In the case of the perception of external objects, the mind travels towards the object and transforms upon contact with it. This transformation is called vRtti. The movement to the object is called vRtti nirgamanam. In the case of indirect cognition, the mind does not travel outside the body, but attains a transformation, also a vRtti. In both cases, the vRtti is inert, but despite so, because it removes ignorance allowing consciousness to shine unveiled, the vRtti itself is figuratively called jnAna. However, there is a requirement for a consciousness different from the vRtti to reveal the object.
The opponent says - even if all this was true, we don't accept that the mind travels outside to the object. The advaitin is the only person who says that jnAna of an external object occurs externally.
ननु - अस्तु चैतन्यस्य विषयप्रकाशकत्वं, तथाप्यन्त:करणस्य देहान्निर्गति: न कल्पया; परोक्षवैलक्षण्याय विषयस्याभिव्यक्तापरोक्षचिदुपराग एव वक्तव्य:, चिदुपरागादौ चापरोक्षवृत्तेस्तदाकारत्वमेव तन्त्रम् ; तस्य च तत्संश्लेषं विनापि परोक्षवृत्तेरिव तत्सन्निकृष्टकरणजन्यत्वेनैवोपपत्ति:,
अस्तु चैतन्यस्य विषयप्रकाशकत्वं, तथाप्यन्त:करणस्य देहान्निर्गति: न कल्पया; परोक्षवैलक्षण्याय विषयस्याभिव्यक्तापरोक्षचिदुपराग एव वक्तव्य:,
He says: even if consciousness is the one that reveals the object, it is not appropriate to postulate that the mind travels out of the body. One can simply say that the object coming into direct contact with unveiled consciousness is the basis to differentiate direct perception from indirect perception.
It is not necessary to say that consciousness becomes manifest/unveiled by this outgoing mind in order to differentiate perception from indirect cognition.
चिदुपरागादौ चापरोक्षवृत्तेस्तदाकारत्वमेव तन्त्रम्
For consciousness to be unveiled all that is needed is a pratyaksha vritti taking on the AkAra of the object.
Why is a pratyaksha vRtti able to unveil the object consciousness, ie remove the ignorance in the object delimited consciousness, even without traveling outside?
The nyAyAmRtakAra postulates that this does not require the vRtti to travel out of the body to the object, it can occur even if one accepts that is simply the nature of pratyaksha vRtti, ie there is an intrinsic difference in the nature of the pratyaksha vRtti and paroksha vRtti. By postulating such a difference, we can argue for a direct relationship in the case of pratyaksha vRtti and indirect relationship in the case paroksha vRtti, and not stipulate the vRtti traveling outwards.
How does vRtti take on the AkAra of the viShaya?
तस्य च तत्संश्लेषं विनापि परोक्षवृत्तेरिव तत्सन्निकृष्टकरणजन्यत्वेनैवोपपत्ति:,
That can happen even without the vRtti travelling out, like in the case of paroksha vRtti. It is possible as the vRtti arises upon the contact of the senses with the object.
In the case of inferences such as the inference of fire in the mountain, it is the cognition of invariable concomitance that gives rise the inference of the fire. That vRtti does not require contact with the fire itself. How is a pratyaksha vRtti born differently to a paroksha vRtti? The nyAyAmRtakAra postulates that it arises because of the contact of the senses with the object. Thus in his system, the mind does not travel in vRtti form to the object, rather the mind stays inside the body, only the senses make contact with the object.
नतु प्रभाया एव वृत्तेस्तदावरणनिवर्तकत्वादौ तत्संश्लेषस्तन्त्रं,
It is not the case that the vRtti must necessarily make contact with the object, unlike light, which must necessarily directly fall on the object to illuminate it.
