Continued from here.
Alternative hetu 4
नापि सप्रकाराबाध्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वं हेतु:, Nor can the hetu be "whose utility is unsublated by any attributive cognition".
न सप्रकारकजाग्रद्बोधाबाध्यस्वप्नजलावगाहनप्रियासङ्गमादिविशेषिताप्रमाणीभूतज्ञानस्यार्थकारित्वदर्शनेन तद्विषये तत्र व्यभिचारात् | Because there is a vyabhichAra of the hetu in the case of dreams where ones bathes in a river, spends time with a dear one, etc. They may be unsublated by any attributive cognition upon waking up and have a certain utility to them (because they can give happiness etc to the dreamer), but cannot be considered to be valid (because their objects are unreal).
There is one school of thought within advaita that dreams are sublated upon waking up, and another school that holds that the dreams disappear on waking up, but their objects cannot be considered as sublated. The above reply is from the latter perspective.
अथ तत्र ज्ञानमेव सुखादिजनकं तच्चाबाध्यमेवेति मतं, तदसत्; Now, if it is held that it is the cognition alone that gives rise to happiness, and that alone (not its object) is unsublated, that is not correct.
ज्ञानमात्रस्य हि तादृक्सुखाजनकत्वेन किञ्चित्विशेषितस्यैव तथात्वम् वाच्यम्, Because, it is not cognition alone that gives rise to happiness, it is a cognition of a particular object that give rise happiness.
ज्ञाने च विशेषो नार्थातिरिक्त: | The qualifier of a cognition is nothing but the object that it reveals.
तदुक्तम् - 'अर्थेनैव विशेषो हि निराकारतया धियाम् |' इति | It has been said - "it is by objects, that cognitions are qualified, for cognitions are otherwise formless".
This is a quote from the nyAyakusumAnjali by udayanAchArya had said:
अर्थेनैव विशेषो हि निराकारतया धियाम् | क्रियैव विशेषो हेतु: व्यवहारेषु कर्मणाम् ||
अर्थेनेत्यर्थ एवेत्यर्थ: | The use of the third case (arthena) implies that it is by objects alone that cognitions are qualified.
तथा च मिथ्याभूतविशेषितस्य जनकत्वाभ्युपगमे मिथ्याभूतस्यापि जनकत्वाद्व्यभिचार एव | Therefore, if a cognition qualified by an unreal object can give rise (to happiness), then it follows that an unreal object also does so, and therefore there is a vyabhichAra for the hetu.
तथा चोक्तं शास्त्रदीपिकायां बौद्धं प्रति - 'अथ सुखज्ञानमेवार्थक्रिया तच्चाव्यभिचार्येव | नहि क्वचिदप्यसति सुखे सुखज्ञानमस्तीतियाशङ्क्य सत्यमेतन्न तु तेन पूर्वज्ञानप्रामाण्याध्यवसानं युक्तं ; अप्रमाणेनापि प्रियासङ्गमविज्ञानेन स्वप्नावस्थायां सुखदर्शनात् |' इति |
Thus has been said in the shAstra dIpikA (by pArthasArathi miSra) to the Buddhist - "It is the cognition of happiness alone which has utility, and therefore there is no vyabhichAra; for a happiness which does not exist, cannot lead to the cognition of happiness - If this is the doubt, then that is true. However, that does not mean that the former knowledge was a valid one. For even an illusory cognition, such as the cognition of uniting with a loved one in a dream, can lead to experiencing happiness in the dream".
The Buddhist had argued that even without objects, it is possible for cognitions to arise. To refute him, pArthasArathi miSra had said this. The object may be illusory, but it is still needed for the cognition.
ननु - विषयविशेषोपलक्षितस्यैव ज्ञानस्य सुखजनकत्वमस्तु, तत् कुतो विषयस्य जनकत्वमिति - चेन्न;
If it is said - Let us hold that it is cognitions, whose objects are not contemporaneously present, that is, they are the upalakshaNa-s of the cognition, that give rise to happiness. If so, how can it be argued that it is objects that give rise to it? - No.
There are no attributes that are intrinsic to the cognition that give rise to a particular effect like the cognition of happiness.
