paricCheda 1 - asata: sAdhakatvAbhAve bAdhakanirUpaNam (part 1)
अथासत: साधकत्वाभावे बाधकनिरूपणम् |
In the previous chapter, it was established that even objects that are vyAvahArika, that is, have empirical reality (but not ultimate reality) are capable of being sAdhaka-s, i.e., achieving / proving things. The opponent in this chapter argues that mithyA objects cannot have sAdhakatva (asata: sAdhakatvAbhAva:). The siddhikAra provides logic to refute that view in this chapter (hence, asata: sAdhakatvAbhAve bAdhakanirUpaNam).
view is that only ultimately real objects are capable of achieving something.
In response, the advaitin argues that all that is required for achieving
something is that the object is not asat, it is tucChavilakshaNam.
The opponent argues that such a position suffers from the flaw of gauravatva,
ननु - सत्त्वापेक्षया तुच्छविलक्षणत्वादेर्गौरवतरत्वेन साधकत्वे कथं तन्त्रत्वमिति -चेन्न ;
The opponent says - To prove sAdhakatva, or the power to establish things, if instead of saying that the object is sat, if it is held that it is not asat, then such a position is superfluous, it suffers from gauravatva. How can that be the basis then?
The siddhikAra says - no. What do you mean by sat?
त्रिकालबाधविरहरूपस्य सत्त्वस्य लघुत्वाभावात्, A sat (reality) which means unsublatability in all three periods of time is not parsimonious (compared to saying it is not asat)
जात्यादिरूपस्य तस्य मिथ्यात्वाविरोधित्वात्, If that (sat, or reality) is something which is a jAti (ie a category of things), then such a conception is not contradictory to mithyAtva (the opponent's intent is not achieved)
उभयसिद्धे सद्विविक्ते साधकत्वदर्शनेन पारमार्थिकसत्त्वस्य साधकत्वाप्रयोजकत्वाच्च | Something that both (dvaitin and the advaitin) agree is not sat, is seen to have sAdhakatva. Further, pAramArthikatva does not imply sAdhakatva.
- प्रतिबिम्बे बिम्बसाधकत्वं तावदस्ति | To explain - the reflection proves the existence of
तस्य बिम्बात्मना सत्त्वेऽपि प्रतिबिम्बाकारेणासत्त्वात् परमार्थसत्त्वं न साधकत्वे प्रयोजकम् | Even though that (the reflection) is real when seen as the original, as the reflection, it is not real - therefore, it follows that it is not necessary that only real things have sAdhakatva.
एवं स्वप्नार्थस्यासतोऽपि भाविशुभाशुभसूचकत्वम् | Similarly, even though dreams are unreal, they are able to indicate good / bad events in the waking state.
यद्यपि तत्रत्यदर्शनस्यैव सूचकत्वम् ; Even if it is argued that, while the dream object is unreal, the dream jnAna (cognition) is real, and therefore it is only a real cognition that is an indication of good / bad events…
'पुरुषम् कृष्णं कृष्णदन्तं पश्यती'त्यादिश्रुतिबलात् ; for example, on the basis of the shruti which says "if you see a dark man with black teeth in the dream, (know that that indicates the death of the dreamer)".
तथापि दर्शनमात्रस्यातिप्रसक्तत्वेन विषयोऽप्यवश्यमपेक्षणीय एव | Even then, to say that only the cognition has sAdhakatva, is an untenable extension, because the dream cognition presupposes dream objects.
एवं स्फटिकलौहित्यस्य उपाधिसन्निधानसाधकत्वं च | Similarly, the redness of the crystal establishes that there is an upAdhi (an adjunct, ie a red flower) close-by.
नच - लौहित्यं स्फटिके न मिथ्या, किन्तु धर्ममात्रप्रतिबिम्ब इति न पृथगुदाहरणमिति - वाच्यम् | It cannot be argued that - The redness of a crystal is not mithyA (ie, is real). It is the reflection of the attribute of the upAdhi in the crystal. Thus, it is not a different example to the one of reflection provided earlier.
धर्मिभूतमुखादिनैरपेक्ष्येण तद्धर्मभूतरूपादिप्रतिबिम्बादर्शनात्, One never observes the reflection of the attribute (form) alone, without the substance (the face) that has the form. Thus, the redness of the crystal is not a case of reflection.