नेत्रान्निर्गच्छद्ध्रुवाद्याकारवृत्त्यैव स्वसंश्लिष्टनेत्रस्थकज्जलादेर्ध्रुवनेत्रमध्यवर्तिन: परमाण्वादेश्चापरोक्षत्वापातादिति
For that would mean that a vRtti that leaves through the eyes and takes on the AkAra of the Pole Star, will necessarily cause everything that it is in contact with in the distance between the seer and the object, such as the eyeliner in the seer’s eyes, atoms in the intervening space, etc.
The siddhikAra replies
- चेत् न ; if this is the argument, no.
विषयेष्वभिव्यक्तचिदुपरागे न तदाकारत्वमात्रं तन्त्रम् ; परोक्षस्थलेऽपि प्रसङ्गात्, किंतु तत्संश्लेष:,
For the consciousness within objects to shine, it is not just sufficient for the vRtti to take on the AkAra of the objects, for that much is true even for indirect cognitions, rather what is needed is contact with the objects.
In order for an object to be perceived (not indirectly known), there has to be something that unveils the consciousness pervading the object and a connection between the seer and that unveiled consciousness.
If all that is required is vRtti taking on the AkAra of the object for that object to be perceived, that much is true even in the case of the inference of fire in the mountain. There is a vahni AkAra vRtti even there, however the experience is that one knows that there is fire in the mountain, but one does not directly see that fire. Therefore vRtti taking on the AkAra is insufficient for perception.
प्रभाया विषयसन्निकृष्टतेजस्त्वेनावरणाभिभावकत्वदर्शनात् For, it is seen that a ray of light is able to reveal an object only when it comes into contact with the object, and removing darkness that envelops it.
The general rule that can be extracted from this is that for light to remove darkness over an object, it has to fall on the object - if light is somewhere and the object is somewhere else, the object will not be seen.
तैजसस्य मनसोऽप्यज्ञानरूपावरणाभिभवाय तत्संश्लेष आवश्यक:, The mind too, being of the nature of fire (light), requires contact with the object, in order to remove the veil over the object.
ध्रुवादिदेहमध्यवर्तिपरमाण्वादावतिप्रसङ्गस्तु तदाकारत्वप्रयोजकसामग्रीविरहादेव परिहरणीय: ;
The argument that all objects between the eye and the Pole Star, such as atoms etc, will be seen must be refuted on the basis that they lack all the required criteria required for the vRtti to take on the AkAra of such objects.
The object should be pratyaksha yogya, capable of being perceived, it should have form, be of a sufficiently large size, be at a distance that is perceivable, etc.
अन्यथेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादेर्विद्यमानत्वात् परमाण्वाद्याकारताया दुर्निवारत्वापत्ते: |
Otherwise, as the senses leaving the body to make contact with the object, can also be said to take on the AkAra of atoms etc, and this charge cannot be refuted (by you).
तस्मात् प्रभाविशेषान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां यत् क्लृप्तं सन्निकृष्टतेजस्त्वेनावरणाभिभावकत्वं, तस्य तदाकारत्वरूपविशेषापेक्षायामपि न त्याग: |
Therefore, by saying that the contact with the object is necessary for the removal of ignorance, following the logic of copresence and coabsence (anvaya-vyatireka) of the vRtti on account of it being a product of fire, we do not give up the necessity for the vRtti taking on the AkAra of the object.
That is, the vRtti must not only make contact with the object, it must also take on the AkAra of the object in order for the ignorance in the consciousness delimited by the object to be removed.
नहि पृथिवीत्वगन्धत्वादिना कार्यकारणभावे आवश्यके अनित्यगुणत्वद्रव्यत्वादिना तत्त्याग: |
For in nyAya, just because we say that gandhatva (smell) is born in that which has prithivItva (earth), it does not mean that the general rule that an impermanent attribute can only be born in a dravya (substance) is given up.
If there is a special rule, why must a general rule also be accepted? If we say this pot requires this wheel, stick, how do we know what is required for a pot that has not come into existence yet?
