paricCheda 1 - anukUlatarka nirUpaNam (part 1)
The supportive reasoning for mithyAtva anumAna, the anukUla tarka is being established in this chapter.
In the previous chapter it was said that as there can be no real relationship between the seer and the seen, it follows that there must be an unreal, superimposed relationship between the two. The opponent raises an objection to this: If the seer is one, and the seen has a superimposed relationship with the seer, everyone should be able to see the same illusion at the same time.
However, that is not the case -
1) Some see a snake where a rope lies, some a crack in the ground, some the rope itself.
2) If the world too is superimposed on the one seer, everyone should see the pot that is in front of one person.
3) Even for the same person, he only sees the object when his eyes are open and not otherwise.
स्यादेतत् - सर्वस्यापि दृश्यस्य ब्रह्मात्मकदृगध्यस्तत्वेऽपि कस्यचित् कदाचित् कञ्चित् प्रतिप्रकाशाय त्वयाऽपि तत्तत्सन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियजन्यतत्तदाकारवृत्तिद्वारक एवानावृतदृक्संबन्ध: स्वीकृत:, तथाच सत्यत्वेऽपि तद्द्वारक एव संबन्धोऽस्तु, किमाध्यासिकसंबन्धदुर्व्यसनेन, नहि भवतां विज्ञानवादिनामिव तत्तज्ज्ञाने तत्तदर्थाध्यासस्वीकार:, शुद्धदृश: स्वतो भेदाभावात् उपाधिविशिष्टाया भेदेऽपि घटादिवत्तस्या अपि मिथ्यात्वेनाधिष्ठानत्वायोगादिति - चेन्न;
स्यादेतत् - सर्वस्यापि दृश्यस्य ब्रह्मात्मकदृगध्यस्तत्वेऽपि - Even if that were to be the case (that the seer and seen do not have a real relationship) - given that everything seen is superimposed on the (one) seer, which is Brahman
कस्यचित् कदाचित् कञ्चित् प्रतिप्रकाशाय - in order for (an object) to be seen only be some, at sometime, in some place (when it should be seen by everyone, everywhere, all the time)
त्वयाऽपि तत्तत्सन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियजन्यतत्तदाकारवृत्तिद्वारक एवानावृतदृक्संबन्ध: स्वीकृत: You too will have to accept that (this difference in perception is through) the medium of the cognition, which arises due to the senses being in contact with each (object), taking on the shape of the object, (and by doing so, removes the veil of ignorance over the object). Thus, you also will have to accept a relationship between the unveiled consciousness and (the object) through the medium of such a cognition (vRtti).
तथाच सत्यत्वेऽपि तद्द्वारक एव संबन्धोऽस्तु, That being the case, let the relationship between the seer and the seen be a relationship arising through the medium of the cognition.
किमाध्यासिकसंबन्धदुर्व्यसनेन, What is to be achieved by your insistence on a superimposed relationship between the seer and the seen?
नहि भवतां विज्ञानवादिनामिव तत्तज्ज्ञाने तत्तदर्थाध्यासस्वीकार:, You are not like the vijnAnavAdi, who argues that each object is superimposed on its own cognition.
The advaitin does not say that objects are superimposed on thought, rather, he says that objects are superimposed on consciousness.
शुद्धदृश: स्वतो भेदाभावात् उपाधिविशिष्टाया भेदेऽपि घटादिवत्तस्या अपि मिथ्यात्वेनाधिष्ठानत्वायोगात् If you say that the relationship of superimposition is with pure consciousness, as there is no internal difference within pure consciousness, (there can be no accounting for difference in perceived empirical reality); if you say that (the relationship) is with "consciousness delimited by the adjunct cognition" because of which there is a difference (in perception), then as that too ("consciousness delimited by cognition") is as much mithyA as pots, etc., it cannot be the substratum.
Thus, you cannot claim that the relationship between the seer and the seen is a superimposition. It must be a real relationship through the medium of cognition. There is no need for the seen to be mithyA.
इति चेन्न - the siddhikAra says, if this is your argument, no.
The dvaitin had said that the relationship between the seer and the seen was through the medium of cognition - that is, consciousness has a relationship with cognition, and cognition has a relationship with the seen object. However, as cognition is inert, it cannot illuminate the object. There has to be a conscious entity that is capable of illumining the object. However, a conscious entity cannot reveal something if it doesn't have a direct relationship with the object. Why do we say this?
This is akin to the example that the illumination of an object only occurs when light directly falls on it. There has to be a direct relationship between the light and the object for it to be illumined. If light does not directly fall on an object - if it falls on a wall, and if behind the wall, there is an object, that light cannot illuminate that object. Similarly,
प्रकाशस्य साक्षात् स्वसंसृष्टप्रकाशकत्वनियमेन चैतन्यस्य परम्परासंबन्धेन विषयप्रकाशकत्वायोगात् | Consciousness cannot illuminate an object through an indirect relationship (through vRtti) with the object, (just like) light as a rule only illuminates an object if it directly falls on it.
Two connections are required for an object to be cognised - a connection between consciousness (located/reflected in the thought) and the object, and a connection between thought and the object.
नहि प्रदीप: परम्परासंबद्धं प्रकाशयति; अतो विषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्यमनावृतमेव प्रकाशकम्, आवरणभङ्गश्च वृत्त्या; अतो वृत्ते: पूर्वमाध्यासिकसंबन्धे विद्यमानेऽपि दृश्याऽप्रतीतिरुपपन्ना |
A lamp does not illuminate anything indirectly. Therefore, it is only the unveiled consciousness, which is the substratum of the object, which is the cause for illumination, where the removal of the veil is by means of a cognition. Thus, even though there is a prior superimposed relationship between consciousness and the object, it is possible to explain why it is not seen (as long as ignorance veils it) .
This is the methodology to explain perception in advaita - When there is contact between the eyes and the object, the mind has a connection with the object. The modification of the mind that makes contact with the object is called vRtti (cognition). This vRtti is also called jnAna, because a reflection of consciousness is present in the vRtti. Consciousness is present in the pot too, but does not illuminate the pot when it (the object delimited consciousness) is veiled by ignorance. When the vRtti has a connection with the pot, it destroys the ignorance that is veiling the consciousness that is the substratum of the pot, and as a result, the unveiled consciousness illuminates the pot.
The nyAyAmRtakAra asks - is it the consciousness reflected in the thought that illuminates the object, or is it the consciousness delimited by the pot which becomes manifest (abhivyaktam) when the ignorance located in that consciousness is removed (AvaraNa bhaNga)?
अतएव - वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वे आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यातन्त्रतापात:, घटाभिव्यक्तचैतन्यस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वे आवश्यकेन वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्येनैव घटप्रकाशकत्वोपपत्तौ तदधिष्ठानचिदभिव्यक्तिकलपनायोग इति - निरस्तम् ;
The siddhikAra says:
It is for this reason that the following statement by the nyAyAmRtakAra is rejected -
The nyAyAmrtakAra's statement under discussion:
वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वे आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यातन्त्रतापात:
If it is consciousness reflected in the thought that illuminates the pot, then the rule of a superimposed connection (between the seer and seen) is rejected (as the superimposed connection is supposed to be between consciousness and the object, not consciousness reflected in thought and the object).
According to the advaitin, the object exists even before the thought that objectifies it, thus the superimposed connection cannot be between the consciousness reflected in thought and the object.