प्रतिबिम्बस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वनियमेन लौहित्यस्य स्फटिके व्याप्यवृत्तिप्रतीत्ययोगाच्च | Moreover, there is a difference in the two examples. The reflection occupies only a part of the mirror (avyApya vRtti), whereas the redness observed in the crystal pervades the crystal in its entirety (vyApya vRtti).
लौहित्ये स्फटिकस्य त्वारोपे तस्य प्रतिबिम्बत्वम्, स्फटिके लौहित्यारोपे तु तस्य मिथ्यात्वमिति विवेक: | If the crystal had been superimposed on the redness, then that can be classified as a reflection. Whereas here, the redness is superimposed on the crystal (it appears to belong to the crystal). Thus, such a redness must be mithyA. That is the difference.
स्फटिकमणेरिवोपधाननिमित्तो लोहितिमेति लोहितिम्नो मिथ्यात्वं दर्शितं प्रतिबिम्बसत्यत्ववादिभि: पञ्चपादिकाकृद्भि: | Even the author of the panchapAdika (padmapAdAchArya) who considers reflections to be real (because they are identical with the original), shows that the redness of the crystal is unreal with the words - “Like the crystal whose redness is on account of the proximate object”.
एवं रेखातादात्म्येनारोपितानां वर्णानामर्थसाधकत्वं | Similarly, varNa-s, the letters of a language are superimposed on written lines (the script) and together, they indicate sound / meaning. The script is not the letter itself, the letter is assumed to be the script, by convention.
- रेखास्मारिता वर्णा एवार्थसाधका इति - वाच्यम् ; It cannot be argued that it is not superimposed letters,
but letters that are recollected by the written script, that confer meaning.
आशैशवमयं ककारोऽयं गकार इत्यनुभवात् अभेदेनैव स्मरणात्, विवेके सत्यपि दृढतरसंस्कारवशात् नारोपनिवृत्ति: | We recall them as being identical with the letters, such as this set of lines is the sound “ka”, this is “ga”, etc. Even when one knows the difference, as the association is so strong, that superimposition is not removed.
अतएव ककारं पठति लिखति चेति सार्वलौकिको व्यवहार: | As a result, we observe everyday usage like “He is reading ‘ka’, writing ‘ka’, etc.”.
वर्णारोपितदीर्घह्रस्वत्वादीनाम् च नगो नागो इत्यादावर्थविशेषप्रत्यायकत्वम् | Further, the superimposition of elongations/shortening of the vowels in the script allows for the distinct comprehension of the meanings of words such as naga (tree / mountain) and nAga (snake / elephant) – they share the same consonants, but the meanings are different on account of the elongations in the vowels, indicated by the script.
नच - वर्णेष्वनारोपितध्वनिसाहित्यं तदभिव्यक्तिरूपं वा दैर्घ्यं प्रत्यायकम्, एवं ह्रस्वत्वादिकमपीति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued thus – It is the unsuperimposed sound which manifests as the elongation or shortening, not the script.
ध्वनीनामस्फुरणेऽपि दीर्घो वर्ण इत्यादिप्रत्ययात् | Because, even when the sound itself is not heard, it is possible to infer that the speaker is trying to say an elongated vowel.
ननु - आरोपितेन वर्णदैर्घ्यादिना कथं तात्त्विकार्थसिद्धि:, न ह्यारोपितेन धूमेन तात्त्विकवह्निसिद्धिरिति - चेन्न;
The opponent says – “How can a superimposed elongation / shortening of letters indicate a real meaning? For, an unreal smoke does not prove the presence of a real fire.”
The siddhikAra says - no.
साधकतावच्छेदकरूपवत्वमेव साधकताया: प्रयोजकं, न त्वारोपितत्वमनारोपितत्वं वा – The ability to prove something is because of the characteristic of sAdhakatva, not whether it happens to be real or not.
धूमाभासस्य त्वसाधकत्वम्; साधकतावच्छेदकरूपव्याप्यत्यभावात्, नासत्त्वात् ; Unreal smoke may not establish fire because it does not have the ability to prove the existence of fire, and not because it is non-existent.
अनाभासत्वग्रहश्च तत्र बहुलोर्ध्वतादिग्रहणवद्व्याप्तिग्रहणार्थमेवापेक्षित: | To know that the smoke is not unreal, we need to check whether there is a lot of smoke, it is going upwards, etc. Therefore, what is needed is whether there is a vyApti (concomitance) between the sAdhaka (the hetu, the indicator) and sAdhya (the indicated).
