paricCheda 1 - mithyAtva shrutyupapattih
एतदनुमानमे'कमेवाद्वितीय'मित्यादिश्रुतिरप्युनुगृह्णाति |
This inference (of mithyAtva) is also supported by the Shruti "One alone, without a second".
ननु - श्रुत्या स्वस्वरूपस्वप्रामाण्यस्वयोग्यतादेर्मिथ्यात्वाबोधनेन प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धतत्सत्त्वोपजीवनेन च ब्रह्मेतरसकलमिथ्यात्वासिद्धि:,
The opponent asks - As the Veda does not convey the unreality of itself, its validity or its capacity for its syntactical meanings to be uncontradicted (ie does not reveal something which is incorrect), and because it itself is dependent on perception (one "hears" the shruti) both for its cognition, and its existence, the unreality of everything other than Brahman cannot be the meaning revealed by the ekamevAdvitIya shruti.
'सन्निपातलक्षणो विधिरनिमित्तं तद्विघातस्ये'ति न्यायेन प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धघटादिमिथ्यात्वासिद्धिश्च,
The reality of pots as established by perception cannot be overturned by the inference of their mithyAtva - because of the mahAbhAShya (commentary to the vyAkaraNa sUtra-s of pANini) rule - "any rule born out of an association cannot be the cause for breaking the association (because that would invalidate the rule itself)".
योग्यतादिमिथ्यात्वबोधने च श्रुत्यर्थस्यातात्त्विकत्वापत्ति:,
If the shruti taught that its capacity for uncontradicted syntactical connections was mithyA, it will lead to the falsehood of things revealed by the veda-s.
शाब्दबोधस्य शब्दतत्प्रामाण्ययोग्यतादिना समसत्ताकत्वनियमात्,
Because, as a rule, the meaning generated by spoken sentences must be of the same order of reality as the sentences themselves, their validity and their syntactical connection.
च सदर्थस्वाप्नदेवतावाक्ये व्यभिचार:,
Nor does this rule break down in the case of true words spoken by deities in a dream.
आप्तत्वापौरुषेयत्वायोगेन तस्य शब्दत्वेन प्रामाण्यायोगात्, किं तूपश्रुतिवत्तादृशशब्दज्ञानं लिङ्गत्वेन प्रमाणमिति
The validity resulting from being spoken by trustworthy persons, or arising from a non-human source may not apply to those words, but like in the case of chance encounters of something overheard which then turns out to be true (an upashruti), their validity stems from being indicators of things that turn out to be true.
The siddhikAra says
- चेन्न ; No.
निर्दोषशब्दत्वेन तस्य शब्दविधयैव प्रामाण्यसंभवात्,
The validity of vedas is, like other spoken true words, is on account of them emerging from a non-defective source.
आप्तत्वापौरुषेयत्वयोर्दोषाभाव एवोपक्षयात्
Even in the case of words of trustworthy persons or their origins having no-human beings as their source, their validity is because of the non-defectiveness of their sources.
व्याप्त्याद्युपस्थितिकल्पने गौरवात्,
Instead of this, to claim that there is an invariable concomitance between trustworthy individuals' words and validity is an unnecessary postulate.
वक्तु: कल्पितत्वेऽपि तद्गतदोषस्यार्थसंवादेन कल्पयितुमशक्यत्वाच्च |
Even if the speaker were to be unreal, it is not possible to claim as a rule that what is said will necessary be untrue on account of such a defect.
तथाच शब्दसमसत्ताकत्वस्य व्यभिचारात् योग्यतादिसमसत्ताकत्वनियमसिद्धेरप्रयोजकत्वाच्च परोक्षत्वानित्यत्वाद्युपाधिसंभवाच्च श्रुत्या योग्यतादिसकलमिथ्यात्वबोधनेऽपि तदर्थस्य न मिथ्यात्वम् ;
Therefore, even if shruti reveals the mithyAtva of everything, including its own yogyatA, that does not imply that the reality of advaita is invalidated because
(i) the rule that the meaning must be of the same order of reality as the words (or their speaker) is not universal,
(ii) the reality of syntactical connections of words (in sentences) is not a necessary pre-condition for the validity of sentence meanings, and
(iii) there is the upAdhi of indirectness and non-permanence (in the opponent's concomitance) - the opponent had said if the syntactical connection between words of a sentence etc was unreal, the meaning of the sentence would be unreal. His example was normal words. The siddhikAra is saying that those normal words give rise to an indirect meaning, they also reveal impermanent things, whereas in the paksha, advaita shruti, the words give rise to a direct perception which is eternal - thus indirect cognitions and impermanence are upAdhi-s to the opponent's concomitance.
मिथ्यात्वप्रयोजकरूपाभावात् | The necessary factor that would imply the mithyAtva of the object (of advaita shruti) is not present.
महाभाष्योक्तन्यायोदहारणमपि न युक्तम् ; विषयवैषम्यात् |
The rule from mahAbhAShya is not applicable. Its application is elsewhere.
The siddhikAra says
तथाहि - 'शतानि सहस्राणी'त्यत्र सर्वनामस्थानसंज्ञकशिसन्निपातेन विहितो नुम् 'ष्णान्ता षडि'ति षट्संज्ञाद्वारा 'षड्भ्यो लुगि'ति शिस्वरूपसर्वनामस्थानस्य पञ्चेत्यादाविव लुक: निमित्तं न भवति ; तत्सन्निपातेनैव विहितत्वात्, तत्सद्भावनियमेनैव विहितत्वादित्यर्थ: |
With respect to the formation of words such as 'shatAni' and 'sahasrANi' (meaning hundreds and thousands), because of the proximity of the शि suffix, which takes on the designation of a 'sarvanAma sthAna', should be, by the prescription (of the sUtra नपुंसकस्य झलचः, where if a sarvanAma sthAna follows a consonant (झल्), or a vowel (अच्), it gets the नुम् augment) takes on the नुम् suffix. Further the sUtra ष्णान्ता षट् classifies words ending with न् as षट्, which by the sUtra षड्भ्योलुक् (in the case of षट् words, it is said that the suffix after षट् words is elided), the शि suffix should have been elided. However, unlike the case of the word पञ्चम्, where the elision of म् happens by the षड्भ्योलुक् rule, in the case of शतानि, the शि suffix does not get elided to form शतं because, the very basis for the षड्भ्योलुक् rule is the classification of ष्णान्ता (words ending with न्) as षट् and the word became a ष्णान्ता only because of शि suffix taking on a sarvanAma sthAna designation. Thus as the very application of the rule is because of proximity of शि suffix, the rule itself (षड्भ्योलुक्) does not apply.
If we examine how the word शतानि (the plural of the word शत) is formed.
1) Plural of शत् - शत्+जस् The pAnIni sUtra 4-1-2 स्वौजसमौट्छष्टा... mandates the suffixes सुँ, औ, जस् etc after the root word for singular, dual, and plural tense. The first case plural takes the suffix जस्. So the plural of शत् becomes शत् + जस्.
2) शत् + शि . There is a sUtra which says that जस् and शस् become शि: for neuter words (जस्शसोः शि: 7.1.20) - the affixes जस् and शस् get शि as the replacement when they follow a neuter root, in this case शत्.
3) By sUtra 1-1-42 शि सर्वनामस्थानम्, the affix शि gets the designation as a सर्वनामस्थानम्.
4) By the sUtras लशक्वतद्धिते (1.3.7), the शि suffix is classified as इत्. Further, as a result of sUtra तस्य लोप: (1.2.9), the श-कार is elided to become शत इ.
5) Because शत is नपुंसक and is followed by a sarvanAma sthAna, the sUtra नपुंसकस्य झलचः (7.1.72) is applied. This mandates that when a सर्वनामस्थानम् affix follows a the neuter base that end in a झल् (consonant) or an अच् (vowel) get the नुम् augment.
6) By the application of the sUtra मिदचोऽन्त्यात्परः (1.1.47), which applies when there is an addition of नुम् before the last letter, इ. The म-कार of नुम् is इत् and उ-कार is merely for the sake of pronunciation, thus both are elided, leaving न् inserted before the last vowel - which is इ, so it becomes शतन् इ.
7) By 6-4-8 सर्वनामस्थाने चासम्बुद्धौ, where the penultimate letter of the अङ्गम् (base) ending in a न-कार gets elongated if it is followed by a non-vocative affix having the designation सर्वनामस्थानम्.
So शतन् इ becomes शतान् + इ to become शतानि.
However, as the word शतान् ends with न्, there is a question whether the sUtra 1.1.24 ष्णान्ता षट् applies - this says that words that end with न् are classified as षट्. Further, by the sUtra षड्भ्योलुक्, in the case of षट् words, it is said that the suffix after षट् terms is elided.
If this were to be the case, the जस् and शि ought to be elided. The designation of sarvanAmasthAna would not apply. The elongation of the penultimate letter will not apply, and the addition of नुम् will also not apply. The plural for शत would end up with the form शत, and because it is a neuter gender word, it will end up as शतं. Thus, the plural of शत would not be शतानि if ष्णान्ता षट् and षड्भ्योलुक् apply.
However, common usage sees the plural of शत as शतानि. To explain this, the mahAbhAshya postulates a rule - सन्निपातलक्षणो विधिरनिमित्तं तद्विघातस्य - if the application of a rule ends up contradicting the very basis for its application, then such a rule cannot be applied.
It is argued that if the sUtra ष्णान्ता षट् has scope for application here, it will contradict the very reason for its applicability - ie if it is a षट् word because it ends with न्, it will lead to an outcome where the न् ending is ultimately elided.