घटाभिव्यक्तचैतन्यस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वे आवश्यकेन वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्येनैव घटप्रकाशकत्वोपपत्तौ तदधिष्ठानचिदभिव्यक्तिकलपनायोग: - if the pot manifested consciousness reveals the pot, then because it is also necessary to postulate the presence of consciousness reflected in thought for the pot to be seen (for the former cannot reveal the pot without the presence of the latter), there is no need to postulate that the substratum consciousness becomes manifest (for the pot to be seen).
If that consciousness is not the substratum of the object, it is not superimposed on it. If it is not superimposed, the object is not mithyA. There would be no supportive logic or anukUla tarka for drishyatva to imply mithyAtva.
Why was the nyAyAmRtakAra's argument rejected? Because what has been said disproves this. Both the consciousness delimited by the object and the consciousness reflected in thought are required to know the pot. The latter is to remove the the veil of ignorance, and the former to illuminate the object. If this is not true, the difference between pratyaksha, direct cognitions and paroksha, indirect cognitions, which is apparent in transactions, would be lost.
परोक्षविलक्षणस्फुटतरव्यवहारार्थम् विषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्याभिव्यक्तिकल्पनाया युक्तत्वात् |
It is appropriate to postulate a consciousness that is the substratum to the object which becomes manifest, to account for the difference experienced between indirect knowledge vs clear, direct perception.
Perception is not necessarily clearer knowledge than indirect cognition. What does the siddhikAra mean by saying that direct perception is clearer? He means that with indirect knowledge, we only get limited knowledge of the object; whereas with direct perception, we know several things about what it reveals. Therefore pratyaksha is sphuTatara, clearer.
Both perception and other means of knowledge require a thought and by consequence, consciousness reflected in the thought. There is no difference between direct perception and indirect knowledge as far as the requirement for consciousness reflected in thought is concerned.
However, the reason direct knowledge results in "clearer" knowledge of the object than indirect knowledge is that in indirect knowledge, the indirect cognition does not remove the veil over the consciousness delimited by the object. On the other hand in direct perception, the perceptual cognition removes the veil over the object delimited consciousness. Thus perception reveals the object more clearly than indirect knowledge.
नच - शुद्धचैतन्यस्य चरमसाक्षात्कारात्पूर्वम् नाभिव्यक्ति:, अभिव्यक्तस्य च घटाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य न तदधिष्ठानत्वम्, आत्माश्रयादिति - वाच्यम् ;
नच - इति - वाच्यम् Do not argue thus:
शुद्धचैतन्यस्य चरमसाक्षात्कारात्पूर्वम् नाभिव्यक्ति:,
Pure consciousness cannot become manifest prior to the rise of the final cognition (the direct cognition of Brahman that is the cause for the cessation of samsAra).
Manifestation of the substratum consciousness means the removal of the ignorance that obscures the object. What is the substratum? If it is pure consciousness, the ignorance which obscures pure consciousness will only be removed with the final cognition of brahman (brahma jnAna). Therefore if it is pure consciousness that is required to become manifest for the cognition of objects, until the rise of brahma jnAna, no object will be cognised.
अभिव्यक्तस्य च घटाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य न तदधिष्ठानत्वम्, आत्माश्रयादिति
If the manifested consciousness is pot-delimited consciousness, it cannot be the substratum, as that would be circular logic.
The pot delimited consciousness cannot be the substratum of the pot. If the pot is superimposed on pot delimited consciousness, it would be a case of self-referential error. The delimitation of consciousness would require the delimiter, the pot, and the pot would require the delimited consciousness as a substratum for its superimposition.
The siddhikAra's reply is that consciousness is the substratum (not pot delimited consciousness), but there are several tUlAvdiya-s (secondary ignorance-s) that veil objects. To illuminate the object, the removal of tUlAvidya is sufficient. A superimposed connection (between objects and consciousness) continues to exist, and at the same time, the manifestation of the consciousness delimited by the object leads to the object being seen.
चरमसाक्षात्कारात् पूर्वमपि शुद्धचैतन्यस्याविद्यावशादधिष्ठानभूतस्य मुलाज्ञाननिवृत्तिलक्षणाभिव्यक्त्यभावेऽपि तदवस्थाविशेषादिनिवृत्तिलक्षणाभिव्यक्त्या विषयप्रकाशकत्वोपपत्ते: |
Even prior to the rise of the final cognition (brahma jnAna) - ie, even prior to the manifestation of pure consciousness resulting from the removal of primal nescience, and therefore, even though it does not become manifest as a result of the removal of primal nescience, it is possible for the object to be illuminated as a result of the manifestation of consciousness owing to the removal of secondary nescience (referred to as avasthA visheSha ajnAna here).
नच - घटप्रकाशिकाया: दृशो मिथ्यात्वे नाधिष्ठानत्वं सत्यत्वे दोषाजन्यत्वेन प्रमात्वात् सत्यं स्वविषयं प्रति नाधिष्ठानत्वमित्युभयत:पाशारज्जुरिति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue thus - If the consciousness that illuminates the pot is unreal, it cannot be the substratum. If it is real, as it is valid knowledge, being born from a non-defective source, its object has to be real and it cannot be the substratum of that object. Thus there is a noose (for you) on either end of the rope.
The siddhikAra says:
यतो दोषाजन्यत्वं न प्रमात्वप्रयोजकम्, चैतन्यस्य सर्वत्र दोषाजन्यत्वात्, किन्तु दोषाजनयवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नत्वं ; प्रकृते च तदभावात् न विषयस्य सत्यत्वम् |
(This stands rejected) because the consciousness not being born from a defective source does not imply validity to the cognition, for consciousness is not born from a defective source anywhere (even in an illusion, consciousness is not born from a defect, for it is never born). Rather, it is consciousness being de-limited by a cognition that is born from a non-defective source that implies the reality of that object. In our context, as that does not apply (the cognition that manifests consciousness is born from a defective source, avidyA), the reality of the object is not implied.
अतो मिथ्याभूतविषयं प्रत्यधिष्ठानत्वं सत्याया दृशो युक्तं |
Thus, it is possible for the real seer (consciousness) to be the substratum of an unreal object.
ननु - तात्त्विकसंबन्धासंभवे आध्यासिकसंबन्धकल्पनम्,
The nyAyAmRtakAra counters - only if a real relationship is proven to be impossible, can a superimposed relationship be postulated.
It is not proven that a real relationship is impossible. Just because it is not contact or inherence, it does not mean that the relationships is unreal.
स एव तु कुत: क्लृप्तसंयोगबाधे गुणगुणिनो: समवायवत्तदुभयबाधे तृतीयस्य संभवात्, But where was that proven? After every kind of samyoga is rejected, (a real relationship), samavAya is postulated. So even if both (samyoga and sambandha) are rejected, a third (real relationship) is still possible.
In the cognition "jnAto ghaTa:" (the pot is known), there is a relationship between the seer (consciosuness) and the pot. It is neither samyoga nor samavAya, but some connection is experienced. If it is experienced, it must exist. Why should we automatically assume it is unreal?
नच तत्र मानाभाव:, समवायवदनुमाध्यक्षयो: सत्त्वात् Nor can it be said that there is no proof (pramANa) for this. Just like in the case of (proving) samavAya, this is proven by perception and inference.
When the object is seen by perception, there is a relationship experienced between consciousness and the pot - one does not need another proof when the experience itself is there. If someone really desires an inference, that is also possible thus: -
The naiyyAyika provides an anumAna to prove the existence of samavAya - नीलो घटः इति विशिष्टबुद्धिः विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धविषया, विशिष्टधीत्वात्, घटवद्भूतलमिति विशिष्टबुद्धिवत् - The qualified cognition, blue pot, objectifies the relationship between the locus and the qualifier, because it is a qualified cognition, like the qualified cognition "the ground with the pot".