स्वरूपाणामननुगततया ज्ञानत्वादेश्चातिप्रसक्ततया अनुगतानतिप्रसक्तोपलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकाभावादुपलक्षणत्वासंभवात् |
There is nothing intrinsic in the nature of a cognition that allows a cognition to objectify a particular kind of object (sadness, happiness, desire, anger etc.), and because it would be an overstatement to conclude that the attributes present in cognitions, such as knowledge-ness etc., are capable of classifying knowledge (into such categories), neither the cognition by itself, nor an attribute present in it, can be an upalakshyatAvacChedaka, a basis for it to be qualified by a non-existent qualifier, and therefore an object, not present in some form at the time of the cognition, cannot serve to be an upalakshaNa of the cognition.
ननु - विशेषणत्वमप्यसंभवि अनागतज्ञानजन्ये तत्कालाविद्यमानस्य विषयस्य पूर्वभावित्वरूपजनकत्वासंभवात् - इति चेन्न;
If it is said that - Objects cannot be qualifiers of cognitions, because in the case of cognitions of the future, as their objects have not come into existence yet, it is incorrect to hold that a future object leads to a current cognition - No.
स्वव्यापरजन्ये व्यापारिणोऽसतो जनकत्ववत् स्वज्ञानजन्येऽप्यसतो जनकत्वसंभवात्,
Just like a vedic sacrifice (vyApAriNa) that has already been completed and is no longer existent, is held to be the cause of a particular result (even after a length of time, possibly even years afterwards), through the medium of the adRShTa generated by it, even a non-existent object can lead to its cognition.
अतीतानागतावस्थस्यासत्त्वधर्माश्रयत्वेनैवाभ्युपगमात्, For, in nyAya, it is accepted that the past and future states of objects can be the loci of the attributes of absence. The future pot is held to be the counterpositive of its prior absence (prAgabhAva), the destroyed pot is held to be the counterpositive of the absence of destruction (dhvamsa).
अन्यथा ध्वंसप्रागभावप्रतियोगित्ववत् ज्ञानविषयत्वादीनामनाश्रयत्वापत्ते:, Otherwise, the objecthood (viShayatA) of the cognition of prior absence and the absence of destruction, will end up without a locus, because their objects are non-existing.
If the opponent accepts that a non existent sacrifice leads to heaven on the basis of vedic statements (svargakAmo yajeta), but otherwise objects that the non existent cannot lead to effects, we say:
प्रमाणबलात् कारणत्वाभ्युपगमस्यात्रापि तुल्यत्वात् | (Just like in the case of vedic sacrifices being held to be the causes of results), there is a valid reason that establishes causation here too (i.e the cognition of objects causing outcomes, as opposed to cognitions alone).
किञ्च स्वरूपाबाध्यस्य विषयाबाध्यत्वदर्शनेन विषयबाधे स्वरूपबाधस्यावश्यकतया स्वप्नादिज्ञानं सदेवेत्यस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्, Moreover, when the cognitions themselves are not sublated, it has been observed that the objects of such cognitions are unsublated too. Therefore, it must be held that the sublation of objects leads to the sublation of their cognitions too. So, it cannot be said that dream cognitions are real when their objects are unreal.
अनादित्वस्य विषमव्याप्तस्योपाधित्वाच्च | Further, the one sided invariable concomitance (viShama vyApti) with beginninglessness is present as an upAdhi in such an inference of reality.
To explain: The opponent's inference is विमतं परमार्थसत् सप्रकाराबाध्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वात्.
The sAdhya of the opponent's inference is परमार्थसत्. There are six beginningless entities accepted in advaita: Brahman, ignorance, their relationship, jIva, Ishvara, and the difference between the two. Of these, ultimate reality is present in Brahman alone. Thus whatever is ultimately real is beginningless, but whatever is beginningless is not ultimately real. So the one-sided invariable concomitance with beginningless exists for परमार्थसत्, ultimate reality, the sAdhya of the opponent's inference.
The hetu of the opponent's inference is सप्रकाराबाध्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वात्. Brahman, which is beginning-less, despite being unsublatable, does not have utility. So whatever is beginningless is not unsublated by an attributive cognition and have utility. The world which is unsublated by an attributive cognition and have utility, is not beginningless. Thus there is no one-sided invariable concomitance between beginninglessness and सप्रकाराबाध्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वं, being unsublated by an attributive cognition and have utility, the hetu.