अलुप्तस्यैव सर्वनामस्थानस्य लुङ्गनिमित्तत्वात्, 'न लुमताङ्गस्ये'ति लुमता लुप्तेऽङ्गकार्यनिषेधात् |
It is only if the sarvanAmasthAna is not elided, that there is scope for the application of लुङ्ग, as has been said in the sUtra 'न लुमताङ्गस्य', if the suffix is elided, its effect on the stem stands prevented.
तथाचालुप्तप्रत्ययत्वेन यत्र निमित्तता तत्र सन्निपातलक्षणन्यायावतार:,
Where causation is as a result of the suffix not being elided will the rule - that an application of a rule that contradicts its own basis must not be performed - have scope.
यत्र तु 'प्रत्ययलोपे प्रत्ययलक्षणमि'ति न्यायेन लुप्तेऽपि प्रत्यये कार्यं भवति, तत्रालुप्तत्वविशेषणनैरपेक्ष्येण प्रत्ययत्वमात्रेणैव निमित्तत्वात् न सन्निपातलक्षणन्यायावतार:, प्रत्ययसद्भावस्य तत्रानुपजीव्यत्वात् |
However, where even upon the suffix being elided, if the effect of the suffix still remains, like in the instance of the application of the प्रत्ययलोपे प्रत्ययलक्षणम् rule, as the causation is due to the suffix alone, irrespective of the requirement of the suffix not being subsequently elided, there is no scope for the rule - that an application of a rule that contradicts is own basis must not be performed, because the existence of the suffix is not contributing to the effect of the suffix.
एवं स्थिते यद्यमिथ्याभूतत्वेन प्रत्यक्षादेर्निमित्तता स्यात्, तदा प्रत्ययस्यालुप्तत्वेन निमित्ततायामिव भवेदेतन्न्यायावतार: |
That being the case, if perception could have produced its result (to reveal the world and the Shruti) only if it itself was not mithyA, then, like in the case where the suffix is able to produce an effect only if it was unelided, one could say that such a rule would have scope for application.
प्रत्यक्षादेस्तु स्वरूपेणैव निमित्तता स्वप्नाद्यर्थस्याप्यर्थक्रियाकारित्वदर्शनेन प्रागेवोपपादिता ।
However the ability of perception etc to produce its result is down to its own nature (and not presupposed on the perception not being mithyA), for we have already established previously that dream objects also are seen to have some utility / function.
अतो यत् बाध्यते तात्त्विकत्वं तन्नोपजीव्यम्; यच्चोपजीव्यमर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यलक्षणव्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यम् तच्च न बाध्यत इति किं केन सङ्गतम् ?
Therefore, as the reality (of perception) that is contradicted is not what the shruti depends on (to reveal its object), whereas, the aspect (of perception) that it depends upon, which is the capacity for perception to cause the shruti to be manifested (ie hearing the Veda from a teacher, etc), ie the empirical validity of perception, is not being denied - what is the untenability?
तदुक्तं टीकाकृद्भि: - 'उत्पादकाप्रतिद्वन्द्वित्वा'दिति |
This has been said by the sub-commentator (vAcaspati miSra) - 'on account of not being inimical to the cause from it emerged'.
अतएव - ज्योतिष्टोमादिविधेरुपजीव्याग्निविद्यावद्विषयत्वेनेव द्वैतनिषेधस्यापि स्वोपजीव्ययोग्यतादीतरविषयत्वेन सङ्कोचस्य वा सृष्ट्यादिश्रुतेरिव कल्पितविषयत्वस्य वोपपत्तौ न तात्त्विकसर्वमिथ्यात्वपरत्वकल्पनं युक्तमिति - अपास्तम् ;
By the same logic, the following has been refuted:
"Like the injunction for the sacrifice, jyotiShToma etc, is dependent on the (AvahanIya) agni (in which it is performed), and the study (of vedas formally under a guru), the denial of duality is dependent on the reality of the Veda's syntactical coherence, etc.
Thus, even though the injunction to perform the jyotiShToma, "those desirous of heaven should perform the jyotiShToma" does not qualify who has the authority to perform the sacrifice, its scope is limited to say that only those who have studied the Vedas under a guru and those who possess the AvahanIya fire are authorised to perform the jyotiShToma (because the injunction is dependent on those factors).
Similarly, the meaning of vedic statements relating to creation etc was limited by the advaitin to say that it is talking of the creation of unreal things.
By the same logic, it is not appropriate to say that the meaning of the shruti "one, alone, non-dual" is revealing the unreality of absolutely everything (there has to be some limitation to the scope of that Vedic statement, to exclude the unreality of the things that such a shruti is dependent on)".
The above was the argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra, which the siddhikAra quotes verbatim and denies. Why?
दृष्टान्ते अग्निविद्यादेरिव दार्ष्टान्तिके योग्यतादेस्तात्त्विकस्यानुपजीव्यत्वात् |
Because unlike the example where the sacrifice was dependent on the fire, study etc, the Shruti is not dependent on reality of its syntactical coherence etc.
नहि योग्यता तात्त्विकयोग्यतात्वेन निमित्तम्, किंतु योग्यतात्वेनैव |
The syntactical coherence of the words of the shruti does need have to be absolutely real for it to produce its effect of conveying meaning. Rather, all that is expected is that there is syntactical coherence present.
सकलद्वैताभावस्याधिकरणस्वरूपत्वेन तदधिकरणस्य च ब्रह्मण: 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' 'तत्सत्यं स आत्मे'त्यादिश्रुत्या सत्यत्वप्रतिपादनात् न सृष्ट्यादिश्रुतेरिव कल्पितविषयत्वोपपत्ति: |
As the absence of every kind of duality is of the nature of the locus of that absence, and existence of that locus, Brahman, is established by the Vedic statements such as 'Existence, Consciousness, Infinite" and "That is Real. That is the Atma", it is not possible to impute an unreal existence to Brahman, unlike the case of Vedic statements that that talk of creation etc.
तस्माद्योग्यतादेर्मिथ्यात्वेऽपि वेदान्तबोध्यं सत्यमेवेति स्थितम् |
Thus it stands proven that even if the syntactical coherence of Vedic sentences was mithyA, the object of the Vedic sentences, Brahman, is real.
यथाचाविद्यातत्कार्यस्य स्वरूपतो निषेधेऽपि तुच्छवैलक्षण्यं, पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण निषेधे वा पारमार्थिकत्वधर्मशून्यस्यापि ब्रह्मण: स्वरूपेण सत्त्वं, तथोपपादितमधस्तात् ।
We have already shown before how even when ignorance and its effects are absolutely negated or even if only their absolute reality is negated, they are different to the absolutely absent tucCha entities, and even if Brahman does not possess the attribute of absolute reality, it is absolutely real (in the chapters on the first / second definitions of mithyAtva).
ननु - तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येन प्रत्यक्षाद्यविरोधाय तत्त्वंपदलक्षितयोरैक्यमिव मिथ्यात्वश्रुत्यापि तदविरोधाय प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धादन्यस्यैव मिथ्यात्वं बोध्यम् ; अन्यथा प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुग्रहाय व्यावहारिकमपि सत्त्वं न कल्पयेत, 'नेह नाने'त्यादिनिषेधेनात्यन्तासत्त्वबोधनात् - इति चेन्न ;
The opponent says -
Like, in order to avoid the contradiction of the Vedic sentences such as "You are that" with direct perception, it is said that the identity that is revealed is of the one entity indirectly implied by the words "you" and "that", the Vedic sentences that convey the mithyAtva of all entities, must be admitted to reveal the mithyAtva of all entities, other than those that are not revealed to be real by perception and other means of knowledge.
Otherwise, it will not be necessary to postulate an empirical reality in order to preserve perception and other means of knowledge, for the Shruti 'there is no multiplicity here whatsoever' would convey the absolute absence of any duality.
The siddhikAra says - no.
विशिष्टयोरैक्ये विशेषणयोप्यैक्यापातेन सर्वत्र विशिष्टाभेदपरवाक्यस्य लक्षितविशेष्यैक्यपरत्वनियमेन 'तत्त्वमसी'त्यत्रापि तथाभ्युपगमात् |
When two qualified objects are identical, the two qualifiers also must be identical (and that is not the case, always). As a result, where statements speak of the identity between qualified entities (and the qualifiers are not identical), it has been admitted that the identity being spoken of is of the underlying substance, sans the qualifiers. Thus, in the sentence "you are that" also, the same has been admitted (the qualifiers "omniscience" and "limited knowledge" of Ishvara and jIva can never be the same, so the sentence is not talking of the qualified entities, Ishvara and jIva, rather it is revealing the identity of consciousness without the qualifiers).
तदुक्तं - 'अविरुद्धविशेषणद्वयप्रभवत्वेऽपि विशिष्टयोर्द्वयो: | घटते न यदैकता तदा नतरां तद्विपरीतरूपयो: ||' इति |
Thus it has been said (in the samkshepa shAriraka) - "Even when the two qualifiers are not mutually exclusive, it has been said the two qualified entities cannot be the same, here, when there is mutual exclusion between the two sets of qualifiers, there is absolutely no possibility of the identity being of the qualified entites".
The qualifier, daNDa (stick) and kuNDala (earrings) are not mutually exclusive - the same person can hold a stick and wear earrings. However, despite so, daNDi devadattah is not the same kuNDalI devadattah, even when Devadatta is holding the stick and wearing earrings at the same time. That being the case, as omniscience implies the absence of possessing only limited knowledge, and possessing only limited knowledge implies the absence of omniscience, to say that Ishvara and jIva are identical is totally unsupportable.