अतएव - तदितरहेतुसाकल्ये सति घटचक्षु:सन्निकर्षस्यैव घटानुभवजनकत्वम्, नतु घटमन:सन्निकर्षस्य, तद्विलंबेन तद्विलंबाभावादिति - निरस्तम् ;
By this the following has been refuted – “All else being present, it it is sufficient for the eyes to come into contact with the pot, there is no need for the mind to come into contact with the pot. For a delay in that (contact with the mind) does not delay that (the perception of the pot).”
आवरणभङ्गे सन्निकृष्टतेज:कारणत्वावधारणेन तस्याप्यावश्यकत्वात् |
As the removal of a veil (ignorance) requires a form of light (vRtti) that too is required (the vRtti making contact with the object).
नच - स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षे चाक्षुरादिवन्नियतगोलकद्वाराभावेनान्त:करणनिर्गत्ययोगादावरणाभिभवानुपपत्तिरिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be said – “Then in the case of touch, as the vRtti does not travel through the instrument of touch externally towards the object, like in the case of sight, the unveiling of ignorance would not be possible.”
The vRtti in the case of touch is not admitted to travel outside the body. So if external travel is required, then one should not be able to feel anything by touch.
सर्वत्र तत्तदिन्द्रियाधिष्ठानस्यैव द्वारत्वसंभवात् |
Every sense organ is the means for the vRtti to reach its object only via the locus of the sense organ. In the case of eyes, the vRtti makes contact with the object via the locus of sight, eyes towards the object. In the case of touch, the vRtti makes contact with the object via the locus of touch, skin.
नच - अन्त:करणवृत्तित्वाविशेषादिच्छद्वेषादिरूपवृत्तयोऽपि देहान्निर्गत्य विषयसंसृष्टा भवन्तीति कथं न स्वीक्रियत इति - वाच्यम्,
Nor can it be argued – “As they are mental vRttis too, why don’t you accept that desire, hatred etc also travel outside the body to come into contact with their objects?”
आवरणाभिभावकतेजस्त्वस्य तत्प्रमापकस्य ज्ञानवत् तत्राभावात् |
The removal of ignorance that needs that (the vRtti to come out), like in the case of cognitions, is not present there. There is no reason like the removal of ignorance for the desire vRtti to make contact with the object.
ननु - घटप्रकाशकं चैतन्यमुपदेशसाहस्त्र्यनुसारेण घटाकारधीस्था चिद्वा ; परागर्थप्रमेयेष्वित्यादिवार्त्तिकोक्तरीत्या धीप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्तविषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्यं वा, नाद्य: ; आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यातन्त्रतापातात् | न द्वितीय:, आवश्यकेन विषयसंसलिष्टवृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्येनैव तदज्ञाननिवृत्तिवत् तत्प्रकाशस्याप्युपपत्तौ किं विषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्याभिव्यक्तिकल्पनेनेति - चेन्न ;
The opponent says
घटप्रकाशकं चैतन्यमुपदेशसाहस्त्र्यनुसारेण घटाकारधीस्था चिद्वा
Is the illuminator of the pot, the consciousness that is reflected in the ghaTAkAra vritti along the lines of what was said in the upadesha sAhasrI?
(This is the position of upadesha sAhasri, based on which it is said in the panchadashi-
घटैकाकार धीस्थाचित् घटमेवावभासयेत् | घटस्य ज्ञातता ब्रह्मचैतन्येनावभासयेत् || What the panchadashIkAra wishes to say here is that the notion “this is a pot” is a result of the consciousness reflected in the pot-cognition, whereas the illumination of the pot, “the pot is known”, is due to Brahman. The nyAyAmRtakAra has interpreted this to mean that the illumination of the pot is by the consciousness reflected in the thought.)
परागर्थप्रमेयेष्वित्यादिवार्त्तिकोक्तरीत्या धीप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्तविषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्यं वा,
Or is it the object delimited unveiled consciousness that has become one with the consciousness reflected in the object cognition, like stated in the vArttika “In external objects that are known…” ?
