paricCheda 1 - dRgdRshya sambandha bhanga: (part 1)
अथ दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धभङ्ग: |
The next chapter in the advaita siddhi is the commencement of the anukUla tarka, or supportive logic to the inference of the world's reality. In any anumAna (inference), the opponent can insinuate aprayojaka shaNkA / vyabhichAra - हेतु अस्तु साध्यं मास्तु, that is, he can allege that the presence of the hetu does not necessarily imply that the sAdhya is present. To refute such a charge, one needs to provide some supporting logic to strengthen the inferential reasoning.
For example, in the inference of fire in the mountain, the hetu or reason is dhUmavatvAt, because there is smoke in the mountain. The opponent may argue that smoke does not necessarily imply fire. To this, the anukUla tarka, or supportive reasoning given is the cause-effect relationship between fire and smoke. If smoke did not imply fire, it would mean that such a cause-effect relationship is invalidated.
In the inference of the mithyAtva of the world, the hetu or reason is dRshyatvAt, knowability - The world is mithyA, because it is knowable. The opponent alleges that knowability need not imply the world's mithyAtva. The anukUla tarka or supportive reasoning given by the advaitin in this chapter is that there is no real relationship possible between the seer and the seen (objects) - despite this, the world is cognised. Therefore, it follows that there is an AdhyAsika sambandha, an unreal relationship between the seer and the world. Therefore, the world too is unreal.
This is the reasoning provided by ChitsukhAchArya and AnandabodhAchArya - dRgdRshya sambandhAnupapatti - the impossibility of a relationship between dRk (the knower) and dRshya (the known).
The methodology adopted in this chapter is pArisheSha nyAya - review all possible alternatives for a real relationship between cognition and the world, refuting all such alternatives and concluding by saying that if no real relationship is possible, it must follow that there is an unreal relationship between the two.
The pUrvapakshi says
ननु - मिथ्यात्वानुमानमप्रयोजकं, सत्यत्वेऽपि दृश्यत्वोपपत्तेरिति - The inference of the world's mithyAtva does not prove its objective (because there is no supporting reasoning for it). Even if the world was real, it would be possible to cognise it.
The siddhikAra responds
चेन्न; दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धानुपपत्ते: | No. Because no real relationship is possible between the seer and the seen.
नहि ज्ञानं ज्ञेयासंबद्धमेव प्रकाशकम् ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् | jnAna does not reveal an object without being connected / associated with the object. If it did, it would be atiprasanga - any cognition can reveal any object. I can study English and gain an understanding of French.
नापि संबद्धम् ; Nor can jnAna have a (real) connection with objects.
The word jnAna in the advaitin's parlance applies to both consciousness and cognition.
आत्मस्वरूपस्य तद्गुणस्य वा ज्ञानस्य ज्ञॆयेन संयोगसमवययोरभावात्, jnAna, whether it means the Self (ie consciousness), or whether it means an attribute of the Self (according to nyAya) can neither be in a samyoga relationship or samavAya relationship with objects.
It cannot be in a samyoga with objects - if jnAna is the Self, the Self is not in contact with anything. If it refers to an attribute of the Self, samyoga in nyAya can only be between two dravya-s, substances. It cannot be between an attribute and a substance. So if jnAna is an attribute of the self, it cannot have a samyoga with anything.
It cannot be in a samavAya with objects. In nyAya, jnAna is in a samavAya relationship with the Atma, not with other objects. Further, samavAya is a permanent relationship with objects. If jnAna had a samavAya relationship with other objects, it would imply that the objects are forever cognised, which is not supported by experience.
अन्यस्य चानाध्यासिकस्य संबन्धस्याभावात् | There is no other relationship between the two, other than an unreal one.
The opponent may argue that things are the objects of knowledge - thus things and knowledge share a subject-object relationship. The siddhikAra denies that also.
नच विषयविषयिभाव: स:, it cannot have a subject-object relation either.
विषयित्वविषयत्वरूपस्य एकैकमात्रनिष्ठत्वेन द्विनिष्ठसंबन्धात्मकत्वासंभवात्, दुर्निरूपत्वाच्च | A relationship which by definition must exist in two entities, cannot be of the nature of subject-object, because the nature of a subject and nature of object are located in only entity - either the subject or the object. It is difficult to define such a relationship as well.
To explain, the attribute of being a subject is only located in the subject and the attribute of being an object is located only in the object. Therefore, a relationship which always exists in both the related entities cannot be of the nature of subject-object.
Further, it is impossible to prove establish what constitutes viShayatva (being an object) or viShayitva (being a subject). How did the pot suddenly become a viShaya? What is this new factor called viShayatva that the pot obtains due to jnAna?
तथा हि - 1) विषयत्वं किं ज्ञानजन्यफलाधारत्वं, As the bhATTa mImAmsaka-s say, does viShayatva mean being the locus of a result that accrues to the object as a result of a cognition?
The bhATTa-s call this by various names - prAcakyam, jnAtatA, etc. Can viShayatva mean being the basis, the reason why an object becomes known by a cognition?
2) किंवा ज्ञानजन्यहानादिबुद्धिगोचरत्वं,
Or else is it (as according to some), that which leads to a notion of avoiding etc, as a result of being cognised? It is said that when an object is known, it can lead to three outcomes. The knower can think that:
a) the object is grAhyam, to be obtained; or
b) it is tyAjyam, to be avoided; or
c) udAsInam, something to be indifferent about.
Is viShayatva that which leads to a thought that the object should be obtained, avoided, or be indifferent towards?
3) उत ज्ञानकर्मत्वम्
Or is viShayatva the karmatva (object-caseness) of jnAna?
In Sanskrit grammar, certain verbs are akarmaka - do not have an object, while others are sakarmaka - have an object. For example, the verb tiShThati (sit) is akarmaka - the action sitting does not have an object (the question, what do you sit?, is a nonsensical one). The verb bhunkte (eat), on the other hand, is sakarmaka - one eats something.
Thus, is viShayatvam the karmatva of the jnAna, the object case-ness? Just as action and its object have karma kArakatva sambandha, do jnAna and viShaya have karma kArakatva sambandha?
4) ज्ञानाकारार्पकत्वं वा,
or is viShayatvam that which causes the thought to take on the shape of the object?
Some school of buddhists (yogAchAra) say that a cognition taking a particular shape is erroneously considered as an external object. One sub-school says that no objects exist, while another says external objects do exist. However, they all agree that a thought pattern of an object is necessary for cognition. Therefore, is viShayatvam that which causes the thought to take the shape of the object?
There is a problem with this definition - one cannot say that only the object is required for the thought to take the shape of the object - there are other things required. For example, one needs eyes to see the object etc. If we say that the thing which causes the jnAna to take that shape is the viShaya of the jnAna, then even the eyes will also end up as the viShaya of jnAna. That is not true however. To correct this, it is said:
5) दृश्यमानत्वे सति तत्त्वं वा, or, that which causes the thought to take the shape of the object, while being itself perceivable is viShayatva?