तथाहि - परस्परासंयुक्तासमवेतविशेषणविशेष्यकविशिष्टधीर्विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धविशिष्टविषया, विशिष्टधीत्वात्, दण्डीति विशिष्टधीवत् ;
Thus - two entities that appear related in a qualified cognition, but are neither in contact, nor inherent in each other, are related to each other in an attribute-attributed relationship (visheShaNa visheShya bhAva), because they are seen (directly cognised) in a relational cognition, like the relational cognition of a man carrying a stick.
To extend this, the cognition ghaTo driShTa: is the a relational cognition. Here ghaTa: is visheShya, jnAnam is visheShaNa.
Therefore, we can postulate some third relationship to be present to explain the appearance of the relational cognition.
Another inference is provided. There is a rule that the object is a cause for its direct perception - विषयतासम्बन्धेन प्रत्यक्षं प्रति तादात्म्यसंबन्धेन विषय: कारणम् | For the perception objectifying an object, the object itself is the cause. In the relational cognition ghaTo driShTa:, the cause for the generation of the relational cognition is the relation between pot and the cognition.
उक्ता जन्यप्रमा, विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धनिमित्तिका, अबाधितजन्यविशिष्टधीत्वात्, संमतवत् ; The said valid cognition that arises is a result of the relationship between the attribute and the attributed, because that cognition is a relational one that is born and uncontradicted. The example is that which is acceptable to both of us. (daNDI puruSha:)
The two adjectives are used keeping the naiyyAyika in mind.
With the qualifier "uncontradicted", vyabhichAra in the shell silver is avoided. There is no relationship between the shell and silver, so it cannot be the hetu for the cognition of silver in the shell.
With "born", vyabhichAra with respect to Ishvara's cognition of shell silver is removed. Ishvara's cognition is not born and uncontradicted. The the shell silver will be seen by Him too (as he is omniscient, he sees all, including someone's illusions), the relationship between the shell and silver is not the cause of Ishvara's cognition for the shell silver.
The third anumAna is to prove that the sambandha must be real.
विमता धी:, अबाधितविशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धविषया अबाधितजन्यविशिष्टधीत्वाद्दण्डीति विशिष्टधीवत् ;
The cognition under discussion has as its object an unsublated relationship between the locus and qualifier, because the cognition is unsublated, generated, and relational, like the relational cognition of the man with stick.
An opponent may say - "Chaitra, the owner of the cow is present here". The cognition of the cow-owner Chaitra is a relational one, but the cow is not physically present, so there can neither be a samyoga, nor a samavAya relationship between the two. There is no relationship here.
गोमान्श्चैत्र इत्यादेरपि पक्षकुक्षिनिक्षेप एवेति न तत्र व्यभिचारशङ्का | To such an objection, the nyAyAmRtakAra says - The cognition "Chaitra, the cow-owner" too is within the the paksha (ie a third relationship that is real) thus one cannot raise an objection of vyabhichAra there.
तथा च संयोगसमवायातिरिक्तसंबन्धसिद्धि: - Thus we have established that there is a third relationship apart from samyoga and samavAya.
The siddhikAra says
इति चेन्न ; If this is your argument, no.
प्रथमे द्वितीये चार्थान्तरम् ; आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यैव विषयत्वेन निमित्तत्वेन चोपपत्ते: | The first two inferences suffer from the defect arthAntara (do not prove a real relationship), because even a superimposed relationship can be the object and cause (of relational cognitions).
In the first inference you had said that the relationship is real because it is the object of the relational cognition, in the second inference you had said that the relationship is real because it is the cause for the relational cognition. Both these do not imply a real relationship.
द्वितीये परोक्षधीषु व्यभिचाराच्च | In the second case, there is vyabhichAra for indirect cognitions.
When we infer that there is fire in the mountain, there is a relational cognition that arises (parvato vahnimAn). The relationship between the mountain and fire is not directly seen, it is inferred. The relationship between the locus and the qualifier is the cause only for direct cognitions, not indirect cognitions. Thus the relationship between the fire and the mountain is not a cause for the rise of the relational cognition, parvato vahnimAn. If only the relationship which is a cause for the rise of a relational cognition can be cognised in the relational cognition, it follows that as the relation is not a cause for the relational inferential cognition, it follows that such a relation cannot be cognised. There is vyabhichAra, because while the hetu of the inference (abAdhita janya dhI) is present, the sAdhya (visheShaNa visheShya sambandha nimittikA) is absent for inferential cognitions.
तृतीये ब्रह्मज्ञानपर्यन्ताबाधितत्वेन सिद्धसाधनमेव | In the third, if unsublated means that which is unsublated until brahmajnAna, then such a relationship is accepted by me - it is a case of siddha sAdhana.
सर्वथा अबाधितधीविषयत्वे साध्ये साध्यवैकल्यम् | If it means that which is always unsublated, then that is a case of sAdhya vaikalya - ie such a sAdhya is absent in the example as then there is no example of any relationship that remains unsublated.
नच - तात्त्विकसंबन्धबाधे आध्यासिकसंबन्धसिद्धि:, तथाच संयोगसमवायातिरिक्ततात्त्विकसंबन्धबाधपर्यन्तं नाध्यासिकसंबन्धसंभावना, तथाच कथमर्थान्तरसिद्धसाधनसाध्यवैकल्यानीति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can one argue thus - Only when a real relation is disproved, can one postulate an unreal relation. Therefore, until a (real) relation other than samyoga and samavAya is contradicted, it cannot be an unreal relationship. Thus how are defects of arthAntara, siddhasAdhana, sAdhyavaikalya, etc possible?
तात्त्विकसंबन्धस्य व्यापकानुपलब्ध्याबाधात् | Because a real relationship is disproven by the absence of vyApaka.
The absence of the vyApaka will prove the absence of vyApya. What is the vyApaka, ie that which is proven when a real relationship exists?
तथाहि - तात्त्विकसंबन्धस्य व्यापको देशकालविप्रकर्षाभाव: | To clarify - the vyApaka for a real relation is the absence of temporal and spatial distance between the two entities.
Where there is a real relation between two things (vyApya), the two things must necessarily be present at the same place and the same time (vyApaka).
सचातीतादिविषयकज्ञानादीनां नास्त्येवेति कथं तात्त्विकस्तेषाम् संबन्ध: | That (the absence of temporal and spatial distance) is absent in the case of the cognition of past events, then how can there be any real relation between them?
The absence of temporal and spatial distance being absent means there is either a temporal distance or spatial distance.
The samavAya relation is postulated as eternal by the logician (invoking the principle of parsimony). It is considered eternal even when the the objects related by samavAya are themselves destroyed. The samavAya between a pot and its shape exists even if the pot and its shape are destroyed.
नच - समवायवत् सम्बन्ध्यभावविप्रकर्षाद्यविरुद्धत्वेनैव - वाच्यम् ;
Don't argue thus - this (relationship) is like samavAya, which is uncontradicted even when the two related items themselves are not existent and even there is a spatio-temporal distance (between the related items).
समवायस्यापि देशकालविप्रकृष्टयो: संबन्धव्यवहाराप्रयोजकत्वात् | Because samavAya too cannot relate two entities if there is a spatio-temporal distance between them.
नहि संबन्ध्यभावेऽपि सन् समवायोऽद्य नष्टं घटं श्वस्तनेन रूपेण विशिनष्टि | If a pot breaks today, and takes another form tomorrow, no samavAya can exist today between the pot and its future form.