In the vArttika it is said
परागर्थप्रमेयेषु या फलत्वेन सम्मता ।
संवित् सैवेह मेयोऽर्थ: वेदान्तोक्ति प्रमाणत: ||
This vArttika is saying that the phalam (object delimited consciousness) that shines when external objects that are known, is the consciousness which must be known through the statements of vedAnta. That is, the vArttikakAra is saying that it is the object delimited consciousness which reveals all things.
The nyAyAmRtakAra alleges that the two AchArya-s are contradicting each other, and there is a problem in either position.
नाद्य: ; आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यातन्त्रतापातात् |
It cannot be the former, because it will mean that the AdhyAsika samandha, the superimposed connection between the seer (revealer) and the seen (objects) will be disproven.
To explain, in the dRgdRshyasambandha anupapattih chapter, it was argued that the seer if consciousness, and that all objects are superimposed on consciousness because there is no other relationship possible between the seer and the seen. If we now say that the seer (revealer) is consciousness reflected in the vRtti, the object can exist even before the vRtti arose, so the object cannot be superimposed on such a seer.
न द्वितीय:, आवश्यकेन विषयसंसलिष्टवृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्येनैव तदज्ञाननिवृत्तिवत् तत्प्रकाशस्याप्युपपत्तौ किं विषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्याभिव्यक्तिकल्पनेन
It cannot be the second option either, because we can say that like in the case of the removal of ignorance, the revelation of objects also happens due to the consciousness reflected in the vRtti that has come into contact with the object. That being the case, what purpose is served by saying it is the object substratum consciousness that reveals the object?
The siddhikAra responds:
इति - चेन्न - If this is the argument, no.
प्रकाशकं तावत् अधिष्ठानचैतन्यम् | It is the substratum-consciousness of the object which reveals the object.
तच्चाध्यासेन विषयै: सह साक्षात्संबद्धं प्रकाशस्य च स्वयं भासमानस्य स्वसंबद्धसर्वभासकत्वमपि क्लृप्तमेव ; एतदनभ्युपगमे कल्पनान्तरगौरवापत्ते: |
तच्चाध्यासेन विषयै: सह साक्षात्संबद्धं - That (substratum-consciousness) can reveal the superimposed object only when it has a direct relationship with the object
प्रकाशस्य च स्वयं भासमानस्य स्वसंबद्धसर्वभासकत्वमपि क्लृप्तमेव
The illuminator which reveals itself will reveal everything that it comes into contact with (the lamp that lights up a room, reveals itself and the room)
एतदनभ्युपगमे कल्पनान्तरगौरवापत्ते: | To say this is not the case and postulate something else would be superfluous.
तच्चानभिव्यक्तं निर्विकल्परूपमाच्छादितदीपवन्न प्रकाशकमिति तदभिव्यक्तिरपेक्षिता |
When that happens to be veiled, it cannot reveal anything, like the naiyyAyika’s indeterminate cognition or a covered lamp, and therefore its unveiling is necessary.
This unveiling of ignorance happens for both direct and indirect cognitions, but the ignorance that is unveiled is slightly different. To understand this we must first know that ignorance of an object is classified into two – asattvApAdakam (I do not know that it exists) and abhAnApAdakam (I do not see it). In the case of perceptions, both types of ignorance are removed (I see the pot, and I also know it exists), whereas in the case of indirect cognitions, only the asattvApAdaka ajnAna is removed (I only know that the fire exists in the mountain, I do not see it). The siddhikAra alludes to this idea here:
तच्च परोक्षस्थले वृत्त्यवच्छेदेनैवाभिव्यज्यते | In the case of indirect cognitions, it is consciousness delimited by vRtti that is unveiled.