6) ज्ञानजन्यव्यवहारयोग्यत्वं वा, or, is viShayatva being capable of being an object of vyavahAra (activity) that is a result of jnAna?
7) सन्निकृष्टकरणेन यज्ज्ञानमुत्पाद्यते तत्त्वं वा, or is viShayatvam the characteristic of the object that gives rise to a cognition as a result of the sense organs coming into contact with the object?
For a pot to be perceived by the eyes, it is necessary for a prior relation between the eyes and the pot. Thus we can say viShayatva is that which is a result of a sense organ's relation with an object, which leads to the object being revealed by the jnAna. That is, the object comes to have a connection with a sense organ, as a result of which it becomes revealed by a cognition, and becomes the viShaya of the jnAna. The characteristic of that object is viShayatva.
8) यस्यां संविदि योऽर्थोऽवभासते स तस्या विषय:, तथाच संविदि भासमानत्वमिति वा, or the object which is illumined in a particular cognition is the object of the cognition. viShayatva is the characteristic of the object being illumined in cognition.
This is a definition found in the prAbhAkAra work - prakaraNa panchikA (by shAlinAtha miSra).
9) संबन्धान्तरमन्तरा ज्ञानावच्छेदकत्वं वा | or viShayatva is that qualifier of a cognition which does not depend on any other relationship. To explain, that which differentiates one cognition from the other (pot cognition from a tree cognition for example), without resorting to any other relationship is the viShayatva. A pot differentiates a pot cognition from a tree cognition without requiring any other relationship between the pot and the cognition.
Nine alternative definitions to viShayatva were proposed. The siddhikAra proceeds to refute them sequentially.
1) आद्ये फलं न तावत् ज्ञातता, In the first, one cannot say that jnAtata, becoming known, is a result of the jnAna.
According to bhATTa mImAmsa, cognition is beyond sensory perception. However, when an object becomes known, it allows us to infer the presence of cognition. A seer when asked 'What do you see?', will reply 'a pot', and not 'cognition of pot'.
अनङ्गीकारात्; advaitin-s do not accept that a new attribute called jnAtatA enters the object when it becomes known. According to us, the removal of ignorance is jnAtatA, and not something new that is created due to knowledge.
अतीतादावभावाच्च | Even if such an attribute was accepted, it does not exist in remote cognitions of past objects, etc.
The object of memory need not exist in the present, for example the memory of a pot seen in the past. When that memory is recalled now, one cannot insist that a new attribute called jnAtatA enters that past pot. However, the pot that is recalled is the object of the memory. Similarly, the cognition of future objects does not create this new attribute in those objects.
But can anything other than jnAtatA be the result of knowledge? The siddhikAra says no.
2) नापि हानादि:, Neither can avoidance etc (or a wish to take up, or indifference) be a result of cognition.
गगनादौ तदभावात्, None of these three apply for the cognition of the sky, etc (even indifference does not apply)
कलधौतमलादेरपि तज्ज्ञानविषयत्व प्रसङ्गाच्च | If a person picks up a coin from the floor, which after picking up he realises is dirty. As he has picked up the dirt as well, the dirt would end up having viShayatva according to this definition, but the fact is that such a viShayatva is not a result of his cognition of the dirt to begin with.
नाप्यभिज्ञाभिलपने; Neither can referring to the object verbally (abhilapana) or identifying the object (abhijnA) be used to define the viShayatva of the object.
तयोर्ज्ञेयावृत्तित्वात् | Because, both of them are not located in the known object - The locus of verbal reference or identification is not the object, but the speaker/identifier. So how can the object get viShayatva?
नच - विषयविषयिभावेन ते तत्र स्त इति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued that those two (verbal reference / identification) exist in the object through a subject-object relation,
तस्यैव विचार्यमाणत्वात् | because that is the very thing that we are currently trying to define - what makes the object the object in a subject-object relation?
अत एव न द्वितीयोऽपि | Therefore, the second option is also not correct.
3) न तृतीय:, ईश्वरज्ञानस्यातीतादिज्ञानस्य च कर्मकारकाजन्यत्वेन निर्विषयत्व प्रसङ्गात् | The third definition is not correct. God's cognition, and the cognition of past objects etc is not born from the objective / accusative case (i.e. the cognition of an object is not a result of the object being a contributory factor to its cognition, as the object of the activity of cognition), and would end up having no objects.
A kAraka (case) is something which enables the kriyA, action to occur. Thus, it is one of the causes of action. There are different factors, like kartA (actor), karma (object), karaNa (instrument) etc., needed for an action to happen. Thus, the ultimate meaning of kAraka is being the cause for an action. In examining knowledge, we ask if the object of knowledge, as a contributory factor of knowledge, is always needed?
God's knowledge, for example, does not need a karma kAraka. It is an eternal knowledge, so it cannot have a cause. If it has no cause, it cannot have any contributing causal factors and therefore, no kAraka-s either.
Similarly for the cognition of past objects, the object is not physically present when the cognition arises. Thus, as the object is not present in the immediately previous instant of the cognition (अव्यवहित पूर्वक्षणं), it cannot be considered a cause of the cognition. This will mean that past objects cannot be called karma kAraka. Thus, this definition will make these
cognitions as objectless, which is incorrect.
4) न चतुर्थ:, it is not the fourth alternative either
ज्ञानतदाकारयोरभेदेन सर्वेषां ज्ञानहेतूनाम् विषयत्वापातात्, As thought and its pattern are identical, every cause of the thought, will end up being a cause of the thought pattern (light, sense organs, mind, Atma), and every cause of cognition will end up as the object of the cognition as well.
अनुमित्यादिविषये तदभावाच्च | Further, the object of inference etc will end up not meeting that definition. The object of the inference of fire in the mountain is fire, but fire is not the cause of the inference.
5) न पञ्चम:, दृश्यमानत्वस्य विषयत्वघटितत्वेनात्माश्रयात् | Neither is it the fifth alternative, because to say something is दृश्यमानं, ie revealable by cognition, is inextricably linked within the concept of being the object of knowledge, thus such a definition of viShayatvam is self-referential.
We are trying to determine what jnana viShayatvam is, ie what is the characteristic of an object that makes it revealed by jnAna. If you say that that factor is because it is revealable, you are not proving anything - the definition refers to itself.
6) न षष्ठ:, योग्यतायां योग्यतान्तराभावात् | Neither is it the sixth definition, because to know that something is capable of being an object of vyavahAra, one must know what that capability is beforehand - however, knowing that capability (ie for capability to be an object of knowledge), requires that capability be capable of being known, which requires another capability, and so on and so forth, ad infinitum, leading to infinite regress.
नच - योग्यता योग्यातां विनैव योग्या, यथा दृश्यत्वं दृश्यत्वान्तरं विनैव दृश्यमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be alleged that - capability does not need another capability to be capable, just like one knowability does not require another knowability in order to be knowable.