The definition of the defect upAdhi is साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वम् - that which is present invariably with the sAdhya, but not present invariably with the hetu. As explained, the one-sided invariable concomitance with beginninglessness satisfies that requirement for the opponent's inference and hence it is flawed.
नच - अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं प्रति परमार्थत्वस्य ब्रह्मणि प्रयोजकत्वेनावधारणादकारणककार्योत्पत्तिरूपविपक्षबाधक तर्केण हेतो: साध्यव्यापककतया तदव्यापकतयोपाधे: साध्याव्यापकत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue thus - As it is known that having utility implies absolute reality (like in Brahman), and because of the rebuttal reasoning that without a cause, an effect will not come into being, it follows that wherever the hetu (having utility) is present, the sAdhya (being ultimately real) is invariably present, and therefore if the upAdhi (one-sided concomitance with beginninglessness) is not present wherever the hetu is present, it follows that the upAdhi is not present wherever the sAdhya is present either. (Therefore as this does not fulfil the requirement of pervading the sAdhya, but not pervading the hetu, it is not an upAdhi at all.)
This stands refuted because:
प्रातिभासिकरज्जुसर्पादौ भयकम्पादिकार्यकारित्वदर्शनेन प्रातिभासिकसाधारणस्य तुच्छव्यावृत्तस्य प्रतीतिकालसत्त्वस्यैवार्थक्रियाकारित्वं प्रति प्रयोजकत्वात्, It has been observed that even apparently real objects such as the rope-snake can lead to effects such as fear, shivering etc. Thus, it follows that the object which is different from the absolutely unreal (tucCha), has in common with the apparently real, the nature of having utility as long as it appears to exist.
प्रातिभासिकस्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वानभ्युपगमे सप्रकाराबाध्येति हेतुविशेषेणवैयर्थ्यापत्ते:, If it is not admitted that the apparently real have utility, the qualifier "that which is unsublated by an attributive cognition" would be redundant in the hetu.
कस्मिन्नपि देशे कस्मिन्नपि काले केनापि पुरुषेणाबाध्यत्वं हि परमार्थसत्त्वम्; तदपेक्षया प्रतीतिकालसत्त्वस्य लघुत्वाच्च | That which is unsublated by anyone in any place in any time is that which is ultimately real. Compared to that, it is more parsimonious to hold that the world exists only for as long as its appearance.
किञ्च शुद्धस्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वाभावात् साधनविकलत्वम्, उपहितस्य पक्षनिक्षेपात् साध्यविकलत्वम् | Moreover, as pure Brahman (consciousness) does not have any utility, if the example (Brahman) referred to it, the hetu would not be present. If it instead referred to qualified (Brahman), the sAdhya of ultimate reality would not be present.
5th Alternative for hetu
आरोपितमिथ्यात्वकत्वादित्यपि न हेतु:, "Unreality being superimposed" cannot be a hetu either.
आरोपितत्वं प्रातिभासिकत्वं चेत्, प्रपञ्चे हेतोरसिद्धि: ; If being superimposed means being apparently real, then the hetu does not exist for the world.
तत्सिद्धे: पारमार्थिकसिद्ध्युत्तरकालीनत्वात् | If it is known, that is only after knowing ultimate reality.
व्यावहारिकत्वं चेत्, शुक्तिरूपादौ व्यभिचार:, If it (being superimposed) means having empirical reality, then that is absent for the shell silver.
उभयसाधारण्येऽप्ययमेव दोष: | If you say it is either, the same defects prevail.
6th Alternative for hetu
कल्पकरहितत्वादित्यपि न हेतु:, "Because they do not have a Creator" is also not a hetu.
असति व्यभिचारात् यथाश्रुतस्यासिद्धेश्च | The absolutely absent (asat) do not have a Creator either (but cannot be called real by any stretch). As it contradicts the veda-s which say the world was created by Brahman, the hetu is absent in the paksha, and therefore, taken literally, there is asiddhi.