नचाध्यासिकत्वे संबन्धस्य साध्ये धर्मिग्राहकमानबाध:, विशिष्टबुद्धित्वेन प्रथमतात्त्विकातात्त्विकसाधारणसंबन्धत्वस्यैव सिद्धे: |
Nor is it the case that if the relationship is superimposed, the very cognition that reveals the relationship contradicts it (the notion that the relationship is supeirmposed), because by the relational cognition all that is known that the relationship is present, irrespective of whether it is real or unreal.
To explain dharmigrAhakapramANa bAdha - normally to disprove something, a refuting reason is used. Sometimes, instead of a refuting reason, one can disprove it by using the very proof for the existence of that thing to argue for its non-existence.
In nyAya, the mind is considered to be paramANu rUpa (atomic). Atma is considered to be vibhu (all-pervading). Some groups within mImAmsa argue that the mind is all-pervading.
The mImAmsaka's inference for this as follows: मनो विभु ज्ञानासमवायिकारणसंयोगाश्रयत्वात् आत्मवत्. The mind is all pervading because like the Atma, it happens to be the locus for the samyoga between the mind and Atma, and an asamavAyi kAraNa (ie it is a cause for cognition, but is not its material cause).
The naiyyAyika says that the anumAna is flawed because the Atma mana samyoga, which is the basis to argue that the mind is all-pervading, is itself not possible if both the mind and Atma are all pervading, because two all pervading entities cannot have samyoga. There has to be some movement in at least one of the two sambandhi's for samyoga to occur. If both entities of the relation are all-pervading, there is no possibility for movement. In the absence of movement, no samyoga is possible.
Thus the very basis to argue for something, is proved to be absent and the absence is used by the opponent to disprove the thing implied by the basis. Such a technique is called dharmi grAhaka pramANa bAdha.
The nyAyAmRtakAra says that there is dharmigrAhakapramANa bAdha in the siddhikAra's position that the observed relation between the seer and the seen is unreal. If it is observed, the relation must exist, so how can it be unreal?
किंच संबन्धग्राहक एव तात्त्विकसंबन्धव्यापकानुपलब्धिरूपबाधसहकृताध्यासिकसंबन्धे पर्यवस्यति | As the inference that reveals the relationship (between the seer and the seen) is accompanied by the absence of the condition which should have been necessarily present if the relationship had been real - in the absence of such an unreality contradicting condition - one is left with the conclusion that the relationship is unreal.
To explain itarabAdhasahakRta - When a person infers fire in the mountain, it is a mountain fire. The fire he sees in the kitchen is kitchen fire. The fire he saw in the kitchen is not mountain fire, so how is it possible to use that kitchen fire to prove mountain fire?
When he is certain that the fire in the mountain can only be mountain fire and nothing else, by seeing smoke, his inference will be of mountain fire alone. This is called इतरबाधसहकृतपरामर्श, which can lead to a specific knowledge of mountain fire.
To show this in another inference: Any created object must have a creator - yat janyam tat sakartRkam.
Now this raises the question of whether the creator is one or many. One creator who creates all beings, as he is omnipotent, is considered to be right, because it is more parsimonious to postulate one creator. If it is accepted that it is more parsimonious to have one creator, then the inference that reveals that the world is created, will also reveal that its creator is only one. This is another case of itarabAdhasahakRta parAmarsha. The inference arises with the conviction that the alternatives are untrue.
Similarly as the inference for the relationship between consciousness and object rises along with the cognition that the two entities are not spatially or temporally proximate, it follows that the relationship must be unreal.
That is, when the inference proving a relationship between the seer and the seen arises, it is accompanied by the cognition of a spatial and temporal distance between the two, with the net result that all that the inference proves is an unreal relationship.
अतो न धर्मिग्राहकबाधशङ्कापि | Thus one need not doubt that the argument for the proof of the unreality of the relationship is self-defeating.
न चैवं - युतसिद्धयोरेव संयोगरूपसंबन्धदर्शनादयुतसिद्धिरपि समवायस्य बाधिका स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue on the basis of this that - "As relationships such as samyoga are always seen when the relationship is impermanent (in the samyoga), permanence would end up disproving samavAya."
The opponent argues that by such an argument one can disprove samavAya. Substances (padArtha) are divided into two categories - yutasiddha (things which were not in contact previously, but are now in contact) and ayutasiddha (things that were always in contact. They were never not in contact). The permanence of the contact need not be two-way between the entities, it can be one way too. A form is always in contact with a pot, but a pot need not always be in contact with that form. The former is ayutasiddhi, the latter is yutasiddhi.
If a real samavAya is refuted on the grounds that pot and its colour have a permanent relationship, it would mean that no real samavAya is possible between pot and colour, which would be undesirable. Therefore, there is no requirement for impermanence for the
This is a flawed argument, similar to saying that the presence of a space-time distance between two entities, proves that relationship cannot be real. This is the nyAyAmRtakAra's argument - the siddhikAra refutes this.
अयुतसिद्धयोरपि क्वचित्संबन्धदर्शनेन युतसिद्धत्वस्य संबन्धाप्रयोजक्त्वात्, यस्मिन् सत्यवश्यं संबन्ध: स एव संबन्धस्य प्रयोजक इति समव्याप्तत्वाभावेन युतसिद्ध्यनुपलब्धेरबाधकत्वात्,
Impermanence is not a necessary condition for a relationship because with permanence too a relationship is seen. That factor whose presence is a necessary condition for a relationship is the one that implies the relationship. Therefore as there is no mutually invariable concomitance between the two, the absence of impermanence does not act as a contradicting reason (for the reality of the relationship).
यत्र संबन्धस्तत्रावश्यं युतसिद्धिरिति विषमव्याप्तिकल्पनेऽपि मानाभावात्, There is no basis to postulate a one way invariable concomitance because wherever there is a relationship there must be impermanence is also not true.
अनुकूलतर्कादर्शनात्, There is no supporting logic for it.
A concomitance occurs in the example does not imply it occurs everywhere.
देशकालविप्रकर्षाभाववतां तु सर्वेषां संबन्धदर्शनेन विप्रकर्षे तददर्शनेन च समव्याप्ततया प्रयोजकस्य देशकालविप्रकर्षाभावस्यानुपलब्धे: संबन्धबाधकत्वस्यावश्यमङ्गीकरणीयत्वात् |
On the other hand, the absence of spatial or temporal distance is always accompanied by a real relationship everywhere, and when such a distance is present, it is seen that a real relationship is absent. Thus, as there is a mutually invariant concomitance, it must necessarily be conceded that the presence of spatial and temporal distance will disprove a real relationship.
नहि प्रयोजकाभावे प्रयोज्यसंभव: | When the implying condition is absent, the implied cannot be present.
The opponent then provides various examples where sambandha must be accepted even in the presence of spatio-temporal distance. The relationship between the seer and the seen is similar to these.
नन्वेवं - 1) ध्वंसादेरतीतादिना, There must be a relationship between the destruction (of a pot and the pot) with past objects (The counterpositive of destruction is in the past having been destroyed).
Without it, even after a hammer blow breaks the pot, one will have to say that the pot does not get destroyed. Rather one will have to say that another entity called destruction gets added to it. Ie Destruction and the pot will simultaneously exist. That is an absurd proposition. Therefore, there must be a relationship between destruction and the object destroyed. However these two never temporally coexist.
2) मिथ्यात्वलक्षणान्तर्गतस्यात्यन्ताभावस्य प्रतियोगिना, The absolute absence included within the (second) definition of mithyAtva and its counterpositive (must have a relationship).
The absolute absence is for all time, but its counterpositive appears to exist only in the present. If no relationship existed between the two prior to the object's appearance, then mithyAtva itself will not exist.