तदुक्तं वाचास्पतिमिश्रै: - 'यथा सत्यत्वाविशेषेऽपि चक्षुषा रूपमेव ज्ञाप्यते न रस:, तथैवासत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि वर्णदैर्घ्यादिना सत्यं ज्ञाप्यते, नतु धूमाभासादिने'ति |
As was said by vAcaspati miSra in the ArambhaNAdhikaraNa - "even though they are real, the eyes are only able to see, but not taste. Similarly, even though they are unreal, elongated letters are able to reveal a real object, when an unreal smoke is unable to do so."
दृष्टं हि मायाकल्पितहस्त्यादे: रज्जुसर्पादेश्च भयादिहेतुत्वं सवितृसुषिरस्य च मरणसूचकत्वम् शङ्काविषस्य च मरणहेतुत्वम् | It has been observed that a) An unreal elephant and b) an unreal snake observed in place of the rope can cause a real fear; c) that a non-existent hole seen in the sun can be an indication of imminent death and that d) the fear that one has consumed poison (even when that doubt is unfounded) can lead to death.
ननु - तत्र शङ्कैव भयमुप्त्पाद्य धातुव्याकुलतामुत्पादयति सैव मरणहेतु:, नतु शङ्कितं विषमपि ;
The opponent says - there it is the doubt alone that creates fear, leading to the imbalance in the humours in the body (the kapham, vAtam, pittam of ayurveda) leading to death. The cause of death is not the unreal poison.
सवितृसुषिरमायाकल्पितगजादीनामपि ज्ञानमेव तत्तदर्थक्रियाकारि, नत्वर्थोऽपि ; Similarly, in the case of the
hole in the sun, the magical elephant etc, it is the cognition (ie the illusion)
that leads to the various outcomes described, and not the non-existent objects
तथाच सर्वत्रोदाहृतस्थलेषु ज्ञानमेव हेतु:, तच्च स्वरूपत: सत्यमेव; in all the examples, it is the cognition that is the cause (for action), and that cognition is intrinsically real.
अन्वयव्यतिरेकावपि ज्ञानस्यैव कारणतां ग्राहयत:, नहि संनिहितं सर्पमजानानो बिभेति | By the logic of anvaya and vyatireka also, it is the cognition that is the cause. The person who has not seen the rope snake nearby, will not fear it. Thus, it is not the existence of the rope-snake that causes fear, but its cognition.
नच - अर्थानवच्छिन्नस्य ज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वेऽतिप्रसङ्गादर्थावच्छिन्नमेव ज्ञानं हेतु: ; तथाचार्थोऽपि हेतुरेवेति - वाच्यम् ; The advaitin may argue thus – “If a cognition which does not include its object is considered as a cause (for a particular outcome), then it will lead to the situation that any cognition can lead to any outcome. Therefore, it must be admitted that cognition in association with the object is the cause. Hence, the object too must be admitted to be the cause.” – That is not correct (this is the dvaitin speaking), because:
अर्थावच्छिन्नस्य ज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वेऽपि अवच्छेदकस्यार्थस्य ताटस्थ्येनाहेतुत्वोपपत्ते: - Even though cognition in association with objects is the cause, as the association of the object with the cognition is only incidental, the object cannot be called the cause.
several examples where an incidentally present entity does not do anything. The
opponent gives 11 different examples. Like:
1) घटावच्छिन्नस्य तदत्यन्ताभावतद्ध्वम्सादेर्घटदेशकालभिन्नदेशकालादित्वेऽप्यवच्छेदकस्य घटस्य तदभाववत्, The absolute-absence of the pot and its posterior-absence (absence post the pot’s destruction), may be located in a time and place other than the time and locus of the pot, but that is not the case for the delimitor of the absence, the pot. The pot cannot be located in a time and space other than when and where the pot is present.
2) घटेच्छाब्रह्मज्ञानयोर्घटज्ञानवेदान्तसाध्यत्वेऽपि घटब्रह्मणो: तदभाववत्, Even though the desire for a pot arises because of the knowledge of the pot, the pot itself does not exist because of the knowledge of the pot. Even though the cognition of Brahman is born from vedAnta, Brahman itself is not born from vedAnta.
