paricCheda 1 - mithyAtva anumAnasya anumAna bAdhoddhAra: (part 3)

Continued from here.
Inference #8

अथ आत्मा, यावत्स्वरूपमनुवर्तमानानात्मवान्, यावत्स्वरूपमनुवर्तमानभावरूपानात्मवान् वा स्वज्ञानाबाध्यानात्मवान्, स्वज्ञानाबाध्यभावरूपानात्मवान्वा, पदार्थत्वात्, भावत्वाद्वा घटादिवत् इति |

The Self contains within it the non-Self a) for as long as the the Self as an entity persists, or b) which is of the nature of existence1,2, for as long as the Self as an entity persists, or c) which is unsublated by its (the Self's) knowledge, or d) which is of the nature of existence1,2 and which is unsublated by its (the Self's) the knowledge, because it is a substance, or because it is of the nature of existence, like a pot.

अत्र पञ्चमप्रकाराविद्यानिवृत्त्यभ्युपगमपक्षे सिद्धसाधनपरिहाराय साध्ययोर्भावरूपपदमनात्मविशेषणम् - If it is accepted that the end of avidyA is of the fifth category2 , the qualifier "of the nature of existence" is added to the non-Self in the sAdhya-s, to avoid the charge of proving something known.

1 This is to cover the view of maNDana miSra, who argues in the brahma siddhi that while the world is sublated upon liberation, the absence of the objects of the world persists even then. The opponent wishes to prove that the world continues to exist even after sublation, in a positive, existential form.

2 This is the view of AnandabodhAchArya, who argues the nature of avidyA nivritti, the end of ignorance after liberation, does not fit into any of the four known categories: existent (sat), non-existent (asat), existent and non-existent (sadasat), and neither existence nor non-existent (sadasatvilakshaNam).

The siddhikAra responds

इत्यपि मन्दम् | 'यावत्स्वरूप' मित्यस्य यत्किञ्चित्स्वरूपपरत्वे सिद्धसाधनात्, आत्मस्वरूपपरत्वे साध्याप्रसिद्धे: |

This too is not very clever. By the term "for as long as the entity", if the entity is some object, then that is stating the obvious (the statement "a thing persists as long as its persists" is tautological), and if it means the Self itself, then such a sAdhya is unknown. Why?

नहि यावदात्मस्वरूपमनुवर्तमानोऽनात्मा प्रसिद्धोऽस्ति; तथा सत्यनुमानवैयर्थ्यात् | There is no object that we are aware of, which persists for as long as the Self persists. If such an ever-existent thing was already known, then why bother proving its existence by inference?

अथ - स्वरूपपदस्य समभिव्याहृतपरत्वाद्व्याप्तिग्रहदशायां दृष्टान्तस्वरूपं पक्षधर्मताग्रहदशायां चात्मस्वरूपमेव प्राप्यत इति न साध्याप्रसिद्धिर्न वा सिद्धसाधनमिति - चेन्न ; Now if this be said - "The term 'entity' refers to the object in the example when the concomitance is being cognised, and when determining the qualifiers of the paksha (that is when determining if the hetu is present in the paksha) the term refers to the Self - thus neither is the sAdhya unknown, nor is it stating the obvious.- No.

शब्दस्वभावोपन्यासस्यानुमाने अनुपयोगात् | While a word can mean different things in different contexts, the rules of debate do not allow this in an inference (because then, it would be impossible to refute such an inference - if the opponent were to refute it using one meaning of the word, the speaker can simply claim that the meaning of the word was something else).

स्वज्ञानाबाध्येत्यत्र स्वशब्देऽपि तुल्योऽयं दोष: | The word "it" (sva) in the context of "its knowledge" also suffers from the same flaw.

Inference #9

अतएव - विमता, बन्धनिवृत्ति:, स्वप्रतियोगिविषयविषयकज्ञानाबाध्यानात्मसमकालीना, उक्तज्ञानाबाध्यभावरूपानात्मसमकालीना  वा; बन्धनिवृत्तित्वात् ; निगलबन्धनिवृत्तिवदित्यापि - निरस्तम् ;

Thus, the following has been refuted in a similar manner - "The cessation of bondage a) is contemporaneous with the non-Self which has not been sublated by a cognition having as its object, the object of bondage*, or b) is contemporaneous with the non-Self, which is of the nature of existence, because it is the cessation of bondage, like the release from handcuffs / chains (is not a result of the cognition of the object to which one is chained)."