अवच्छेदकरूपापरिचये योग्यताया एव ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् | Because, without a determining factor, a means to know whether the object is capable of being an object of vyavahAra born out of its cognition, it is not possible to determine if the object is capable or not. There is a requirement for a yogyatAvacChedakam.
नच ज्ञानविषयत्वम् तदवच्छेदकम्; आत्माश्रयात् | One cannot say that being an object of knowledge is that determining factor, because that would be self-referential.
7) न सप्तम:, नित्येश्वरज्ञानस्य निर्विषयत्वप्रसङ्गात् | The seventh definition is also not correct, because God's cognition would end up object-less. As God's cognition is eternal, it cannot be a result of the object coming into contact with His sense organs.
8) नाष्टम:, संविदीति न तावदधिकरणसप्तमी:, ज्ञानस्य ज्ञॆयानधिकरणत्वात् | The eighth is also not correct. The seventh case-ending in the words "in cognition" does not imply that cognition is the locus of the object, because the cognition is inside the person and the object is somewhere outside - so the known cannot be located within knowledge.
नापि विषयसप्तमी ; तस्यैव निरूप्यमाणत्वात्, Nor can the phrase "in cognition" in the definition be used in the sense of meaning the object of cognition (viShaya saptami), because that is the very thing we are trying to define.
संविदो विषयत्वं संवेद्यस्य च विषयित्वमिति वैपरीत्यापाताच्च | Further, it (viShaya saptami) may lead to the eventuality that cognition is the object and the object is the subject.
नापि सति सप्तमी; भासमनत्वस्य विषयताघटितत्वेनात्माश्रयात् | It cannot be sati saptami (i.e., when cognition is present, that which is illumined) either, because the idea of illumination is inextricably linked with the idea of viShayatvam, thus one cannot talk of revealing / illumination prior to defining viShayatva, ending up becoming self-referential.
9) नापि नवम:, मत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्यत्र रूपज्ञानसमवायस्य संबन्धान्तरं विनैव रूपज्ञानावच्छेदकस्य 'इदं रूप'मिति ज्ञानेऽपि विषयत्वापातात् | Nor is it the ninth definition either - when someone says "I have the knowledge of colour", as the 'inherent relationship of colour in me' is also present as a qualifier in the cognition of colour without requiring any other relationship, it too would end up becoming the object of the cognition.
When someone sees an object, he says that object appears to me (mat samavetam) - this is said using nyAya terminology - There is a samavAya sambandha between me (Atma) and the cognition of colour. The object of the cognition of colour is colour, not the samavAya of the cognition of colour in me.
In nyAya, it is postulated that samavAya does not depend on any other sambandha to perform its function, because that will lead to infinite regress (if samavAya needed another samavAya, that would lead to another, that to another, and so on).
In the cognition in question, samavAya is between Atma and rUpajnAna - if it is not connected to both, then it cannot be a sambandha. Thus samavAya exists in rUpajnAna, but it does not require any other sambandha to be present there. Thus samavAya ends up as a qualifier of rUpajnAna without any other sambandha. If something that is present as a qualifier of jnAna without requiring any other sambandha is the viShaya or the object of the cognition, then, in the cognition "this is a colour", the 'samavAya of the cognition with me' will also end up as the object of the cognition.
Thus far, nine definitions of viShayatvam were considered and dismissed. The opponent takes a different tack. In pUrvamImAmsa, there is a rule that whatever a knowledgeable person, an abhiyukta, considers to be a mantra is taken as a mantra. A long discussion is conducted to consider other possible definitions of what constitutes a mantra, following which it is determined that none of them apply, and therefore, a mantra is simply something that a knowledgeable person deems to be a mantra. The opponent uses this to argue that the same approach be considered for viShayatvam also.
The pUrvapakshi argues -
ननु - ज्ञानविषय इत्यभियुक्तप्रयोग एव ज्ञानविषययो: संबन्ध:, Let the relationship between cognition and its object simply be what a knowledgeable person considers to be the object of knowledge.
यथा अभियुक्तस्य मन्त्र इति प्रयोगविषयत्वमेव मन्त्रलक्षणम्, similar to the definition of a mantra being that which a knowledgable considers to be a mantra.
न चान्योन्याश्रयः, Nor is this a case of mutual dependence in saying that something is considered to be an object of knowledge because a knowledgeable person says so, and a knowledgeable person says so because he considers it to be an object of knowledge.
पूर्वपूर्वप्रयोगमपेक्ष्योत्तरोत्तरप्रयोगादिति For what has been said by knowledgeable people in the past has been accepted as valid by those that follow them, which is considered as valid by their succeeding generations etc.
- चेन्न; To such an argument, the siddhikAra says no.
एतावता हि ज्ञेयत्वमात्रं सामान्यत: स्यात्, न त्वेतद्ज्ञानविषयत्वम् | With such a definition all that is established is that something is knowable, not the objectification of the thing by a particular cognition. We are not simply interested in saying that something can be known, but in examining what makes a thing the object of a particular cognition.
न चास्मिन् सादौ पूर्वप्रयोगमपेक्ष्य उत्तरोत्तरप्रयोगो वक्तुं शक्यते; तस्यानादिमात्रविश्रान्तत्वात् | For a usage that has a beginning at a particular point in time, it cannot be held that every current instance of the usage is on the basis of a prior usage, for such an explanation only works for cases which are beginning-less.
किञ्च प्रयोगोऽपि स्वविषये संबन्ध इत्यात्माश्रयोऽपि | Moreover, if we seek to define what constitutes usage, we end up with the meaning being the object of knowledge, which would up a self-referential definition.
The opponent says -
ननु - यद् ज्ञानं यदभिलपनरूपव्यवहारकारणम् स तस्य विषय:, The cognition of which thing results in the activity (vyavahAra) of the nature of verbally referring to it, that thing is the object of that cognition. If a person says 'this is a pot', then he must have had a cognition of a pot. The object of that pot-cognition is the pot.
करणपाटवाद्यभावेन व्यवहारानुदयेऽपि सहकारिविरहप्रयुक्तकार्याभाववत्त्वरूपं कारणत्वमस्त्येव, Even where the sense organ does not function (he may be mute / there is no one to talk to, etc.) and thus the activity (of speech) is absent, causation is not denied - as the absence of the effect on account of the absence of the enabling factors of the cause, does not imply the absence of the cause.
Causation may directly lead to a result sometimes (phalopahita kAraNam), but sometimes the effect does not arise even when the cause is present, because the enabling factors needed to produce the effect are absent, but one cannot deny that causative power of the cause. For example, the potter remains one of the causes of the pot, even when the pot is not created because of the absence of other necessary factors such as clay, etc.
नच निर्विकल्पकविषये अव्याप्ति: Nor can it be alleged that the definition does not apply in the case of indeterminate cognition.
According to nyAya, prior to the knowledge of a thing (determinate cognition or savikalpaka jnAna), there arises an indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka jnAna). Only after the nirvikalpaka jnAna arises can savikalapaka jnAna arise. In nyAya, every object has attributes. It is also held that prior to the knowledge of any qualified object (vishiShTa), it is necessary to have the knowledge of the qualifier (visheShaNa). That is, the cognition of the visheShaNa is a cause for the cognition of the vishiShTa. This is a general rule in nyAya.
