paricCheda 1 - bhAvibAdhopapatti:

अथ भाविबाधोपपत्ति: |

The core argument of the next chapter of the advaita siddhi is that the world is capable of being sublated in the future (bhAvi bAdha upapatti). 

The siddhikAra commences his argument.
एवंच 'भाविबाधनिश्चयाच्चे'ति यदुक्तं, तदप्युपपन्नतरमेव ; The statement made, namely, "On account of certainty that there will be sublation in the future", is an eminently logical one.

However, as perception stands uncontradicted in the present, how can the future possibility of its contradiction be grounds to set it aside? To answer such a possible doubt, the siddhikAra says:

प्रकारान्तरेणाबाधितस्य चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वप्रत्यक्षस्य यथा आगमेन बाध:, तथा प्रकारान्तरेणाबाधितस्य 'सन् घट' इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षस्य मिथ्यात्वबोधकागमेन बाध इति निर्णयात् | The perception of the moon being the size of a digit may be uncontradicted in the present, but we say that it is overruled by scripture which reveals its true size (jyotiSa). Similarly, the perception "this pot exists", may be uncontradicted in the present, but it is also sublated by the scripture that reveals its mithyAtva - of this, one can be certain.

In the nyAyAmRta, it was argued that the doubt in relation to a future sublation of the world is itself impossible, and therefore such a doubt cannot be cited as grounds for the invalidation of perception. The siddhikAra considers this next.

एवंच - भाविबाधशङ्कामादाय यत्परैर्दूषणमुक्तम् तदनुक्तोपलम्भनतया - अपास्तम् | Moreover, the defect that was cited by some (i.e the nyAyAmRtakAra) assuming that our position was grounded on "a doubt" about the future sublation of the world - stands rejected because it is imputing something that was never claimed by us.  

advaitin-s do not argue that perception is accompanied by a doubt that the object revealed by it could be sublated in the future. Rather, what we say is that there is the certainty that the world will be sublated when the knowledge of identity with Brahman arises. However, even if we had claimed that it was a doubt, not a certainty, in relation to the future sublation, the cited defect is not problematic.

वस्तुतस्तु - बाधशङ्कामादायापि प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधकतोद्धार: समीचीन एव ; In reality, even if our position was that there was a doubt about future sublation, it would be sufficient grounds to overturn the refutation of pratyaksha bAdha (contradiction with perception).

How does such a doubt arise? Perception says the world is real. Scripture says it is unreal. The two are in contradiction.

प्रत्यक्षशब्दयोर्बलाबलविचारात् प्राक् किमयं शब्द उपचरितार्थ: ; आहोस्वित् प्रत्यक्षमप्रमाणमिति शङ्कायामुभयोरबाधकत्वप्राप्तौ
This is so because the question "Which one among shruti and perception is stronger?" arises only when there is an apparent contradiction between the two. However, before such an analysis of relative strength is conducted, when there is a doubt whether shruti takes a figurative meaning or whether perception is invalid, there is no question of contradiction between the two. (If shruti statements revealing mithyAtva are only figurative, there is no contradiction with perception. If perception is invalid, there is no question of an invalid means of knowledge contradicting shruti. Thus in either 'koTi' of the doubt, there is no contradiction between perception and shruti).

तात्पर्यलिङ्गै: श्रूयमाणार्थपरतया निश्चितस्यागमस्योपचरितार्थत्वशङ्काव्युदासेन लब्धावकाशत्वसंभवात् |  
That being the case, as the vedic statements revealing the mithyAtva of the world are supported by the six indicatory marks that reveal that such statements are the primary import of scripture, it follows that the direct meaning apparent from hearing those statements is correct, and therefore there is no room for doubting that the shruti's meaning is figurative (it cannot be figurative, it is the direct, "as-heard", meaning of the words). From this it follows that the other doubt in question - whether the object of perception will be sublated in the future - does have scope, ie, such a doubt is very much possible.

नच - शब्दलिङ्गयो: प्रत्यक्षाबाधकतया प्रत्यक्षान्तरस्याप्रमाणतया शङ्क्यमानत्वेनाबाधकतया च बाधकसामान्याभावे निश्चिते बाधशङ्का न युक्तेति - वाच्यं ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "As scripture and inference are incapable of overruling perception, and if there is another perception which invalidates this perception, it would lead to a doubt about the validity of the sublating perception itself, it is quite clear that there are no means of knowledge capable of contradicting perception. That being so, a doubt about the future invalidation of perception is untenable".

शब्दलिङ्गयो: प्रत्यक्षाबाधकत्वस्य व्यवस्थापितत्वात्प्रत्येकं विशेषाभावनिश्चयेऽपि विशेषाणामियत्तावधारणदशायाम् संशयसंभवात्,
This is a flawed argument because - The grounds for inference and scripture to overrule perception have already been established. Even if one is certain that perception is not overruled in individual instances of pramANa-s, because one is unsure whether these are the only possible instances for contradictory means, a doubt lingers whether perception is sublatable or not.

The basic argument is that the nyAyAmRtakAra is taking 3-4 instances and argues that in such instances, perception is not overruled. Using this, he generalises to conclude that it is impossible to overrule perception, and that, even a doubt about such a possibility cannot be entertained.

