paricCheda 1 - asatassādhakatvopapatti:

अथासतस्साधकत्वोपपत्ति: |

The opponent wishes to argue that the inference of the world's unreality has another set of defects. He says that unreal things (ie things which are sublatable) are not able to prove / establish / achieve anything. His argument is that things which have vyAvhArika satya (empirical reality) cannot be mithyA, because they have utility - they are used to achieve things transactionally. Unreal things cannot prove / achieve anything.

The opponent argues:
ननु - सत्त्वसाधकानां मिथ्यात्वसाधकानुमानेभ्य: प्राबल्यम् ; Those (pramANas) that establish the reality (of the world) are stronger than the inference that establishes the mithyAtva of the world. Why?

मिथ्यात्वसाधकप्रतिज्ञाद्युपनीत पक्षादीनां मिथ्यात्वाबोधने सर्वमिथ्यात्वासिद्धि:, Because, if the elements constituting the pratijnA (of the inference) such as the paksha etc., are not proven to be mithyA by the very inference of the mithyAtva of the world, it follows that universal mithyAtva stands unproven.

The opponent's argument is as follows: The inference of the world's mithyAtva follows the statement of the inferential reasoning - "The world is mithyA, like the shell silver". Are the elements of the inferential statement - such as the word "the world" - ie the paksha, or the words "The world is mithyA" (the hypothesis) - mithyA? If they are not mithyA, then as the world consists of words and objects denoted by words, it stands that there are some things in the world (such as these words), which are not mithyA. Thus universal mithyAtva stands disproven. If on the other hand, the words are mithyA, they are false - and how can false statements prove something real?

तद्बोधने परस्परव्याहतिराश्रयासिद्ध्यादिकं चेति - If the inference does prove that those words are mithyA, a statement containing mithyA words cannot prove anything, and if it cannot prove anything, it cannot prove that the words are mithyA either - leading to a paradoxical outcome. This would lead to AshrayAsiddhi etc - the paksha itself would end up not existing, so how can such an inference prove anything?

The siddhikAra responds to this argument - 

- चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.

मिथ्यात्वसाधकप्रतिज्ञाद्युपनीतपक्षादीनां मिथ्यात्वबोधनेऽपि व्याहत्यभावात्, Even if the elements of the pratijnA (the hypothesis of the inference), such as paksha, etc., are proven to be mithyA by the very same inference, that in itself will not invalidate the inference.

प्रतिज्ञादिभिस्तेषां त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपसत्त्वाप्रतिपादनात् | Because the pratijnA etc., does not prove the existence of the words in all three periods of time.

ननु - साधकत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या परमार्थसत्त्वमायाति परमार्थसत एव साधकत्वात्, साधकताया: प्राक् सत्त्वघटितत्वात्, 
The opponent states his case - As its ability to prove (mithyAtva) cannot exist otherwise, it follows that the proof must be ultimately real for it to be a proof (that is, the proof must be ultimately real if it is seeking to prove something). The proof's ability to prove something presupposes that the proof be real.

नतु धीमात्रविषयत्वं, अपरोक्षधीविषयत्वं, सत्त्वेन तादृशधीविषयत्वम् वा साधकताप्रयोजकम्; तुच्छे नित्यातीन्द्रिये चातिव्याप्त्यव्याप्तिभ्याम् |
None of - 1) being the object of cognition, 2) being the object of direct cognition, or 3) being known as existent by being the object of cognition - is sufficient to prove its object.

The first alternative (धीमात्रविषयत्वं) stretches the definition beyond its remit (ativyApti), because absolutely absent (tucCha) objects are the object of cognition too - they are the objects of vikalpa vritti, as stated in the yoga sUtra 1.9 
शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः

The second alternative (
अपरोक्षधीविषयत्वं), does not cover all cases (avyApti), because objects that are beyond sensory perception, such as dharma (puNya) and adharma (pApa) are not perceptible, but are still capable of causing happiness and sorrow respectively. 