For example, in the savikalpaka jnAna, "this is a pot", the pot is the object of the cognition. The pot is not just an attribute-less pot, but a pot qualified by pot-ness, thus it is a vishiShTa. The naiyyAyika says that if one needs to know that something is a pot, one needs to know what pot-ness is first. This knowledge of the visheShaNa is what the naiyyAyika refers to as nirvikalpaka jnAna, and says that this nirvikalpaka jnAna is a cause for the savikalpaka jnAna. There is another school of thought within nyAya that says that the visheShya also is cognised by a nirvikalpaka jnAna, but some naiyyAyika-s hold that only the visheShaNa is cognised by nirvikalpaka jnAna. In any case, nyAya holds that a nirvikalpaka jnAna precedes every savikalpaka jnAna.
No one is aware of the existence of such an indeterminate cognition, let alone speak about it. Thus, even though the nirvikalpaka jnAna has an object (the visheShaNa or the visheShya), under this definition it will end up object-less, thus the definition suffers from avyApti.
It must be noted that the naiyyAyika nirvikalpaka jnAna is different from the advaitin's nirvikalpaka jnAna. According to the advaitin, nirvikalpaka jnAna only refers to the akhaNDAkAra vRtti, the impartite cognition of Brahman.
तस्यानङ्गीकारात्, The opponent says, one cannot hold that the definition suffers from avyApti, because the dvaitin does not accept nirvikalpaka jnAna in the first place. He continues:
न च यत्तद्भ्यामाननुगमो दोष:, Nor can it be held that the usage of the words "which" (yat) and "that" (tat) in the definition means that it is not a universal definition that applies to all cognitions. That is, each cognition will have a separate definition for what constitutes its object (if I talk of pot, then the pot is the object of the pot-cognition which led me to talk of the pot. If I talk of a tree, then the tree is the object of the tree-cognition which led me to talk of the tree, etc.).
कस्य को विषय इति अननुगतस्यैव प्रश्नविषयत्वेन तस्यादोषत्वात्, it is not a defect of the definition that each cognition has its own object, and there is no one common object for all cognitions. Each cognition has its own object, so what is the defect in saying that there is a definition that applies to each cognition separately?
नच घटज्ञानान्तरम् प्रमादात् यत्र पट इति व्यवहारस्तत्र घटज्ञानस्य पटाभिलपनरूपव्यवहारजनकत्वेन पटविषयत्वापत्ति:, Nor can one argue that if someone erroneously says that there is a cloth present when in reality they have seen a pot, the cloth erroneously ends up as the object of the pot-cognition, merely by the activity of the talk of a cloth occurring as a result of the cognition of the pot.
समानविषयाभिलापं प्रत्येव ज्ञानस्य जनकतया भिन्नविषयतया तत्राजनकत्वादिति To say that the verbal activity is a result of cognition only holds good when the object of the cognition and what is talked about are the same. If one sees one thing and talks of something else, it cannot be held that the cognition led to the talk.
The siddhikAra replies
- चेन्न; if this is the argument, no.
This definition cannot be understood. One has to first know how a particular cognition will lead to someone speaking. Only after that can we say the object of the words is the object of the cognition.
What is the determining factor (kAraNatAvacChedaka dharma) for a cognition to have the capability to lead to a particular activity? This kAraNatAvacChedaka can only be known after a person speaks of it. Thus, it is impossible to claim that there is a common determining factor, avacChedaka dharma, existing in every cognition.
अभिलपनरूपव्यवहारजननयोग्यत्वं न प्रातिस्विकरूपेण निर्णेयम्; अवच्छेदकत्वस्य फलनिर्णेयत्वात् ; The capacity of a particular cognition to generate a particular verbal activity cannot be known from the cognitions themselves - that a cognition is capable of leading to that outcome can only be observed from the result of the cognition - the generated verbal activity.
प्रतिस्वं च फलादर्शनात्, अजनितफले प्रातिस्विकयोग्यतायां मानाभावात्, The result is not observed from each such cognition, and without a result, there is no basis to claim that that cognition had such a capacity.
किन्तु तत्र तत्रानुगततत्तद्वृत्तिविषयत्वेन | Rather, the cognition's capacity to produce a particular outcome (speaking about something) is because the cognition has its object as an inherent attribute.
The cognition of the pot leads talk of the pot. Thus, if you say that the objectification of the pot by pot-cognition is known by the pot-related verbal activity it leads to, then as we have demonstrated, that the pot-cognition has the capacity to lead to pot-related verbal activity is only determined when holding on to the fact that the pot is the object of pot-cognition. This is circular logic.
तथाच आत्माश्रय: | This is a case of AtmAshraya, self reference.
The nyAyAmritakAra had offered some corrections to the definition of objectification as that which confers object-caseness (jnAna karmatva) to the cognition. The siddhikAra responds to these corrections.
The nyAyAmritakAra's correction is cited verbatim first. The अतएव - निरस्तम् is siddhikAra's response to the nyAyAmritakAra.
अतएव - "ज्ञानकर्मत्वम् विषयत्वं, कर्मत्वं च न कारकविशेष:; येनातीतादौ तदभावो भवेत्, किन्तु क्रियाधीनव्यवहारयोग्यत्वरूपातिश्यवत्त्वम् ; अन्यथा घटं करोतीत्यादावसिद्धं घटादि न जनकं सिद्धं च न कृतिकर्मेति द्वितीयविभक्तिरनर्थिका स्यादिति" - निरस्तम् ;
By this, the following has been refuted -
"ज्ञानकर्मत्वम् विषयत्वं, कर्मत्वं च न कारकविशेष:; येनातीतादौ तदभावो भवेत्, किन्तु In defining viShayatva as jnAna karmatva, the word karmatva does not refer to a particular kind of case-ending (kAraka) which could have left it open to the charge that it would not apply to past objects etc.,
किन्तु क्रियाधीनव्यवहारयोग्यत्वरूपातिश्यवत्त्वम् Rather, karmatva refers to the the special characteristic of being capable of utility that accrues to an object as a result of an action (here action = cognising)
अन्यथा घटं करोतीत्यादौ असिद्धं घटादि न जनकं सिद्धं च न कृतिकर्मेति द्वितीयविभक्तिरनर्थिका स्यात् Otherwise, in sentences like "he creates a pot", one can claim that the accusative case-ending is redundant, citing arguments such as - is the object of that sentence an existent or a non-existent pot? If non-existent, a non-existent pot cannot lead to the creation of the pot, and if it is an existent pot, an existing pot will not lead to the creation of the pot (it already exists, so why make it?).
Thus, the nyAyAmRtakAra says, let us define the object of any action to be the suitability for achieving an utilitarian objective that accrues to the thing as a result of the action. In the case of making a pot, the pot's creation leads to it being used to carry and store water. Thus, the pot can be said to be the object of the activity of making it.