The term इयत्तावधारणं is used by the siddhikAra. To explain this with an example: Of the elements, only earth, water and fire have form. No other element has form. Therefore if it would be correct to say that wind, which is different from earth, water and fire, has no form. A person may know that each of earth, water and fire have have no form (विशेषाभावनिश्चयेऽपि), so long as he lacks the knowledge that "only" those three have form (विशेषाणामियत्तावधारणदशायाम्),  he may still be doubtful whether wind has form or not (संशयसंभवात्).

प्रत्यक्षस्याप्रमाणतया शङ्क्यमानत्वेन शङ्काविरहोपपादनस्यासम्भवदुक्तिकत्वाच्च | As the possibility of another perception being able to invalidate this perception was entertained (by the nyAyAmRtakAra himself), to deny any doubt in relation to the future invalidation of perception is untenable.

अथैवं - जाग्रदादिज्ञानस्याप्रमात्वे स्वप्नदृष्टस्य शुक्तिरूप्यादेश्च बाधासिद्धौ कथं दृष्टान्त्सिद्धि: - स्यादिति चेन्न ; Therefore if it is said - "If the perceptual knowledge obtained in the waking state is invalid, then as there would be no means to sublate the dream, or the shell silver (for objects in a dream are sublated by waking up and seeing that they do not exist, and the shell silver is sublated by the perception of the shell), there would be no example (dRShTAnta) necessary to substantiate the inference of the world's mithyAtva" - we refute such an argument.

The argument is that the inference of the world's reality uses the dRShTAnta of shell-silver and dream objects. However, their unreality can only be established by the perception of real objects in their place. However if perception itself is invalid, then the unreality of the dream and the shell-silver itself is not established. That being so, there is no substantive basis to establish the inference of the world's mithyAtva.

This is rejected for three reasons:
आरोप्यसत्ताधिकसत्ताकविषयत्वेनापेक्षिकप्रमाणत्वेनान्यूनसत्ताकविषयत्वेन वा बाधकत्वात् |
1) आरोप्यसत्ताधिकसत्ताकविषयत्वेन As the cognition has an object having a higher order of reality than the sublated object
2) आपेक्षिकप्रमाणत्वेन or, because the validity of cognition (in the waking state) is relatively higher 
3) अन्यूनसत्ताकविषयत्वेन वा बाधकत्वात् | or because the object of the cognition is not of a lower order of reality compared to the sublated object, it can be a sublating cognition.

As these reasons apply in the case of dream objects and shell-silver, they are sublated, and can be used as examples in the mithyAtva inference.

The nyAyAmRtakAra had quoted a verse from kumArila bhaTTa's Sloka vArttikam in support.

अतएव यदुक्तं बौद्धं प्रति भट्टवार्तिके - "प्रतियोगिनि दृष्टे च जाग्रद्बोधे मृषा भवेत् | स्वप्नादिदृष्टिरस्माकं तव भेदोऽपि किंकृत: ||" इति - तत्सङ्गच्छते |
Therefore, the verse from the BhattavArttika (quoted by the nyAyAmRtakAra against the advaitin) was directed to the Buddhist, not us - "When the superseding object (pratiyogi) is seen using a valid cognition, dream objects etc are invalidated. This is the basis for us (to declare them to be unreal). However, if you say the waking perception is also invalid, what is the basis for dreams to be unreal?"

This verse has scope against the Buddhists, not the advaitin-s - for we say that perceptions in the waking state etc are valid until it is superceded by a higher truth, just like taking oneself to be a human being is very much valid in a transactional sense, even though from a higher standpoint, that is accepted as incorrect, even by the dvaitin himself. ShankarAchArya had made the same point by quoting an ancient writer in the samnvaya sUtra:
देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत् प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः ।
लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं तु आ आत्मनिश्चयात्॥

The nyAyAmRtakAra postulates a condition for a cognition to be capable of sublating an object. Taking the example of the shell-silver, he argues that merely a generic cognition such as "this is an object" will not sublate the silver. The cognition has to reveal a hitherto unknown aspect of the proximate object. For example, the cognition that sublates the shell-silver should reveal that the object in front is a shell, not silver. Extending this rule in the case of the world, the advaitin argues that the world is sublated only when one has had the cognition of the self, Atma. However, the self is self-evident, svaprakAsha. The cognition of the self can sublate the world (according to the rule that was postulated), only if it reveals something unknown about the object. As the self is ever known, there is nothing unknown revealed by the cognition of the self. As a result, it cannot be the sublating cognition, and as there is no other cognition capable of sublating the world,  it is not mithyA.

The siddhikAra refutes this.

ननु - भ्रामकालीनापरोक्षबुद्ध्यविषयविशेषविषयैव धीर्बाधिका दृष्टा , नच विश्वबाधिका धीस्तथेति - चेन्न;
If it is argued thus - "For a cognition to be capable of sublating, it must reveal a characteristic of the object that is not perceived during the time of an illusion, however the world-sublating cognition is not capable of doing that" - no.

अधिष्ठानतत्वज्ञानत्वेनैव भ्रमनिवर्तकत्वात्, विश्वनिवर्तकब्रह्मज्ञानस्य तथात्वात् |
The capacity of a cognition to sublate the illusion is by it revealing the reality of the substratum of the illusion, and the cognition of Brahman, which is the world-sublating cognition, certainly does that. 