The opponent argues:
ननु - नासिद्धि:, शुद्धं हि चैतन्यं न कल्पकम् ; अद्रष्टृत्वात्, नोपहितम् ; कल्पितत्वादेवान्यथानवस्थानात्, Surely there is no asiddhi. Pure Consciousness cannot be the Creator, because it is not the seer (and the vedic statements on creation start off with statements such as "He saw"). Nor is Brahman with limiting adjuncts the Creator, because according to the advaitin, such a Brahman is also unreal, and thus this will lead to infinite regress.
तथाच यावद्विशेषाभावे कल्पकसामान्याभावसिद्धि:
Thus in the absence of any qualifiers for Brahman, it follows that there is no Creator of the world.
The siddhikAra responds:
- इति चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
शुद्धस्याप्यनाद्यविद्योपधानवशेन कलपकत्वोपपत्ते: | It is Pure Consciousness that creates the world, using the limiting adjunct of ignorance.
कल्पकत्वं हि कल्पनां प्रत्याश्रयत्वं, विषयत्वं, भासकत्वं वा | Being a Creator can mean either: being the locus of creation, being the object of creation, or revealing creation.
तच्च सर्वं कल्पनासमसत्ताकत्वेन शुद्धत्वाव्याघातकम् | As all of these are of the same order of reality as the creation itself, there is no harm to purity of consciousness.
तदुक्तं संक्षेपशारिरिके - 'आश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी निर्विभागचितिरेव केवला | पूर्वसिद्धतमसो हि पश्चिमो नाश्रयो भवति नापि गोचर: ||' इति | That is why it was said in the samkshepa shAririka: Both the locus and object of ignorance is Pure Consciousness itself. A darkness which presupposes (both the jIva or the Ishvara) cannot be located in them, which logically follow from it.
अस्तु वोपहितस्य कल्पकत्वम्, नचानवस्था; अविद्याध्यासस्याध्यासान्तरानपेक्षत्वात्, स्वपरसाधारणसर्वनिर्वाहकत्वोपपत्ते:, Even if Brahman with limiting adjuncts is postulated as the Creator, there is no infinite regress because, the superimposition of ignorance on Brahman does not presuppose any other superimposition. It is able to achieve the superimposition of itself and other things just by itself.
अकल्पितस्य कल्पकत्वादर्शनाच्च कल्पितप्रतिबिम्बविशिष्टादर्शादेरादर्शान्तरे प्रतिबिम्बकल्पकत्वदर्शनाच्च, For the superimposition of something by a non-superimposed entity has not been observed anywhere. It is only a mirror containing a superimposed reflection that is able to reflect that onto other mirrors. If the original mirror had no reflection in it, what would be reflected on to other mirrors?
It may be argued that it is the original that is reflected in the second mirror, but
बिम्बस्य द्वितीयादर्शसंमुखत्वाभावेन तत्र कल्पकत्वायोगात् ; अन्यथा अतिप्रसङ्गात् | where the original is not front of the second mirror, the original cannot be held to be the Creator of the superimposition. Otherwise, even an object not in front of a mirror will be capable of being reflected, which would be inappropriate.
विस्तरेण चैतदग्रे वक्ष्याम: | This will be elaborately examined later.
तदेवं निराकृता: परमार्थसत्त्वे साध्ये षडमी हेतव: | Thus, the six hetu-s to establish the absolute reality of the world have been refuted.
एवमन्येऽपि निराकार्या: | Similarly, others may be refuted.
Until now the hetu-s were varied while keeping the paksha and sAdhya the same. Now different inferences will be taken up where those elements will be varied as well.
Inference # 2
अथ - विमतं, न सद्विलक्षणम्, असद्विलक्षणत्वादात्मवदिति अनुमानान्तरं भविष्यतीति - मतम् | तन्न; Now, if this is offered as an alternative inference - The world is not different from the existent, because it is different from the non-existent, like the self - no.
प्रातिभासिके शुक्तिरूप्यादौ व्यभिचारात् | Because that inference fails in the case of apparently real entities such as shell-silver.
नच - तत्रासद्विलक्षणत्वहेतुरेव नास्तीति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued that the hetu - "being different from the non-existent" - is absent in shell silver.
असद्विलक्षणत्वाभावे हि अपरोक्षतया प्रतीतिरेव न स्यात् | If "being different from non-existent" was absent (in shell-silver), it would not be directly seen.