Continued here.
The next chapter in the advaita siddhi is the commencement of the anukUla tarka, or supportive logic to the inference of the world's reality. In any anumAna (inference), the opponent can insinuate aprayojaka shaNkA / vyabhichAra - हेतु अस्तु साध्यं मास्तु, that is, he can allege that the presence of the hetu does not necessarily imply that the sAdhya is present. To refute such a charge, one needs to provide some supporting logic to strengthen the inferential reasoning.
For example, in the inference of fire in the mountain, the hetu or reason is dhUmavatvAt, because there is smoke in the mountain. The opponent may argue that smoke does not necessarily imply fire. To this, the anukUla tarka, or supportive reasoning given is the cause-effect relationship between fire and smoke. If smoke did not imply fire, it would mean that such a cause-effect relationship is invalidated.
In the inference of the mithyAtva of the world, the hetu or reason is dRshyatvAt, knowability - The world is mithyA, because it is knowable. The opponent alleges that knowability need not imply the world's mithyAtva. The anukUla tarka or supportive reasoning given by the advaitin in this chapter is that there is no real relationship possible between the seer and the seen (objects) - despite this, the world is cognised. Therefore, it follows that there is an AdhyAsika sambandha, an unreal relationship between the seer and the world. Therefore, the world too is unreal.
This is the reasoning provided by ChitsukhAchArya and AnandabodhAchArya - dRgdRshya sambandhAnupapatti - the impossibility of a relationship between dRk (the knower) and dRshya (the known).
The methodology adopted in this chapter is pArisheSha nyAya - review all possible alternatives for a real relationship between cognition and the world, refuting all such alternatives and concluding by saying that if no real relationship is possible, it must follow that there is an unreal relationship between the two.
The pUrvapakshi says
ननु - मिथ्यात्वानुमानमप्रयोजकं, सत्यत्वेऽपि दृश्यत्वोपपत्तेरिति - The inference of the world's mithyAtva does not prove its objective (because there is no supporting reasoning for it). Even if the world was real, it would be possible to cognise it.
The siddhikAra responds
चेन्न; दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धानुपपत्ते: | No. Because no real relationship is possible between the seer and the seen.
नहि ज्ञानं ज्ञेयासंबद्धमेव प्रकाशकम् ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् | jnAna does not reveal an object without being connected / associated with the object. If it did, it would be atiprasanga - any cognition can reveal any object. I can study English and gain an understanding of French.
नापि संबद्धम् ; Nor can jnAna have a (real) connection with objects.
The word jnAna in the advaitin's parlance applies to both consciousness and cognition.
आत्मस्वरूपस्य तद्गुणस्य वा ज्ञानस्य ज्ञॆयेन संयोगसमवययोरभावात्, jnAna, whether it means the Self (ie consciousness), or whether it means an attribute of the Self (according to nyAya) can neither be in a samyoga relationship or samavAya relationship with objects.
It cannot be in a samyoga with objects - if jnAna is the Self, the Self is not in contact with anything. If it refers to an attribute of the Self, samyoga in nyAya can only be between two dravya-s, substances. It cannot be between an attribute and a substance. So if jnAna is an attribute of the self, it cannot have a samyoga with anything.
It cannot be in a samavAya with objects. In nyAya, jnAna is in a samavAya relationship with the Atma, not with other objects. Further, samavAya is a permanent relationship with objects. If jnAna had a samavAya relationship with other objects, it would imply that the objects are forever cognised, which is not supported by experience.
अन्यस्य चानाध्यासिकस्य संबन्धस्याभावात् | There is no other relationship between the two, other than an unreal one.
The opponent may argue that things are the objects of knowledge - thus things and knowledge share a subject-object relationship. The siddhikAra denies that also.
नच विषयविषयिभाव: स:, it cannot have a subject-object relation either.
विषयित्वविषयत्वरूपस्य एकैकमात्रनिष्ठत्वेन द्विनिष्ठसंबन्धात्मकत्वासंभवात्, दुर्निरूपत्वाच्च | A relationship which by definition must exist in two entities, cannot be of the nature of subject-object, because the nature of a subject and nature of object are located in only entity - either the subject or the object. It is difficult to define such a relationship as well.
To explain, the attribute of being a subject is only located in the subject and the attribute of being an object is located only in the object. Therefore, a relationship which always exists in both the related entities cannot be of the nature of subject-object.
Further, it is impossible to prove establish what constitutes viShayatva (being an object) or viShayitva (being a subject). How did the pot suddenly become a viShaya? What is this new factor called viShayatva that the pot obtains due to jnAna?
तथा हि - 1) विषयत्वं किं ज्ञानजन्यफलाधारत्वं, As the bhATTa mImAmsaka-s say, does viShayatva mean being the locus of a result that accrues to the object as a result of a cognition?
The bhATTa-s call this by various names - prAcakyam, jnAtatA, etc. Can viShayatva mean being the basis, the reason why an object becomes known by a cognition?
2) किंवा ज्ञानजन्यहानादिबुद्धिगोचरत्वं,
Or else is it (as according to some), that which leads to a notion of avoiding etc, as a result of being cognised? It is said that when an object is known, it can lead to three outcomes. The knower can think that:
a) the object is grAhyam, to be obtained; or
b) it is tyAjyam, to be avoided; or
c) udAsInam, something to be indifferent about.
Is viShayatva that which leads to a thought that the object should be obtained, avoided, or be indifferent towards?
3) उत ज्ञानकर्मत्वम्
Or is viShayatva the karmatva (object-caseness) of jnAna?
In Sanskrit grammar, certain verbs are akarmaka - do not have an object, while others are sakarmaka - have an object. For example, the verb tiShThati (sit) is akarmaka - the action sitting does not have an object (the question, what do you sit?, is a nonsensical one). The verb bhunkte (eat), on the other hand, is sakarmaka - one eats something.
Thus, is viShayatvam the karmatva of the jnAna, the object case-ness? Just as action and its object have karma kArakatva sambandha, do jnAna and viShaya have karma kArakatva sambandha?
4) ज्ञानाकारार्पकत्वं वा,
or is viShayatvam that which causes the thought to take on the shape of the object?
Some school of buddhists (yogAchAra) say that a cognition taking a particular shape is erroneously considered as an external object. One sub-school says that no objects exist, while another says external objects do exist. However, they all agree that a thought pattern of an object is necessary for cognition. Therefore, is viShayatvam that which causes the thought to take the shape of the object?
There is a problem with this definition - one cannot say that only the object is required for the thought to take the shape of the object - there are other things required. For example, one needs eyes to see the object etc. If we say that the thing which causes the jnAna to take that shape is the viShaya of the jnAna, then even the eyes will also end up as the viShaya of jnAna. That is not true however. To correct this, it is said:
5) दृश्यमानत्वे सति तत्त्वं वा, or, that which causes the thought to take the shape of the object, while being itself perceivable is viShayatva?