The siddhikAra's contention is that the rule cannot simply be that the sublating cognition reveals an unknown aspect of the object, but that it reveals that unknown aspect, the ignorance of which, is the cause of the illusion. In the case of the shell-silver, the cognition of the market price of silver too reveals a hitherto unknown aspect of the perceived object (and thus satisfies the condition for a sublating cognition, as stipulated by the nyAyAmRtakAra) but cannot be said to sublate the shell-silver. The cause of the illusion is the ignorance of the nature of the proximate object. The seer does not know that the object before is a shell, and as a result superimposes a piece of silver upon it. If he later comes to realise that the object is a shell, such a knowledge removes the ignorance, which was the cause of the illusion of silver. In the case of the cognition of the self, it removes the ignorance of the self's true nature, which led to the illusion of the world. Therefore, it is capable of sublating the world illusion.

Anticipating such a response, the nyAyAmRtakAra argues that even so, the world-sublating cognition must reveal an unknown attribute of the self, but the advaitin argues that the cognition is nishprakAraka, an attribute-less cognition.
नच - सप्रकारिकैव धीर्भ्रमनिवर्तिका, इयं तु निष्प्रकारिका कथं तथेति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue thus: "It is only an attributive cognition that is sublating, whereas here the supposedly sublating cognition is attributeless, so how can it be so?" 
निवर्तकतायां सप्रकारकत्वस्य गौरवादप्रवेशात् | Because, the attributiveness of the sublating cognition, being a superfluous requirement, is not needed. 

ननु - आवश्यक: सप्रकारकत्वनियम:, व्यावृत्ताकारज्ञानत्वेनैव भ्रमनिवर्तकत्वात्, अन्यथा अनुवृत्ताकारज्ञानादपि तन्निवृत्त्यापत्तेरिति - चेत् ;
If it is argued thus: "The attributiveness of the cognition is a necessary condition, because only a distinguishing cognition that reveals the object distinctly from other objects is capable of sublating the illusion. If that is not accepted, even a generic, non-distinguishing cognition of the object can sublate the illusion".

To explain, the cognition "this is a shell" distinguishes it from silver, and thus removes the illusion, whereas merely a cognition "this is some object" is not capable of removing the illusion because such a cognition would equally be true whether the proximate object was shell or silver.  Shell-ness is a characteristic that is present only in the shell, not silver and can serve as a basis to distinguish the two objects, whereas object-ness is a characteristic common to both the shell and silver and cannot serve as a basis to distinguish the two. 

The cognition of the self that is world-sublating, does not reveal, according to the advaitin, any attributes in the self. Therefore it contains no basis to distinguish the self from the world, and is incapable of sublating the world. This is the argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra.

The siddhikAra says:
सत्यम्, व्यावृत्ताकारत्वेन ज्ञानस्य भ्रमनिवर्तकता, नतु विशेषप्रकारकत्वनियम: | True, while the sublating cognition must be a distinguishing cognition, there is no requirement that must distinguish based on an attribute.

For example, the person who sees silver instead of shell may know that a shell is different fro silver, but possessing the knowledge of difference, he continues seeing the silver. Thus it is not the cognition of difference which is necessary in the sublating cognition, rather it is the cognition that the object in front is a shell, not silver - ie, this object has shell-ness, not silver-ness. 

That may well be the case, but even there, an attribute belonging to the object is revealed, whereas the cognition of the self reveals no attributes. To explain why it is still capable of distinguishing the world from its substratum, the self and thus sublate the world, the siddhikAra continues:

तथाहि - व्यावृत्ताकारता हि द्वेधा भवति | To explain, a cognition's ability to distinguish is possible in two ways. 

विशेषणादुपलक्षणाच्च | By means of a qualifying feature (visheShaNa) and circumstantial identifier (upalakshaNa). More details here.

The visheShaNa is an intrinsic feature of the object, on the basis of which it is distinguished from the rest. So, for example, when we ask someone to fetch the blue pot from the next room, the hearer identifies the correct pot based on its colour, and when he fetches the pot, it is not the pot alone that is brought, but the pot, along with its colour, blue. 

The upalakshaNa need not be present in the object which it identifies, it need not even be present at the point of time when that object is uniquely identified versus others.  When someone says that the house with crow is Devadatta's, the crow is not an intrinsic characteristic of the house, it is merely a circumstantial presence which is the basis for distinguishing Devadatta's house from other houses. When the house is identified, the crow need not even be sitting in the house, but the memory of the crow sitting there is sufficient to identify the house in the present. 

upalakshaNa itself is of two kinds - Where the upalakshaNa points to some attribute which is present in the object, and where the upalakshaNa identifies the object itself. 

Continuing with the example of the crow used to identify the house, it has been observed that sometimes when the crow flies away, the straw in the thatching of the roof stands upright as a result of the crow gripping onto it tightly when flying away. The slightly raised straws in the house serve as a clue to the seer that the crow was sitting there in the past. In such a case, the crow does not reveal the house directly, but it reveals it through an attribute that it left behind in the house. This is called dharmAntara uplakshaNam. Where there is no such attribute left behind, but the crow serves to identify the house by itself,  it is called svarUpa upalaksaNam.

तत्राद्ये सप्रकारकत्वनियम: In the former (visheShaNa), where the distinguishing cognition identifies the object on the basis of a visheShaNa present in the object, it is an attributive cognition.

द्वितीयेऽपि धर्मान्तरस्य यदुपलक्षणं तस्माद्व्यावृत्ताकारत्वे सप्रकारकतैव | Even in the second case (upalakshaNa), where the distinguishing cognition identifies the object on the basis of some attribute left behind (dharmAntara), it is an attributive cognition.