*sva = cessation of bondage, svapratiyogi = bondage, svapratiyogiviShaya = the object of bondage, svapratiyogiviShayaviShayakajnAna = a cognition having as its object the object of bondage, tadabAdhya anAtma = a non-Self which is unsublated by such a cognition, tatsamakAlIna = is contemporaneous with such an object

This inference has been refuted on the same lines as before - that is, the word bondage in the paksha refers to a bondage due to ignorance whereas the same word in the example means handcuffs.

पक्षदृष्टान्तयोर्बन्धपदार्थस्यैकस्याभावेन स्वरूपासिद्धि साधनवैकल्यान्यतरापातात् | The word bandha in the paksha and the example do not mean the same, thus either this will result in svarUpAsiddhi (the hetu is not present in the paksha) or sAdhanavaikalya (the hetu is not present in the example).

स्वपदे चोक्त: साध्याप्रसिद्धिदोष: | The word "sva" can take different meanings, leading to the defect of the sAdhya not being known.

हेतौ च बन्धेतिविशेषणवैयर्थ्यात् व्याप्यत्वासिद्धि: | Further, as the term "bondage" is superfluous in the hetu (no vyabhichAra is removed by its presence), its use leads to vyApyatvAsiddhi.

अप्रयोजकत्वं च कस्याश्चिन्निवृत्तेरनात्मसमानकालीनत्वदर्शनंं निवृत्तिमात्रस्य तथात्वसाधने If the contemporaneity of all cessation is what is meant to be proved, then as there is always some cessation which is contemporaneous with non-Self, the hetu "cessation" does not necessarily imply such a sAdhya.

संसारकालीनाया दु:खनिवृत्ते: समानाधिकरणदु:खप्रागभावकालीनत्वदर्शनमिव दु:खनिवृत्तिमात्रस्य तथात्वसाधने | Like the observation of the colocation of the prior absence of future pain with the cessation of some pain during samsAra, if the hetu was merely the "cessation of pain", it wouldn't prove the sAdhya.

नन्वेवं - सामान्यानुमानेषु निराकृतेषु विशिष्यानुमानं भविष्यति | After the general inferences have been disproved, specific inferences will be taken up.

Specific inference #1

आत्मधी:, न स्वविषयविषयकधीबाध्या, धीत्वात्, शुक्तिधीवत् - The cognition of the Self is not sublated by a cognition that has its object the object of the cognition itself - because it a cognition, like the cognition of the shell.

इत्यपि बालभाषितम् ; This inference is also childlike babble.

The cognition of the Self is inimical to the ignorance which has the Self as its object. When ignorance is destroyed by the cognition of the Self, the cognition of the Self is also destroyed, as its material cause ignorance is destroyed. The siddhikAra uses this to construct a upAdhi  (vitiating condition) for the opponent's inference.

स्वविरोध्यविषयकप्रत्ययविषयकत्वस्योपाधित्वात्, The cognition not having an object whose cognition is inimical to the cognition itself is an upAdhi to the inference. This characteristic is present in the example (cognition of the shell), but not in the paksha (cognition of the Self).

The cognition of the shell has as its object the shell, whose cognition being the cognition of the shell, is not inimical to the cognition of the shell itself. The cognition of the Self has as its object the Self, whose cognition is inimical to the cognition of the Self because it destroys the material cause for all cognitions, including it.

अन्धोऽयं रूपज्ञानवानित्यन्धस्य रूपविषयतया कल्पितं यत् ज्ञानं तस्य रूपं नान्धगम्यमिति स्वविषयविषयकप्रत्ययबाध्यत्वदर्शनेन व्यभिचारात् |

The cognition "this blind person possesses the cognition of colour", which has an imaginary cognition which has colour as its object, is sublated by the cognition "colour is not seen by the blind" (which too has colour as its object), and thus the quality of being sublated by a cognition which has the same object as itself is seen, thus falsifying the inference.

कल्पितत्वात्तत्र तद्बाधने प्रकृतेऽपि वृत्ते: कल्पितत्वं समम् | If it is said that that cognition is sublated because it happens to be an illusory one, then such illusoriness is present in the cognition here (cognition of the Self) too.

धीपदेन चैतन्यमात्रविवक्षायां तु सिद्धसाधनमेव | If by the word "cognition", consciousness is meant, then as consciousness is fundamentally unsublatable, the inference is stating the obvious.

Specific inference #2

The opponent's next inference says that the shell appears as silver because it has the quality of shininess. This quality does not get sublated when the silver is sublated. However the ignorance which is said to be the cause of the world illusion, is sublated when the substratum is cognised. This is a discrepancy.