6) ज्ञानजन्यव्यवहारयोग्यत्वं वा, or, is viShayatva being capable of being an object of vyavahAra (activity) that is a result of jnAna?
7) सन्निकृष्टकरणेन यज्ज्ञानमुत्पाद्यते तत्त्वं वा, or is viShayatvam the characteristic of the object that gives rise to a cognition as a result of the sense organs coming into contact with the object?
For a pot to be perceived by the eyes, it is necessary for a prior relation between the eyes and the pot. Thus we can say viShayatva is that which is a result of a sense organ's relation with an object, which leads to the object being revealed by the jnAna. That is, the object comes to have a connection with a sense organ, as a result of which it becomes revealed by a cognition, and becomes the viShaya of the jnAna. The characteristic of that object is viShayatva.
8) यस्यां संविदि योऽर्थोऽवभासते स तस्या विषय:, तथाच संविदि भासमानत्वमिति वा, or the object which is illumined in a particular cognition is the object of the cognition. viShayatva is the characteristic of the object being illumined in cognition.
This is a definition found in the prAbhAkAra work - prakaraNa panchikA (by shAlinAtha miSra).
9) संबन्धान्तरमन्तरा ज्ञानावच्छेदकत्वं वा | or viShayatva is that qualifier of a cognition which does not depend on any other relationship. To explain, that which differentiates one cognition from the other (pot cognition from a tree cognition for example), without resorting to any other relationship is the viShayatva. A pot differentiates a pot cognition from a tree cognition without requiring any other relationship between the pot and the cognition.
Nine alternative definitions to viShayatva were proposed. The siddhikAra proceeds to refute them sequentially.
1) आद्ये फलं न तावत् ज्ञातता, In the first, one cannot say that jnAtata, becoming known, is a result of the jnAna.
According to bhATTa mImAmsa, cognition is beyond sensory perception. However, when an object becomes known, it allows us to infer the presence of cognition. A seer when asked 'What do you see?', will reply 'a pot', and not 'cognition of pot'.
अनङ्गीकारात्; advaitin-s do not accept that a new attribute called jnAtatA enters the object when it becomes known. According to us, the removal of ignorance is jnAtatA, and not something new that is created due to knowledge.
अतीतादावभावाच्च | Even if such an attribute was accepted, it does not exist in remote cognitions of past objects, etc.
The object of memory need not exist in the present, for example the memory of a pot seen in the past. When that memory is recalled now, one cannot insist that a new attribute called jnAtatA enters that past pot. However, the pot that is recalled is the object of the memory. Similarly, the cognition of future objects does not create this new attribute in those objects.
But can anything other than jnAtatA be the result of knowledge? The siddhikAra says no.
2) नापि हानादि:, Neither can avoidance etc (or a wish to take up, or indifference) be a result of cognition.
गगनादौ तदभावात्, None of these three apply for the cognition of the sky, etc (even indifference does not apply)
कलधौतमलादेरपि तज्ज्ञानविषयत्व प्रसङ्गाच्च | If a person picks up a coin from the floor, which after picking up he realises is dirty. As he has picked up the dirt as well, the dirt would end up having viShayatva according to this definition, but the fact is that such a viShayatva is not a result of his cognition of the dirt to begin with.
नाप्यभिज्ञाभिलपने; Neither can referring to the object verbally (abhilapana) or identifying the object (abhijnA) be used to define the viShayatva of the object.
तयोर्ज्ञेयावृत्तित्वात् | Because, both of them are not located in the known object - The locus of verbal reference or identification is not the object, but the speaker/identifier. So how can the object get viShayatva?
नच - विषयविषयिभावेन ते तत्र स्त इति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued that those two (verbal reference / identification) exist in the object through a subject-object relation,
तस्यैव विचार्यमाणत्वात् | because that is the very thing that we are currently trying to define - what makes the object the object in a subject-object relation?
अत एव न द्वितीयोऽपि | Therefore, the second option is also not correct.
3) न तृतीय:, ईश्वरज्ञानस्यातीतादिज्ञानस्य च कर्मकारकाजन्यत्वेन निर्विषयत्व प्रसङ्गात् | The third definition is not correct. God's cognition, and the cognition of past objects etc is not born from the objective / accusative case (i.e. the cognition of an object is not a result of the object being a contributory factor to its cognition, as the object of the activity of cognition), and would end up having no objects.
A kAraka (case) is something which enables the kriyA, action to occur. Thus, it is one of the causes of action. There are different factors, like kartA (actor), karma (object), karaNa (instrument) etc., needed for an action to happen. Thus, the ultimate meaning of kAraka is being the cause for an action. In examining knowledge, we ask if the object of knowledge, as a contributory factor of knowledge, is always needed?
God's knowledge, for example, does not need a karma kAraka. It is an eternal knowledge, so it cannot have a cause. If it has no cause, it cannot have any contributing causal factors and therefore, no kAraka-s either.
Similarly for the cognition of past objects, the object is not physically present when the cognition arises. Thus, as the object is not present in the immediately previous instant of the cognition (अव्यवहित पूर्वक्षणं), it cannot be considered a cause of the cognition. This will mean that past objects cannot be called karma kAraka. Thus, this definition will make these
cognitions as objectless, which is incorrect.
4) न चतुर्थ:, it is not the fourth alternative either
ज्ञानतदाकारयोरभेदेन सर्वेषां ज्ञानहेतूनाम् विषयत्वापातात्, As thought and its pattern are identical, every cause of the thought, will end up being a cause of the thought pattern (light, sense organs, mind, Atma), and every cause of cognition will end up as the object of the cognition as well.
अनुमित्यादिविषये तदभावाच्च | Further, the object of inference etc will end up not meeting that definition. The object of the inference of fire in the mountain is fire, but fire is not the cause of the inference.
5) न पञ्चम:, दृश्यमानत्वस्य विषयत्वघटितत्वेनात्माश्रयात् | Neither is it the fifth alternative, because to say something is दृश्यमानं, ie revealable by cognition, is inextricably linked within the concept of being the object of knowledge, thus such a definition of viShayatvam is self-referential.
We are trying to determine what jnana viShayatvam is, ie what is the characteristic of an object that makes it revealed by jnAna. If you say that that factor is because it is revealable, you are not proving anything - the definition refers to itself.
6) न षष्ठ:, योग्यतायां योग्यतान्तराभावात् | Neither is it the sixth definition, because to know that something is capable of being an object of vyavahAra, one must know what that capability is beforehand - however, knowing that capability (ie for capability to be an object of knowledge), requires that capability be capable of being known, which requires another capability, and so on and so forth, ad infinitum, leading to infinite regress.
नच - योग्यता योग्यातां विनैव योग्या, यथा दृश्यत्वं दृश्यत्वान्तरं विनैव दृश्यमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be alleged that - capability does not need another capability to be capable, just like one knowability does not require another knowability in order to be knowable.
अवच्छेदकरूपापरिचये योग्यताया एव ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् | Because, without a determining factor, a means to know whether the object is capable of being an object of vyavahAra born out of its cognition, it is not possible to determine if the object is capable or not. There is a requirement for a yogyatAvacChedakam.
