paricCheda 1 - jaDatva hetUpapattih (part 2)
In the previous post, we had looked at the primary objections made by the opponent to the suitability of jaDatva as a hetu for mithyAtva. The meaning of jaDatva as jnAna bhinnatva - difference from jnAna was under discussion. jnAna was interpreted as artha upalakshita prakAsha - that is, in this context, jnAna is taken to mean pure illumination in the absence of objects.
This raises a question - is it possible for jnAna to exist independent of objects? Every form of knowledge that one typically encounters is "of something". Can there be knowing, without the known?
नच - अभावे सप्रतियोगित्ववदिच्छाज्ञानादिष्वपि सवषियकस्य स्वाभाविकत्वादिच्छायामिव ज्ञानेऽपि तस्य समानसत्ताकत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ;
The purvapakshi says - Absence is always in association with its counter-positive. Like absence, desires, etc. are naturally associated with objects. One always desires some thing. jnAna, like desire, must also therefore be necessarily associated with objects. If there is no object, there can be no jnAna too - thus they must necessarily have the same degree of reality.
The siddhikAra says - no. He says:
ज्ञानस्य हि सविषयत्वं विषयसंबन्ध:, स च न तात्त्विक:, किन्त्वाध्यासिक: ; वक्ष्यमाणरीत्या तात्त्विकसंबन्धस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्, The saviShayatvam of jnAna is its association with the viShaya, the object. That is not a real association, but an adhyAsa, a superimposition. We will go on to say that it is impossible to establish that any real association can exist between jnAna and viShaya (in the drik drishya nirUpaNa chapter).
अतो न तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वम् ; नहि शुक्तौ रूप्यं स्वाभाविकम् | Therefore, this association between jnAna and viShaya is not an intrinsic one. The relationship of the silver with the shell is not intrinsic to the shell. It is born out of error.
एवंच ज्ञानोपाधिकस्यैव सविषयत्वस्य इच्छादिष्वभ्युपगमात् नतरां तत्र तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वम् | The association of desires with objects is not intrinsic to desires, but born out of jnAna's upAdhi (the mind).
The pUrvapakshi responds - if association with objects is not intrinsic to jnAna, then desire too can exist even without objects, but that is never observed.
नचैवं - ज्ञानवत् विषयसंबन्धं विनापि कदाचिदिच्छाया: सत्त्वापत्तिरिति- वाच्यम् ;
If jnAna is not necessarily associated with objects, then desire too, like jnAna, can exist without having an association with objects.
The siddhikAra says - no.
There is a difference between jnAna and desire. Desire's association with objects is as a result of the mind, which is mutually interdependent with the world. Thus desires can never be separate from objects, being of the same order of reality as the mind which causes that association. The mutual interdependency of the mind and objects was previously highlighted by GaudapAda in the mANDUkya kArikas (3.31 and 3.32):
मनोदृश्यमिदं द्वैतं यत्किञ्चित्सचराचरम् ।
मनसो ह्यमनीभावे द्वैतं नैवोपलभ्यते ॥ ३१ ॥
आत्मसत्यानुबोधेन न सङ्कल्पयते यदा ।
अमनस्तां तदा याति ग्राह्याभावे तदग्रहम् ॥ ३२ ॥
The duality perceived in the world is only seen through the mind. In the absence of the world, the mind too ceases to be. However, this is not true for jnAna, consciousness.
Unlike desire, which is dependent on the mind, consciousness exists independently of the mind. It is of a higher order of reality compared to both the mind and objects. Thus even in their absence, jnAna continues to exist, but desire does not. The siddhikAra says:
सविषयत्वप्रयोजकोपाध्यपेक्षया अधिकसत्ताकत्वस्य तत्र प्रयोजकत्वात्, It is the higher order of reality of jnAna compared to the mind - saviShayatva prayojaka upAdhi, the upAdhi causing the association with objects - that allows jnAna to exist independently of objects;
इच्छायाश्च तत्समानसत्ताकत्वात् | however, as desires are of the same order of reality as the mind, they are always associated with objects.
The opponent makes another objection. He says:
नच - त्वया मोक्षावस्थायामात्मनो निर्विषयत्वाङ्गीकारात् आनन्दाप्रकाशे तदपुमर्थत्वं स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
If liberation in your view is the Atma unassociated with anything, there can be no experience of bliss in liberation. If so, such a liberation can be of no interest to humanity. Why would anyone desire such a liberation?