यदि तु स्वरूपोपलक्षणाद्व्यावृत्ताकारता, तथा निष्प्रकारकतैव However, where the cognition distinguishes the object based on the object's own nature, then the cognition need not contain an attribute.

उपलक्षणस्य तत्राप्रवेशात्, Because the uplakshaNa (based on which the object is distinguished) does not form part of the object distinguished. 

This may raise the question, even if the object is distinguished on its own basis, can the object itself not be revealed as an attribute in the cognition? To address this, the siddhikAra says:

स्वस्य च स्वस्मिन्नप्रकारकत्वात् | The object itself cannot be revealed as its own attribute in a cognition.

Logicians argue that sometimes an object can be its own attribute. For example, in nyAya, it is said that everything is knowable. Thus every object has knowability. However, knowability itself must be knowable (if it did not, the proposition that everything is knowable would not be true). Therefore, knowability must possess knowability as an attribute. So, why cannot the cognition of the self reveal the self as an attribute of the self (and thus end up being attributive)?

नच - प्रमेयत्वादिवत् स्वस्यैव स्वस्मिन् प्रकारकत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue that "like knowability, it is possible for a thing to be its own attribute".

त्वयापि केवलान्वयिन्येवागत्या तथाङ्गीकारात्, नतु सर्वत्र | Because you too concede that this stipulation is only for universal attributes, and not everywhere. The advaitin does not accept the existence of any such universal attributes, and so knowability cannot be used against him as an example to establish that the self can have itself as its own attribute. 

The exact mechanism by which a cognition reveals object will be discussed in detail in the pratikarmavyavasthA chapter of the advaita siddhi, but briefly, it is held that each cognition takes on the AkAra of the object and thus helps reveal it. Normally, the word 'AkAra' is translated as shape, but that is not the intended meaning of the term here. 'AkAra' is a technical term denoting the relationship between the cognition and its object.

The nyAyAmRtakAra seizes on this to argue that the AkAra of a cognition is the same as its prakAra (attribute), and because it is the same, the cognition of Brahman being brahmAkAra, is brahma-prakAra also, and thus the world sublating cognition has Brahman as its attribute.  

In nyAya, it is held that every vishiShTa buddhi (composite cognition) reveals three aspects of an object - the visheShya (substance), the prakAra (attribute), and samsarga (their relationship). Thus the cognition of a pot comprises the pot as the visheShya, its colour as the prakAra and their relationship (the pot endowed with colour) as its samsarga. 

अथ - आकारप्रकारयोरभेदात् ब्रह्माकारतैव ब्रह्मबुद्धेस्तत्प्रकारतेति - चेत्, न | if you argue that as AkAra and prakAra are the same, the brahmAkAra cognition has brahman as its prakAra - no.

विशिष्टबुद्धेर्विशेष्याकारत्वेऽपि तदप्रकारकत्वात्, आकारप्रकारयोर्भेदात् ।AkAra and prakAra are different because while the substance in a composite cognition has AkAratva, it cannot be a prakAra. 

आकारश्च वृत्तिनिष्ठ: कश्चिद्धर्मोऽसाधारणव्यवहारहेतुरिति वक्ष्यते |
AkAra is that attribute of a cognition, which is the cause of a specific activity. This will be discussed later.

For example, while sight and touch reveal both the substance and its attribute, smell and fragrance only reveal the attribute and not the substance. Is it possible for a cognition to reveal just the substance and not its attributes? 

The nyAyAmRtakAra had argued that this is not possible for cognition. The siddhikAra gives an example from nyAya where verbal cognitions can refer to only the substance without referring to its attribute. 

The word space is different from the word pot.  All the pots in the world can be referred to by the single word pot. This is so because the word pot refers not only to the particular pot, it also refers to its underlying pot-ness. However, in the case of space, as space is one and all pervading, one need not infer that the word refers to the particular space as well as space-ness. 

If it is argued that space must also have some attribute, and thus the word space must refer to space-ness also, we ask what is space-ness? That is, what is the attribute present in space? The technical definition of space in nyAya is AkAsha: shabdAshraya: - Space is that which is the basis for the attribute of sound.

If the word space refers to space including it being the locus of sound, then the definition of space would be repetitive, punarukti. If the word AkAsha refers to its attribute (shabdAshrayatva), the definition AkAsha: shabdAshraya: would be tantamount to saying the basis of sound is that which is the basis of sound.

Therefore we must accept that the word space only refers to the substance space, and not to its quality of being the locus of sound. This has been accepted by the tattvachintAmaNikara (gangeSa upAdhyAya).

तस्माद्यथाऽऽकाशपदाच्छब्दाश्रयत्वोपलक्षितधर्मिस्वरूपमात्रं ज्ञायते, तद्वदत्रापि द्वितीयाभावाद्युपलक्षितब्रह्मस्वरूपज्ञानं व्यावृत्ताकारं द्वैतनिवर्तकमपरोक्षम् | Just like the word space is known to only denote the substance identified by the upalakshaNa of being the locus of sound, similarly here too, the direct knowledge of Brahman in its essential nature as identified by the upalakshaNa of the absence of duality, is able to sublate duality.

यथाच शब्दात्तादृग्ज्ञानसंभवस्तथा वक्ष्यते | The mechanism by which words can generate such a verbal cognition will be discussed later (in the third paricCheda).