नच ज्ञानविषयत्वम् तदवच्छेदकम्; आत्माश्रयात् | One cannot say that being an object of knowledge is that determining factor, because that would be self-referential.
7) न सप्तम:, नित्येश्वरज्ञानस्य निर्विषयत्वप्रसङ्गात् | The seventh definition is also not correct, because God's cognition would end up object-less. As God's cognition is eternal, it cannot be a result of the object coming into contact with His sense organs.
8) नाष्टम:, संविदीति न तावदधिकरणसप्तमी:, ज्ञानस्य ज्ञॆयानधिकरणत्वात् | The eighth is also not correct. The seventh case-ending in the words "in cognition" does not imply that cognition is the locus of the object, because the cognition is inside the person and the object is somewhere outside - so the known cannot be located within knowledge.
नापि विषयसप्तमी ; तस्यैव निरूप्यमाणत्वात्, Nor can the phrase "in cognition" in the definition be used in the sense of meaning the object of cognition (viShaya saptami), because that is the very thing we are trying to define.
संविदो विषयत्वं संवेद्यस्य च विषयित्वमिति वैपरीत्यापाताच्च | Further, it (viShaya saptami) may lead to the eventuality that cognition is the object and the object is the subject.
नापि सति सप्तमी; भासमनत्वस्य विषयताघटितत्वेनात्माश्रयात् | It cannot be sati saptami (i.e., when cognition is present, that which is illumined) either, because the idea of illumination is inextricably linked with the idea of viShayatvam, thus one cannot talk of revealing / illumination prior to defining viShayatva, ending up becoming self-referential.
9) नापि नवम:, मत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्यत्र रूपज्ञानसमवायस्य संबन्धान्तरं विनैव रूपज्ञानावच्छेदकस्य 'इदं रूप'मिति ज्ञानेऽपि विषयत्वापातात् | Nor is it the ninth definition either - when someone says "I have the knowledge of colour", as the 'inherent relationship of colour in me' is also present as a qualifier in the cognition of colour without requiring any other relationship, it too would end up becoming the object of the cognition.
When someone sees an object, he says that object appears to me (mat samavetam) - this is said using nyAya terminology - There is a samavAya sambandha between me (Atma) and the cognition of colour. The object of the cognition of colour is colour, not the samavAya of the cognition of colour in me.
In nyAya, it is postulated that samavAya does not depend on any other sambandha to perform its function, because that will lead to infinite regress (if samavAya needed another samavAya, that would lead to another, that to another, and so on).
In the cognition in question, samavAya is between Atma and rUpajnAna - if it is not connected to both, then it cannot be a sambandha. Thus samavAya exists in rUpajnAna, but it does not require any other sambandha to be present there. Thus samavAya ends up as a qualifier of rUpajnAna without any other sambandha. If something that is present as a qualifier of jnAna without requiring any other sambandha is the viShaya or the object of the cognition, then, in the cognition "this is a colour", the 'samavAya of the cognition with me' will also end up as the object of the cognition.
Thus far, nine definitions of viShayatvam were considered and dismissed. The opponent takes a different tack. In pUrvamImAmsa, there is a rule that whatever a knowledgeable person, an abhiyukta, considers to be a mantra is taken as a mantra. A long discussion is conducted to consider other possible definitions of what constitutes a mantra, following which it is determined that none of them apply, and therefore, a mantra is simply something that a knowledgeable person deems to be a mantra. The opponent uses this to argue that the same approach be considered for viShayatvam also.
The pUrvapakshi argues -
ननु - ज्ञानविषय इत्यभियुक्तप्रयोग एव ज्ञानविषययो: संबन्ध:, Let the relationship between cognition and its object simply be what a knowledgeable person considers to be the object of knowledge.
यथा अभियुक्तस्य मन्त्र इति प्रयोगविषयत्वमेव मन्त्रलक्षणम्, similar to the definition of a mantra being that which a knowledgable considers to be a mantra.
न चान्योन्याश्रयः, Nor is this a case of mutual dependence in saying that something is considered to be an object of knowledge because a knowledgeable person says so, and a knowledgeable person says so because he considers it to be an object of knowledge.
पूर्वपूर्वप्रयोगमपेक्ष्योत्तरोत्तरप्रयोगादिति For what has been said by knowledgeable people in the past has been accepted as valid by those that follow them, which is considered as valid by their succeeding generations etc.
- चेन्न; To such an argument, the siddhikAra says no.
एतावता हि ज्ञेयत्वमात्रं सामान्यत: स्यात्, न त्वेतद्ज्ञानविषयत्वम् | With such a definition all that is established is that something is knowable, not the objectification of the thing by a particular cognition. We are not simply interested in saying that something can be known, but in examining what makes a thing the object of a particular cognition.
न चास्मिन् सादौ पूर्वप्रयोगमपेक्ष्य उत्तरोत्तरप्रयोगो वक्तुं शक्यते; तस्यानादिमात्रविश्रान्तत्वात् | For a usage that has a beginning at a particular point in time, it cannot be held that every current instance of the usage is on the basis of a prior usage, for such an explanation only works for cases which are beginning-less.
किञ्च प्रयोगोऽपि स्वविषये संबन्ध इत्यात्माश्रयोऽपि | Moreover, if we seek to define what constitutes usage, we end up with the meaning being the object of knowledge, which would up a self-referential definition.
The opponent says -
ननु - यद् ज्ञानं यदभिलपनरूपव्यवहारकारणम् स तस्य विषय:, The cognition of which thing results in the activity (vyavahAra) of the nature of verbally referring to it, that thing is the object of that cognition. If a person says 'this is a pot', then he must have had a cognition of a pot. The object of that pot-cognition is the pot.
करणपाटवाद्यभावेन व्यवहारानुदयेऽपि सहकारिविरहप्रयुक्तकार्याभाववत्त्वरूपं कारणत्वमस्त्येव, Even where the sense organ does not function (he may be mute / there is no one to talk to, etc.) and thus the activity (of speech) is absent, causation is not denied - as the absence of the effect on account of the absence of the enabling factors of the cause, does not imply the absence of the cause.
Causation may directly lead to a result sometimes (phalopahita kAraNam), but sometimes the effect does not arise even when the cause is present, because the enabling factors needed to produce the effect are absent, but one cannot deny that causative power of the cause. For example, the potter remains one of the causes of the pot, even when the pot is not created because of the absence of other necessary factors such as clay, etc.
नच निर्विकल्पकविषये अव्याप्ति: Nor can it be alleged that the definition does not apply in the case of indeterminate cognition.
According to nyAya, prior to the knowledge of a thing (determinate cognition or savikalpaka jnAna), there arises an indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka jnAna). Only after the nirvikalpaka jnAna arises can savikalapaka jnAna arise. In nyAya, every object has attributes. It is also held that prior to the knowledge of any qualified object (vishiShTa), it is necessary to have the knowledge of the qualifier (visheShaNa). That is, the cognition of the visheShaNa is a cause for the cognition of the vishiShTa. This is a general rule in nyAya.
