited by the thing, which is also the object of the vRtti, it is appropriate to say the ignorance has existed prior to objects.
तस्मादधिष्ठानचैतन्यं स्वाध्यस्तं भासयतीति सिद्धम् |
Therefore, it has been proven that it is the substratum consciousness that reveals the object that is superimposed upon it.
तदयमत्र निष्कर्ष: - यद्यपि विषयप्रकाशकं विषयाधिष्ठानभूतं प्रमेयचैतन्यम्, अन्त:करणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यं तु तस्य प्रमातृ, अन्त:करणवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यं तु प्रमाणम् ;
This is extracted meaning – while the illuminator of the object is the substratum of the object which is the consciousness delimited by the known object, the consciousness delimited by the mind is the knower, the consciousness delimited by cognition is the knowledge / means of knowledge.
तथापि यदीयान्त:करणवृत्त्या विषयपर्यन्तं चाक्षुरादिद्वारा निस्सृतया यत्प्रकाशकं चैतन्यं यत्प्रमातृचैतन्याभेदेनाभिव्यज्यते तमेव स एव जानाति नान्यं नान्यो वा |
It is only that object - which has been revealed by the consciousness delimited by the object, because of becoming one with the consciousness of that knower, whose vRtti has emanated from the eyes etc and reached that object - which is known by that knower, and no other object, and by no other knower.
अतेवैकवृत्त्युपारूढलक्षणैकलोलीभावापन्नं प्रमातृप्रमाणप्रमेयचैतन्यं भवति |
Therefore, through the means of the one vRtti enveloping the knower, knowledge and the known, consciousness delimited by the knower, knowledge and the known, become one.
ततस्तदवच्छेदेनाज्ञाननिवृत्त्या निवृत्त्या भासमानं प्रमेयचैतन्यमपरोक्षं फलमित्युच्यते
तत् स्वयं भासमानं सत् स्वाध्यस्तं घटाद्यपि भासयतीति तत् फलव्याप्यमित्युपेयते |
By the removal of ignorance in that (object) delimited consciousness,
the revealed (1) object consciousness is called phalam, perception. That while revealing itself, also reveals everything (pots etc) that is superimposed upon it. Thus it (the pot) is called phala vyApya, pervaded by the phala.
(1) nivRttyA bhAsamAnam - Here, the implication is not that thought reveals consciousness - consciousness being self-evident, it does not need thought to reveal it. Rather, the intended meaning of the term revealed - bhAsamAnam- is that consciousness is the locus of the nivRtti, removal of ignorance. The tritIyA vibhakti is not used in the sense of karaNa, instrument, but in the sense of abheda, identity with nivRtti.
यन्निष्ठा च यदाकारा वृतिर्भवति तन्निष्ठं तदाकारमज्ञानं सा नाशयतीति नियमात् प्रमातृप्रमेयोभयव्यापिन्यपरोक्षवृत्ति: स्वावच्छेदेनावरणमपसारयति ; प्रकाशस्य स्वावच्छेदेनावरणापसारकत्वदर्शनात् |
Based on the rule that the person in whom the vRtti is located, and the object whose AkAra the vRtti takes, is the person for whom, and the object whose ignorance is destroyed, the perceptive cognition which pervades both the knower and the known removes the ignorance in the consciousness delimited by them (ie the consciousness delimited by the knower and the consciousness delimited by the known). Just like light, which removes darkness wherever it falls (and not elsewhere).
अत: प्रमात्रवच्छिन्नस्यासत्त्वावरणस्य प्रमेयावच्छिन्नस्याभानावरणस्य चापसरणात् घटोऽयं मे स्फुरतीत्याद्यपरोक्षव्यवहार: |
Therefore, in the case of direct perception, because of the removal of the ignorance of existence located in the knower and the ignorance of appearance located in the known, one has the perceptive experience "This pot is seen by me".
Ignorance is divided into two types - asattvApAdaka and abhAnApAdaka. The asattvApAdaka ignorance is the one that one leads to say "I don't know that the pot exists", the abhAnApAdaka ignorance is the one that one that leads one to say "I can't see the pot".
In the case of direct perception such as "I see a pot ", the vRtti pervades both the knower consciousness and object consciousness and thus we can infer that both kinds of ignorance are removed. In the case of indirect cognition such as "I infer the presence of fire in the mountain", the cognition does not pervade the fire, it exists only within the knower, thus one concludes that the ignorance of existence is removed, but the ignorance of appearance remains.