The nyAyAmRtakAra takes a different tack. If someone sees the illusion of the shell-silver, and later that illusion is sublated, the sublating cognition only removes the illusion. It does not alter the fact that the seer had seen the illusion previously. Nor does it sublate the fact that the seer was previously ignorant of the object being a shell. Nor does it sublate a possible defect present in the eye which caused him to see silver instead of a shell. Nor does it sublate the seer himself. 

नच - बाधकधियां भ्रमतद्धेत्वज्ञानदोषाध्यस्तद्रष्ट्रादीनामबाधकत्वं दृष्टमिति कथं ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य तद्बाधकत्वं घटतामिति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue thus: "The sublating cognition does not remove the (prior) illusion, nor its cause, ignorance, defective organs, the superimposition of seer-ness, etc. That being so, how is it said that with brahma jnAna, each of those things are sublated?"

यत्र हि स्वप्ने द्रष्टारं दुष्टकरणवन्तम् कल्पयित्वा तस्य भ्रमं कल्पयति, तत्र जागरज्ञानेन सर्वेषां निवृत्तिदर्शनात् | Because, it is possible to imagine a seer with defective eyes seeing an illusion in a dream, all of which are sublated upon waking.
जाग्रद्दशयामपि यदा मनुष्यप्रकृतौ चैतन्यं कल्पयित्वा तत्समीपवर्तिन्यनादर्श एवादर्शत्वं कल्पयित्वा स्वप्रतिबिम्बमयं पश्यतीति कल्पयति, तदा नायं चेतनो न चायमादर्श इति प्रमया सर्वनिवृत्तिदर्शनाच्च नेयमादृष्टचरी कल्पना | When awake, it is possible to superimpose consciousness in the toy figure of a man, to imagine that a proximate a toy mirror is real, to imagine him seeing his reflection in a mirror. And then, with the right knowledge that there is neither a conscious entity, nor a real mirror (nor a reflection, etc), all the superimposed imaginations are sublated. Thus what is being postulated is not outside the realms of possibility.

तथाचेयं शुक्तिरित्याद्यधिष्ठानज्ञानं रज्ज्वां सर्पभ्रममिव द्रष्ट्राध्यासं मा निवीवृतत्, तत्कस्य हेतो:? Therefore, what is the reason to argue that, like in the instances of the shell-silver illusion, the seer of the rope-snake illusion is not sublated?

तदधिष्ठानसाक्षात्कारत्वाभावात्, It is so because the substratum of the illusion of seer-ness has not been clearly perceived there. The shell is the substratum of the illusion of shell-silver, not of the illusion of being a seer in the first place.

ब्रह्मज्ञानं त्वाकाशादिप्रपञ्चभ्रममिव द्रष्टुर्दोषादिभ्रममपि निवर्तयेदेव, तत्कस्य हेतो:? What indeed is the cause for the illusion of being the seer, his defective sense organs, etc. are removed, like the illusion of the world comprising space etc., upon the dawn of brahma jnAna?

अशेषभ्रमाधिष्ठानतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारत्वात् | It is so because the direct cognition of the substratum of all illusions (Brahman). 

एवंच बाधबुद्धित्वं न दोषाद्यबाधकत्वे प्रयोजकम्, अपि तु तद्भ्रमाधिष्ठानतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारभिन्नत्वमिति द्रष्टव्यम् | Thus, there is no rule that a sublating cognition cannot sublate the defects that aided the occurrence of the illusion. Rather, it is the sublating cognition being different from the direct cognition of the substratum of the illusion of the defect that prevents it from being able to sublate the defect. 

ननु - कल्पितत्वादुक्तदृष्टान्तेन तत् बाध्यताम्, इह तु कथमिति - चेत्, If you say: "All the examples involve something imagined, whereas in the present case, the world cannot be a figment of someone's imagination, so how do your arguments apply?"
हन्त ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्य कल्पितत्वमङ्गीकुर्वतामस्माकमिदमनिष्टं महदापादितं देवानां प्रियेण | Well, it would be naive to ask us such a question as if it were something undesirable to us, when we hold that everything other than Brahman is an imagination. 

The nyAyAmRtakAra invokes the perception by the sAkshi to argue for their reality.

ननु - साक्षिप्रत्यक्षं न बाध्यम् ; दोषाजन्यत्वात्, प्रत्युत श्रुतिजनिताद्वैतज्ञानमेव बाध्यम् ; Those that are revealed by the sAkshi cannot be sublatable, because they are revealed by a source which is defect-free, rather, it is shruti revealing advaita which must be taken to be defective.

तात्पर्यभ्रमरूपदोषजन्यत्वादिति चेत् because such a cognition is born out of an ignorance of the true import of shruti. 

- न; If this is the argument, no

चैतन्यस्य स्वरूपतो दोषाजन्यत्वेऽपि तदवच्छेदिकाया अविद्यावृत्तेर्दोषजन्यत्वात् ; While consciousness intrinsically is defect free, the cognition that delimits it can be avidyA vritti (a cognition in the causal layer) 

तत्प्रतिफलितचैतन्यस्यैव साक्षिपदार्थत्वात् | And it is the consciousness reflected in such a vritti that is called the sAkshi.

अद्वैततात्पर्यग्रहस्य च प्रत्यक्षाद्यविरोधेन प्रमारूपतया दोषत्वाभावात् न तज्जन्यमद्वैतज्ञानं बाध्यम् ; As the import of shruti revealing advaita is not contradictory to perception etc, its import cannot be caused into question, nor can the advaita revealed by such a shruti deemed to be sublatable. 