ननु - तर्ह्यसद्विलक्षणत्वे तद्विरुद्धसद्विलक्षणत्वायोगः। तथाच साध्यस्यापि विद्यमानत्वात् - इति चेन्न; If it is so argued - if it is different from the non-existent, then it is not appropriate for it to be different from the existent, and so the sAdhya is present - no.
सत्त्वे सर्वजनसिद्धबाधविरोधात्, If it was real, then it would not be sublatable by everyone.
गजादौ गोवैलक्षण्येऽपि तद्विरुद्धाश्ववैलक्षण्ययोगवत् सद्वैलक्षण्येऽप्यसद्वैलक्षण्ययोगोपपत्ते: प्रथममिथ्यात्वनिरुक्तावुक्तत्वात् | Thus, even though an elephant is different from a cow, it can be said to be different to the horse as well. Similarly, even if something is different from the existent, it is possible for it to be different the non-existent too. This has already been said in the chapter on the first definition of mithyAtva.
Inference # 3
ननु - विमतं, न चैतन्याज्ञानकार्यम्, न तत्कार्यधीविषय:, न तत्कार्यसत्त्ववत्, न तज्ज्ञानबाध्यसत्त्ववद्वा, तस्मिन्नपरोक्षेऽप्यनिषेध्यत्वेन साक्षाद्भासमानत्वात्, यदेवं तदेवम्, यथा घटे अपरोक्षेऽप्यनिषेध्यत्वेन साक्षाद्भासमान: पटो न घटाज्ञानकार्यादि:,
The opponent says - The world
sAdhya - a) is not a product of the ignorance of consciousness, or b) is not the object of a cognition of its products, or c) does not contain the existence that is present in its products, or d) does not contain the existence that is present in those objects that are sublated by its cognition.
hetu - because when it is perceived in that, it appears as unsublated.
For whatever appears thus, is so (real). The cloth that appears to be inside a pot, appears unsublated, and is not a product of the ignorance of the pot, etc.
विपक्षे च तदापरोक्ष्ये तदज्ञानव्याहतिरेव बाधिका, Any opposition to this is refuted on the basis that when it is cognised directly, its ignorance is destroyed (so it must be real).
नचासिद्धि:, अधिष्ठानतया सुखादिसाक्षित्वेन तदानीमपि चैतन्यापरोक्ष्यात् Nor can it be held that there is asiddhi (the world does not appear unsublated in consciousness), because as consciousness is the substratum and witness of happiness etc, even when happiness is seen in its locus, consciousness is directly cognised as the inner witness (but that does not sublate the happiness that is observed).
The siddhikAra says:
- इति चेन्न; No.
सामान्याकारेणापरोक्ष्येऽपि शुक्त्यादौ रजतादेरनिषेध्यत्वेन साक्षाद्भासमानतया तत्र व्यभिचारात् |
This inference fails here - Even if it is directly perceived in a generic manner, for so long as it has not been perceived as a shell, the silver continues to directly appear as unsublated.
अथ व्यावृत्ताकारेण यस्मिन् भासमाने यदनिषेध्यत्वेन साक्षात् भासते, तन्न तदज्ञानकार्यादीति व्याप्तिरिति मन्यसे, तर्ह्यसिद्धिः। Now, if you think that if an object is perceived with its specific distinguishing characteristics in a particular locus and directly appears to be unsublated there, it cannot be the product of the ignorance of that locus, such a concomitance is not proven.
नहि चैतन्यमिदानीं भ्रमनिवर्तकत्वाभिमतव्यावृत्ताकारापरोक्षप्रतीतिविषय:, तथा सत्यधिष्ठानमेव न स्यात् | Consciousness is not presently the object of a direct cognition that reveals its distinguishing characteristics, considered to be one capable of removing the world illusion. If Consciousness was known thus, then it would not even be the substratum.
यदा तु वेदन्तवाक्यजन्यवृत्तौ व्यावृत्ताकारतया अपरोक्षं, तदा अनिषेध्यत्वेन प्रपञ्चे आपरोक्ष्यशङ्कापि नास्ति | However, when it is directly cognised with its distinguishing features through a thought born from vedAntic sentences, there can not even be a doubt that the world will be seen unsublated.