3) घटप्रागभावस्य घटं प्रति जनकत्वेऽपि घटस्याजनकत्ववत्, Even though the absence of the pot is said to be one of the causes of the creation of the pot, the pot itself is not considered to be the cause of the pot.
4) विशेषादर्शनस्य भ्रमं प्रति जनकत्वेऽपि विशेषदर्शनस्य तदभाववत् Even though the absence of specific knowledge can lead to illusion (when only the shiny side of the shell is seen, and its black underside of the shell is not, one mistakes the shining object to be silver), specific knowledge does not lead to illusion.
5) विहिताकरणस्य प्रत्यवायजनकत्वेऽपि विहितकरणस्य तदभाववत् Even though the failure to perform the prescribed ritual leads to pratyavAya (sin), the performance of prescribed ritual does not.
6) स्वर्गकामनाया: यागजनकत्वेऽपि स्वर्गस्य तदजनकत्ववत् Even though the desire for heaven leads one to perform the sacrifice, heaven does not lead to the sacrifice.
7) अतीतादिस्मृत्यादेर्दु:खादिजनकत्वेऽप्यतीतादेस्तदजनकत्ववत् Even though the memory of past objects is a cause of sorrow etc., the past objects themselves do not generate sorrow. The memory of Sita caused Rama's grief, Sita did not.
8) असद्विषयकपरोक्षज्ञानस्य तद्व्यवहारहेतुत्वेऽप्यसतस्तदभाववत् Even though the knowledge of an asat object leads to activity, the asat object itself does not lead to vyavahAra.
9) चिकीर्षतघटबुद्धेर्घटहेतुत्वेऽपि घटस्य तदहेतुत्ववत् Even though the desire to create a pot is needed to create a pot, a pot is not sufficient to create a pot.
10) ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य तदज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वेऽप्युदासीनस्वभावस्य ब्रह्मणस्तदभाववत् Even though the cognition of Brahman removes the ignorance of Brahman, Brahman does not remove the ignorance of Brahman.
11) ब्रह्माज्ञानस्य जगत्परिणामिकारणत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणस्तदभाववच्च | Even though the ignorance of Brahman is the changing material cause for the world, Brahman is not the changing material cause for the world.
Thus, through all these examples, the nyAyAmRtakAra wishes to argue that where two factors have an incidental association, both of them together cannot be held to be the cause of an outcome. Only that factor which directly leads to the outcome is the cause of the outcome, not the incidentally associated factor. Extending this to the issue under discussion, he argues that even though the dream object in association with the dream cognition is the cause of fear, the object by itself cannot be called the cause of fear, because being unreal, its association with the cognition is merely incidental. The dream object is what is known as an upalakshaNa.
नच - तथापि मिथ्यार्थे ज्ञानव्यावर्तकताऽस्तीत्यसतोऽपि हेतुत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can the advaitin argue thus - Even so, as a mithyA object distinguishes one cognition from the other (i.e. a rope-snake cognition is different from a pot cognition, because the rope-snake is different from the pot), it must be admitted that the mithyA object is independently the cause of (activity).
नहि व्यावृत्तधीहेतुत्वं व्यावर्तकत्वं, किन्तु व्यावृत्तिधीहेतुधीविषयत्वमेव; सत्यपि दण्डे तदज्ञाने व्यावृत्त्यज्ञानात् | The object being the cause of a distinguishing cognition is not the basis for distinguishing, rather it is being the object of the cognition that is the cause of the distinguishing knowledge.
To explain: Even though the stick is present, if it is not known, the individual holding the stick cannot be identified as a daNDI – a stick endowed individual.
The mere existence of the stick does not act as a cause for the separating knowledge of the individual as a daNDI. The knowledge of the stick causes us to perceive the person as a “daNDI”, which distinguishes him from other people not holding sticks.
The advaitin may argue:
अथावच्छेदकस्य मिथ्यात्वे अवच्छिन्नस्यापि तन्नियम:, The mithyAtva of the delimitor (upAdhi) necessarily implies the mithyAtva of the delimited (upahita).