अपरोक्षस्थले तु वृत्तिसंपर्कादापन्नजाड्याभिभवे विषयेऽभिव्यज्यते ; वृत्तेर्विषयपर्यन्तत्वात् |
However, in the case of direct cognition, as the cognition comes into contact with the object, the consciousness delimited by the object is (also unveiled), as a result of the removal of the inertness (ignorance) located in (the consciousness delimited by) the object, because of cognition coming into contact with the object. This is possible because the cognition reaches the object.
Therefore, we have to admit that the revealer of objects is the substratum consciousness, not consciousness reflected in the thought.
नच परोक्षस्थलेऽप्येवं प्रसङ्ग:, द्वाराभावेनान्त:करणनिर्गत्यभावात् |
Nor is this the case for indirect cognitions too (the unveiling of object consciousness does not happen in the case of indirect cognitions), as the sense organs, which are the doorways (for the mind to come into contact with the object) are not involved, and the mind does not 'travel' (to the object).
We keep referring to vRtti taking on the AkAra of the object. In this case, AkAra does not mean shape, ie we do not intend to say that the vRtti takes on the shape of the object. What does AkAra mean?
ननु - वृत्तेस्तदाकारत्वं न तावत्तद्विषयत्वम् ; त्वयैव निरासात् |
The opponent says – The vRtti taking on the AkAra of the object does not mean that the vRtti objectifies the object, for you yourself have refuted such a possibility (in the chapter on dRgdRshyasambandha anupapapatti, we have said that defining viShayatva is an impossibility).
नापि तस्मिन् चैतन्योपरागयोग्यतापादकत्वं, तदज्ञानाभिभावकत्वं वा; उभयोरपि तदाकारत्वप्रयोज्यत्वेन तत्त्वायोगात् |
Nor is it that which causes the vRtti to have the capacity to establish a connection between the object and consciousness, nor the removal of ignorance of the object, for both only describe the results of AkAratva, not the nature of AkAratva.
नापि घटादिवत् पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारत्वम्; साकारवादापातात्, संस्थानहीनजातिगुणादिवृत्तेर्निराकारत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च ;
Nor is AkAra taking on the shape of the object, like a pot’s broad base and narrow neck, for that would end up in sAkAravAda (vijnAnavAda / yogAchAra Buddhism). It would also mean that everything which is not a combination of parts such as jAti, guNa etc would end nirAkAra.
घटपटाविति समूहालम्बने विरुद्धनानाकारत्वापत्तेश्चेति
In the combined cognition of a pot and cloth, it will end up having multiple, contradictory shapes.
The siddhikAra says:
- चेन्न ; अस्तीत्यादितद्विषयकव्यवहारप्रतिबन्धकाज्ञाननिवर्तनयोग्यत्वस्य, तत्सन्निकृष्टकरणजन्यत्वस्य वा तदाकारत्वरूपत्वात् तदुभयं च स्वकारणाधीनस्वभावविशेषात् |
No. As AkAra is of the nature of that (i) which confers to the vRtti the capacity to remove the ignorance which obstructs notions such as "it exists", etc., related to an object, or (ii) which is born from the pramANa (karaNa) coming into contact with the object, for both explanations, the particular nature of the tadAkAravRtti is dependent on the cause which gives rise to it.
In the case of cognition of the pot, the eyes are in contact with the pot, and the vRtti that is generated as a result of sight coming into contact with the pot is the ghaTAkAra vRtti.
In the case of paroksha like the inference of fire, the vyApti (concomitance) is the pramANa that is relation with fire. Thus vahni AkAra vritti is that which is born from the vyApti.
In the case of verbal cognitions (linguistic cognitions), the padArtha jnana (the meaning of the words) is in contact with the object (sentence meaning) and gives rise to shabda jnAna, linguistic meaning thus the AkAra vritti for shabda is that which is born from the padArtha jnAna.