मिथ्यात्वबोधकश्रुतौ तु नास्ति प्रत्यक्षादिविरोध:, तात्त्विकत्वांशस्यानुपजीव्यत्वात्,
The Vedic statements which talk of the mithyAtva of the world are not contradictory to perception, because the absolute reality of the world is not something that the Shruti is dependent on in its revelation.
व्यावहारिकसत्त्वस्य चोपजीव्यत्वान्नात्यन्तासत्त्वकल्पनमित्यस्याप्युक्तप्रायत्वात् |
As it (the veda) is dependent on the world's empirical reality, it does not lead to the world being absolutely absent (like the hare's horn) - this too has been previously said.
ननु - श्रुतेस्तात्पर्यं चैतन्यमात्रे वा, द्वितीयाभावविशिष्टे वा, तदुपलक्षिते वा,
The opponent asks - is the import of shruti lie in revealing consciousness alone? Or is it in revealing consciousness endowed with the absence of duality? Or is it in consciousness which is indicated by the absence of duality (but the indicator is itself absent at the time of indication)?
नाद्य:, विश्वमिथ्यात्वासिद्धेरिष्टापत्ते:, तस्य स्वप्रकाशतया नित्यसिद्धत्वेन श्रुतिवैयर्थ्याच्च |
It cannot be the first, because as it does not prove the mithyAtva of the world, such an interpretation is desirable to us. Further, there would be no need to reveal consciousness, for it is self-evident, leading to the Vedas being made redundant.
न द्वितीय:, अखण्डार्थत्वहानात् |
It cannot be the second, because it would contradict the advaitin's contention that the Vedas reveal the impartite nature of consciousness.
अत एव न तृतीय:, काकवदितिवत् द्वितीयाभाववदित्यनेनापि सप्रकारकज्ञानजननेनाखण्डार्थत्वायोगात्,
Thus it cannot be the third either. Like saying "the house with the crow", to say that that there is no second thing in it, would lead to a cognition with qualifiers, which means it cannot be classified as an impartite cognition.
चिन्मात्रस्य नित्यसिद्धत्वेन तदन्यस्य च मुमुक्ष्वज्ञेयत्वेन काकेन संस्थानविशेषस्येव द्वितीयाभावेनोपलक्ष्यस्यान्यस्याभावात् तस्योपलक्षणत्वायोगाच्चेति
Pure Consciousness , being ever revealed, and anything else apart from That, not being worthy of being known by the one desiring liberation - like the vestigial indicatory mark, the entity indicated by the absence of duality cannot be anything other than the object itself, but as thing that is indicated is said to be attributeless, that cannot be the one indicated by the cognition.
The opponent is alleging that even if the advaitin holds that the absence of duality is an upalakshaNa, an indicator, for the attributeless consciousness, the absence of duality itself will have to be left behind in consciousness in order for the attribute to be an upalakshaNa. However if such an attribute is left behind, then the indicated object would not be attributeless.
He gives the example of a house being identified by the crow sitting on the rooftop - even when the crow has flown off, the house is identified, but it is so identified because the crow has left behind a vestigial mark on the house (e.g. the straws clutched by the crow stand up a little). Thus, like the crow leaves behind a vestigial mark, the absence of duality also leaves behind a vestigial mark in Brahman. Without it, it would not be possible for the absence of duality to denote Brahman. If it did indicate Brahman, Brahman would not be attributeless.
The siddhikAra says
- चेन्न ; no.
The crow may not leave behind a mark necessarily.
काकस्य संस्थानविशेष इव द्वितीयाभावस्य स्वरूपमेवोपलक्ष्यमित्युपलक्ष्याभावनिबन्धनोपलक्षणत्वानुपपत्तेरभावात् |
Like where it is possible for the crow itself to be used as the house's identifier even in the absence of a vestigial mark, Brahman itself could be identified. The rule that in the absence of the indicated, the indicator itself would be absent cannot be invoked here.
The opponent had tried to say that the only way the absence of duality could indicate Brahman was if it indicated Brahman endowed with the absence of duality. If Brahman endowed with the absence of duality was not conceded as the upalakshya (because the advaitin holds that the upalakshya is attributeless Brahman), then the absence of duality would not be an upalakshaNa. Therefore, he had alleged that in order for the absence of duality to be an upalakshaNa, Brahman would have to possess the absence of duality as an attribute.
The siddhikAra says that that is not necessarily the case - the crow can be used as an identifier of the house even if it did not leave behind, like standing up straws, the crow itself could be recalled and that used as a basis to identify the house in the present. Similarly, the absence of duality itself can be used to identify Brahman without the absence of duality being part of the identified Brahman in the present. Alternatively, the absence of duality itself could be Brahman (ie the nature of the absence of a thing is the substratum of where the thing would have otherwise been present). In either explanation, the identifying mark need not form part of the identified object.
उपलक्षणत्वे हि उपलक्ष्यसत्त्वमात्रं तन्त्रं, नतु तस्य स्वरूपातिरिक्तत्वमपि; गौरवात्, उपलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकरूपाभावेऽपि स्वतोव्यावृत्तजातिवदुपलक्ष्यत्वसंभवात् |
For something to be an indicatory mark, all that is required is the existence of the indicated, and not any distinguishing feature apart from the indicated thing itself, for that would be superfluous. Even where there was no attribute in the object that enabled the object to be identified, the object may be identified, like the universal (jAti) which separates every individual apart from its species and from itself.
अतएव न सप्रकारकत्वापत्ति:, काकवदित्यत्राप्युपलक्षणस्याप्रकारत्वात्, किंतु स्वरूपातिरिक्तधर्मस्य तत्रोपलक्षणत्वेन सप्रकारत्वम्, इह तु तन्नेति वैषम्यं |
Hence it does not lead to the cognition to contain qualifiers of the object. Even in the case of the cognition, "the house with the crow", the attributes of the upalakshaNa are not included as part of the upalakshya. However, the cognition of the house does contain the crow as a qualifier, which is something different from the house itself. Whereas, here (in the case of Brahman), that is not there - i.e. the absence of duality is not an attribute different to the substratum itself - that much is the difference.
नचोपलक्षणवैयर्थ्यम् ; अनर्थनिवृत्ति हेतुत्वेन द्वितीयाभावद्वारकस्वरूपज्ञानस्योद्देश्यत्वात्, तस्य प्रागसिद्धित्वात् |
This does not render the indicator useless, for it serves the purpose of removing evil - the cognition of the substratum is following the intervening cognition of the substratum endowed with the absence of duality - and such a knowledge is not present so far.
This will be further explained in the second paricCheda in the context of the akhaNDArtha sentences such as satyam, jnAnam, anantam and tattvamasi.
नच मिथ्यात्वासिद्ध्येष्टापत्ति:, अवान्तरतात्पर्यस्य तत्रापि सत्त्वात्, तद्द्वारैव स्वरूपचैतन्ये महातात्पर्यत्वात् |
Nor can it be alleged that this is something that is desirable to the opponent because it does not establish the mithyAtva of the world. For proving that the world is mithyA has secondary import, in that it serves as the intervening cognition prior to the cognition of the substratum, which is of primary import.
अत एव - श्रुतिबोध्यस्य विशेषणस्योपलक्षणस्य वा द्वितीयाभावस्य सत्त्वे अद्वैतहानि:, असत्त्वे चादण्डे दण्डीति वाक्यवत् काकहीने काकवदिति वाक्यवच्चाद्वैतवाक्यस्यातत्त्वावेदकत्वापत्तिरिति - निरस्तम् ;
For this reason this argument stands refuted- "If the absence of duality is taught by the shruti, existed as a visheShaNa or an upalakshaNa, it would lead to the refutation of non-duality. If it did not exist, then like the sentence "The person without a stick is holding a stick" or "the house without the crow has the crow" the sentence that conveys advaita would end up teaching a falsehood."
आद्ये द्वितीयाभावसत्त्वेन द्वितीयाभावासिद्ध्यापादनस्यानुचितत्वात्, अभावस्याधिकरणातिरेकानभ्युपगमाच्च |
In the first case, as the veda's teaching of the absence of duality does exist, to argue that the absence of duality is not proven is inappropriate. Further, we do not admit that the absence of a thing is separate to the substratum of the absence (of a thing).
द्वितीये तु सृष्ट्यादिवाक्यवदुपलक्ष्यस्वरूपसत्यत्वमादाय तत्त्वावेदकत्वात्, मुख्यतात्पर्यविषयस्यासत्यतायामेवातत्त्वावेदकत्वाभ्युपगमात् |
In the second case, like in the case of the teaching of creation etc, the teaching's validity lies in the reality of the thing taught - It is only if the primary import of the Veda was unreal can it be argued that the Vedas are teaching a falsehood.
अतएव महातात्पर्याभिप्रायेण चैतन्यमात्रे तात्पर्यमित्याद्यपक्षेऽपि न दोष:,
For this reason alone, in the first position when it is said that consciousness alone is revealed, keeping the primary import of the shruti in mind, there is no defect.
अवान्तरतात्पर्येण मिथ्यात्वसिद्धेरपि स्वीकारेणेष्टापत्तेरप्यसंभवात् |
For, the establishment of mithyAtva too is admitted to be the secondary import, and a sentence having consciousness alone as the primary import cannot be prove the opponent's view (by not revealing the mithyAtva of the world).