तत्त्वेन ज्ञानमपि न तत्र प्रयोजकम्; वह्नित्वेनाज्ञातेपि वह्नौ दाहकत्वदर्शनात्, वह्नित्वेन ज्ञातेऽपि गुञ्जापुञ्जे तददर्शनाच्च, Nor is the cognition revealing the nature of the object sufficient to establish its causative power, because fire's ability to burn exists even when it is not known to be fire, and even when something is known as fire, it is insufficient to establish its capacity to burn, because sometimes a pile of red berries is mistaken to be a flame, which is incapable of burning. 

नापि त्रिचतुरकक्ष्यास्वबाधितासत्त्वप्रतीतिस्तन्त्रम्;
Nor does revealing something to be real three or four times (ie it is not contradicted those times) confer the ability to prove something. 

आत्मनो गौरवत्वेनानित्यत्वस्य नभसो नैल्येन स्पर्शवत्वस्य चापत्ते:, गौरोऽहं 'नीलम् नभ' इत्यादिप्रतीतावपि त्रिचतुरकक्ष्यस्वबाधात्, Because the notions 'I am fair' or 'I am not eternal' or 'the sky is blue' which are not contradicted many times, but that in itself does not prove that the self has colour or the sky is really blue.

Therefore, the only way a pramANa can prove the reality of something is if that pramANa itself is real.

यौक्तिकबाधस्य त्वन्मते प्रकृतेऽपि भावादिति Thus these kinds of logical contradictions exist, even according to you, in your inferential reasoning.

This was the argument of the opponent. The siddhikAra responds -

- चेन्न; No.
यादृश्या बुध्या तव नभोनैल्यादिधीव्यावृत्त्या घटादौ सत्त्वसिद्धि:, तादृक्बुद्धिविषयत्वस्यैव साधकत्वे तन्त्रत्वात् | The cognition (basis) by which it is possible for you to say that the pot is real whereas the sky is not blue, even when it appears so,  the same basis is sufficient for proving / establishing / achieving something. 

अत एव लोकप्रसिद्धिस्तन्त्रमितीष्टसिद्ध्युक्तमप्युक्ताभिप्रायेण सम्यगेव | That is why vimuktAtman's statement in the iShTasiddhi - "(this is a) well known means (vyAvahArika jnAna) to establish the mithyAtva of the world" - is appropriate, because it was said with this in mind.

एवं त्रिचतुरकक्ष्यास्वबाधिता वादिप्रतिवादिप्राश्निकादीनाम् सत्त्वबुद्धिस्तन्त्रमित्युपपन्नमेव | In the same way, that which is unsublated after being challenged by opponents and questioners etc three or four times is accepted as sufficient to establish that the object is real. (However such a proof is not proof of its absolute reality, merely its transactional reality).

गुञ्जापुञ्जस्य वह्नित्वे आत्मनो गौरत्वे नभसो नीलत्वे च तादृग्बुद्धिविषयत्वस्य तवाप्यसंप्रतिपत्ते: ; You also must accept that mistaking a pile of red berries to be a flame, or thinking that one is fair, etc., or that the sky is blue are disproven by such a test (when it is tested 2-3 times, its falsity is proven). 

अन्यथा तेषामपि तत्र सत्त्वसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् | If it is not accepted, you will have to admit that those mistaken notions are also true.

Therefore, the following argument by the opponent is also incorrect: 
अथ - यादृश्या शब्दे क्लृप्तदोषरहितया बुद्ध्या तव ब्रह्मणि सत्त्वसिद्धि:, तादृश्या प्रत्यक्षे क्लृप्तदोषरहितया मम जगति सत्त्वसिद्धिरस्तु साधकतुल्यत्वादिति - चेन्न;
"Just like the absence of defects in the shruti is accepted by you (the advaitin) as sufficient to prove the absolute reality of Brahman, the absence of defects in perception is sufficient for me (the dvaitin) to prove the reality of the world. Our standard of proof is thus the same."

ब्रह्मसत्त्वबुद्धिवत् जगत्सत्त्वबुद्धेरबाधितत्वाभावात्, त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपस्य सत्त्वस्य प्रत्यक्षाविषयताया उक्तत्वाच्च | (The reason why that argument is flawed, is because) unlike the cognition of the Brahman's reality, the cognition of the world is sublated. Further, it has already been stated (in a previous chapter) that the nature of reality revealed by perception is not unsublatability in all three periods of time. 