अत: प्रमाणजन्यासाधारणाकारभानस्यैव अज्ञानविरोधित्वान्नापरोक्षतामात्रेणाज्ञानपराहतिप्रसङ्ग: | Therefore, as its opposition to ignorance only arises for its particular appearance in a cognition that is born through a valid means of knowledge, Consciousness cannot be required to remove ignorance merely through a generic direct perception.
यत्त्वज्ञानपदेन ज्ञानाभावोक्तौ सिद्धसाधनम्; अनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानोक्तौ च तस्य खपुष्पायमाणत्वेन प्रतियोग्यप्रसिद्धिरिति | तत्तुच्छम्; If it is said - if by the word ignorance (in the above statement), the absence of knowledge is meant, then that is stating the obvious. If by it, an inexpressible (as existent or non-existent) ignorance is meant, then like the sky-flower, a completely unknown entity, it cannot be the counterpositive of absence - that is not a worthwhile argument.
असत्प्रतियोगिकाभावं स्वीकुर्वत: पराभ्युपगममात्रेणैव प्रतियोगिप्रसिद्धिसंभवात् | For someone who accepts that even an absolutely non-existent entity can be the counterpositive of absence (the dvaitin), it is possible to accept that something (inexpressible as existent or non-existent) can be the counterpositive of absence, on the basis of an opponent recognising such an entity.
Inference # 4
ननु - विमतं, नात्मन्यध्यस्तम्; आत्मसाक्षात्कारवत् प्रवृत्तिविषयत्वात्, यदेवं तदेवम्, यथा घटसाक्षात्कारवत्प्रवृत्तिविषयो पटो न तत्राध्यस्त:,
The world is not superimposed on the Self, because even those who have clearly cognised the Self transact with it - whatever is thus, will be like that. Someone who has cognised a pot does not transact with a cloth thinking it is superimposed on the pot.
न चासिद्धि:, ईश्वरजीवन्मुक्तयोरात्मसाक्षात्कारवतोरपि जगद्रक्षणभिक्षाटनादौ प्रवृत्ते:, Nor can it be argued that there is asiddhi (the hetu is not present in the paksha), ie because God, and those that have attained liberation while living, transact with the world - God, by sustaining the world, and the liberated ones keeping the body alive through seeking alms, etc.
शङ्खे अध्यस्तमपि पीतत्वं न शङ्खश्वेतत्वसाक्षात्कारवत्प्रवृत्तिविषय इति न तत्र व्यभिचार - No one who has seen that a conch is white, and that the yellowness seen in it is only illusory, will seek to remove the yellowness in the conch through physical means.
In response, the siddhikAra says:
- इति चेन्न; प्रतिबिम्बे व्यभिचारात् | No. The inference fails in the case of a reflection.
स हि मुखैक्यसाक्षात्कारवत्प्रवृत्तिविषयो मुखेऽध्यस्त: | People still transact with the reflection, despite knowing it is a superimposition, and that it is identical with the original.
तद्व्यतिरेकेणोपलभ्यमानत्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च | Being cognised as different from that (the substratum) is an upAdhi to the inference.
The person who has seen the pot knows that the pot and the cloth are different, whereas the world is not known to be different from Brahman.
Inference # 5
एवंच - विमतं, नेश्वरमायाकल्पितम्, तं प्रत्यपरोक्षत्वात्, यदेवं तदेवम्, यथा चैत्रं प्रत्यपरोक्षे घटो न चैत्रमायाकल्पित: ; विमतं, न जीवकल्पितम्, तस्मिन् सुषुप्तेऽप्यवस्थितत्वात्, आत्मवत्,
The world is not a creation of Ishvara's mAya, because it is an object of his direct perception, like the pot seen by Chaitra is not a creation of his mAya.
Similarly, the world is not creation of the jIva's mAya, because it continues to exist even when he is asleep, like the Self.
नचासिद्धि:, प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्; अदृष्टादेरभावे पुनरुत्थानायोगाच्च - There is no asiddhi here, because of the recognition (of the world after waking up). If unseen factors (such as the results of karma) were absent, he would not have woken up.