3) शक्ते: शक्येन, the power (present in the cause to produce an effect) and the effect (must necessarily have a relationship).
If it did not, anything can be created from anything.
4) अज्ञानस्याज्ञेयेन, ignorance and its object (must necessarily have a relationship).
These two need not exist simultaneously, so can we say that ignorance has no relationship with its object?
5) इच्छाया इष्यमाणेन, desire and its object (must have a relationship), but they don't exist together at the same time. One desires something that one does not have. If one acquires the object of desire, he stops desiring it.
6) व्यवहारस्य व्यवहर्तव्येन, transactions (speech) and the transacted (must have a relationship). Alternatively, perceptual cognitions and their object must have a relationship.
7) वाक्यस्यार्थेन, sentence and its meaning (must have a relationship). However a sentence and its meaning are not located in the same place.
8) वृत्तिरूपज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयेन, a thought and its object (must have a relationship).
संबन्धो नेति त्वद्वाक्योक्तसंबन्धाभावस्य ज्ञानेनासम्बन्धात् स्वन्यायस्वक्रियास्ववचनविरोधा: स्यु:, If cognition and its object don't have a relationship, your statement will also be unrelated to its meaning, leading to a violation of your own rule, actions and speech.
Contd
In the previous chapter it was said that as there can be no real relationship between the seer and the seen, it follows that there must be an unreal, superimposed relationship between the two. The opponent raises an objection to this: If the seer is one, and the seen has a superimposed relationship with the seer, everyone should be able to see the same illusion at the same time.
However, that is not the case -
1) Some see a snake where a rope lies, some a crack in the ground, some the rope itself.
2) If the world too is superimposed on the one seer, everyone should see the pot that is in front of one person.
3) Even for the same person, he only sees the object when his eyes are open and not otherwise.
स्यादेतत् - सर्वस्यापि दृश्यस्य ब्रह्मात्मकदृगध्यस्तत्वेऽपि कस्यचित् कदाचित् कञ्चित् प्रतिप्रकाशाय त्वयाऽपि तत्तत्सन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियजन्यतत्तदाकारवृत्तिद्वारक एवानावृतदृक्संबन्ध: स्वीकृत:, तथाच सत्यत्वेऽपि तद्द्वारक एव संबन्धोऽस्तु, किमाध्यासिकसंबन्धदुर्व्यसनेन, नहि भवतां विज्ञानवादिनामिव तत्तज्ज्ञाने तत्तदर्थाध्यासस्वीकार:, शुद्धदृश: स्वतो भेदाभावात् उपाधिविशिष्टाया भेदेऽपि घटादिवत्तस्या अपि मिथ्यात्वेनाधिष्ठानत्वायोगादिति - चेन्न;
स्यादेतत् - सर्वस्यापि दृश्यस्य ब्रह्मात्मकदृगध्यस्तत्वेऽपि - Even if that were to be the case (that the seer and seen do not have a real relationship) - given that everything seen is superimposed on the (one) seer, which is Brahman
कस्यचित् कदाचित् कञ्चित् प्रतिप्रकाशाय - in order for (an object) to be seen only be some, at sometime, in some place (when it should be seen by everyone, everywhere, all the time)
त्वयाऽपि तत्तत्सन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियजन्यतत्तदाकारवृत्तिद्वारक एवानावृतदृक्संबन्ध: स्वीकृत: You too will have to accept that (this difference in perception is through) the medium of the cognition, which arises due to the senses being in contact with each (object), taking on the shape of the object, (and by doing so, removes the veil of ignorance over the object). Thus, you also will have to accept a relationship between the unveiled consciousness and (the object) through the medium of such a cognition (vRtti).
तथाच सत्यत्वेऽपि तद्द्वारक एव संबन्धोऽस्तु, That being the case, let the relationship between the seer and the seen be a relationship arising through the medium of the cognition.
किमाध्यासिकसंबन्धदुर्व्यसनेन, What is to be achieved by your insistence on a superimposed relationship between the seer and the seen?
नहि भवतां विज्ञानवादिनामिव तत्तज्ज्ञाने तत्तदर्थाध्यासस्वीकार:, You are not like the vijnAnavAdi, who argues that each object is superimposed on its own cognition.
The advaitin does not say that objects are superimposed on thought, rather, he says that objects are superimposed on consciousness.
शुद्धदृश: स्वतो भेदाभावात् उपाधिविशिष्टाया भेदेऽपि घटादिवत्तस्या अपि मिथ्यात्वेनाधिष्ठानत्वायोगात् If you say that the relationship of superimposition is with pure consciousness, as there is no internal difference within pure consciousness, (there can be no accounting for difference in perceived empirical reality); if you say that (the relationship) is with "consciousness delimited by the adjunct cognition" because of which there is a difference (in perception), then as that too ("consciousness delimited by cognition") is as much mithyA as pots, etc., it cannot be the substratum.
Thus, you cannot claim that the relationship between the seer and the seen is a superimposition. It must be a real relationship through the medium of cognition. There is no need for the seen to be mithyA.
इति चेन्न - the siddhikAra says, if this is your argument, no.
The dvaitin had said that the relationship between the seer and the seen was through the medium of cognition - that is, consciousness has a relationship with cognition, and cognition has a relationship with the seen object. However, as cognition is inert, it cannot illuminate the object. There has to be a conscious entity that is capable of illumining the object. However, a conscious entity cannot reveal something if it doesn't have a direct relationship with the object. Why do we say this?
This is akin to the example that the illumination of an object only occurs when light directly falls on it. There has to be a direct relationship between the light and the object for it to be illumined. If light does not directly fall on an object - if it falls on a wall, and if behind the wall, there is an object, that light cannot illuminate that object. Similarly,
प्रकाशस्य साक्षात् स्वसंसृष्टप्रकाशकत्वनियमेन चैतन्यस्य परम्परासंबन्धेन विषयप्रकाशकत्वायोगात् | Consciousness cannot illuminate an object through an indirect relationship (through vRtti) with the object, (just like) light as a rule only illuminates an object if it directly falls on it.
Two connections are required for an object to be cognised - a connection between consciousness (located/reflected in the thought) and the object, and a connection between thought and the object.
नहि प्रदीप: परम्परासंबद्धं प्रकाशयति; अतो विषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्यमनावृतमेव प्रकाशकम्, आवरणभङ्गश्च वृत्त्या; अतो वृत्ते: पूर्वमाध्यासिकसंबन्धे विद्यमानेऽपि दृश्याऽप्रतीतिरुपपन्ना |
A lamp does not illuminate anything indirectly. Therefore, it is only the unveiled consciousness, which is the substratum of the object, which is the cause for illumination, where the removal of the veil is by means of a cognition. Thus, even though there is a prior superimposed relationship between consciousness and the object, it is possible to explain why it is not seen (as long as ignorance veils it) .
This is the methodology to explain perception in advaita - When there is contact between the eyes and the object, the mind has a connection with the object. The modification of the mind that makes contact with the object is called vRtti (cognition). This vRtti is also called jnAna, because a reflection of consciousness is present in the vRtti. Consciousness is present in the pot too, but does not illuminate the pot when it (the object delimited consciousness) is veiled by ignorance. When the vRtti has a connection with the pot, it destroys the ignorance that is veiling the consciousness that is the substratum of the pot, and as a result, the unveiled consciousness illuminates the pot.
The nyAyAmRtakAra asks - is it the consciousness reflected in the thought that illuminates the object, or is it the consciousness delimited by the pot which becomes manifest (abhivyaktam) when the ignorance located in that consciousness is removed (AvaraNa bhaNga)?