भ्रमजन्यवत्वस्य विषयबाधाप्रयोजकत्वाच्च | It is not necessary that a cognition born from a defective source can only reveal objects that are sublatable. 


नच - बाधकतुल्यमानताकद्वैतश्रुतिसंवादिद्वैतप्रत्यक्षं कथं बाध्यमिति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued thus: "shruti revealing duality has an equal status as a pramANa in comparison to shruti revealing non-duality,  and supports perception that reveals duality. Thus, how can it be contradicted?"
द्वैतस्य प्रत्यक्षादिलौकिकमानसिद्धत्वेन तद्बोधकश्रुतेरनुवादकतया फलवदज्ञातस्वार्थतात्पर्यकाद्वैतश्रुतिसाम्याभावात् | Duality is already known through other means of knowledge, thus the status of shruti which talks of duality is only to repeat something already known, and cannot be held to be of the same status as shruti revealing non-duality, which serves a useful purpose, it reveals something hitherto unknown and is supported by indicatory marks of import.

Another objection is raised. In an illusion, the silver is erroneously seen to be identical to the shell. The sublating cognition reveals the identity to be false, and shows that the object in front is shell, which is different from silver. 
ननु - बाधकधीबोध्यम् न बाध्यम्, भेदश्च बाधकधीबोध्य:. तया स्वविषयस्य भिन्नत्वेनैव ग्रहान्नेदं रजतमितिवत् अभिन्नतयोदासीनतया ग्रहणे बाधकत्वायोगादिति - चेत्, न ;
The nyAyAmRtakAra argues:

बाधकधीबोध्यम् न बाध्यम् भेदश्च बाधकधीबोध्य: That which is known through the sublating knowledge is not sublated itself, and difference is what is conveyed by the sublating knowledge.
तया स्वविषयस्य भिन्नत्वेनैव ग्रहान्नेदं रजतमितिवत् Like in the case of the sublating cognition, "This is not silver", it reveals that the illusion is different from the object it reveals. 
अभिन्नतयोदासीनतया ग्रहणे बाधकत्वायोगादिति - thus the sublating cognition is incapable of conveying either identity, or the absence of both identity and difference. 

The siddhikAra responds: if this is your argument, no.

बाधकधियो भेदविषयत्वानभ्युपगमात्, इयं शुक्तिरित्येव बाधबुद्ध्युदयात् । Because difference is not the object of the sublating cognition - the sublating cognition is not "this is not silver", but  "this is a shell". 
तस्यास्तु नेदं रजतमिति भेदबुद्धि: फलम् | The resulting knowledge of that sublating cognition is "this is not silver".
व्यावृत्ताकारतैव बाधधिय आवश्यकी | Thus the requirement for the sublating cognition is that it be able to distinguish the revealed object. 
सा च स्वरूपोपलक्षणबलान्निष्प्रकारकब्रह्मज्ञानेऽपि अस्तीति न बाधकधीबोध्यत्वम् भेदस्य | That requirement exists for the non-attributive cognition of brahman revealed through the mechanism of svarUpa upalakshaNa, therefore there is no requirement that the sublating cognition reveal difference. 

The NAK attacks the idea of doubt.
ननु - स्वप्नविलक्षणं फलपर्यन्तपरीक्षायामिति चेच्छङ्का स्यात्, तदा अद्वैतश्रुतिप्रत्यक्षतत्प्रामाण्यशङ्कायामद्वैतश्रुतिरपि न सिद्ध्येत् |
If a doubt that something is not a dream-object is said to persist until it is proven otherwise through an examination, then the direct perception of shruti revealing advaita itself is called into question. 
How can one be sure that the advaita shruti that is heard is actually a sentence from the veda, and not somewhere else? How do we know that we have heard this correctly? There has to be some limit to doubt. 

बाधेऽपि बाधशङ्कायामबाधितबाधप्रसिद्धरपि न स्यात्; If there is doubt whether the sublating cognition will lead to sublation, then the sublation itself is not known to be unsublated. 
बाधितबाधशङ्कायाश्चाबाध्यत्वाविरोधात् | If however, the doubt regarding the sublatability of the sublating cognition has been sublated itself, then there is nothing to opposing the unsublatability of the sublating cognition. 
भाविबाधशङ्कापातेन स्वक्रियाव्याघातश्च स्यात् | If a doubt regarding the future sublatability of the world is cited, it will harm the very purpose of the advaitin. If a doubt regarding future sublation always persists, what is the reason for any activity in the present? 
शङ्काप्रत्यक्षेऽपि शङ्कायां शङ्कापि न सिद्ध्येत् | If one perceives a doubt about the doubt itself, then the doubt itself does not achieve its result. 
एवं सर्वत्र शङ्काप्रसारात् सर्वविप्लवापत्तिरिति Therefore, if everything is up for doubt, nothing can be achieved.

The siddhikAra responds:
- इति चेत्, मैवं मंस्था: | No, that is not my position. Only if there is a genuine reason, is there scope for doubt. I am not saying doubt should be entertained without rhyme or reason.
यत: समत्वेन प्रमाणान्तरे उपस्थित एव निश्चितेऽपि सत्त्वादौ शङ्का भवतीति ब्रूम:, Because there is another equal pramANa which provides certainty to a contradictory result to this pramANa, can there be a doubt.
नतु निश्चितमात्रे शङ्का भवतीति | It is not merely on account of there being certainty that a particular pramANa is incorrect.