ननु - द्वितीयाभावे महातात्पर्याभाव: किं प्रमाणान्तरप्राप्त्या, यथा वायुक्षेपिष्ठत्वादौ, उत तद्विरोधित्वेन ; यथात्मवपोत्खननादौ, उतोद्देश्यविशेषणत्वादिना यथा ग्रहैकत्वादौ,
The opponent retorts - On what basis is it said that the teaching of mithyAtva is not primary import?
a) Is it something that is well known by some other means, like the vedic sentence 'the wind is swift' (which is known by daily experience)?
b) or is it being it is contradicted by something known, like 'prajApati performed a sacrifice by offering his own liver' (no one can survive after removing their own liver)?
c) because it is a qualifier in the subject of the sentence, like in the case of the vedic sentence 'graham sammARShTi' (wash the graha vessel) - the sentence uses graha in singular, but it is held that many vessels are to be washed. Even though the singular tense is a qualifier for the word, it is not the intended meaning. Is the advaitin saying that as the "absence of duality" is a qualifier in the subject of the vedic sentence, it cannot be the primary import of the Veda?
नाद्य:, त्वयैव द्वितीयाभावस्य प्रमाणान्तरप्राप्त्यनभ्युपगमात् |
It cannot be the first, because you yourself (advaitin) have said that the absence of duality is not knowable by any other means.
द्वितीयेऽपि विरोधिमानं न तावत्प्रत्यक्षादि द्वैतग्राहि; त्वन्मते तस्यैव श्रुतिबाध्यत्वात्,
Even in the second alternative, the contradicting means of knowledge cannot be perception etc, which reveal duality, because in your system, it is those other means that are overruled by the Veda.
नाद्वैतवाक्यान्तरम् ; तस्यात्ममात्रपरत्वे द्वितीयाभावाविरोधित्वात्,
Nor is another shruti teaching non-duality overruling this shruti, because as such a shruti would have the Atma alone as its import, it cannot overrule the absence of duality being the import of this sentence.
न हि विशेष्यविषयं 'अग्निहोत्रं जुहोती'ति वाक्यं विशिष्टविषयेण 'दध्ना जुहोती'ति वाक्येन विरुध्यते,
A sentence that has an unqualified substratum alone as its object such as 'perform the agnihotra' cannot be overruled by a sentence which contains a qualifier such as 'use curd in the sacrifice', for there is nothing to say that the agnihotra cannot be performed with curd.
द्वैताभावपरत्वे त्वेकविषयत्वेन सुतरामविरोधात् |
If this sentence has the teaching of duality as its import, it cannot be interpreted to have a common combined meaning with another sentence which would this sentence's import being overruled by the other sentence.
नापि तृतीय:, 'ग्रहं संमार्ष्टी'त्यत्र संमार्जनस्येवाखण्डार्थपरे वाक्ये विधेयान्तरस्याभावेन विशेष्यस्य शास्त्रगम्यस्य चिन्मात्रस्याप्राप्तत्वेनोद्देश्यत्वायोगाच्च
The third option is also not correct. Unlike the sentence "the graha is to be washed", the sentence which has an impartite meaning does not have any other object in the sentence, and the revealed entity, being pure consciousness, which is known by the scripture alone, is not otherwise known and therefore cannot be the subject of the sentence.
The opponent is saying that the subject of a sentence is something that is known. The object is something that is unknown - that is why the veda has come to reveal a hitherto unknown meaning. The impartite sentence "tattvamasi" cannot have consciousness as its subject, it must have consciousness as its object, because that is the meaning that is not otherwise known.
द्वितीयाभावस्योद्देश्यविशेषणत्वानुपपत्ते:,
That being the case, the absence of duality in consciousness, cannot be the qualifier of the subject, which can be ignored, like in the case of "the graha is to be washed".
अविवक्षाहेतोरनुवाद्यत्वस्याप्यभावाच्चेति -
Nor can it be said to be a repetition that is not intended to be conveyed.
The siddhikAra responds to this argument - चेन्न ; No.
स्वयमेव स्वबोधितमपि द्वितीयाभावं द्वितीयत्वादेव निषेधतीति स्वविरोधादेव श्रुतेस्तत्रातात्पर्यात् |
Even though the absence of all duality has been taught by the vedic sentence itself, and that absence, itself being a second, is also negated by the sentence conveying the absence of all duality - because it would negate all duality including the absence of duality that it itself reveals, the sentence is said to not have primary import.
मानविरोधित्वमात्रस्य तात्पर्याभावे प्रयोजकत्वात् स्वविरोधेऽपि न क्षति: |
The determinant of where primary import lies is if it happens to be overruled by some means of knowledge - if that happens to be itself, all that means is that that is not the primary import.
ननु - एकेनैव प्रमाणेनैकस्य प्राप्तिनिषेधावनुपपन्नौ, न ;
The opponent asks - It is not appropriate for a thing to both prove and overrule a thing.
The siddhikAra replies - no.
रूपभेदेनाविरोधात् | It does not contradict itself, because the object of the teaching and its negation are slightly different.
द्वितीयाभावस्वरूपं हि शास्त्रेण प्राप्यते | The absence of duality is known by the scripture.
तस्य च प्राप्यतावच्छेदकरूपं द्वितीयाभावत्वम् ; Thus what is known is the absence of duality.
तच्च न निषेध्यतावच्छेदकम्, किंतु द्वितीयत्वमेव निषेध्यमात्रानुगतम् |
However, what is negated is duality, not the absence of duality. Therefore, the "absence of duality" is also negated because it is a second thing to Brahman.
तत्र तदनभ्युपगमे तु न तस्य निषेध्यत्वम्, न वा तेनात्मन: सद्वितीयत्वापत्तिरिति न कोऽपि दोष: |
If the "absence of duality" is not accepted to be a second thing, then it would not be negated, and thus by such an absence of duality, Brahman would not end up having a second thing. Thus, there would be no defect.
If the absence of duality is a second thing, it would be negated by the sentence conveying the absence of all duality. If it is not a second thing, it cannot overrule the teaching of non-dual Brahman.
यत्र तु प्राप्यतावच्छेदकमेव निषेध्यातावच्छेदकं, तत्र प्राप्तिनिषेधशास्त्रयोरतुल्यविषयत्वेऽपि विशेषशास्त्रविषयपरित्यागेन सामान्यशास्त्रप्रवृत्ति:, तुल्यविषयत्वे त्वगत्या विकल्प इति न निषेधस्यासङ्कोचेन प्रवृत्ति:,
However where what is revealed is the same as what is being negated, and if the sentence that reveals and sentence that negates have the same subject, the general rule would prevail everywhere expect where the special rule has scope, where the subject and the scope are the same, then there would be a choice in the matter - in either case the negation does not always have untrammelled scope.
यथा 'न हिंस्यात्सर्वा भूतानी'ति निषेधशास्त्रस्य 'अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेते'त्यादिप्राप्तिशास्त्रविषयेतरविषयत्वं 'अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति' 'नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाती'त्यादिप्राप्तिनिषेधशास्त्रयोस्तु विकल्पेनैकविषयत्वम्
For example, the sentence "do not hurt living beings" and the sentence "sacrifice the animal in the agniShomIya ritual" are interpreted such that the former has general application everywhere except in vedic sacrifices, and the latter has scope in vedic sacrifices of the agniShomIya type. Whereas, the sentence "use the ShoDashi vessel" and "do not use the ShoDashi vessel" because they have the same subject and scope, are deemed to be options - either can be used.
एकस्यैव हिंसात्वस्य षोडशिग्रहत्वस्य च प्राप्तिनिषेधयोरवच्छेदकत्वात्, तत्र निषेधशास्त्रस्यासंकुचद्धृत्तित्वे प्राप्तिशास्त्रस्य सर्वात्मना वैयर्थ्यापत्ति: ;
In both cases, what is revealed is the same as what is being denied (violence, using the ShoDashi). If it is said that the negating rule is always unrestricted in its application, the affirming rule will end up worthless.
प्रकृते च द्वितीयत्वेन रूपेण निषेधस्यैव शास्त्रार्थत्वान्न कस्यापि वैयर्थ्यशङ्का |
Whereas in our context, as the negation of the second thing is the meaning of the vedic sentence, there is no scope for redundancy of any statement.
अतएव - द्वितीयाभावनिषेधे पुनर्द्वितीयोन्मज्जनापत्तिरिति - निरस्तम् |
Thus the statement - the negation of the absence of duality would lead to the reinstatement of duality - stands refuted.
उपपादितमेतत् मिथ्यात्वमिथ्यात्वसाधने |
This has already been proven in the chapter on mithyAtva's mithyAtva.
यथा प्रतियोग्यभावयोर्निषेध्यतावच्छेदकैक्ये न एकनिषेधेऽपरसत्त्वापत्तिरिति|
Where the counterpositive and its absence are being denied on the same common basis, the denial of absence does not lead to the affirmation of the object and vice versa.
नच - स्वेनैव निषिद्धस्य द्वितीयाभावस्य द्वितीयस्येव विशेषणत्वेनोपलक्षणत्वेन वा पुनरुपादानं न युक्तमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - Like duality, the absence of duality that has been negated by the sentence cannot end up as the visheShaNa or upalakshaNa.
अभावबुद्धौ निषिद्धस्यापि प्रतियोगिन: 'सा शुक्ति'रित्यत्र प्रतिषिद्धस्यापि पूर्वप्रतीतिरजतस्योपलक्षणतयोपादानदर्शनात्,
For, in the cognition of absence, the negated counterpositive is used as an upalakshaNa, like the previously seen silver in the cognition "that is a shell (not silver)".
असङ्कीर्णज्ञानप्रयोजकत्वस्य प्रकृतेऽपि तुल्यत्वात्
The cognition that denies (this is not silver) serving to denote the actual object (shell), is the same here too (the cognition "there is no duality whatsoever" serves as a means for knowing pure consciousness).
तस्मात् 'एकमेवाद्वितीय'मित्यादिश्रुतिर्विश्वमिथ्यात्वे प्रमाणमिति सिद्धम् ||
Therefore the Shruti 'one alone was there, non-dual" serves to prove the mithyAtva of the world.
इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ सामान्येन मिथ्यात्वश्रुत्युपपत्ति: ||
This inference (of mithyAtva) is also supported by the Shruti "One alone, without a second".
ननु - श्रुत्या स्वस्वरूपस्वप्रामाण्यस्वयोग्यतादेर्मिथ्यात्वाबोधनेन प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धतत्सत्त्वोपजीवनेन च ब्रह्मेतरसकलमिथ्यात्वासिद्धि:,
The opponent asks - As the Veda does not convey the unreality of itself, its validity or its capacity for its syntactical meanings to be uncontradicted (ie does not reveal something which is incorrect), and because it itself is dependent on perception (one "hears" the shruti) both for its cognition, and its existence, the unreality of everything other than Brahman cannot be the meaning revealed by the ekamevAdvitIya shruti.
'सन्निपातलक्षणो विधिरनिमित्तं तद्विघातस्ये'ति न्यायेन प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धघटादिमिथ्यात्वासिद्धिश्च,
The reality of pots as established by perception cannot be overturned by the inference of their mithyAtva - because of the mahAbhAShya (commentary to the vyAkaraNa sUtra-s of pANini) rule - "any rule born out of an association cannot be the cause for breaking the association (because that would invalidate the rule itself)".
योग्यतादिमिथ्यात्वबोधने च श्रुत्यर्थस्यातात्त्विकत्वापत्ति:,
If the shruti taught that its capacity for uncontradicted syntactical connections was mithyA, it will lead to the falsehood of things revealed by the veda-s.
शाब्दबोधस्य शब्दतत्प्रामाण्ययोग्यतादिना समसत्ताकत्वनियमात्,
Because, as a rule, the meaning generated by spoken sentences must be of the same order of reality as the sentences themselves, their validity and their syntactical connection.
च सदर्थस्वाप्नदेवतावाक्ये व्यभिचार:,
Nor does this rule break down in the case of true words spoken by deities in a dream.
आप्तत्वापौरुषेयत्वायोगेन तस्य शब्दत्वेन प्रामाण्यायोगात्, किं तूपश्रुतिवत्तादृशशब्दज्ञानं लिङ्गत्वेन प्रमाणमिति
The validity resulting from being spoken by trustworthy persons, or arising from a non-human source may not apply to those words, but like in the case of chance encounters of something overheard which then turns out to be true (an upashruti), their validity stems from being indicators of things that turn out to be true.
The siddhikAra says
- चेन्न ; No.
निर्दोषशब्दत्वेन तस्य शब्दविधयैव प्रामाण्यसंभवात्,
The validity of vedas is, like other spoken true words, is on account of them emerging from a non-defective source.
आप्तत्वापौरुषेयत्वयोर्दोषाभाव एवोपक्षयात्
Even in the case of words of trustworthy persons or their origins having no-human beings as their source, their validity is because of the non-defectiveness of their sources.
व्याप्त्याद्युपस्थितिकल्पने गौरवात्,
Instead of this, to claim that there is an invariable concomitance between trustworthy individuals' words and validity is an unnecessary postulate.
वक्तु: कल्पितत्वेऽपि तद्गतदोषस्यार्थसंवादेन कल्पयितुमशक्यत्वाच्च |
Even if the speaker were to be unreal, it is not possible to claim as a rule that what is said will necessary be untrue on account of such a defect.
तथाच शब्दसमसत्ताकत्वस्य व्यभिचारात् योग्यतादिसमसत्ताकत्वनियमसिद्धेरप्रयोजकत्वाच्च परोक्षत्वानित्यत्वाद्युपाधिसंभवाच्च श्रुत्या योग्यतादिसकलमिथ्यात्वबोधनेऽपि तदर्थस्य न मिथ्यात्वम् ;
Therefore, even if shruti reveals the mithyAtva of everything, including its own yogyatA, that does not imply that the reality of advaita is invalidated because
(i) the rule that the meaning must be of the same order of reality as the words (or their speaker) is not universal,
(ii) the reality of syntactical connections of words (in sentences) is not a necessary pre-condition for the validity of sentence meanings, and
(iii) there is the upAdhi of indirectness and non-permanence (in the opponent's concomitance) - the opponent had said if the syntactical connection between words of a sentence etc was unreal, the meaning of the sentence would be unreal. His example was normal words. The siddhikAra is saying that those normal words give rise to an indirect meaning, they also reveal impermanent things, whereas in the paksha, advaita shruti, the words give rise to a direct perception which is eternal - thus indirect cognitions and impermanence are upAdhi-s to the opponent's concomitance.
मिथ्यात्वप्रयोजकरूपाभावात् | The necessary factor that would imply the mithyAtva of the object (of advaita shruti) is not present.
महाभाष्योक्तन्यायोदहारणमपि न युक्तम् ; विषयवैषम्यात् |
The rule from mahAbhAShya is not applicable. Its application is elsewhere.
The siddhikAra says
तथाहि - 'शतानि सहस्राणी'त्यत्र सर्वनामस्थानसंज्ञकशिसन्निपातेन विहितो नुम् 'ष्णान्ता षडि'ति षट्संज्ञाद्वारा 'षड्भ्यो लुगि'ति शिस्वरूपसर्वनामस्थानस्य पञ्चेत्यादाविव लुक: निमित्तं न भवति ; तत्सन्निपातेनैव विहितत्वात्, तत्सद्भावनियमेनैव विहितत्वादित्यर्थ: |
With respect to the formation of words such as 'shatAni' and 'sahasrANi' (meaning hundreds and thousands), because of the proximity of the शि suffix, which takes on the designation of a 'sarvanAma sthAna', should be, by the prescription (of the sUtra नपुंसकस्य झलचः, where if a sarvanAma sthAna follows a consonant (झल्), or a vowel (अच्), it gets the नुम् augment) takes on the नुम् suffix. Further the sUtra ष्णान्ता षट् classifies words ending with न् as षट्, which by the sUtra षड्भ्योलुक् (in the case of षट् words, it is said that the suffix after षट् words is elided), the शि suffix should have been elided. However, unlike the case of the word पञ्चम्, where the elision of म् happens by the षड्भ्योलुक् rule, in the case of शतानि, the शि suffix does not get elided to form शतं because, the very basis for the षड्भ्योलुक् rule is the classification of ष्णान्ता (words ending with न्) as षट् and the word became a ष्णान्ता only because of शि suffix taking on a sarvanAma sthAna designation. Thus as the very application of the rule is because of proximity of शि suffix, the rule itself (षड्भ्योलुक्) does not apply.
If we examine how the word शतानि (the plural of the word शत) is formed.
1) Plural of शत् - शत्+जस् The pAnIni sUtra 4-1-2 स्वौजसमौट्छष्टा... mandates the suffixes सुँ, औ, जस् etc after the root word for singular, dual, and plural tense. The first case plural takes the suffix जस्. So the plural of शत् becomes शत् + जस्.
2) शत् + शि . There is a sUtra which says that जस् and शस् become शि: for neuter words (जस्शसोः शि: 7.1.20) - the affixes जस् and शस् get शि as the replacement when they follow a neuter root, in this case शत्.
3) By sUtra 1-1-42 शि सर्वनामस्थानम्, the affix शि gets the designation as a सर्वनामस्थानम्.
4) By the sUtras लशक्वतद्धिते (1.3.7), the शि suffix is classified as इत्. Further, as a result of sUtra तस्य लोप: (1.2.9), the श-कार is elided to become शत इ.
5) Because शत is नपुंसक and is followed by a sarvanAma sthAna, the sUtra नपुंसकस्य झलचः (7.1.72) is applied. This mandates that when a सर्वनामस्थानम् affix follows a the neuter base that end in a झल् (consonant) or an अच् (vowel) get the नुम् augment.
6) By the application of the sUtra मिदचोऽन्त्यात्परः (1.1.47), which applies when there is an addition of नुम् before the last letter, इ. The म-कार of नुम् is इत् and उ-कार is merely for the sake of pronunciation, thus both are elided, leaving न् inserted before the last vowel - which is इ, so it becomes शतन् इ.
7) By 6-4-8 सर्वनामस्थाने चासम्बुद्धौ, where the penultimate letter of the अङ्गम् (base) ending in a न-कार gets elongated if it is followed by a non-vocative affix having the designation सर्वनामस्थानम्.
So शतन् इ becomes शतान् + इ to become शतानि.
However, as the word शतान् ends with न्, there is a question whether the sUtra 1.1.24 ष्णान्ता षट् applies - this says that words that end with न् are classified as षट्. Further, by the sUtra षड्भ्योलुक्, in the case of षट् words, it is said that the suffix after षट् terms is elided.
If this were to be the case, the जस् and शि ought to be elided. The designation of sarvanAmasthAna would not apply. The elongation of the penultimate letter will not apply, and the addition of नुम् will also not apply. The plural for शत would end up with the form शत, and because it is a neuter gender word, it will end up as शतं. Thus, the plural of शत would not be शतानि if ष्णान्ता षट् and षड्भ्योलुक् apply.
However, common usage sees the plural of शत as शतानि. To explain this, the mahAbhAshya postulates a rule - सन्निपातलक्षणो विधिरनिमित्तं तद्विघातस्य - if the application of a rule ends up contradicting the very basis for its application, then such a rule cannot be applied.
It is argued that if the sUtra ष्णान्ता षट् has scope for application here, it will contradict the very reason for its applicability - ie if it is a षट् word because it ends with न्, it will lead to an outcome where the न् ending is ultimately elided.