अतएव - वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वे आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यातन्त्रतापात:, घटाभिव्यक्तचैतन्यस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वे आवश्यकेन वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्येनैव घटप्रकाशकत्वोपपत्तौ तदधिष्ठानचिदभिव्यक्तिकलपनायोग इति - निरस्तम् ;
The siddhikAra says:
It is for this reason that the following statement by the nyAyAmRtakAra is rejected -
The nyAyAmrtakAra's statement under discussion:
वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वे आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यातन्त्रतापात:
If it is consciousness reflected in the thought that illuminates the pot, then the rule of a superimposed connection (between the seer and seen) is rejected (as the superimposed connection is supposed to be between consciousness and the object, not consciousness reflected in thought and the object).
According to the advaitin, the object exists even before the thought that objectifies it, thus the superimposed connection cannot be between the consciousness reflected in thought and the object.
घटाभिव्यक्तचैतन्यस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वे आवश्यकेन वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्येनैव घटप्रकाशकत्वोपपत्तौ तदधिष्ठानचिदभिव्यक्तिकलपनायोग: - if the pot manifested consciousness reveals the pot, then because it is also necessary to postulate the presence of consciousness reflected in thought for the pot to be seen (for the former cannot reveal the pot without the presence of the latter), there is no need to postulate that the substratum consciousness becomes manifest (for the pot to be seen).
If that consciousness is not the substratum of the object, it is not superimposed on it. If it is not superimposed, the object is not mithyA. There would be no supportive logic or anukUla tarka for drishyatva to imply mithyAtva.
Why was the nyAyAmRtakAra's argument rejected? Because what has been said disproves this. Both the consciousness delimited by the object and the consciousness reflected in thought are required to know the pot. The latter is to remove the the veil of ignorance, and the former to illuminate the object. If this is not true, the difference between pratyaksha, direct cognitions and paroksha, indirect cognitions, which is apparent in transactions, would be lost.
परोक्षविलक्षणस्फुटतरव्यवहारार्थम् विषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्याभिव्यक्तिकल्पनाया युक्तत्वात् |
It is appropriate to postulate a consciousness that is the substratum to the object which becomes manifest, to account for the difference experienced between indirect knowledge vs clear, direct perception.
Perception is not necessarily clearer knowledge than indirect cognition. What does the siddhikAra mean by saying that direct perception is clearer? He means that with indirect knowledge, we only get limited knowledge of the object; whereas with direct perception, we know several things about what it reveals. Therefore pratyaksha is sphuTatara, clearer.
Both perception and other means of knowledge require a thought and by consequence, consciousness reflected in the thought. There is no difference between direct perception and indirect knowledge as far as the requirement for consciousness reflected in thought is concerned.
However, the reason direct knowledge results in "clearer" knowledge of the object than indirect knowledge is that in indirect knowledge, the indirect cognition does not remove the veil over the consciousness delimited by the object. On the other hand in direct perception, the perceptual cognition removes the veil over the object delimited consciousness. Thus perception reveals the object more clearly than indirect knowledge.
नच - शुद्धचैतन्यस्य चरमसाक्षात्कारात्पूर्वम् नाभिव्यक्ति:, अभिव्यक्तस्य च घटाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य न तदधिष्ठानत्वम्, आत्माश्रयादिति - वाच्यम् ;
नच - इति - वाच्यम् Do not argue thus:
शुद्धचैतन्यस्य चरमसाक्षात्कारात्पूर्वम् नाभिव्यक्ति:,
Pure consciousness cannot become manifest prior to the rise of the final cognition (the direct cognition of Brahman that is the cause for the cessation of samsAra).
Manifestation of the substratum consciousness means the removal of the ignorance that obscures the object. What is the substratum? If it is pure consciousness, the ignorance which obscures pure consciousness will only be removed with the final cognition of brahman (brahma jnAna). Therefore if it is pure consciousness that is required to become manifest for the cognition of objects, until the rise of brahma jnAna, no object will be cognised.
अभिव्यक्तस्य च घटाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य न तदधिष्ठानत्वम्, आत्माश्रयादिति
If the manifested consciousness is pot-delimited consciousness, it cannot be the substratum, as that would be circular logic.
The pot delimited consciousness cannot be the substratum of the pot. If the pot is superimposed on pot delimited consciousness, it would be a case of self-referential error. The delimitation of consciousness would require the delimiter, the pot, and the pot would require the delimited consciousness as a substratum for its superimposition.
The siddhikAra's reply is that consciousness is the substratum (not pot delimited consciousness), but there are several tUlAvdiya-s (secondary ignorance-s) that veil objects. To illuminate the object, the removal of tUlAvidya is sufficient. A superimposed connection (between objects and consciousness) continues to exist, and at the same time, the manifestation of the consciousness delimited by the object leads to the object being seen.
चरमसाक्षात्कारात् पूर्वमपि शुद्धचैतन्यस्याविद्यावशादधिष्ठानभूतस्य मुलाज्ञाननिवृत्तिलक्षणाभिव्यक्त्यभावेऽपि तदवस्थाविशेषादिनिवृत्तिलक्षणाभिव्यक्त्या विषयप्रकाशकत्वोपपत्ते: |
Even prior to the rise of the final cognition (brahma jnAna) - ie, even prior to the manifestation of pure consciousness resulting from the removal of primal nescience, and therefore, even though it does not become manifest as a result of the removal of primal nescience, it is possible for the object to be illuminated as a result of the manifestation of consciousness owing to the removal of secondary nescience (referred to as avasthA visheSha ajnAna here).
नच - घटप्रकाशिकाया: दृशो मिथ्यात्वे नाधिष्ठानत्वं सत्यत्वे दोषाजन्यत्वेन प्रमात्वात् सत्यं स्वविषयं प्रति नाधिष्ठानत्वमित्युभयत:पाशारज्जुरिति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue thus - If the consciousness that illuminates the pot is unreal, it cannot be the substratum. If it is real, as it is valid knowledge, being born from a non-defective source, its object has to be real and it cannot be the substratum of that object. Thus there is a noose (for you) on either end of the rope.
The siddhikAra says:
यतो दोषाजन्यत्वं न प्रमात्वप्रयोजकम्, चैतन्यस्य सर्वत्र दोषाजन्यत्वात्, किन्तु दोषाजनयवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नत्वं ; प्रकृते च तदभावात् न विषयस्य सत्यत्वम् |
(This stands rejected) because the consciousness not being born from a defective source does not imply validity to the cognition, for consciousness is not born from a defective source anywhere (even in an illusion, consciousness is not born from a defect, for it is never born). Rather, it is consciousness being de-limited by a cognition that is born from a non-defective source that implies the reality of that object. In our context, as that does not apply (the cognition that manifests consciousness is born from a defective source, avidyA), the reality of the object is not implied.
अतो मिथ्याभूतविषयं प्रत्यधिष्ठानत्वं सत्याया दृशो युक्तं |
Thus, it is possible for the real seer (consciousness) to be the substratum of an unreal object.
ननु - तात्त्विकसंबन्धासंभवे आध्यासिकसंबन्धकल्पनम्,
The nyAyAmRtakAra counters - only if a real relationship is proven to be impossible, can a superimposed relationship be postulated.
It is not proven that a real relationship is impossible. Just because it is not contact or inherence, it does not mean that the relationships is unreal.
स एव तु कुत: क्लृप्तसंयोगबाधे गुणगुणिनो: समवायवत्तदुभयबाधे तृतीयस्य संभवात्, But where was that proven? After every kind of samyoga is rejected, (a real relationship), samavAya is postulated. So even if both (samyoga and sambandha) are rejected, a third (real relationship) is still possible.