न; तुच्छ्ज्ञाने तुच्छवैलक्षण्ये च तुच्छत्वस्य, प्रातिभासिकाद्वैलक्षण्ये प्रातिभासिकत्वस्य, पञ्चमप्रकारायामात्मस्वरूपभूतायां वा अनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानस्य निवृत्तौ चतुर्थप्रकारानिर्वचनीयत्वस्य, पारमार्थिकात्मस्वरूपे तद्भिन्ने वा अनृतद्वैतस्याभावेऽनृतत्वस्य चादर्शनात् तत्रावच्छेदकानामसदादीनाम् ताटस्थ्येऽत्रापि तथास्त्विति - चेत्,
No – because such a rule fails in the following places:
1) तुच्छ्ज्ञाने तुच्छवैलक्षण्ये च तुच्छत्वस्य, The cognition of non-existent objects (delimited) is not absolutely non-existent, but the object (delimitor) is.
2) प्रातिभासिकाद्वैलक्षण्ये प्रातिभासिकत्वस्य, That which is “different from prAtibhAsika” (delimited) does not have prAtibhAsikatva, but a prAtibhAsika object (delimitor) does.
3) पञ्चमप्रकारायामात्मस्वरूपभूतायां वा अनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानस्य निवृत्तौ चतुर्थप्रकारानिर्वचनीयत्वस्य, The removal of ignorance (avidyA nivRtti) is considered to be the fifth category in ontology (as postulated by AnandabodhAchArya), but avidyA itself is of the fourth category, anirvachanIyam. Alternatively, the nature of the self is sat, but the cognition of the self is anirvachanIyam.
AnandabodhAchArya postulated that the removal of the ignorance belongs to a separate (fifth) category of ontology compared to the any of the four previously acknowledged categores – sat (real), asat (absolutely unreal), sadasat (real and absolutely unreal), sadasatvilakshaNam / anirvachanIyam (that which is neither / cannot be spoken of as real nor unreal).
4) पारमार्थिकात्मस्वरूपे तद्भिन्ने वा
The quality of pAramArthika is located in the self, but that which is different from pAramArthika is not located in the self.
5) अनृतद्वैतस्याभावेऽनृतत्वस्य चादर्शनात्
of unreal duality does not contain unreality itself.
तत्रावच्छेदकानामसदादीनाम् ताटस्थ्येऽत्रापि तथास्त्विति In each of these cases, even though the delimitors are unreal, but as they are incidental, they do not make the delimited unreal. Let that be the case here also.
Until here was the argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra.
The siddhikAra says in response: - चेत्, अत्रोच्यते - if this is the argument, here is our reply:
यदुक्तं ताटस्थ्यलक्षणमुपलक्षणत्वमेव सर्वत्रावच्छेदस्येति, तन्न It was said wherever anything is delimited, it is only incidentally so, and therefore all the delimitors are upalakshaNa-s – that is incorrect.
See here for an explanation on visheshaNa, upAdhi and upalakshaNa: http://www.advaitasiddhi.com/blog/upadhi-upalakshana-visheshana
विशेषणत्वे सम्भवत्युपलक्षणत्वायोगात् | Because, if it is proven that the delimitor is present as a visheShaNa, it cannot be considered upalakshaNa.
विशेषणत्वबाधपूर्वकत्वादुपलक्षणत्वकल्पनाया: ; The postulation of a differentiator as an upalakshaNa is only possible when it being a visheShaNa has been ruled out first.
अन्यथा 'दण्डी प्रैषवानन्वाह' 'लोहितोष्णीषा ऋत्विज: प्रचरन्ती'त्यादावापि वेदे दण्डलौहित्यादेरुपलक्षणत्वात् तदभावेऽपि अनुष्ठानप्रसङ्ग:, If this is not accepted, if the vedic statements such as "the one with the stick chants the invocation for invitation" and "the red turbanned priests walk about", are interpreted such that the qualifiers “stick” and “red” respectively are understood to be upalakshaNa-s, it would mean that even in the absence of the qualifiers, the vedic sacrifice can be conducted, which would erroneous.
To explain, the veda prescribes that the Rtwik that invites the devatA-s to the sacrifice needs to do so holding a stick, दण्डी प्रैषवानन्वाह. This is called praiSha mantra uccAraNam. The priest is called a daNDI, because the mantra must be uttered only when he is holding the stick, not otherwise. Thus the daNDa must be a visheShaNa not a upalakshaNa in the praiSha mantra.
There is another example, that the Rtwik-s have to wander about the sacrificial
hall wearing a red turban लोहितोष्णीषा ऋत्विज: प्रचरन्ति. If the qualifier “red-turbanned” was an upalakshaNa,
then even without wearing the red turban they would be allowed to walk about in
the sacrificial hall, but doing so would invalidate the sacrifice.