तथाच यदुक्तं बौद्धं प्रति भट्टवार्तिके - "दुष्टज्ञानगृहीतार्थप्रतिषेधोऽपि युज्यते | गृहीतमात्रबाधे तु स्वपक्षोऽपि न सिद्ध्यति ||" इति,
The nyAyAmRtakAra had quoted from kumArila bhaTTa's sloka vArtikam, which was directed against the buddhist. The verse says: "If a defect is cited and as a result of which, something that appears is deemed to be incorrect, that is acceptable. If on the other hand, if everything that appears is deemed to be incorrect, then the appearance of such a denial itself must be denied." 
तदपि न विरुध्यते ; गृहीतमात्रबाधस्य तच्छङ्कायाश्चानुक्ते: |  That too does not contradict the advaita position, because we do not say there is a doubt about the reality of the world simply on account of its appearance - we say so on the basis of shruti revealing that duality is unreal. 

The nyAyAmRtakAra comes up with further objections:
ननु - सत्त्वादिप्रत्यक्षे क्लृप्तदूरादिदोषाभावनिश्चये कथं शङ्कोदय:, In the absence of any defects such as distance etc, how can a doubt about reality revealed by perception arise?
नच - क्लृप्तानामभावनिश्चयेऽप्यक्लृप्तस्य शङ्का स्यात् ; Nor can it be argued that even when one is unaware of perception being defective, there may be defects that one is unaware of (e.g. the unknown unknowns). 
शब्दे क्लृप्तवक्तृनिबन्धदोषस्य नित्यत्वेन वेदे अभावेऽपि दोषान्तरशङ्काया: सुवचतत्वात्, Such an argument can be turned against the speaker itself - even if one is unaware of defects in the eternal shruti, it is possible for other defects to be present. 
नच - स्वाप्नप्रत्यक्षे तदा दूराद्यभावनिश्चयेऽप्यप्रमाण्यदर्शनेन तद्वदत्रापि शङ्केति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued that even if there are no defects such as distance etc in the dream perception, it is said to be invalid, similarly here too a doubt can exist in relation to the validity of what is being seen.
शून्यमेव तत्त्वमिति स्वाप्नवेदेऽपि तदा भ्रान्त्यादिदोषाभावनिश्चयेऽप्यप्रामाण्यदर्शनस्य वेदेऽपि समानत्वात्; An illusory sentence heard in the dream "Everything is shUnyam" which is mistaken to be part of a veda while in the dream is said to be invalid, so can we say that in the waking state too, the same logic applies to the veda?
(If you argue that like the dream-state perception despite being defect-free is still deemed invalid, and therefore the waking-state perception must also be deemed invalid, despite being defect-free, I will argue that the dream veda despite being defect-free is deemed invalid, so why is the veda heard in the waking state not be deemed invalid?)

स्वप्नवैषम्यानुभवस्तूभयत्रापि समान - The difference in the reality of the dream state and waking state is equal - whether we are using it to compare perception or the veda. 

The siddhikAra says in reply:
- इति चेत्, न; If this is the argument, no.
सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षाद्वैतागमयो: क्लृप्तदोषाभावनिश्चयस्य समानत्वेन प्रामाण्यशङ्कायामप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् | Even though there is a similarity between perception that reveals reality and shruti talking of non duality (the certainty that defects are absent in both), that in itself is not sufficient to prevent a doubt from arising.
नहि सत्प्रतिपक्षे उभयत्र दोषाभावनिश्चय: किमत्र तत्त्वमिति जिज्ञासां प्रतिबध्नाति; In the satpratipaksha hetvAbhAsa, there are two contradicting reasons which are certainly defect free, and thus this certainty does not prevent one from having the  doubt, which one of the two is correct? 

The nyAyAmritakAra may argue that when there is visheSha darshana about any alternative, that will prevent a doubt from arising. What is visheSha darshana? If a person sees an object from a distance and does not know if that object is a man or a tree, upon spotting some specific features such as arms etc, or leaves etc, such a doubt may be prevented. In the case of shruti and pratyaksha, the visheSha darshana is certainty about the absence of defects. That being present, how can doubts arise?

विरुद्धविशेषादर्शनकालिकस्यैव विशेष शङ्काप्रतिबन्धकत्वात्;  A visheSha darshana from one pramANa can prevent a doubt from arising only if there is no other visheSha darshana from another pramANa, which contradicts this one. 

Now the siddhikAra refutes another argument of the nyAyAmritakAra in relation to sAkshi pratyaksha.

अवच्छेदकवृत्त्यनित्यत्वेन च साक्षिप्रत्यक्षस्य दोषजन्यत्वोक्ते: | It has already been said that despite consciousness being eternal and defect free, the sAkshi is consciousness associated with a delimiting cognition, which is non-eternal and defective, and that can affect the ultimate reality of the object revealed by the sAkshi. 