आत्माधिष्ठानकभ्रमहेतु: , न स्वकार्यभ्रमाधिष्ठानज्ञानबाध्य:, भ्रमहेतुत्वात्, यदेवं तदेवम्, यथा शुक्त्यधिष्ठानकभ्रमहेतुकाचादीत्यपि न साधु;

The cause of the world illusion, which has the Self as its substratum, is not sublated by the cognition of its illusory product's substratum, because it happens to be the cause of the illusion. Wherever that happens, this too does. Like the shininess of the shell, which has the shell as its locus and which caused the illusion to appear knowledge of the shell does not get sublated when the shell is seen.

The siddhikAra says - this too is not correct.

व्यावृत्ताकाराधिष्ठानज्ञानानवधित्वस्य स्वकार्यभ्रमाधिष्ठानानारोपितत्वस्य वा उपाधित्वात्;

Two upAdhi-s are cited by the siddhikAra.  

1) Being other than that which remains after the cognition of the substratum with the distinguishing characteristics of the (substratum) has arisen. brahmAnanda in the laghuchandrika says here - यं प्रति व्यावर्तकधर्मवत्तया ज्ञातं सत् स्वजन्यभ्रमाधिष्ठानं स्वजन्यभ्रमनिवर्तकं तदन्यत्वस्य इत्यर्थ:. That which is other than: an entity whose cognition is endowed with an attribute that excludes it, which cognition's object is the substratum of the illusion created by the defect, and which is the cause of the destruction of the defect's effect, the illusion.

To explain: 

The stated upAdhi has two parts: 1) Being other than 2) that which meets the following conditions (together, the "Conditions"): 

a) The cognition of which is endowed with an attribute that excludes the entity

b) Which cognition has as its object the substratum of the illusion which is a product of the entity.

c) Which cognition is the cause of the destruction of the illusion which is a product of the entity.

In the case of the example (the shell-silver) - the cognition that contains an attribute excluding it (this is not silver), is the cognition of the shell. The object of the cognition, the shell, is the substratum of the illusion created by the defect of shininess. Upon the cognition of the shell, the illusion of the silver is removed.

However, the only entity which meets those Conditions is the shell. Shininess is a thing different from the shell (it is a property, whereas the latter is a substance). Thus shininess contains the upAdhi.

In the case of the exemplified, the cognition of the world that excludes it, is the cognition of Brahman endowed with absence of duality. The object of such cognition is Brahman. Knowing which, the illusion of the world created due to ignorance is removed. It also happens to be the substratum of the illusion created by ignorance. However, ignorance is an entity which meets those Conditions. The cognition that excludes ignorance is the one and the same cognition of Brahman which meets those Conditions. Therefore, ignorance is not an entity that is other than that which satisfies those conditions.

Thus, such a feature is present in the example, but not in the paksha, and hence this is an upAdhi.

2) Alternatively, that which is not superimposed on the same substratum upon which its product, the illusion, is also superimposed - can also be cited as an upAdhi. Shininess is not superimposed on the the substratum of its product, the silver illusion, i.e. the shell (it is the shell's real property). Ignorance is superimposed on Brahman, which happens to be the substratum of the world illusion, which is a product of ignorance. Thus, as such a feature is present in the example, but not in the paksha, it is an upAdhi.

The opponent had said that the cause of the illusion is itself not sublated by the cognition of the substratum. That is being refuted with an example.

दूरादिदोषादुपलादौ यत्र चाकचक्यकल्पना तेन चाकचक्यदोषेण शुक्ताविव रजतकल्पना तत्राधिष्ठानज्ञानेन चाकचक्यरूप्ययोरुभयोरपि बाधदर्शनेन व्यभिचाराच्च |
The inference fails where the shininess itself is an illusory one, which can occur in objects seen from great distance, and that shininess leads to the illusion of silver, like in a shell. When the substratum is properly observed, both the silver and shininess are sublated.

For example, the mirage observed over hot sand sometimes gives rise to the illusion that there is shiny silver present. Upon closer observation, it is revealed to be sand, and both the shininess, and its product, the illusion of silver are sublated. 

Specific inference #3

ब्रह्मान्यानादिपरमार्थसत्, अनादित्वात्, ब्रह्मवदित्यपि न भद्रम् ; The following inference is incorrect too - "Every other beginningless entity other than Brahman is ultimately real, because it is beginningless, like Brahman".

ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वस्योपाधित्वात् | Because, being a counterpositive of destruction is an upAdhi for the inference. Brahman is not destroyed, the others are.