However, there may be a doubt whether this explanation has some issues. The first explanation is also dependent on the result of the tadAkAra vRtti, not explaining the nature of AkAra. What is the yogyatAvacChedakam - the characteristic present in the vRtti, the karaNatA avacChedaka, that leads to that particular outcome (the object becoming known)?
The second explanation needs a kAryatA avacChedakam - why is the vritti created thus? The answer is that the AkAra is a particular type of sambandha between the object and the vRtti that is revealed by the sAkshi. The yogyatva, capacity, is automatically known when the vRtti arises.
Hence there is no anyonyAshraya (to know the AkAra, you have to look at the result, and to know if the result is possible you need the AkAra) as alleged by the nyAyAmRtakAra. The AkAra is automatically known when the vRtti arises, as the sAkshi reveals that this vRtti is tadAkAra.
न चात्माश्रय:, निवृत्तिजननस्वरूपयोग्यतया फलोपधानस्य साध्यत्वेन स्वानपेक्षणात् |
Nor is this a case of AtmAshraya, self-reference (it is not that the AkAra is its own result). Rather the AkAra is the avacChedaka dharma (svarUpayogyatA of the vRtti) that gives the vRtti the capacity to remove ignorance which is the result (phalopAdhAna), therefore the result and the AkAra are two different things.
ननु - दृशि विषयाध्यासस्वीकर्तुर्जीवचैतन्यं वा विषयदृक् ब्रह्मचैतन्यं वा |
The opponent asks - Those who say that the world is superimposed, do they say that the seer of the word is jIva consciousness or Brahman consciousness?
नाद्य:, जीवे अवच्छिन्नचित्स्वरूपे कल्पिते अध्यासायोगात् |
It can't be the former, the jIva being of the nature of limited consciousness is itself superimposed and nothing can be superimposed on it.
नच - विषयदृक् जीवचैतन्यमेव, अध्यासस्तु ब्रह्मचैतन्य इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that the seer of the world is the jIva consciousness only, whereas the superimposition is upon Brahman consciousness.
दृश्ययोरेवाध्यासिकसंबन्धापत्ते:, अध्यस्थाधिष्ठानयोरुभयोरपि दृग्भिन्नत्वात् |
It will lead to the situation where the seen is superimposed on the seen because both the superimposed (world) and the substratum (Brahman) are different from the seer (and hence both are seen).
अत एव न द्वितीयोऽपि ; सविशेषब्रह्मणोऽपि कल्पितत्वेन तत्राध्यासायोगाच्च |
Therefore, the second is not correct either, as Brahman with features is also superimposed, nothing can be superimposed upon it.
नच - शुद्धचैतन्यमेकमेव ; तदेवाधिष्ठानम्, तत्रावच्छेदकमविद्यादिकं नाधिष्ठानकोटौ प्रविशति ; तदेव च जीवशब्देन ब्रह्मशब्देन च व्यपदिश्यते, उपाधिविशेषात् , तथा च जीवचैतन्यस्य दृक्त्वेऽपि दृश्याध्यासो नानुपन्न इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus – “Pure consciousness is one only. That alone is the substratum. Delimiting factors such as ignorance etc do not form part of the substratum. That consciousness is referred to by words such as “jIva”, “Brahman” etc. Therefore even if the jIva consciousness is the seer, the superimposition of the seen (upon the seer) is not inappropriate”.
शुद्धचैतन्यस्य आसंसारमावृतत्वेन जगदान्ध्यप्रसङ्गादिति
Because, as pure consciousness is hidden until the end of samsara, the universe will be plunged into darkness. As it is the substratum that reveals the object, if the substratum itself is hidden until the end of samsAra, nothing can be revealed until then.
- चेन्न ; मूलाविद्यानिवृत्त्यभावेन सर्वत आवरणाभिभवाभावेऽपि घटाद्यवच्छेदेनावरणभिभवात् आन्ध्यविरहोपपत्ते: |
The siddhikAra says – If this is the argument, no. Even though the removal of primal nescience has not occurred and therefore, in that aspect the unveiling of consciousness has not happened, as the unveiling of consciousness delimited by objects such as pots etc can happen, the world need not be plunged into darkness until the end of samsAra.