'सर्वादीनि सर्वनामानी'त्यत्र सर्वशब्दस्य सर्वनामसंज्ञा न स्यात्, In the pANini sUtra 'all, etc., are pronouns', the word 'all' would not be included in the list of pronouns.
There is a sUtra in vyAkaraNa called सर्वादीनि सर्वनामानि - sarva etc are together called pronouns. Here if sarva is taken as an upalakshaNa in the term “sarva etc”, then sarva would not be included in the list of pronouns.
'जन्माद्यस्य यत' इत्यत्र जन्मनो ब्रह्मलक्षणत्वम् न स्यात् ;
In the brahma sUtra, 'From whom the universe takes birth etc.', Brahman would no longer be considered to be the source of the universe.
विशेषणार्थत्वेन तद्गुणसम्विज्ञानबहुव्रीहिसंभवेऽप्युपलक्षणार्थत्वेनातद्गुणसम्विज्ञानबहुव्रीहिस्वीकारप्रसङ्गात् |
If they - all
in “all etc” (sarvAdi) and birth in “birth etc” (janmAdi))
- are considered as visheShaNa-s, the compound would be a tadguNasamvijnAna
bahuvrIhi, whereas if they are upalakshaNa-s it would end up
becoming atadguNasamvijnAna bahuvrIhi.
एवं 'असिपाणय: प्रवेशयन्ता'मित्यादिलौकिकप्रयोगेऽपि प्रतिबिम्बादिज्ञानानां जनकत्वे च विशेषणतया प्रतिबिम्बादीनामपि जनकत्वे बाधाभावात् नोपलक्षणत्वपक्षो युज्यते, Similarly, the statement "(only) sword-bearing people may enter" is made in everyday speech on the basis that the qualifier “sword-bearing” is a visheShaNa and not an upalakshaNa. Where the reflection of an image gives rise to the knowledge of the original, the knowledge of the original thus gained contains with it the cognition of the reflection as well, which knowledge is not sublated – therefore they cannot be used as a upalakshaNa-s.
उदाहृतस्थलेषु सर्वत्र बाधकमस्त्येवेति विशेष: | Whereas, in each of the instances provided by the nyAyAmRtakAra, the usage as a visheShaNa has been sublated, leading them to be classified as upalakshaNa. That does not mean that objects as the delimitor of cognitions are upalakshaNa-s for cognitions.
तथाहि - प्रथमे घटदेशकालौ गृहीत्वा तद्भिन्नदेशकालत्वं तदत्यन्ताभावादौ ग्राह्यम् ; घटस्यापि तत्संबन्धे तद्देशकालभिन्नदेशकालत्वमेव व्याहतं स्यात् | Therefore - in the first example, it is after first
knowing the location and time of the pot, can one know the time and location of
its absolute absence and absence post-destruction. Whereas, once the pot is
known to exist in a specific time and place, it would be a contradiction in
terms to even look for its existence in any other time and space. Thus, as the
absence of the pot in the same time and space as its location would be a
contradiction, the pot is an upalakshaNa in the cognition “the absence
of the pot in the location and time of its existence”.
द्वितीये त्विष्टापत्ति:, क्वचित् घटज्ञानस्य घटेच्छाजनकत्ववत् घटं प्रत्यपि जनकत्वात्, ब्रह्मणो वेदान्तसाध्यत्वे तु नित्यत्वविरोध: | The second example is desirable to us – Sometimes, just like the knowledge of a pot can lead to the desire for a pot, it can also lead to the creation of the pot also. However, to hold that Brahman is born from vedAnta, would contradict the eternality of Brahman, so it cannot occur.
तृतीये प्रागभाववत् घटस्य स्वजनकत्वे प्रतियोगिप्रागभावयो: समानकालीनत्वापत्ति:, स्वावधिकपूर्वत्वघटितजनकत्वस्य स्वस्मिन्व्याहतत्वम् च | In the third example, if the pot, like its prior absence, is a cause for its own creation, then the counterpositive and the prior absence would end up existing at the same time. As causation would require the presence of the cause in the prior instance of the effect’s creation, it would mean that the pot existed prior to its own creation. Again, a case of contradiction, hence such a possibility is denied.