अलुप्तस्यैव सर्वनामस्थानस्य लुङ्गनिमित्तत्वात्, 'न लुमताङ्गस्ये'ति लुमता लुप्तेऽङ्गकार्यनिषेधात् |
It is only if the sarvanAmasthAna is not elided, that there is scope for the application of लुङ्ग, as has been said in the sUtra 'न लुमताङ्गस्य', if the suffix is elided, its effect on the stem stands prevented.
तथाचालुप्तप्रत्ययत्वेन यत्र निमित्तता तत्र सन्निपातलक्षणन्यायावतार:,
Where causation is as a result of the suffix not being elided will the rule - that an application of a rule that contradicts its own basis must not be performed - have scope.
यत्र तु 'प्रत्ययलोपे प्रत्ययलक्षणमि'ति न्यायेन लुप्तेऽपि प्रत्यये कार्यं भवति, तत्रालुप्तत्वविशेषणनैरपेक्ष्येण प्रत्ययत्वमात्रेणैव निमित्तत्वात् न सन्निपातलक्षणन्यायावतार:, प्रत्ययसद्भावस्य तत्रानुपजीव्यत्वात् |
However, where even upon the suffix being elided, if the effect of the suffix still remains, like in the instance of the application of the प्रत्ययलोपे प्रत्ययलक्षणम् rule, as the causation is due to the suffix alone, irrespective of the requirement of the suffix not being subsequently elided, there is no scope for the rule - that an application of a rule that contradicts is own basis must not be performed, because the existence of the suffix is not contributing to the effect of the suffix.
एवं स्थिते यद्यमिथ्याभूतत्वेन प्रत्यक्षादेर्निमित्तता स्यात्, तदा प्रत्ययस्यालुप्तत्वेन निमित्ततायामिव भवेदेतन्न्यायावतार: |
That being the case, if perception could have produced its result (to reveal the world and the Shruti) only if it itself was not mithyA, then, like in the case where the suffix is able to produce an effect only if it was unelided, one could say that such a rule would have scope for application.
प्रत्यक्षादेस्तु स्वरूपेणैव निमित्तता स्वप्नाद्यर्थस्याप्यर्थक्रियाकारित्वदर्शनेन प्रागेवोपपादिता ।
However the ability of perception etc to produce its result is down to its own nature (and not presupposed on the perception not being mithyA), for we have already established previously that dream objects also are seen to have some utility / function.
अतो यत् बाध्यते तात्त्विकत्वं तन्नोपजीव्यम्; यच्चोपजीव्यमर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यलक्षणव्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यम् तच्च न बाध्यत इति किं केन सङ्गतम् ?
Therefore, as the reality (of perception) that is contradicted is not what the shruti depends on (to reveal its object), whereas, the aspect (of perception) that it depends upon, which is the capacity for perception to cause the shruti to be manifested (ie hearing the Veda from a teacher, etc), ie the empirical validity of perception, is not being denied - what is the untenability?
तदुक्तं टीकाकृद्भि: - 'उत्पादकाप्रतिद्वन्द्वित्वा'दिति |
This has been said by the sub-commentator (vAcaspati miSra) - 'on account of not being inimical to the cause from it emerged'.
अतएव - ज्योतिष्टोमादिविधेरुपजीव्याग्निविद्यावद्विषयत्वेनेव द्वैतनिषेधस्यापि स्वोपजीव्ययोग्यतादीतरविषयत्वेन सङ्कोचस्य वा सृष्ट्यादिश्रुतेरिव कल्पितविषयत्वस्य वोपपत्तौ न तात्त्विकसर्वमिथ्यात्वपरत्वकल्पनं युक्तमिति - अपास्तम् ;
By the same logic, the following has been refuted:
"Like the injunction for the sacrifice, jyotiShToma etc, is dependent on the (AvahanIya) agni (in which it is performed), and the study (of vedas formally under a guru), the denial of duality is dependent on the reality of the Veda's syntactical coherence, etc.
Thus, even though the injunction to perform the jyotiShToma, "those desirous of heaven should perform the jyotiShToma" does not qualify who has the authority to perform the sacrifice, its scope is limited to say that only those who have studied the Vedas under a guru and those who possess the AvahanIya fire are authorised to perform the jyotiShToma (because the injunction is dependent on those factors).
Similarly, the meaning of vedic statements relating to creation etc was limited by the advaitin to say that it is talking of the creation of unreal things.
By the same logic, it is not appropriate to say that the meaning of the shruti "one, alone, non-dual" is revealing the unreality of absolutely everything (there has to be some limitation to the scope of that Vedic statement, to exclude the unreality of the things that such a shruti is dependent on)".
The above was the argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra, which the siddhikAra quotes verbatim and denies. Why?
दृष्टान्ते अग्निविद्यादेरिव दार्ष्टान्तिके योग्यतादेस्तात्त्विकस्यानुपजीव्यत्वात् |
Because unlike the example where the sacrifice was dependent on the fire, study etc, the Shruti is not dependent on reality of its syntactical coherence etc.
नहि योग्यता तात्त्विकयोग्यतात्वेन निमित्तम्, किंतु योग्यतात्वेनैव |
The syntactical coherence of the words of the shruti does need have to be absolutely real for it to produce its effect of conveying meaning. Rather, all that is expected is that there is syntactical coherence present.
सकलद्वैताभावस्याधिकरणस्वरूपत्वेन तदधिकरणस्य च ब्रह्मण: 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' 'तत्सत्यं स आत्मे'त्यादिश्रुत्या सत्यत्वप्रतिपादनात् न सृष्ट्यादिश्रुतेरिव कल्पितविषयत्वोपपत्ति: |
As the absence of every kind of duality is of the nature of the locus of that absence, and existence of that locus, Brahman, is established by the Vedic statements such as 'Existence, Consciousness, Infinite" and "That is Real. That is the Atma", it is not possible to impute an unreal existence to Brahman, unlike the case of Vedic statements that that talk of creation etc.
तस्माद्योग्यतादेर्मिथ्यात्वेऽपि वेदान्तबोध्यं सत्यमेवेति स्थितम् |
Thus it stands proven that even if the syntactical coherence of Vedic sentences was mithyA, the object of the Vedic sentences, Brahman, is real.
यथाचाविद्यातत्कार्यस्य स्वरूपतो निषेधेऽपि तुच्छवैलक्षण्यं, पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण निषेधे वा पारमार्थिकत्वधर्मशून्यस्यापि ब्रह्मण: स्वरूपेण सत्त्वं, तथोपपादितमधस्तात् ।
We have already shown before how even when ignorance and its effects are absolutely negated or even if only their absolute reality is negated, they are different to the absolutely absent tucCha entities, and even if Brahman does not possess the attribute of absolute reality, it is absolutely real (in the chapters on the first / second definitions of mithyAtva).
ननु - तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येन प्रत्यक्षाद्यविरोधाय तत्त्वंपदलक्षितयोरैक्यमिव मिथ्यात्वश्रुत्यापि तदविरोधाय प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धादन्यस्यैव मिथ्यात्वं बोध्यम् ; अन्यथा प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुग्रहाय व्यावहारिकमपि सत्त्वं न कल्पयेत, 'नेह नाने'त्यादिनिषेधेनात्यन्तासत्त्वबोधनात् - इति चेन्न ;
The opponent says -
Like, in order to avoid the contradiction of the Vedic sentences such as "You are that" with direct perception, it is said that the identity that is revealed is of the one entity indirectly implied by the words "you" and "that", the Vedic sentences that convey the mithyAtva of all entities, must be admitted to reveal the mithyAtva of all entities, other than those that are not revealed to be real by perception and other means of knowledge.
Otherwise, it will not be necessary to postulate an empirical reality in order to preserve perception and other means of knowledge, for the Shruti 'there is no multiplicity here whatsoever' would convey the absolute absence of any duality.
The siddhikAra says - no.
विशिष्टयोरैक्ये विशेषणयोप्यैक्यापातेन सर्वत्र विशिष्टाभेदपरवाक्यस्य लक्षितविशेष्यैक्यपरत्वनियमेन 'तत्त्वमसी'त्यत्रापि तथाभ्युपगमात् |
When two qualified objects are identical, the two qualifiers also must be identical (and that is not the case, always). As a result, where statements speak of the identity between qualified entities (and the qualifiers are not identical), it has been admitted that the identity being spoken of is of the underlying substance, sans the qualifiers. Thus, in the sentence "you are that" also, the same has been admitted (the qualifiers "omniscience" and "limited knowledge" of Ishvara and jIva can never be the same, so the sentence is not talking of the qualified entities, Ishvara and jIva, rather it is revealing the identity of consciousness without the qualifiers).
तदुक्तं - 'अविरुद्धविशेषणद्वयप्रभवत्वेऽपि विशिष्टयोर्द्वयो: | घटते न यदैकता तदा नतरां तद्विपरीतरूपयो: ||' इति |
Thus it has been said (in the samkshepa shAriraka) - "Even when the two qualifiers are not mutually exclusive, it has been said the two qualified entities cannot be the same, here, when there is mutual exclusion between the two sets of qualifiers, there is absolutely no possibility of the identity being of the qualified entites".
The qualifier, daNDa (stick) and kuNDala (earrings) are not mutually exclusive - the same person can hold a stick and wear earrings. However, despite so, daNDi devadattah is not the same kuNDalI devadattah, even when Devadatta is holding the stick and wearing earrings at the same time. That being the case, as omniscience implies the absence of possessing only limited knowledge, and possessing only limited knowledge implies the absence of omniscience, to say that Ishvara and jIva are identical is totally unsupportable.
मिथ्यात्वबोधकश्रुतौ तु नास्ति प्रत्यक्षादिविरोध:, तात्त्विकत्वांशस्यानुपजीव्यत्वात्,
The Vedic statements which talk of the mithyAtva of the world are not contradictory to perception, because the absolute reality of the world is not something that the Shruti is dependent on in its revelation.