Specific inference #4

ब्रह्म, देशकालसंबन्धं विना नावतिष्ठते, पदार्थत्वात्, घटवदित्यपि न; The following is also not correct - "Brahman cannot be without some relation to space and time, because it is a substance, like a pot".

कालसंबन्धं विना नावतिष्ठत इत्यस्य यदा ब्रह्म तदावश्यं कालसंबन्ध इत्येवंरुपा व्याप्तिरित्यर्थ: | When it is said that Brahman does not exist without some relation to time, the concomitance must mean that when It exists, It does so with a relation with time.

तथा च सुस्थिरं सिद्धसाधनम् | नहि यस्मिन् काले ब्रह्म तस्मिन् काले ब्रह्मण: कालसंबन्धो नास्ति | This is definitely stating the obvious, for we do not say that when Brahman exists, It does not have a relation with time.

एवं यत्रात्मा तत्र कालसंबन्ध इति दैशिकव्याप्तावपि सिद्धसाधनम् | Wherever the Self is present, there is a relation with time - such a spatial concomitance also is stating the obvious.

नहि देशकालासंबन्ध: कदाप्यस्ति | It is not unrelated to time and space at any time.

परममुक्तौ तु न देशो न काल इति सुस्थिरं सिद्धसाधनम् | However, as there is no space and time in the ultimate release, this is stating the obvious.

Specific inference #5

ब्रह्मान्यद्वेदैकगम्यम् धर्मादिपरमार्थसत्, श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्वात्, ब्रह्मवदित्यपि न साधु; This too is not correct - Everything other than Brahman that is known solely from the veda-s, like dharma, etc is ultimately real, because it is the object of the import of shruti, like Brahman.

पारमार्थिकत्वेन श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्वस्योपाधित्वात् | Because of the upAdhi, "being the ultimate import of scripture". It is Brahman alone that is the ultimate import of scripture, dharma etc., are only of subsidiary import. 

Specific inference #6

साक्षिवेद्यं सुखादिपरमार्थसत्, अनिषेध्यत्वेन दोषाजन्यज्ञानं प्रति साक्षाद्विषयत्वात्; आत्मवदित्यापि न; This too is not correct - "Things that are revealed by the inner witness, such as happiness, etc., are ultimately real, because they are direct, unsublated objects of a non-defective source, like the Self".

शुक्तिरूप्यादिषु व्यभिचारात् | Such an inference fails, because it equally applies to objects such as the shell-silver, etc., which are direct objects of the inner witness. 

तेषां दोषजन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वेऽपि दोषाजन्यसाक्षिविषयत्वात्, Even though they arise due to a defective source (ignorance), they are revealed by the inner witness, which is defect free. 

शुद्धस्य वृत्तिविषयत्वानभ्युपगमे दृष्टान्तस्य साधनविकलत्वाच्च | If Pure Consciousness is not held to be an object of cognition, the concomitance fails in the example. It is ultimately real, but it is not the object of the witness through a thought.

दोषजन्यज्ञानाविषयत्वविवक्षायां वाऽसिद्धो हेतु: ; साक्ष्यवच्छेदिकाया अविद्यावृत्तेर्दोषजन्यत्वात् | If the hetu is reinterpreted to mean that it is not an object of a defective source (as opposed to being an object of a non-defective source), then there is asiddhi, because as the inner witness is itself consciousness delimited by ignorance, the hetu will not be in the paksha, because it the inner witness that reveals happiness. 

असद्गोचरशाब्दज्ञानात्मकविकल्पस्य दोषाजन्यत्वेनासति व्यभिचाराच्च | The inference also fails in the case of verbal cognitions of absolutely non-existent objects, known as vikalpa. The source of the vikalpa is not defective, but its object is non-existent.

आत्मनो वृत्तिविषयत्वाभ्युपगमे दोषजन्यदेहात्मैक्यभ्रमविषयत्वात् साधनविकलो दृष्टान्त:, If the Self is accepted to be the object of a cognition, then the hetu does not exist in the example because of the illusion of the body taken to be the Self. The Self becomes the object of an erroneous cognition.

तदनभ्युपगमे तु अविषयत्वमात्रस्यैव परमार्थसत्त्वसाधकत्वोपपत्तौ दोषजन्यज्ञानेति विशेषणवैयर्थ्याद्व्याप्यत्वासिद्धि:, If that is not acceptable, as "not being an object" itself is sufficient to establish absolute reality, the qualifiers "erroneous cognition" being redundant qualifiers, we have the defect of vyApyatvAsiddhi

तावन्मात्रं च पक्षे स्वरूपासिद्धमित्यन्यत्र विस्तर: | However, if only that much is the hetu (not being an object), then there is svarUpAsiddhi, as the hetu is not present in the paksha (because happiness is an object).