The siddhikAra says - do not argue thus. In our view,
तदा ह्यानन्द एव प्रकाशो नत्वानन्दस्य, प्रकाशत्वम् अर्थोपलक्षितप्रकाशत्वं वा तदास्त्येवेति न ज्ञानत्वहानिरित्युक्तम् |
Then, the illumination itself is bliss, it is not the illumination of bliss. In any case, whether as illumination, or objectless-experience, the existence of consciousness then cannot be denied. There is no destruction of jnAna and as such there can be no ajnAna in brahman. Thus jaDatva cannot exist in brahman, and the charge of vyabhichAra is unfounded.
Until now, the opponent had been arguing that jnAna cannot exist independently of objects. The next leg of the argument is that jnAna cannot exist independently of the knower, jnAtA.
He says:
ननु - तथापि ज्ञातुरभावात् तदा तन्न ज्ञानम् ; Even so, as there is no knower then (during moksha), it cannot be called jnAna.
नहि भोक्तृहीना भुजिक्रिया भवति, In the absence of the eater, there can be no action of eating.
नच अनादित्वेन क्रियारूपत्वाभावात् अनपेक्षत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue that as jnAna is beginningless, it is not a type of action requiring an actor (a knower).
The opponent argues that anAditvam or the beginningless of jnAna is no basis for ruling out the requirement for a knower. He takes some examples of beginningless entities and says that all of them require another associated entity.
अनादे: प्रागभावास्य प्रतियोगिनि, जातेर्व्यक्तौ जीवब्रह्मविभागस्य धर्मप्रतियोगिनो: अज्ञानस्य चाश्रयविषययो: ब्रह्मसत्तायाश्च कर्तर्यपेक्षादर्शनात्, अन्यथा 'अस्ति ब्रह्मे'त्यादौ कर्तरि लकारो न स्यात् |
1) अनादे: प्रागभावास्य प्रतियोगिनि, The prior absence of an object, prAgabhAva, has no beginning according to the nyAya school. However such a beginning-less prior-absence does have the requirement for a counterpositive, a pratiyogi (the object of the prAgabhAva).
2) जातेर्व्यक्तौ jAti, or species, is also beginningless. However, the species comprises of individuals within it. jAti is indicated by the vyakti, the individual. Therefore jAti requires the vyakti.
3) जीवब्रह्मविभागस्य धर्मप्रतियोगिनो: the difference between jIva and Ishvara, which is admitted as beginning-less by the advaitin, requires both the elements that are different.
4) अज्ञानस्य चाश्रयविषययो: Similarly, ajnAna or nescience is also admitted as beginning-less, but it too requires a locus and object
5) ब्रह्मसत्तायाश्च कर्तर्यपेक्षादर्शनात्, अन्यथा 'अस्ति ब्रह्मे'त्यादौ कर्तरि लकारो न स्यात् | Brahman is beginningless, however it too requires a kartA, an agent. Otherwise, the usage of "अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेत्वेद" ("Brahman exists" - He who knows thus) in the veda, which employs the present tense to indicate agency, would not be possible.
This is a grammatical observation by the opponent. The word 'अस्ति' is a form of the root भू with the suffix तिप् in लट् लकार, present tense. The usage of लकार (tense) is governed by the sUtra ल: कर्मणि च भावे च अकर्मकेभ्य: which by implication says that presence of लकार in a सकर्मक धातु indicates kartA or karma. The opponent's argument is that the usage of लकार in 'अस्ति ब्रह्म' implies the presence of an agent.
Thus, in the opponent's view, it is evident that the presence of an agent, a knower is required even for beginning-less entities. Thus anAditva cannot be cited as a reason to avoid the requirement of a knower for the jnAna.
It may be argued that Ishvara's knowledge does not have expectation of things in current existence.
एवंचातीतादिज्ञानस्य ईश्वरज्ञानस्य च उत्पत्त्यर्थमर्थानपेक्षत्वेऽपि तन्निरूप्यत्वदर्शनेन ज्ञानस्य ज्ञातृज्ञेयनिरूप्यत्वं स्वभाव:, Moreover, even though the knowledge of things in the past etc., or Ishvara's knowledge does not expect things to be present currently, the existence of knowledge can only be established with a knower and the known.
In Indian epistemology, unlike pratyaksha (direct perception), knowledge of things in the past or the future, or Ishvara's knowledge of things is not born from the contact of the sensory organs with objects. However, even with such knowledge, there is an expectation that the knowledge is "of something" and known "by someone".
If such a concomitance did not exist,
अन्यथा 'इदमहं जानामी'त्यनुभवो न स्यात्, Experiences such as "I know this" would not be possible.
The vivaraNakAra also agrees with this.
'ज्ञातुरर्थप्रकाशस्य ज्ञानत्वा'दिति विवरणविरोधश्च स्यात् In defining jnAnatva, knowing, the vivaraNa AchArya has said the illumination of the object for the knower is knowledge.