व्यावहारिकसत्त्वस्य चोपजीव्यत्वान्नात्यन्तासत्त्वकल्पनमित्यस्याप्युक्तप्रायत्वात् |
As it (the veda) is dependent on the world's empirical reality, it does not lead to the world being absolutely absent (like the hare's horn) - this too has been previously said.
ननु - श्रुतेस्तात्पर्यं चैतन्यमात्रे वा, द्वितीयाभावविशिष्टे वा, तदुपलक्षिते वा,
The opponent asks - is the import of shruti lie in revealing consciousness alone? Or is it in revealing consciousness endowed with the absence of duality? Or is it in consciousness which is indicated by the absence of duality (but the indicator is itself absent at the time of indication)?
नाद्य:, विश्वमिथ्यात्वासिद्धेरिष्टापत्ते:, तस्य स्वप्रकाशतया नित्यसिद्धत्वेन श्रुतिवैयर्थ्याच्च |
It cannot be the first, because as it does not prove the mithyAtva of the world, such an interpretation is desirable to us. Further, there would be no need to reveal consciousness, for it is self-evident, leading to the Vedas being made redundant.
न द्वितीय:, अखण्डार्थत्वहानात् |
It cannot be the second, because it would contradict the advaitin's contention that the Vedas reveal the impartite nature of consciousness.
अत एव न तृतीय:, काकवदितिवत् द्वितीयाभाववदित्यनेनापि सप्रकारकज्ञानजननेनाखण्डार्थत्वायोगात्,
Thus it cannot be the third either. Like saying "the house with the crow", to say that that there is no second thing in it, would lead to a cognition with qualifiers, which means it cannot be classified as an impartite cognition.
चिन्मात्रस्य नित्यसिद्धत्वेन तदन्यस्य च मुमुक्ष्वज्ञेयत्वेन काकेन संस्थानविशेषस्येव द्वितीयाभावेनोपलक्ष्यस्यान्यस्याभावात् तस्योपलक्षणत्वायोगाच्चेति
Pure Consciousness , being ever revealed, and anything else apart from That, not being worthy of being known by the one desiring liberation - like the vestigial indicatory mark, the entity indicated by the absence of duality cannot be anything other than the object itself, but as thing that is indicated is said to be attributeless, that cannot be the one indicated by the cognition.
The opponent is alleging that even if the advaitin holds that the absence of duality is an upalakshaNa, an indicator, for the attributeless consciousness, the absence of duality itself will have to be left behind in consciousness in order for the attribute to be an upalakshaNa. However if such an attribute is left behind, then the indicated object would not be attributeless.
He gives the example of a house being identified by the crow sitting on the rooftop - even when the crow has flown off, the house is identified, but it is so identified because the crow has left behind a vestigial mark on the house (e.g. the straws clutched by the crow stand up a little). Thus, like the crow leaves behind a vestigial mark, the absence of duality also leaves behind a vestigial mark in Brahman. Without it, it would not be possible for the absence of duality to denote Brahman. If it did indicate Brahman, Brahman would not be attributeless.
The siddhikAra says
- चेन्न ; no.
The crow may not leave behind a mark necessarily.
काकस्य संस्थानविशेष इव द्वितीयाभावस्य स्वरूपमेवोपलक्ष्यमित्युपलक्ष्याभावनिबन्धनोपलक्षणत्वानुपपत्तेरभावात् |
Like where it is possible for the crow itself to be used as the house's identifier even in the absence of a vestigial mark, Brahman itself could be identified. The rule that in the absence of the indicated, the indicator itself would be absent cannot be invoked here.
The opponent had tried to say that the only way the absence of duality could indicate Brahman was if it indicated Brahman endowed with the absence of duality. If Brahman endowed with the absence of duality was not conceded as the upalakshya (because the advaitin holds that the upalakshya is attributeless Brahman), then the absence of duality would not be an upalakshaNa. Therefore, he had alleged that in order for the absence of duality to be an upalakshaNa, Brahman would have to possess the absence of duality as an attribute.
The siddhikAra says that that is not necessarily the case - the crow can be used as an identifier of the house even if it did not leave behind, like standing up straws, the crow itself could be recalled and that used as a basis to identify the house in the present. Similarly, the absence of duality itself can be used to identify Brahman without the absence of duality being part of the identified Brahman in the present. Alternatively, the absence of duality itself could be Brahman (ie the nature of the absence of a thing is the substratum of where the thing would have otherwise been present). In either explanation, the identifying mark need not form part of the identified object.
उपलक्षणत्वे हि उपलक्ष्यसत्त्वमात्रं तन्त्रं, नतु तस्य स्वरूपातिरिक्तत्वमपि; गौरवात्, उपलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकरूपाभावेऽपि स्वतोव्यावृत्तजातिवदुपलक्ष्यत्वसंभवात् |
For something to be an indicatory mark, all that is required is the existence of the indicated, and not any distinguishing feature apart from the indicated thing itself, for that would be superfluous. Even where there was no attribute in the object that enabled the object to be identified, the object may be identified, like the universal (jAti) which separates every individual apart from its species and from itself.
अतएव न सप्रकारकत्वापत्ति:, काकवदित्यत्राप्युपलक्षणस्याप्रकारत्वात्, किंतु स्वरूपातिरिक्तधर्मस्य तत्रोपलक्षणत्वेन सप्रकारत्वम्, इह तु तन्नेति वैषम्यं |
Hence it does not lead to the cognition to contain qualifiers of the object. Even in the case of the cognition, "the house with the crow", the attributes of the upalakshaNa are not included as part of the upalakshya. However, the cognition of the house does contain the crow as a qualifier, which is something different from the house itself. Whereas, here (in the case of Brahman), that is not there - i.e. the absence of duality is not an attribute different to the substratum itself - that much is the difference.
नचोपलक्षणवैयर्थ्यम् ; अनर्थनिवृत्ति हेतुत्वेन द्वितीयाभावद्वारकस्वरूपज्ञानस्योद्देश्यत्वात्, तस्य प्रागसिद्धित्वात् |
This does not render the indicator useless, for it serves the purpose of removing evil - the cognition of the substratum is following the intervening cognition of the substratum endowed with the absence of duality - and such a knowledge is not present so far.
This will be further explained in the second paricCheda in the context of the akhaNDArtha sentences such as satyam, jnAnam, anantam and tattvamasi.
नच मिथ्यात्वासिद्ध्येष्टापत्ति:, अवान्तरतात्पर्यस्य तत्रापि सत्त्वात्, तद्द्वारैव स्वरूपचैतन्ये महातात्पर्यत्वात् |
Nor can it be alleged that this is something that is desirable to the opponent because it does not establish the mithyAtva of the world. For proving that the world is mithyA has secondary import, in that it serves as the intervening cognition prior to the cognition of the substratum, which is of primary import.
अत एव - श्रुतिबोध्यस्य विशेषणस्योपलक्षणस्य वा द्वितीयाभावस्य सत्त्वे अद्वैतहानि:, असत्त्वे चादण्डे दण्डीति वाक्यवत् काकहीने काकवदिति वाक्यवच्चाद्वैतवाक्यस्यातत्त्वावेदकत्वापत्तिरिति - निरस्तम् ;
For this reason this argument stands refuted- "If the absence of duality is taught by the shruti, existed as a visheShaNa or an upalakshaNa, it would lead to the refutation of non-duality. If it did not exist, then like the sentence "The person without a stick is holding a stick" or "the house without the crow has the crow" the sentence that conveys advaita would end up teaching a falsehood."
आद्ये द्वितीयाभावसत्त्वेन द्वितीयाभावासिद्ध्यापादनस्यानुचितत्वात्, अभावस्याधिकरणातिरेकानभ्युपगमाच्च |
In the first case, as the veda's teaching of the absence of duality does exist, to argue that the absence of duality is not proven is inappropriate. Further, we do not admit that the absence of a thing is separate to the substratum of the absence (of a thing).
द्वितीये तु सृष्ट्यादिवाक्यवदुपलक्ष्यस्वरूपसत्यत्वमादाय तत्त्वावेदकत्वात्, मुख्यतात्पर्यविषयस्यासत्यतायामेवातत्त्वावेदकत्वाभ्युपगमात् |
In the second case, like in the case of the teaching of creation etc, the teaching's validity lies in the reality of the thing taught - It is only if the primary import of the Veda was unreal can it be argued that the Vedas are teaching a falsehood.
अतएव महातात्पर्याभिप्रायेण चैतन्यमात्रे तात्पर्यमित्याद्यपक्षेऽपि न दोष:,
For this reason alone, in the first position when it is said that consciousness alone is revealed, keeping the primary import of the shruti in mind, there is no defect.
अवान्तरतात्पर्येण मिथ्यात्वसिद्धेरपि स्वीकारेणेष्टापत्तेरप्यसंभवात् |
For, the establishment of mithyAtva too is admitted to be the secondary import, and a sentence having consciousness alone as the primary import cannot be prove the opponent's view (by not revealing the mithyAtva of the world).
ननु - द्वितीयाभावे महातात्पर्याभाव: किं प्रमाणान्तरप्राप्त्या, यथा वायुक्षेपिष्ठत्वादौ, उत तद्विरोधित्वेन ; यथात्मवपोत्खननादौ, उतोद्देश्यविशेषणत्वादिना यथा ग्रहैकत्वादौ,
The opponent retorts - On what basis is it said that the teaching of mithyAtva is not primary import?
a) Is it something that is well known by some other means, like the vedic sentence 'the wind is swift' (which is known by daily experience)?
b) or is it being it is contradicted by something known, like 'prajApati performed a sacrifice by offering his own liver' (no one can survive after removing their own liver)?
c) because it is a qualifier in the subject of the sentence, like in the case of the vedic sentence 'graham sammARShTi' (wash the graha vessel) - the sentence uses graha in singular, but it is held that many vessels are to be washed. Even though the singular tense is a qualifier for the word, it is not the intended meaning. Is the advaitin saying that as the "absence of duality" is a qualifier in the subject of the vedic sentence, it cannot be the primary import of the Veda?