Specific inference #7

There are two kinds of objects - a) if they exist they are known, and b) those that exist even when unknown.

विमतंपरमार्थसत्, स्वविषयज्ञानात्पूर्वभावित्वात्, आत्मवदित्यपि न, This inference is flawed too - "The world is ultimately real, because it exists even before its cognition, like the Self". 

दृष्टिसृष्टिपक्षे असिद्धे: | Because this will lead to asiddhi in the case of dRShTi sRShTi.

विषमव्याप्तस्यानादित्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च | The one-sided concomitance with beginningless is an upAdhi. Whatever is beginningless is not the Self, but whatever is the Self is beginningless. Whatever is beginningless, need not exist before it is cognised, and whatever exists before it is cognised need not be beginningless either. Thus it exists in the example, but not in the exemplified. 

Specific inference #8

अन्योन्याभावातिरिक्तैतद्घटसमानाधिकरणैतद्घटप्रतियोगिकाभावत्वं, एतद्घटसमानकालीनावृत्ति अन्योन्याभावातिरिक्तैतद्घटसामानाधिकरणैतद्घटप्रतियोगिकाभावमात्रवृत्तित्वात्, एतद्घटप्रागभावत्ववत्, व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नाभावपक्षे व्यधिकरणधर्मानवच्छिन्नेत्यपि विशेषणीयम् |

An absence having the pot as its counterpositive, which is other than its difference, and which is located in the same locus as as the pot, cannot exist there at the same time as the pot,  because any absence of a pot other than difference, can be present in a locus only when the pot is absent there, like the prior absence of a pot. If the absence of some other substance's properties in this substance is admitted as a separate category of absence, then a qualifier stating that the absence "does not refer to the absence of the properties of another substance" must be added.

Within nyAya there are two groups - one that admits vyadhikaraNa dharmAvacChinna pratiyogitAka abhAva - an absence that has a counterpositive endowed with properties of some other substance. Every object is endowed with vyadhikaraNa dharma avacChinna pratiyogitA abhAva according to them. This theory was proposed by SondaDopAdhyAya but was rejected by GangeSopAdhyAya in tattva chintAmaNi

अत्र च स्वसमानाधिकरण: स्वसमानकालीनो योऽत्यन्ताभावस्तदप्रतियोगित्वलक्षणसत्त्वसिद्धिरित्यपि न साधु ;

Here, the end result that obtains is the non counterpositiveness of an absence that is colocated in time and space with the counterpositive. The pot cannot be both present and absent in the same location at the same time. 

The siddhikAra says such an inference is also wrong.

साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकस्यैतद्घटप्रतियोगिकजन्यजनकान्यतरमात्रवृत्तित्वस्योपाधित्वात् |
The inference has an upAdhi - Being either the a) the destruction, which is born from the counterpositiveness of the pot, and b) the prior absence, which gives rise to the counterpositiveness of the pot, is something that is present wherever the sAdhya endowed with the hetu is present.

The example (prior absence) is one of prior absence or destruction, but the exemplified can be absolute absence as well (it can be any of the other three types of absences, except difference). 

नच - पक्षीभूतधर्मस्यात्यन्ताभाववृत्तित्वसन्देहे साधनाव्यापकत्वसन्देह इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that as the presence of absolute absence, which is intended to be the attribute of the paksha, is doubtful (it could be one of prior absence or destruction), whether it fails to pervade the hetu is doubtful (and therefore, whether the stated defect of upAdhi, is really an upAdhi or not, is called into question).

विपक्षबाधकतर्कानवतारदशायां सन्दिग्धोपाधेरपि दूषणत्वसम्भवात्, Because, for so long as there is the absence of logic to refute the opponent's logic, even a doubtful upAdhi can lead to a defective inference.

घटात्यन्ताभावत्वे च व्यभिचारात्, संयोगसंबन्धेन घटवत्यपि भूतले समवाय संबन्धेन घटात्यन्ताभावसत्त्वात् Moreover, the inference fails for the absolute absence of the pot - even if the pot is present in contact with the ground, it can be said to be absent inhering in the ground - so the pot and its absence can both be present simultaneously in one location (in nyAya).

साध्याभाववति हेतोर्वृत्तेरित्यलमतिविस्तरेण॥ As the sAdhya is absent but hetu is present, there is the defect of vyabhichAra. This much explication is sufficient.

This concludes the chapter on the possibility of inference contradicting the inference of world's unreality.