Thus to argue that jnAna requires no knower is contradictory to experience and your own AchArya. This is a pretty powerful argument by the opponent.
The siddhikAra says in reply:
- इति चेन्न ; if this is the argument, no.
To be continued.
Originally posted on 1st February 2018
This raises a question - is it possible for jnAna to exist independent of objects? Every form of knowledge that one typically encounters is "of something". Can there be knowing, without the known?
नच - अभावे सप्रतियोगित्ववदिच्छाज्ञानादिष्वपि सवषियकस्य स्वाभाविकत्वादिच्छायामिव ज्ञानेऽपि तस्य समानसत्ताकत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ;
The purvapakshi says - Absence is always in association with its counter-positive. Like absence, desires, etc. are naturally associated with objects. One always desires some thing. jnAna, like desire, must also therefore be necessarily associated with objects. If there is no object, there can be no jnAna too - thus they must necessarily have the same degree of reality.
The siddhikAra says - no. He says:
ज्ञानस्य हि सविषयत्वं विषयसंबन्ध:, स च न तात्त्विक:, किन्त्वाध्यासिक: ; वक्ष्यमाणरीत्या तात्त्विकसंबन्धस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्, The saviShayatvam of jnAna is its association with the viShaya, the object. That is not a real association, but an adhyAsa, a superimposition. We will go on to say that it is impossible to establish that any real association can exist between jnAna and viShaya (in the drik drishya nirUpaNa chapter).
अतो न तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वम् ; नहि शुक्तौ रूप्यं स्वाभाविकम् | Therefore, this association between jnAna and viShaya is not an intrinsic one. The relationship of the silver with the shell is not intrinsic to the shell. It is born out of error.
एवंच ज्ञानोपाधिकस्यैव सविषयत्वस्य इच्छादिष्वभ्युपगमात् नतरां तत्र तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वम् | The association of desires with objects is not intrinsic to desires, but born out of jnAna's upAdhi (the mind).
The pUrvapakshi responds - if association with objects is not intrinsic to jnAna, then desire too can exist even without objects, but that is never observed.
नचैवं - ज्ञानवत् विषयसंबन्धं विनापि कदाचिदिच्छाया: सत्त्वापत्तिरिति- वाच्यम् ;
If jnAna is not necessarily associated with objects, then desire too, like jnAna, can exist without having an association with objects.
The siddhikAra says - no.
There is a difference between jnAna and desire. Desire's association with objects is as a result of the mind, which is mutually interdependent with the world. Thus desires can never be separate from objects, being of the same order of reality as the mind which causes that association. The mutual interdependency of the mind and objects was previously highlighted by GaudapAda in the mANDUkya kArikas (3.31 and 3.32):
मनोदृश्यमिदं द्वैतं यत्किञ्चित्सचराचरम् ।
मनसो ह्यमनीभावे द्वैतं नैवोपलभ्यते ॥ ३१ ॥
आत्मसत्यानुबोधेन न सङ्कल्पयते यदा ।
अमनस्तां तदा याति ग्राह्याभावे तदग्रहम् ॥ ३२ ॥
The duality perceived in the world is only seen through the mind. In the absence of the world, the mind too ceases to be. However, this is not true for jnAna, consciousness.
Unlike desire, which is dependent on the mind, consciousness exists independently of the mind. It is of a higher order of reality compared to both the mind and objects. Thus even in their absence, jnAna continues to exist, but desire does not. The siddhikAra says:
सविषयत्वप्रयोजकोपाध्यपेक्षया अधिकसत्ताकत्वस्य तत्र प्रयोजकत्वात्, It is the higher order of reality of jnAna compared to the mind - saviShayatva prayojaka upAdhi, the upAdhi causing the association with objects - that allows jnAna to exist independently of objects;
इच्छायाश्च तत्समानसत्ताकत्वात् | however, as desires are of the same order of reality as the mind, they are always associated with objects.
The opponent makes another objection. He says:
नच - त्वया मोक्षावस्थायामात्मनो निर्विषयत्वाङ्गीकारात् आनन्दाप्रकाशे तदपुमर्थत्वं स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
If liberation in your view is the Atma unassociated with anything, there can be no experience of bliss in liberation. If so, such a liberation can be of no interest to humanity. Why would anyone desire such a liberation?
The siddhikAra says - do not argue thus. In our view,
तदा ह्यानन्द एव प्रकाशो नत्वानन्दस्य, प्रकाशत्वम् अर्थोपलक्षितप्रकाशत्वं वा तदास्त्येवेति न ज्ञानत्वहानिरित्युक्तम् |
Then, the illumination itself is bliss, it is not the illumination of bliss. In any case, whether as illumination, or objectless-experience, the existence of consciousness then cannot be denied. There is no destruction of jnAna and as such there can be no ajnAna in brahman. Thus jaDatva cannot exist in brahman, and the charge of vyabhichAra is unfounded.