नाद्य:, त्वयैव द्वितीयाभावस्य प्रमाणान्तरप्राप्त्यनभ्युपगमात् |
It cannot be the first, because you yourself (advaitin) have said that the absence of duality is not knowable by any other means.
द्वितीयेऽपि विरोधिमानं न तावत्प्रत्यक्षादि द्वैतग्राहि; त्वन्मते तस्यैव श्रुतिबाध्यत्वात्,
Even in the second alternative, the contradicting means of knowledge cannot be perception etc, which reveal duality, because in your system, it is those other means that are overruled by the Veda.
नाद्वैतवाक्यान्तरम् ; तस्यात्ममात्रपरत्वे द्वितीयाभावाविरोधित्वात्,
Nor is another shruti teaching non-duality overruling this shruti, because as such a shruti would have the Atma alone as its import, it cannot overrule the absence of duality being the import of this sentence.
न हि विशेष्यविषयं 'अग्निहोत्रं जुहोती'ति वाक्यं विशिष्टविषयेण 'दध्ना जुहोती'ति वाक्येन विरुध्यते,
A sentence that has an unqualified substratum alone as its object such as 'perform the agnihotra' cannot be overruled by a sentence which contains a qualifier such as 'use curd in the sacrifice', for there is nothing to say that the agnihotra cannot be performed with curd.
द्वैताभावपरत्वे त्वेकविषयत्वेन सुतरामविरोधात् |
If this sentence has the teaching of duality as its import, it cannot be interpreted to have a common combined meaning with another sentence which would this sentence's import being overruled by the other sentence.
नापि तृतीय:, 'ग्रहं संमार्ष्टी'त्यत्र संमार्जनस्येवाखण्डार्थपरे वाक्ये विधेयान्तरस्याभावेन विशेष्यस्य शास्त्रगम्यस्य चिन्मात्रस्याप्राप्तत्वेनोद्देश्यत्वायोगाच्च
The third option is also not correct. Unlike the sentence "the graha is to be washed", the sentence which has an impartite meaning does not have any other object in the sentence, and the revealed entity, being pure consciousness, which is known by the scripture alone, is not otherwise known and therefore cannot be the subject of the sentence.
The opponent is saying that the subject of a sentence is something that is known. The object is something that is unknown - that is why the veda has come to reveal a hitherto unknown meaning. The impartite sentence "tattvamasi" cannot have consciousness as its subject, it must have consciousness as its object, because that is the meaning that is not otherwise known.
द्वितीयाभावस्योद्देश्यविशेषणत्वानुपपत्ते:,
That being the case, the absence of duality in consciousness, cannot be the qualifier of the subject, which can be ignored, like in the case of "the graha is to be washed".
अविवक्षाहेतोरनुवाद्यत्वस्याप्यभावाच्चेति -
Nor can it be said to be a repetition that is not intended to be conveyed.
The siddhikAra responds to this argument - चेन्न ; No.
स्वयमेव स्वबोधितमपि द्वितीयाभावं द्वितीयत्वादेव निषेधतीति स्वविरोधादेव श्रुतेस्तत्रातात्पर्यात् |
Even though the absence of all duality has been taught by the vedic sentence itself, and that absence, itself being a second, is also negated by the sentence conveying the absence of all duality - because it would negate all duality including the absence of duality that it itself reveals, the sentence is said to not have primary import.
मानविरोधित्वमात्रस्य तात्पर्याभावे प्रयोजकत्वात् स्वविरोधेऽपि न क्षति: |
The determinant of where primary import lies is if it happens to be overruled by some means of knowledge - if that happens to be itself, all that means is that that is not the primary import.
ननु - एकेनैव प्रमाणेनैकस्य प्राप्तिनिषेधावनुपपन्नौ, न ;
The opponent asks - It is not appropriate for a thing to both prove and overrule a thing.
The siddhikAra replies - no.
रूपभेदेनाविरोधात् | It does not contradict itself, because the object of the teaching and its negation are slightly different.
द्वितीयाभावस्वरूपं हि शास्त्रेण प्राप्यते | The absence of duality is known by the scripture.
तस्य च प्राप्यतावच्छेदकरूपं द्वितीयाभावत्वम् ; Thus what is known is the absence of duality.
तच्च न निषेध्यतावच्छेदकम्, किंतु द्वितीयत्वमेव निषेध्यमात्रानुगतम् |
However, what is negated is duality, not the absence of duality. Therefore, the "absence of duality" is also negated because it is a second thing to Brahman.
तत्र तदनभ्युपगमे तु न तस्य निषेध्यत्वम्, न वा तेनात्मन: सद्वितीयत्वापत्तिरिति न कोऽपि दोष: |
If the "absence of duality" is not accepted to be a second thing, then it would not be negated, and thus by such an absence of duality, Brahman would not end up having a second thing. Thus, there would be no defect.
If the absence of duality is a second thing, it would be negated by the sentence conveying the absence of all duality. If it is not a second thing, it cannot overrule the teaching of non-dual Brahman.
यत्र तु प्राप्यतावच्छेदकमेव निषेध्यातावच्छेदकं, तत्र प्राप्तिनिषेधशास्त्रयोरतुल्यविषयत्वेऽपि विशेषशास्त्रविषयपरित्यागेन सामान्यशास्त्रप्रवृत्ति:, तुल्यविषयत्वे त्वगत्या विकल्प इति न निषेधस्यासङ्कोचेन प्रवृत्ति:,
However where what is revealed is the same as what is being negated, and if the sentence that reveals and sentence that negates have the same subject, the general rule would prevail everywhere expect where the special rule has scope, where the subject and the scope are the same, then there would be a choice in the matter - in either case the negation does not always have untrammelled scope.
यथा 'न हिंस्यात्सर्वा भूतानी'ति निषेधशास्त्रस्य 'अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेते'त्यादिप्राप्तिशास्त्रविषयेतरविषयत्वं 'अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति' 'नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाती'त्यादिप्राप्तिनिषेधशास्त्रयोस्तु विकल्पेनैकविषयत्वम्
For example, the sentence "do not hurt living beings" and the sentence "sacrifice the animal in the agniShomIya ritual" are interpreted such that the former has general application everywhere except in vedic sacrifices, and the latter has scope in vedic sacrifices of the agniShomIya type. Whereas, the sentence "use the ShoDashi vessel" and "do not use the ShoDashi vessel" because they have the same subject and scope, are deemed to be options - either can be used.
एकस्यैव हिंसात्वस्य षोडशिग्रहत्वस्य च प्राप्तिनिषेधयोरवच्छेदकत्वात्, तत्र निषेधशास्त्रस्यासंकुचद्धृत्तित्वे प्राप्तिशास्त्रस्य सर्वात्मना वैयर्थ्यापत्ति: ;
In both cases, what is revealed is the same as what is being denied (violence, using the ShoDashi). If it is said that the negating rule is always unrestricted in its application, the affirming rule will end up worthless.
प्रकृते च द्वितीयत्वेन रूपेण निषेधस्यैव शास्त्रार्थत्वान्न कस्यापि वैयर्थ्यशङ्का |
Whereas in our context, as the negation of the second thing is the meaning of the vedic sentence, there is no scope for redundancy of any statement.
अतएव - द्वितीयाभावनिषेधे पुनर्द्वितीयोन्मज्जनापत्तिरिति - निरस्तम् |
Thus the statement - the negation of the absence of duality would lead to the reinstatement of duality - stands refuted.
उपपादितमेतत् मिथ्यात्वमिथ्यात्वसाधने |
This has already been proven in the chapter on mithyAtva's mithyAtva.
यथा प्रतियोग्यभावयोर्निषेध्यतावच्छेदकैक्ये न एकनिषेधेऽपरसत्त्वापत्तिरिति|
Where the counterpositive and its absence are being denied on the same common basis, the denial of absence does not lead to the affirmation of the object and vice versa.
नच - स्वेनैव निषिद्धस्य द्वितीयाभावस्य द्वितीयस्येव विशेषणत्वेनोपलक्षणत्वेन वा पुनरुपादानं न युक्तमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - Like duality, the absence of duality that has been negated by the sentence cannot end up as the visheShaNa or upalakshaNa.
अभावबुद्धौ निषिद्धस्यापि प्रतियोगिन: 'सा शुक्ति'रित्यत्र प्रतिषिद्धस्यापि पूर्वप्रतीतिरजतस्योपलक्षणतयोपादानदर्शनात्,
For, in the cognition of absence, the negated counterpositive is used as an upalakshaNa, like the previously seen silver in the cognition "that is a shell (not silver)".
असङ्कीर्णज्ञानप्रयोजकत्वस्य प्रकृतेऽपि तुल्यत्वात्
The cognition that denies (this is not silver) serving to denote the actual object (shell), is the same here too (the cognition "there is no duality whatsoever" serves as a means for knowing pure consciousness).
तस्मात् 'एकमेवाद्वितीय'मित्यादिश्रुतिर्विश्वमिथ्यात्वे प्रमाणमिति सिद्धम् ||
Therefore the Shruti 'one alone was there, non-dual" serves to prove the mithyAtva of the world.
इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ सामान्येन मिथ्यात्वश्रुत्युपपत्ति: ||