नच - बुद्धिविषयत्वस्य तन्त्रत्वे वह्नित्वेनाज्ञातस्य वह्नेरदाहकत्वप्रसङ्ग:, अमृतत्वेन ज्ञातस्य च विषस्य सञ्जीवकत्वप्रसङ्ग इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor is the following argument of the opponent valid: "If simply cognising a thing is proving its reality, then if something is not known to be fire, it should not burn, and simply thinking that something is amRtam (elixir), should be sufficient to confer immortality." 

There is no requirement that everyone should know fire to be fire for it to burn - as long as someone knows it as such, that is sufficient. 

वह्नौ तादृग्बुद्धिविषयत्वस्येश्वरादिसाधारणस्य सत्त्वात्, विषे सञ्जीवकत्वप्रसङ्गस्य नभोनैल्यादितुल्यत्वात् |  Ishvara, who is omniscient, does know that the object is fire. Consuming poison leading to immortality, or considering the sky to be blue, can be similarly addressed (They do not end up correct just because someone has a notion, albeit, an incorrect one, about them. Rather, they are incorrect, because they are subsequently superseded by right cognitions.).

वस्तुतस्तु - ज्ञाताज्ञातसाधारणं व्यावहारिकं सत्त्वमेव साधकत्वे तन्त्रम् ; Really speaking, whether something is known or unknown, as long as it has empirical reality, that is a sufficient basis for its effectiveness (utility).

तच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाध्यत्वमेव; तच्च न मिथ्यात्वघटितम् ; Empirical reality is defined as that which remains unsublated by any cognition other than the cognition of Brahman. Such a reality is not bound up with the concept of mithyAtva. Empirical reality does not presuppose the acceptance of its mithyAtva - for example, the dvaitin agrees that objects in the world are empirically valid, even when he does not accept they are mithyA. Therefore, it cannot be argued that empirical reality and mithyAtva are mutually dependent - that the acceptance of one presupposes the acceptance of the other. We say that that which is empirically real is mithyA, even when one is not aware of it. To know something as empirically real, one need not accept its mithyAtva, and vice versa.

अत्यन्ताबाध्ये ब्रह्मज्ञानबाध्ये च तुल्यत्वात् अत एव नेदं परमार्थसत्त्वव्याप्यम् | As effectiveness is equally true for the eternally unsublated and that which is only sublated by cognition of Brahman, effectiveness does not imply absolute reality.

एवंच परमार्थसत्त्वस्य साधकतायामतन्त्रत्वेन तदभावेऽपि न साधकतानुपपत्ति: | Moreover, it is not necessary that the proof needs to be ultimately real for it be capable of proving its object. Therefore, in the absence of absolute reality, its ability to prove its object is not compromised. 

एतेन - व्यावहारिकत्वम् ब्रह्मज्ञानबाध्यत्वम् वा, व्यावहारिकविषयत्वे सति सत्त्वं वा, सत्त्वेन व्यवहारमात्रं वा | नाद्य:, मिथ्यात्वसिद्धे: प्राक् तदसिद्ध्या अन्योन्याश्रयात् | नापि द्वितीय:, तस्यास्माकं मिथ्यात्वाविरोधित्वेनेष्टत्वात् | न तृतीय:, सत्त्वाभावे साधकत्वानुपपत्तेरिति - निरस्तम् ;
By this, the following argument of the opponent is refuted:

"Does empirical reality mean that the thing in question is 1) sublated by the cognition of Brahman 2) being capable of being transacted with, while being real 3) it is transacted with the notion that it is real.
It is not the first, because before establishing its mithyAtva, one cannot establish its empirical reality - the two ideas are mutually dependent. 

It is not the second either, because such a definition of empirical reality does not imply the mithyAtva of the object, and hence desirable to us.
It is not the third, if something happens to be not real, it cannot have effectiveness, i.e. prove the mithyAtva of the world.

उक्तनिरुक्तेरदुष्टत्वात् | (The argument is flawed), our definition of empirical reality, does not suffer from these defects. 