The nyAyAmRtakAra continues:
अतएव यदुक्तं तार्किकै: - " तदेव ह्याशङ्क्यते यस्मिन्नाशङ्क्यमाने स्वक्रियाव्याघातादयो दोषा न भवन्ति" |
udayanAchArya had said, "Only that can be doubted which does not result in disproving oneself".
उक्तंच भट्टवार्तिके बौद्धं प्रति - " इह जन्मनि केषाञ्चिन्न तावदुपपद्यते | योग्यावस्थागतानां तु न विद्म: किं भविष्यति||" इति |
kumArila bhaTTa had said against the buddhist - "No one in this present birth knows that the world is unreal. If it is said that yogis can realise this truth, how can we, being ignorant, postulate that a yogi will see it thus?"
तथा च प्रामाण्यस्योत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ च स्वतस्त्वादिह Therefore, because we admit that the validity of a pramANa is both upon its rise, and when it is known,
चोत्पत्तिस्वतस्त्वापवादस्य दोषस्य ज्ञप्तिस्वतस्त्वापवादस्य बाधस्य चादर्शनात्, and since any doubt in relation to the validity of perception when rising is absent because of it is defect free, and any doubt in relation to its validity when cognised is absent because there is no sublating cognition present
निर्मूलशङ्कायाश्च स्वक्रियाविरोधेनानुत्थानाभ्युपगमात् and because a baseless doubt is not accepted on the basis that it will harm one's own purpose, 
स्वस्थं प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रामाण्यमिति the validity of perception is absolutely certain.

The siddhikAra replies
- तदपि निरस्तम्; आगमादिप्रमाणमूलकशङ्काया एव स्वीकारात् | This too has been refuted, because the  basis of the doubt is only because of its contradiction with shruti.

रूप्यादिनिषेधस्य तु "नेदं रजत"मित्यादेरद्वैतश्रुत्यनुगुणत्वेन नाप्रामाण्यशङ्कास्कन्दनम् | The negation of shell silver by the cognition "this is not silver" is not up for doubt, because the shruti-s revealing advaita are supportive it. 
अतो न वृद्धिमिच्छतो मूलहान्यापत्ति : | Thus you cannot argue that we have lost our principal in an effort to earn interest.
नापि 'सन्घट' इत्यादे 'र्नेदं रजत' मित्यनेन समानयोगक्षेमता ; Nor is the cognition "the pot exists" comparable to the cognition "this is not silver".
अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधाविरोधाभ्यां विशेषात् | The first one is contrary to advaita shruti, whereas the second one is not.

अतएव - सौषुप्तिकानन्दानुभवस्याप्यप्रामाण्ये कथमात्मन आनन्दरूपता तात्त्विकी, आनन्दश्रुतेरनुभूतातात्त्विकानन्दानुवादकत्वोपपत्तेरिति - अपास्तम् ;
Thus, the following statement has been rejected too: "One can similarly argue that the shruti which talks of Atma's nature revealed in deep sleep as bliss, is also unreal, as it is simply a repetition of one's experience".
आनन्दस्य ब्रह्मरूपत्वेनाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधाभावेन तदप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकाभावात् | अतएव नानदश्रुतेरप्रामाण्यम् | The nature of Brahman is not contradictory to shruti revealing non-duality and therefore it does not imply its invalidity.

When one is certain about something, a contrarian cognition will not arise. However, this rule has an exception in verbal cognitions. Despite certainty that water cannot catch fire, the words "The lake is on fire", lead to their cognition. The verbal cognition may be invalid, but so long as one understands the words, mere certainty about outcome does not prevent a contrarian verbal cognitions from rising.

तदुक्तं खण्डने - "अत्यन्तासत्यपि ज्ञानमर्थे शब्द: करोति हि | अबाधात्तु प्रमामत्र स्वत: प्रामाण्यनिश्चलाम् ||" इति |  As was said by Sriharsha in the khaNDana - "Even if the object of verbal cognitions is totally wrong (atyanta asati), the words will certainly generate knowledge. However, the validity of words need not always be necessarily present. Here (in the case of shruti) though, not only does it have intrinsic validity, its object is also unsublated. Therefore one can be certain that shruti will generate valid, uncontradictable knowledge.

This is supportive to advaita, but the nyAyAmRtakAra had quoted it to say that previous advaita teachers had supported the intrinsic validity of perception.

उक्तचं सुरेश्वरवार्तिके - "अतोऽवबोधकत्वेन दुष्टकारणवर्जनात् | अबाधाच्च प्रमाणत्वं वस्तुन्यक्षादिवच्छ्रुते: ||" इति | It was also said by sureshvarAchArya in his vArttika - "advaita shruti is just like perception in that it generates certain knowledge, it arises from a defect free source, its object is unsublated."

The nyAyAmRtakAra had seized upon this to argue that sureshvarAchArya himself agrees perception is valid. To this, the siddhikAra says:
अत्र च चाक्षादिवदिति निर्दशनं व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यमात्रेणेति द्रष्टव्यम् | The words "like in the case of visual cognitions, etc." is only a concession that perception has empirical validity (not that it is ultimately valid).

एवंच तात्त्विकप्रामाण्याभावेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादीनां व्यवाहिरकप्रामाण्याभ्युपगमात् न स्वक्रियाव्याघात: | Thereby, even if perception etc do not have ultimate validity, this does not lead to the failure of all activity because it still has empirical validity. 

न वा "प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम् | त्रयं सुविदितं कार्ये धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सता ||" इत्यादि स्मृतिविरोध: |
Neither is there a contradiction with manusmRti - "Three things ought to be known well to determine dharma - perception, inference and scripture". Here too, smRti is talking of perception's empirical validity. 
तस्मात्सिद्धं बाधनिश्चयेन तच्छङ्क्या वा प्रत्यक्षादेरद्वैतागमानुमानाद्यविरोधित्वम् || Therefore, based on the certainty of future sublation, or based on a doubt regarding it, inference and scripture cannot be overruled by perception.
This concludes the chapter on the future sublatability of the world.