In the cognition "jnAto ghaTa:" (the pot is known), there is a relationship between the seer (consciosuness) and the pot. It is neither samyoga nor samavAya, but some connection is experienced. If it is experienced, it must exist. Why should we automatically assume it is unreal?
नच तत्र मानाभाव:, समवायवदनुमाध्यक्षयो: सत्त्वात् Nor can it be said that there is no proof (pramANa) for this. Just like in the case of (proving) samavAya, this is proven by perception and inference.
When the object is seen by perception, there is a relationship experienced between consciousness and the pot - one does not need another proof when the experience itself is there. If someone really desires an inference, that is also possible thus: -
The naiyyAyika provides an anumAna to prove the existence of samavAya - नीलो घटः इति विशिष्टबुद्धिः विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धविषया, विशिष्टधीत्वात्, घटवद्भूतलमिति विशिष्टबुद्धिवत् - The qualified cognition, blue pot, objectifies the relationship between the locus and the qualifier, because it is a qualified cognition, like the qualified cognition "the ground with the pot".
तथाहि - परस्परासंयुक्तासमवेतविशेषणविशेष्यकविशिष्टधीर्विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धविशिष्टविषया, विशिष्टधीत्वात्, दण्डीति विशिष्टधीवत् ;
Thus - two entities that appear related in a qualified cognition, but are neither in contact, nor inherent in each other, are related to each other in an attribute-attributed relationship (visheShaNa visheShya bhAva), because they are seen (directly cognised) in a relational cognition, like the relational cognition of a man carrying a stick.
To extend this, the cognition ghaTo driShTa: is the a relational cognition. Here ghaTa: is visheShya, jnAnam is visheShaNa.
Therefore, we can postulate some third relationship to be present to explain the appearance of the relational cognition.
Another inference is provided. There is a rule that the object is a cause for its direct perception - विषयतासम्बन्धेन प्रत्यक्षं प्रति तादात्म्यसंबन्धेन विषय: कारणम् | For the perception objectifying an object, the object itself is the cause. In the relational cognition ghaTo driShTa:, the cause for the generation of the relational cognition is the relation between pot and the cognition.
उक्ता जन्यप्रमा, विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धनिमित्तिका, अबाधितजन्यविशिष्टधीत्वात्, संमतवत् ; The said valid cognition that arises is a result of the relationship between the attribute and the attributed, because that cognition is a relational one that is born and uncontradicted. The example is that which is acceptable to both of us. (daNDI puruSha:)
The two adjectives are used keeping the naiyyAyika in mind.
With the qualifier "uncontradicted", vyabhichAra in the shell silver is avoided. There is no relationship between the shell and silver, so it cannot be the hetu for the cognition of silver in the shell.
With "born", vyabhichAra with respect to Ishvara's cognition of shell silver is removed. Ishvara's cognition is not born and uncontradicted. The the shell silver will be seen by Him too (as he is omniscient, he sees all, including someone's illusions), the relationship between the shell and silver is not the cause of Ishvara's cognition for the shell silver.
The third anumAna is to prove that the sambandha must be real.
विमता धी:, अबाधितविशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धविषया अबाधितजन्यविशिष्टधीत्वाद्दण्डीति विशिष्टधीवत् ;
The cognition under discussion has as its object an unsublated relationship between the locus and qualifier, because the cognition is unsublated, generated, and relational, like the relational cognition of the man with stick.
An opponent may say - "Chaitra, the owner of the cow is present here". The cognition of the cow-owner Chaitra is a relational one, but the cow is not physically present, so there can neither be a samyoga, nor a samavAya relationship between the two. There is no relationship here.
गोमान्श्चैत्र इत्यादेरपि पक्षकुक्षिनिक्षेप एवेति न तत्र व्यभिचारशङ्का | To such an objection, the nyAyAmRtakAra says - The cognition "Chaitra, the cow-owner" too is within the the paksha (ie a third relationship that is real) thus one cannot raise an objection of vyabhichAra there.
तथा च संयोगसमवायातिरिक्तसंबन्धसिद्धि: - Thus we have established that there is a third relationship apart from samyoga and samavAya.
The siddhikAra says
इति चेन्न ; If this is your argument, no.
प्रथमे द्वितीये चार्थान्तरम् ; आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यैव विषयत्वेन निमित्तत्वेन चोपपत्ते: | The first two inferences suffer from the defect arthAntara (do not prove a real relationship), because even a superimposed relationship can be the object and cause (of relational cognitions).
In the first inference you had said that the relationship is real because it is the object of the relational cognition, in the second inference you had said that the relationship is real because it is the cause for the relational cognition. Both these do not imply a real relationship.
द्वितीये परोक्षधीषु व्यभिचाराच्च | In the second case, there is vyabhichAra for indirect cognitions.
When we infer that there is fire in the mountain, there is a relational cognition that arises (parvato vahnimAn). The relationship between the mountain and fire is not directly seen, it is inferred. The relationship between the locus and the qualifier is the cause only for direct cognitions, not indirect cognitions. Thus the relationship between the fire and the mountain is not a cause for the rise of the relational cognition, parvato vahnimAn. If only the relationship which is a cause for the rise of a relational cognition can be cognised in the relational cognition, it follows that as the relation is not a cause for the relational inferential cognition, it follows that such a relation cannot be cognised. There is vyabhichAra, because while the hetu of the inference (abAdhita janya dhI) is present, the sAdhya (visheShaNa visheShya sambandha nimittikA) is absent for inferential cognitions.
तृतीये ब्रह्मज्ञानपर्यन्ताबाधितत्वेन सिद्धसाधनमेव | In the third, if unsublated means that which is unsublated until brahmajnAna, then such a relationship is accepted by me - it is a case of siddha sAdhana.
सर्वथा अबाधितधीविषयत्वे साध्ये साध्यवैकल्यम् | If it means that which is always unsublated, then that is a case of sAdhya vaikalya - ie such a sAdhya is absent in the example as then there is no example of any relationship that remains unsublated.
नच - तात्त्विकसंबन्धबाधे आध्यासिकसंबन्धसिद्धि:, तथाच संयोगसमवायातिरिक्ततात्त्विकसंबन्धबाधपर्यन्तं नाध्यासिकसंबन्धसंभावना, तथाच कथमर्थान्तरसिद्धसाधनसाध्यवैकल्यानीति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can one argue thus - Only when a real relation is disproved, can one postulate an unreal relation. Therefore, until a (real) relation other than samyoga and samavAya is contradicted, it cannot be an unreal relationship. Thus how are defects of arthAntara, siddhasAdhana, sAdhyavaikalya, etc possible?
तात्त्विकसंबन्धस्य व्यापकानुपलब्ध्याबाधात् | Because a real relationship is disproven by the absence of vyApaka.
The absence of the vyApaka will prove the absence of vyApya. What is the vyApaka, ie that which is proven when a real relationship exists?
तथाहि - तात्त्विकसंबन्धस्य व्यापको देशकालविप्रकर्षाभाव: | To clarify - the vyApaka for a real relation is the absence of temporal and spatial distance between the two entities.
Where there is a real relation between two things (vyApya), the two things must necessarily be present at the same place and the same time (vyApaka).
सचातीतादिविषयकज्ञानादीनां नास्त्येवेति कथं तात्त्विकस्तेषाम् संबन्ध: | That (the absence of temporal and spatial distance) is absent in the case of the cognition of past events, then how can there be any real relation between them?
The absence of temporal and spatial distance being absent means there is either a temporal distance or spatial distance.