Nor is the following argument valid:
नच - हेत्वादीनाम् व्यावहारिकसत्त्वे साध्यस्यापि व्यावहारिकसत्त्वमेव स्यादनुमितिविषयसाध्यस्य परामर्शविषयहेतुना समानसत्ताकत्वनियमादिति - वाच्यम् ;
If the hetu, paksha etc. in the inference are empirically real, the sAdhya of the inference, i.e mithyAtva would also be empirically real.  The object of the inferential cognition being the sAdhya, it must as a rule be of the same order of reality as the object of the concomitance, the hetu

दृश्यत्ववन्मिथ्यात्वस्यापि व्यावहरिकत्वेन समानसत्ताकत्वस्येष्टत्वात्, Such an outcome is desirable to us -  mithyAtva is of the same order of reality as knowability, the hetu in the inference of the world's mithyAtva (see the chapter on mithyAtvasya mithyAtva). 

समानसत्ताकत्वनियमासिद्धेश्च, धूलीपटले धूमभ्रमादपि वह्न्युमितिप्रदर्शनात्, However, it must be stated that there is no rule that the hetu and the sAdhya in the inference must be of the same order of reality. Sometimes one mistakes a dust-cloud to be smoke and use that smoke as a hetu to infer the presence of fire. It may end up that the fire is actually present. Thus in such a scenario, the sAdhya (fire) is empirically real (vyAvahArika), whereas the hetu (smoke) is only apparently real (prAtibhAsika). 

Similarly it is possible that a vyAvahArika hetu leads to a prAtibhAsika sAdhya. It is accepted that the earth is the element that is endowed with the attribute of smell. (Each of the elements inherits the attributes of its cause, while having a unique attribute that its cause does not possess). In nyAya, it is accepted that in the first instance of the pot's creation, it does not possess smell. They argue that the pot gets the attribute of smell only from the second instance of its creation. The siddhikAra uses this as an example to present the instance where someone uses the right reason to arrive at the wrong answer. 

गन्धव्याप्यपृथिवीत्वप्रमातोऽपि गन्धप्रागभावावच्छिन्ने घटे पक्षे बाधास्फूर्तिदशायामनुमितिभ्रमदर्शनाच्च | Even when it is valid that whatever is made of earth has the attribute of smell, when it is argued on this basis that the first instance of the pot's creation also must have smell it would be contradicted (in nyAya).

This is a pretty odd position taken by the naiyyAyika, but we don't argue the rightness or wrongness of it, we merely use this to establish that it is possible for the right reasons to lead to wrong results.

मिथ्यात्वस्य मिथ्यात्वेऽपि तत्वावेदकश्रुतिवेद्यत्वोपपत्ति:, Even if mithyAtva itself is mithyA, it is possible for a (mithyA) shruti to reveal absolute reality.
सत्त्वेन सत इव मिथ्यात्वेन मिथ्याभूतस्यापि प्रमाणगम्यत्वाविरोधात्, Because its validity is not affected in revealing a mithyA thing as mithyA, just like revealing a real thing as real. 
एकांशे तत्त्वावेदकत्वाभावेऽपि अपरांशे तत्त्वावेदकत्वोपपत्ते: | Even if in one aspect, it were to reveal an entity that does not have ultimate reality (karma kANDa revealing karma),  it is possible to reveal an absolutely real entity in another aspect (the jnAna kANDa revealing Brahman).

ननु - व्यावहारिकत्वं साधकतायामतन्त्रं ; अज्ञानादिसाधके परमार्थसति साक्षिणी तदभावादिति - चेन्न;
The following argument is not correct - "Empirical reality is an insufficient basis for effectiveness, because the sAkshi, the inner witness, which is absolutely real, reveals ignorance which is only  empirically real. If something had to be empirically real for it to have utility, that rule fails in the case of the inner witness, which is absolutely real."

ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाध्यत्वस्यात्यन्ताबाध्यत्वेऽपि सत्त्वस्योक्तत्वात् | It has already been said that which is unsublated by anything other than the cognition of Brahman, has the ability to be effective. Such a definition applies to both the ultimate real (that which is eternally unsublated) and the empirically real (that which is unsublated by anything other the cognition of Brahman). 