Therefore, the siddhikAra postulates that the ignorance of existence is present in the knower consciousness, and the ignorance of appearance is present in the object consciousness. This is more for ease of understanding than anything else. brahmAnanda, on the other hand says that the ignorance of existence also must be present in the object - to explain the rise of illusion of shell silver.
परोक्षस्थले तु इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षलक्षणद्वाराभावादन्त:करणनिस्सरणाभावेन विषयपर्यन्तं वृत्तेरगमनात्
On the other hand, in the case of indirect cognition, as the contact by means of senses organs is not present, the mind is not carried to the object, as the vRtti does not reach it,
विषयावच्छिन्नप्रमेयचैतन्येन सह प्रमातृचैतन्यस्यैकवृत्त्युपारूढत्वाभावेनापरोक्षतयाऽभिव्यक्त्यभावेऽपि
the knower consciousness and object consciousness do not merge through the medium of the vRtti, and even though the object consciousness does not shine forth like in the case of perception,
प्रमातृप्रमाणचैतन्ययोरेकलोलीभावापत्त्या प्रमात्रवच्छिन्नमसत्त्वावरणमात्रं निवर्तते
the knower consciousness and knowledge consciousness do merge, and the ignorance of existence that exists in the knower is removed.
तावन्मात्रस्य वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नत्वात् |
because the vRtti pervades only that much (the knower and the knowledge)
इदमेव सुषुप्तिव्यावृत्तिशब्देन विवरणाचार्यैर्व्याख्यातम् | It is this that has been spoken of as 'suShupti vyAvRtti' by vivaraNAchArya.
The vivaraNAchArya had said that in the case of inference 'suShupti vyAvRtti' occurs - अनुमेयादौ सुषुप्तिव्यावृत्ति:. While the literal meaning of the sentence is that the inferential cognition 'removes sleep', which does not make sense, what is meant is that the ignorance of existence that is present is removed. The word suShupti, in this context means asattvApAdaka ajnAna. As GauDapAdAchArya says in the mANDUkya kArika, बीजनिद्रायुतः प्राज्ञः.
A question can be raised, if the pramAtA's AvaraNa is gone, but the prameya's is not, how can the pramAtA know the prameya? The siddhikAra says:
विषयावच्छिन्नाभानावरणतत्कार्यसद्भावेऽपि प्रमात्रवच्छिन्नासत्त्वावरणनिवृत्त्या अनुमानादौ व्यवहारोपपत्ति: |
Even though the ignorance of appearance in the object delimited consciousness and its effect ('I do not see the object’) are present, as the ignorance of the existence of the object present in the knower is removed, inferences can work etc.
अत एव जानाम्यहं पर्वते वह्निरस्तीति, स तु कीदृश इति मे न भातीत्यादिव्यवहार: |
Thus, one says "I know that there is fire in the mountain, although how it is, I do not know".
त्रयाणामेकलोलीभावे अपरोक्षत्वम् ; द्वयोरेकलोलीभावे तु परोक्षत्वमिति न संकर: |
When three become one it is perception, and when two become one it is indirect cognition, and thus no mix up of the two.
वृत्तेश्च विषयेण सह साक्षादेवापरोक्षस्थले संबन्ध:,
In the case of perception, the vRtti is directly connected to the object. Here the word sambandha does not refer to AkAra sambandha, but that both are located in the same place.
परोक्षस्थाले त्वनुमितेरनुमेयेन तद्व्याप्यज्ञानजन्यत्वम्, शाब्द्या: संसर्गेण सह तदाश्रयवाचकपदजन्यत्वम्, स्मृते: स्मर्तव्येन सह तद्विषयानुभवजन्यत्वं |
In indirect cognitions like inference, the connection of the fire with the inferential cognition is that the latter is born from the knowledge of fire's concomitant, smoke. In the case of verbal cognitions, the connection of the syntactical meaning of words with the verbal cognition is that the latter is born from the words which are the locus of that syntactical meaning. In the case of recollection, the connection of the object recollected and the cognition of recollection is that the latter is born from the prior experience of the object.
एवमन्यत्रापि परम्परासंबन्ध एवेति परोक्षापरोक्षविभाग: |
In the same way, in other places of indirect cognitions also, there is an indirect relationship between the cognition and its object, and that is the difference between perception and indirect cognitions.
विस्तरेण व्युत्पदितास्माभिरियं प्रक्रिया सिद्धान्तबिन्दौ |
We have expansively treated this methodology in the siddhAnta bindu.
तस्माद्विषयस्य मिथ्यात्वेऽपि प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थोपपन्नेति दिक् |
Thus, even when the object is mithyA, it is possible to account for pratikarmavyavasthA.
इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थोपपत्ति: ||