चतुर्थे पञ्चमे च प्रतियोगितदभावयो: सहावृत्त्या भ्रमप्रत्यवाययोरनुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्ग: | In the fourth and fifth examples as the counter-positive and its absence cannot co-exist simultaneously, illusion and pratyavAya will not be generated. It was said that the absence of particular knowledge and the absence of the performance of prescribed rituals lead to the rise of illusion and pratyavAya respectively. If the particular knowledge is present, the illusion does not arise, because the existence and absence of particular cannot coexist. Similarly, if prescribed duties are performed, pratyavAya does not arise because the performance and the non-performance of prescribed rituals cannot coexist.
षष्ठे कामनावत् कामनाविषयस्य यागजनकत्वे तस्य प्राक्सत्तया तत्कामनैव व्याहन्येत; सिद्धे इच्छाविरहात् | In the sixth example, like desire, if the object of desire (heaven) is also capable of impelling the performance of the sacrifice, then as the heaven is already obtained before the rise of the desire of heaven, the desire itself will have no reason to exist. Desire cannot arise for attained objects.
सप्तमे अतीतस्य जनकत्वे कार्याव्यवहितपूर्वकाले स्वस्वव्यापारान्यतरसत्त्वापत्ति: | In the seventh, if it is said that a past object is the cause (happiness / sadness, as opposed to the memory of a past object doing so), then either it or its effect would exist in the instant before the existence of the effect. Either option would be problematic - the past object cannot exist in the present, nor can the effect exist before its creation.
अष्टमे असतो जनकत्वे नि:स्वरूपत्वव्याघात: | In the eighth, if the non-existent object leads to activity, then that activity will itself be non-existent, without a svarUpa of its own. Therefore, we say that it is the cognition of the non-existent object that leads to activity.
नवमे चिकीर्षितघटज्ञानवत् स्वस्य जनकत्वे पूर्वव्याघात: | In the ninth, if the pot, like the desire for the pot, were to be the cause for the pot, then it will suffer from the same defect outlined earlier.
दशमे उदासीनस्य ब्रह्मणो न निवर्तकत्वम् ; स्वरूपत: उपहितस्यैव वृत्तिविषयत्वेन तस्या विषयत्वात् , उपहितस्य च निवर्तकत्वमस्त्येव | In the tenth, relation-less Brahman will not remove ignorance. Brahman becomes an object of cognition when it is upahita (delimited) by the cognition. That upahita Brahman will certainly remove ignorance.
एकादशे ब्रह्माज्ञानस्य परिणामिकारणत्वेऽपिन ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वं कार्ये जडत्वोपलम्भात् | in the eleventh, even though the ignorance of Brahman is said to be the cause of the world, Brahman is not the cause of the world because the world is seen to be inert.
एवंविधबाधकबलेन तत्रोपलक्षणत्वस्वीकारात् नच प्रकृते बाधकमस्ति; Therefore, in each instance, there is a contributing contradiction that necessitates the usage to be an upalakshaNa. However, in the context under discussion (that it is possible for unreal objects to have the potency to cause an effect) there is no contradiction which requires the classification of objects as upalakshaNa-s.
अव्यवहितदेशकालादिवृत्तित्वस्य प्रातिभासिकसाधारणत्वात् | Existing in the time and location of their effect (and thus can be the cause) is a feature shared with prAtibhAsika objects.
इदानीमत्र सर्प इत्यादिप्रतीत्यविशेषात् | For example, in the cognition “There is a snake there”.
न हि क्वचित् बाधकबलेन मुख्यपरित्याग: कृत इति सर्वत्र तथैव भविष्यति; Just because in some cases that causation of unreal objects has been denied because of a particular contradiction, it does not mean that as a rule, everywhere that must be true.
उत्कर्षाद्यनुविधानाच्च | Especially so, because we do see that there is gradation in the effect created, it must follow that that is because of the gradation in the causes.
तथाहि - स्वप्ने जागरे चोत्कृष्टकलधौतदर्शनात् उत्कृष्टं सुखं उत्कृष्टसर्पादिदर्शनाच्चोत्कृष्टं भयादि दृश्यते ; Thus - in the dream and waking states, when one observes that the precious metal is of superior quality, one derives a greater pleasures, and when observes a fearsome snake, the fear that it inspires is greater. The amount of happiness or fear one experiences is proportional to the degree of quality or size of the object seen. Thus, to say that it is only the cognition of the object and not the object itself that gives rise to the effect, would be incorrect.