ननु - तर्हीदानीमपि ब्रह्मस्फुरणे चरमवृत्तिवैयर्थ्यं ; अधिकभानेऽपि तस्य स्फुरणात् ,
The opponent says – If that is the case, as Brahman is apparent now itself and there is no need for the final akhaNDAkAra vRtti, for even if something is seen in addition to Brahman, Brahman too is seen.
नह्यखण्डार्थवेदान्तजन्यायां वृत्तौ भावो अभावो वा विशेषणमुपलक्षणम् वा प्रकार: प्रकाशत,
For, in the akhaNDAkAra vRtti born from vedAnta, there is no attribute, whether existent or non-existent, whether as a visheShaNa or upalakshaNa, that appears.
That being the case,there is no difference between the akhaNDAkAra vRtti and any other vRtti.
The siddhikAra replies
इति - चेन्न ;
If this is said, no.
satyam jnAnam anantam brahma is akhandArtha jnAna. So is tattvamasi. Both objectify brahman, but the former is not able to remove primal nescience whereas the latter is able to. The reason is that both the meaning of the word “That” and the meaning of the word “You” have to be present as upalakshaNa-s, prior to the comprehension of the sentence meaning, in order for the primal nescience to be removed.
उपाध्यविषयकब्रह्मस्फुरणस्य चरमवृत्तिप्रयुक्तत्वेन तस्या: साफल्यात्,
The akhaNDAkAra vRtti is successful in that (removal of primal ignorance) because that vRtti reveals only brahman and no upAdhi.
प्रकारास्फुरणम् तु तस्या: भूषणमेव ;
The fact that no attribute appears is a feature (not a defect).
All the vRttis that have arisen until now have attributes, and therefore they objectify the upAdhi too.
On the strength of the shruti statement "One must see that One alone”, and because of the rule that ignorance and knowledge should have the same object, it is only the impartite cognition of Brahman that is the cause for moksha.
नच- अन्त:करणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य जीवत्वे सुषुप्तिदशायां तदभावेन कृतहान्याद्यापत्तिरिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that - if the jIva is consciousness delimited by the mind, then in deep sleep as the mind is absent, as the jIva is gone, all the karma-s performed by him will also cease, without giving their result”. When he awakens, if it is said that a new jiva is born, he will bear fruits of karmas that he hasn't performed.
The siddhikAra refutes it thus-
तदाप्यस्य कारणात्मनाऽवस्थानात्, स्थूलसूक्ष्मसाधारणस्यान्त:करणस्योपाधित्वात् |
Even then (during deep sleep), the jIva is present, in his causal state. When referring to the mind as the upAdhi, it is said without qualifiers of causal or manifest etc.
What is the pramANa for this?
'तदापीते:संसारव्यपदेशा'दित्यस्मिन् सूत्रेचायमर्थ: स्पष्टतर: |
This has been more clearly explained in the sUtra, "Until the end of samsAra, the mind continues".
नच - वृत्त्युपरक्तत्वं चैतन्यस्य न तत्प्रतिबिम्बितत्वम् ; दर्पणे मुख्यस्येवनुद्भूतरूपेऽन्त:करणे शब्दान्यप्रतिबिम्बनोपाधिताया अचाक्षुषचैतन्यस्य प्रतिबिम्बिततायाश्चायोगादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can this be argued - The connection that is made (between consciousness and the object) by the vRtti is not a reflection of consciousness in the vRtti, because like the face reflected in the mirror, the mind (and its vRtti) being itself not visible, is incapable of reflecting anything other than sound. Further, consciousness which is not visually perceptible is incapable of being reflected..
The siddhikAra says no.
Continued in part 3.