Here the siddhikAra does not challenge the notion that the inner witness is ultimately real. Therefore, this is a case of abhyupetya vAda - even if that was the case, there is no problem to our argument.

त्रैविध्यविभागे पारमार्थिकव्यावृत्तव्यावहारिकत्वनिरुक्तावपि जनकतायां तत्साधारण्येऽप्यदोषात् | In the chapter on the three orders of reality, even though empirical reality will be distinguished from ultimate reality, in being effective, they both are equally capable.

वस्तुतस्तु - साक्ष्यप्यज्ञानोपहित एवाज्ञानादिसाधक:, स च व्यावहारिक एव ; However, in reality, the inner witness is consciousness delimited by ignorance. It is also capable of revealing ignorance. It is also only empirically real. 

अनुपहितेन परमार्थसदाकारेण तस्यासाधकत्वात्, Further, as pure consciousness, as the ultimately real entity, it is not able to reveal ignorance. Thus, truly speaking, the one ultimate reality does not have utility, as it is not associated with anything else.

एवंच व्यावहारिकसत्त्वमेव सर्वत्र साधकतायां प्रयोजकमिति स्थितम् | Therefore, it stands proven that it is empirical reality alone that is universally capable of denoting effectiveness. 

यथाचाज्ञानोपहितस्य साक्षित्वेऽपि नात्माश्रयादिदोष:, तथोक्तं दृश्यत्वहेतूपपादने प्राक् ; अग्रे च वक्ष्यते | It had been said in the chapter on knowability (dRshyatva), that there is no case of self dependency or AtmAshraya on account of the inner witness being delimited by ignorance.  This will be further discussed in the future.

यत्र च यत्साधकं व्यावहारिकं, तत्र तद्व्यावहारिकम् ; यत्र तु साधकं प्रातीतिकम्, तत्र फलमपि तत्रैव ; Where the establishing means is empirically real, the established entity is empirically real too. Where the establishing means is apparently real, the established entity is also apparently real only.

 न तु व्यावहारिकमिति सर्वविधिप्रतिषेधादिव्यवहारासङ्कर: | Therefore, there needs to be no confusion that an empirically real portion of the vedas dealing with injunctions and prohibitions has no utility in empirically real transactions based on such instructions. 

अतएव -  लोकस्यापि व्यतिक्रमे विचारस्य यादृच्छिकवाङ्गमात्रतापत्तिरित्युदयनोक्तमपि - निरस्तम् ; Thus the following statement by udayanAchArya which was quoted to support the opponent's stand, stands refuted - "If enquiry is conducted in a manner contrary to that which is universally accepted, then it can only lead to a situation of anything goes, i.e anything that occurs in one's head is stated in argument.

व्यावहारिकसत्त्वेन लोकमर्यादानतिक्रमात् | It is refuted because what we have said does not go against worldly convention - in fact we are stating that it is empirically real, because it is accepted empirically. 

The opponent had quoted kumArila bhaTTa's words (सत्यत्वं न सामन्यं मृषार्थपरमार्थयोः, विरोधात्, न हि सिंहत्वं सामान्यं सिंहवृक्षयोः - reality cannot be common to both the unreal and the real, for that would be contradictory. Just like one does not say that both the tree and the lion share the common attribute of lion-ness) in support.  

भट्टाचार्यवचनानि विरुद्धत्वेन भासमानानि सत्त्वत्रैविध्यानिरूपणायामविरोधेन व्याख्यास्यन्ते | The siddhikAra says - even if the great teacher Bhatta's words appear to be opposed to this, but we will prove that is not so, in the chapter on sattAtraividhyanirUpaNam - establishing the three orders of reality. 

तस्मात् पक्षादिसर्वमिथ्यात्वसाधनेऽपि न व्याहति: || Thus, there is no contradiction in saying that the inference is capable of establishing the mithyAtva of the world, even when every component in the inference, such as paksha etc is mithyA.

इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ असत: साधकत्वोपपत्ति: | This concludes the chapter on asata: sAdhakatva upapatti.