विषयस्याकारणत्वे तदुत्कर्षानुविधानं कार्ये न स्यात्; न ह्यकारणोत्कर्ष: कार्यमनुविधत्ते इति न्यायात् | If the object was not a cause for the effect (i.e. if its cognition was the cause), then it would not be possible to explain the variance in the quality of the effect, because of the rule that without a higher quality of the cause, we cannot account for the quality of the effect.
नच ज्ञानप्रकर्षादेव तत्प्रकर्ष:, ज्ञानेऽपि विषयगतप्रकर्षं विहायान्यस्य प्रकर्षस्याभावात् | It cannot be said that the superiority of the cognition is the reason to account for the superiority of the effect, because the superiority of the cognition itself cannot stem from anything apart from the object's superiority.
अथ ज्ञानगता जातिरेव प्रकर्ष: | If it is argued that superiority is a characteristic (jAti) of the cognition…
न, चाक्षुषत्वादिना सङ्करप्रसङ्गात्, विषयप्रकर्षेणैवोपपत्तौ चाक्षुषत्वादिव्याप्यनानाजात्यङ्गीकारे गौरवान्मानाभावाच्च | …No, because one cannot separate that characteristic from characteristics such as visual perceptiveness, etc., leading to the confusion between categories. Moreover, instead of saying that intensity of the experience is due to the superiority of the object seen, to say that it is due to some specification that cannot be clearly distinguished from other cognitive characteristics such as visual perceptiveness, etc., is unnecessarily complicated.
किंच भयादिजनकत्वे सर्पाद्यवच्छिन्नत्वमेव कारणतावच्छेदकमास्थेयम् | Further, the determining characteristic of serpent knowledge in causing fear must be regarded to be the association of that cognition with the object, serpent.
ज्ञानत्वेन जनकत्वे अतिप्रसङ्गात् | To argue that the determining factor of the cognition is because of itself is a stretch.
तथाच मिथ्यात्वावच्छिन्नत्वाकारेण ज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वात् भ्रमस्थले ज्ञानमात्रस्य जनकत्वेऽपि मिथ्याभूतस्य जनकत्वमागतमेव | As the association of cognitions with unreal objects confers unreality to the cognitions also, if it is argued that it is only the cognitions of illusion that lead to the effect (and not the illusory objects), then as such cognitions themselves are illusory, it follows that unreal things can cause effects.
जनकतावच्छेदकरूपेण च मिथ्यात्वे रूपान्तरेण सत्त्वमप्यसत्त्वात् नातिरिच्यते; अनुपयोगात् | If the cognition’s ability to create an effect is in one aspect which is unreal, and even if the cognition happens to be real in another aspect, then that does not negate the proposition that an unreal thing can lead to real effects, because the real aspect of the cognition is not relevant to its causative power.
तदुक्तं खण्डनकृद्भि: - 'अन्यदा सत्त्वं तु पाटच्चरलुण्ठितवेश्मनि यामिकजागरणवृत्तान्तमनुसरती' ति | as Sriharsha says in khaNDanakhaNDa khAdya – “If it is said that the cause happens to be existent at some other time, then it is as useful as saying that the guard woke up after the thief has bolted with the house’s belongings.”
Until now, we had established that the cognition is unreal on account of its association with an unreal object. Now that illusory cognitions are intrinsically mithyA will be proven.
स्वरूपेणापि तु भ्रमज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वमस्त्येव; The illusory cognition is intrinsically mithyA too.
स्वरूपतो बाधाभावे विषयतोऽप्यबाधप्रसङ्गात् | Because, if the cognition is not intrinsically sublatable, its object will end up unsublated.
नच गुणजन्यत्वमुपाधि:, Being born from a faultless source is not a vitiating condition to this argument.
argument ? It is unstated, but we can infer it. रज्जुसर्पादिविषयकम् भ्रमज्ञानम् अबाधितविषयकम् स्वरूपतो अबाधितविषयत्वात् समीचीनज्ञानवत् - The erroneous knowledge of the snake rope, is not
sublated, because it is intrinsically unsublated, like right knowledge.
glance, being born from a faultless source appears to be a vitiating condition
Valid knowledge is born from a faultless source, but the illusory cognition of the rope snake cannot be said to be born from a faultless so