For example, in the savikalpaka jnAna, "this is a pot", the pot is the object of the cognition. The pot is not just an attribute-less pot, but a pot qualified by pot-ness, thus it is a vishiShTa. The naiyyAyika says that if one needs to know that something is a pot, one needs to know what pot-ness is first. This knowledge of the visheShaNa is what the naiyyAyika refers to as nirvikalpaka jnAna, and says that this nirvikalpaka jnAna is a cause for the savikalpaka jnAna. There is another school of thought within nyAya that says that the visheShya also is cognised by a nirvikalpaka jnAna, but some naiyyAyika-s hold that only the visheShaNa is cognised by nirvikalpaka jnAna. In any case, nyAya holds that a nirvikalpaka jnAna precedes every savikalpaka jnAna.
No one is aware of the existence of such an indeterminate cognition, let alone speak about it. Thus, even though the nirvikalpaka jnAna has an object (the visheShaNa or the visheShya), under this definition it will end up object-less, thus the definition suffers from avyApti.
It must be noted that the naiyyAyika nirvikalpaka jnAna is different from the advaitin's nirvikalpaka jnAna. According to the advaitin, nirvikalpaka jnAna only refers to the akhaNDAkAra vRtti, the impartite cognition of Brahman.
तस्यानङ्गीकारात्, The opponent says, one cannot hold that the definition suffers from avyApti, because the dvaitin does not accept nirvikalpaka jnAna in the first place. He continues:
न च यत्तद्भ्यामाननुगमो दोष:, Nor can it be held that the usage of the words "which" (yat) and "that" (tat) in the definition means that it is not a universal definition that applies to all cognitions. That is, each cognition will have a separate definition for what constitutes its object (if I talk of pot, then the pot is the object of the pot-cognition which led me to talk of the pot. If I talk of a tree, then the tree is the object of the tree-cognition which led me to talk of the tree, etc.).
कस्य को विषय इति अननुगतस्यैव प्रश्नविषयत्वेन तस्यादोषत्वात्, it is not a defect of the definition that each cognition has its own object, and there is no one common object for all cognitions. Each cognition has its own object, so what is the defect in saying that there is a definition that applies to each cognition separately?
नच घटज्ञानान्तरम् प्रमादात् यत्र पट इति व्यवहारस्तत्र घटज्ञानस्य पटाभिलपनरूपव्यवहारजनकत्वेन पटविषयत्वापत्ति:, Nor can one argue that if someone erroneously says that there is a cloth present when in reality they have seen a pot, the cloth erroneously ends up as the object of the pot-cognition, merely by the activity of the talk of a cloth occurring as a result of the cognition of the pot.
समानविषयाभिलापं प्रत्येव ज्ञानस्य जनकतया भिन्नविषयतया तत्राजनकत्वादिति To say that the verbal activity is a result of cognition only holds good when the object of the cognition and what is talked about are the same. If one sees one thing and talks of something else, it cannot be held that the cognition led to the talk.
The siddhikAra replies
- चेन्न; if this is the argument, no.
This definition cannot be understood. One has to first know how a particular cognition will lead to someone speaking. Only after that can we say the object of the words is the object of the cognition.
What is the determining factor (kAraNatAvacChedaka dharma) for a cognition to have the capability to lead to a particular activity? This kAraNatAvacChedaka can only be known after a person speaks of it. Thus, it is impossible to claim that there is a common determining factor, avacChedaka dharma, existing in every cognition.
अभिलपनरूपव्यवहारजननयोग्यत्वं न प्रातिस्विकरूपेण निर्णेयम्; अवच्छेदकत्वस्य फलनिर्णेयत्वात् ; The capacity of a particular cognition to generate a particular verbal activity cannot be known from the cognitions themselves - that a cognition is capable of leading to that outcome can only be observed from the result of the cognition - the generated verbal activity.
प्रतिस्वं च फलादर्शनात्, अजनितफले प्रातिस्विकयोग्यतायां मानाभावात्, The result is not observed from each such cognition, and without a result, there is no basis to claim that that cognition had such a capacity.
किन्तु तत्र तत्रानुगततत्तद्वृत्तिविषयत्वेन | Rather, the cognition's capacity to produce a particular outcome (speaking about something) is because the cognition has its object as an inherent attribute.
The cognition of the pot leads talk of the pot. Thus, if you say that the objectification of the pot by pot-cognition is known by the pot-related verbal activity it leads to, then as we have demonstrated, that the pot-cognition has the capacity to lead to pot-related verbal activity is only determined when holding on to the fact that the pot is the object of pot-cognition. This is circular logic.
तथाच आत्माश्रय: | This is a case of AtmAshraya, self reference.
The nyAyAmritakAra had offered some corrections to the definition of objectification as that which confers object-caseness (jnAna karmatva) to the cognition. The siddhikAra responds to these corrections.
The nyAyAmritakAra's correction is cited verbatim first. The अतएव - निरस्तम् is siddhikAra's response to the nyAyAmritakAra.
अतएव - "ज्ञानकर्मत्वम् विषयत्वं, कर्मत्वं च न कारकविशेष:; येनातीतादौ तदभावो भवेत्, किन्तु क्रियाधीनव्यवहारयोग्यत्वरूपातिश्यवत्त्वम् ; अन्यथा घटं करोतीत्यादावसिद्धं घटादि न जनकं सिद्धं च न कृतिकर्मेति द्वितीयविभक्तिरनर्थिका स्यादिति" - निरस्तम् ;
By this, the following has been refuted -
"ज्ञानकर्मत्वम् विषयत्वं, कर्मत्वं च न कारकविशेष:; येनातीतादौ तदभावो भवेत्, किन्तु In defining viShayatva as jnAna karmatva, the word karmatva does not refer to a particular kind of case-ending (kAraka) which could have left it open to the charge that it would not apply to past objects etc.,
किन्तु क्रियाधीनव्यवहारयोग्यत्वरूपातिश्यवत्त्वम् Rather, karmatva refers to the the special characteristic of being capable of utility that accrues to an object as a result of an action (here action = cognising)
अन्यथा घटं करोतीत्यादौ असिद्धं घटादि न जनकं सिद्धं च न कृतिकर्मेति द्वितीयविभक्तिरनर्थिका स्यात् Otherwise, in sentences like "he creates a pot", one can claim that the accusative case-ending is redundant, citing arguments such as - is the object of that sentence an existent or a non-existent pot? If non-existent, a non-existent pot cannot lead to the creation of the pot, and if it is an existent pot, an existing pot will not lead to the creation of the pot (it already exists, so why make it?).
Thus, the nyAyAmRtakAra says, let us define the object of any action to be the suitability for achieving an utilitarian objective that accrues to the thing as a result of the action. In the case of making a pot, the pot's creation leads to it being used to carry and store water. Thus, the pot can be said to be the object of the activity of making it.
Continued here.