Until now, the opponent had been arguing that jnAna cannot exist independently of objects. The next leg of the argument is that jnAna cannot exist independently of the knower, jnAtA.
He says:
ननु - तथापि ज्ञातुरभावात् तदा तन्न ज्ञानम् ; Even so, as there is no knower then (during moksha), it cannot be called jnAna.
नहि भोक्तृहीना भुजिक्रिया भवति, In the absence of the eater, there can be no action of eating.
नच अनादित्वेन क्रियारूपत्वाभावात् अनपेक्षत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue that as jnAna is beginningless, it is not a type of action requiring an actor (a knower).
The opponent argues that anAditvam or the beginningless of jnAna is no basis for ruling out the requirement for a knower. He takes some examples of beginningless entities and says that all of them require another associated entity.
अनादे: प्रागभावास्य प्रतियोगिनि, जातेर्व्यक्तौ जीवब्रह्मविभागस्य धर्मप्रतियोगिनो: अज्ञानस्य चाश्रयविषययो: ब्रह्मसत्तायाश्च कर्तर्यपेक्षादर्शनात्, अन्यथा 'अस्ति ब्रह्मे'त्यादौ कर्तरि लकारो न स्यात् |
1) अनादे: प्रागभावास्य प्रतियोगिनि, The prior absence of an object, prAgabhAva, has no beginning according to the nyAya school. However such a beginning-less prior-absence does have the requirement for a counterpositive, a pratiyogi (the object of the prAgabhAva).
2) जातेर्व्यक्तौ jAti, or species, is also beginningless. However, the species comprises of individuals within it. jAti is indicated by the vyakti, the individual. Therefore jAti requires the vyakti.
3) जीवब्रह्मविभागस्य धर्मप्रतियोगिनो: the difference between jIva and Ishvara, which is admitted as beginning-less by the advaitin, requires both the elements that are different.
4) अज्ञानस्य चाश्रयविषययो: Similarly, ajnAna or nescience is also admitted as beginning-less, but it too requires a locus and object
5) ब्रह्मसत्तायाश्च कर्तर्यपेक्षादर्शनात्, अन्यथा 'अस्ति ब्रह्मे'त्यादौ कर्तरि लकारो न स्यात् | Brahman is beginningless, however it too requires a kartA, an agent. Otherwise, the usage of "अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेत्वेद" ("Brahman exists" - He who knows thus) in the veda, which employs the present tense to indicate agency, would not be possible.
This is a grammatical observation by the opponent. The word 'अस्ति' is a form of the root भू with the suffix तिप् in लट् लकार, present tense. The usage of लकार (tense) is governed by the sUtra ल: कर्मणि च भावे च अकर्मकेभ्य: which by implication says that presence of लकार in a सकर्मक धातु indicates kartA or karma. The opponent's argument is that the usage of लकार in 'अस्ति ब्रह्म' implies the presence of an agent.
Thus, in the opponent's view, it is evident that the presence of an agent, a knower is required even for beginning-less entities. Thus anAditva cannot be cited as a reason to avoid the requirement of a knower for the jnAna.
It may be argued that Ishvara's knowledge does not have expectation of things in current existence.
एवंचातीतादिज्ञानस्य ईश्वरज्ञानस्य च उत्पत्त्यर्थमर्थानपेक्षत्वेऽपि तन्निरूप्यत्वदर्शनेन ज्ञानस्य ज्ञातृज्ञेयनिरूप्यत्वं स्वभाव:, Moreover, even though the knowledge of things in the past etc., or Ishvara's knowledge does not expect things to be present currently, the existence of knowledge can only be established with a knower and the known.
In Indian epistemology, unlike pratyaksha (direct perception), knowledge of things in the past or the future, or Ishvara's knowledge of things is not born from the contact of the sensory organs with objects. However, even with such knowledge, there is an expectation that the knowledge is "of something" and known "by someone".
If such a concomitance did not exist,
अन्यथा 'इदमहं जानामी'त्यनुभवो न स्यात्, Experiences such as "I know this" would not be possible.
The vivaraNakAra also agrees with this.
'ज्ञातुरर्थप्रकाशस्य ज्ञानत्वा'दिति विवरणविरोधश्च स्यात् In defining jnAnatva, knowing, the vivaraNa AchArya has said the illumination of the object for the knower is knowledge.
Thus to argue that jnAna requires no knower is contradictory to experience and your own AchArya. This is a pretty powerful argument by the opponent.
The siddhikAra says in reply:
- इति चेन्न ; if this is the argument, no.
To be continued.
Originally posted on 1st February 2018