The siddhikAra says:
- इत्यपि निरस्तम् ; आद्ये ऐन्द्रजालिकं प्रत्यपरोक्षे तन्मायाकल्पिते व्यभिचारात्, मायाविद्ययोरभेदेन देहात्मैक्यभ्रमे व्यभिचाराच्च | That also stands refuted. The first inference fails in the case of a magician who perceives his own illusion, which is his creation. Further, as mAya and ignorance are identical, the inference fails in the case of the illusion of the body as the self.
द्वितीये त्वसिद्धे: | The second inference fails because of asiddhi.
नच प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रपञ्चस्य स्थायित्वसिद्धेर्नासिद्धि: , सुषुप्तिकालस्थायित्वासाधकत्वस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञाया दृष्टिसृष्टिसमर्थने वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्, अदृष्टादे: कारणात्मनाऽवस्थितत्वेन पुनरुत्थानसंभवाच्च | Nor can it be argued that the recognition of the world upon waking up proves its continued existence in deep sleep. In the chapter on dRShTi sRShTi, it will be established that recognition does not imply the continued existence of the world in deep sleep. In the case of unseen causal factors (adRShTa), they are held to exist in their causal state, so there is no impossibility of waking up.
मिथ्यात्वं आत्मान्यसर्ववृत्ति न, मिथ्यामात्रवृत्तित्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यत्ववत् - इत्यपि न; मिथ्यात्वन्यूनवृत्तित्वस्योपाधित्वात् |
"Unreality is not something that is present in everything other than the Self, because it only exists in unreal objects, like shell silver" - this too is refuted, because of the upAdhi of "belonging to a category smaller than unreal objects". Every shell-silver is an unreal object, but every unreal object is not shell-silver. However, wherever unreality is present, is unreal, and whatever is unreal has unreality.
मिथ्यात्वं च सदसद्विलक्षणत्वम्, सद्विलक्षणत्वमात्रं वा | The term "unreality" in the paksha can either mean the absence of existence and non-existence, or the absence of existence alone.
आद्ये सिद्धसाधनम्, तस्यात्मान्यसर्वमध्यपतितासद्वृत्तित्वाभावात् | If the former, that is stating the obvious, because we also agree that unreality is not present in everything other the Self (The absolutely non-existent are not unreal).
द्वितीये तु हेतौ मिथ्यापदस्य सदसद्वैलक्षण्यपरत्वे स्वरूपासिद्धि:, In the latter, if the term "mithyA" occurring in the hetu means "other than the existent and non-existent", there is svarUpAsiddhi. The hetu is not present in the paksha, which only means "absence of existence".
सद्वैलक्षण्यरूपे पक्षे तुच्छसाधारणे सदसद्विलक्षणेतरावृत्तित्वरूपहेतुत्वाभावात् | As the paksha is the "absence of existence", tucCha, is part of the paksha, but the hetu of being "only present in those that are other than the existent and non-existent" is absent there (hence svarUpAsiddhi).
तस्यापि सद्वैलक्षण्यमात्रपरत्वे संदिग्धानैकान्तिकता; If the meaning of the term "mithyA" in the hetu is also "being different from existence", there is the defect of a doubtful vyabhichAra.
साध्याभाववत्यात्मभेदे हेतुसन्देहात् | Because there is a doubt whether the hetu (being located in objects other than the existent) is present where the sAdhya is absent, in everything other that the Self.
अप्रयोजकत्वादिकं च पूर्वोक्तम् दूषणमनुवर्तत एव | The previously cited defects of not implying the sAdhya etc apply to this inference also.
आत्मा, परमार्थसदन्य:, पदार्थत्वादनात्मवत् | नच कल्पितात्मप्रतियोगिकभेदेनार्थान्तरम् ; कल्पितमिथ्यात्वेन मिथ्यात्वानुमानेऽपि सिद्धसाधनापत्तेरित्यपि न;
"The Self is an ultimately real entity, different from other ultimately real entities, because it too is a substance, like the non-Self. Nor can it be said that this does not prove the reality of the world, as such a difference with the Self is imaginary, because such a charge applies to the inference of unreality too - that too is proving something known only an imagined unreality to the world."
If so, no.
व्यावहरिकपदार्थमादाय सिद्धसाधने अतिप्रसङ्गाभावात्, अनानन्दत्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च | If the object having empirical reality is stating the obvious, that is not a defect. Further, bliss is an upAdhi.