The samavAya relation is postulated as eternal by the logician (invoking the principle of parsimony). It is considered eternal even when the the objects related by samavAya are themselves destroyed. The samavAya between a pot and its shape exists even if the pot and its shape are destroyed.
नच - समवायवत् सम्बन्ध्यभावविप्रकर्षाद्यविरुद्धत्वेनैव - वाच्यम् ;
Don't argue thus - this (relationship) is like samavAya, which is uncontradicted even when the two related items themselves are not existent and even there is a spatio-temporal distance (between the related items).
समवायस्यापि देशकालविप्रकृष्टयो: संबन्धव्यवहाराप्रयोजकत्वात् | Because samavAya too cannot relate two entities if there is a spatio-temporal distance between them.
नहि संबन्ध्यभावेऽपि सन् समवायोऽद्य नष्टं घटं श्वस्तनेन रूपेण विशिनष्टि | If a pot breaks today, and takes another form tomorrow, no samavAya can exist today between the pot and its future form.
नचाध्यासिकत्वे संबन्धस्य साध्ये धर्मिग्राहकमानबाध:, विशिष्टबुद्धित्वेन प्रथमतात्त्विकातात्त्विकसाधारणसंबन्धत्वस्यैव सिद्धे: |
Nor is it the case that if the relationship is superimposed, the very cognition that reveals the relationship contradicts it (the notion that the relationship is supeirmposed), because by the relational cognition all that is known that the relationship is present, irrespective of whether it is real or unreal.
To explain dharmigrAhakapramANa bAdha - normally to disprove something, a refuting reason is used. Sometimes, instead of a refuting reason, one can disprove it by using the very proof for the existence of that thing to argue for its non-existence.
In nyAya, the mind is considered to be paramANu rUpa (atomic). Atma is considered to be vibhu (all-pervading). Some groups within mImAmsa argue that the mind is all-pervading.
The mImAmsaka's inference for this as follows: मनो विभु ज्ञानासमवायिकारणसंयोगाश्रयत्वात् आत्मवत्. The mind is all pervading because like the Atma, it happens to be the locus for the samyoga between the mind and Atma, and an asamavAyi kAraNa (ie it is a cause for cognition, but is not its material cause).
The naiyyAyika says that the anumAna is flawed because the Atma mana samyoga, which is the basis to argue that the mind is all-pervading, is itself not possible if both the mind and Atma are all pervading, because two all pervading entities cannot have samyoga. There has to be some movement in at least one of the two sambandhi's for samyoga to occur. If both entities of the relation are all-pervading, there is no possibility for movement. In the absence of movement, no samyoga is possible.
Thus the very basis to argue for something, is proved to be absent and the absence is used by the opponent to disprove the thing implied by the basis. Such a technique is called dharmi grAhaka pramANa bAdha.
The nyAyAmRtakAra says that there is dharmigrAhakapramANa bAdha in the siddhikAra's position that the observed relation between the seer and the seen is unreal. If it is observed, the relation must exist, so how can it be unreal?
किंच संबन्धग्राहक एव तात्त्विकसंबन्धव्यापकानुपलब्धिरूपबाधसहकृताध्यासिकसंबन्धे पर्यवस्यति | As the inference that reveals the relationship (between the seer and the seen) is accompanied by the absence of the condition which should have been necessarily present if the relationship had been real - in the absence of such an unreality contradicting condition - one is left with the conclusion that the relationship is unreal.
To explain itarabAdhasahakRta - When a person infers fire in the mountain, it is a mountain fire. The fire he sees in the kitchen is kitchen fire. The fire he saw in the kitchen is not mountain fire, so how is it possible to use that kitchen fire to prove mountain fire?
When he is certain that the fire in the mountain can only be mountain fire and nothing else, by seeing smoke, his inference will be of mountain fire alone. This is called इतरबाधसहकृतपरामर्श, which can lead to a specific knowledge of mountain fire.
To show this in another inference: Any created object must have a creator - yat janyam tat sakartRkam.
Now this raises the question of whether the creator is one or many. One creator who creates all beings, as he is omnipotent, is considered to be right, because it is more parsimonious to postulate one creator. If it is accepted that it is more parsimonious to have one creator, then the inference that reveals that the world is created, will also reveal that its creator is only one. This is another case of itarabAdhasahakRta parAmarsha. The inference arises with the conviction that the alternatives are untrue.
Similarly as the inference for the relationship between consciousness and object rises along with the cognition that the two entities are not spatially or temporally proximate, it follows that the relationship must be unreal.
That is, when the inference proving a relationship between the seer and the seen arises, it is accompanied by the cognition of a spatial and temporal distance between the two, with the net result that all that the inference proves is an unreal relationship.
अतो न धर्मिग्राहकबाधशङ्कापि | Thus one need not doubt that the argument for the proof of the unreality of the relationship is self-defeating.
न चैवं - युतसिद्धयोरेव संयोगरूपसंबन्धदर्शनादयुतसिद्धिरपि समवायस्य बाधिका स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue on the basis of this that - "As relationships such as samyoga are always seen when the relationship is impermanent (in the samyoga), permanence would end up disproving samavAya."
The opponent argues that by such an argument one can disprove samavAya. Substances (padArtha) are divided into two categories - yutasiddha (things which were not in contact previously, but are now in contact) and ayutasiddha (things that were always in contact. They were never not in contact). The permanence of the contact need not be two-way between the entities, it can be one way too. A form is always in contact with a pot, but a pot need not always be in contact with that form. The former is ayutasiddhi, the latter is yutasiddhi.
If a real samavAya is refuted on the grounds that pot and its colour have a permanent relationship, it would mean that no real samavAya is possible between pot and colour, which would be undesirable. Therefore, there is no requirement for impermanence for the
This is a flawed argument, similar to saying that the presence of a space-time distance between two entities, proves that relationship cannot be real. This is the nyAyAmRtakAra's argument - the siddhikAra refutes this.
अयुतसिद्धयोरपि क्वचित्संबन्धदर्शनेन युतसिद्धत्वस्य संबन्धाप्रयोजक्त्वात्, यस्मिन् सत्यवश्यं संबन्ध: स एव संबन्धस्य प्रयोजक इति समव्याप्तत्वाभावेन युतसिद्ध्यनुपलब्धेरबाधकत्वात्,
Impermanence is not a necessary condition for a relationship because with permanence too a relationship is seen. That factor whose presence is a necessary condition for a relationship is the one that implies the relationship. Therefore as there is no mutually invariable concomitance between the two, the absence of impermanence does not act as a contradicting reason (for the reality of the relationship).
यत्र संबन्धस्तत्रावश्यं युतसिद्धिरिति विषमव्याप्तिकल्पनेऽपि मानाभावात्, There is no basis to postulate a one way invariable concomitance because wherever there is a relationship there must be impermanence is also not true.
अनुकूलतर्कादर्शनात्, There is no supporting logic for it.
A concomitance occurs in the example does not imply it occurs everywhere.
देशकालविप्रकर्षाभाववतां तु सर्वेषां संबन्धदर्शनेन विप्रकर्षे तददर्शनेन च समव्याप्ततया प्रयोजकस्य देशकालविप्रकर्षाभावस्यानुपलब्धे: संबन्धबाधकत्वस्यावश्यमङ्गीकरणीयत्वात् |
On the other hand, the absence of spatial or temporal distance is always accompanied by a real relationship everywhere, and when such a distance is present, it is seen that a real relationship is absent. Thus, as there is a mutually invariant concomitance, it must necessarily be conceded that the presence of spatial and temporal distance will disprove a real relationship.
नहि प्रयोजकाभावे प्रयोज्यसंभव: | When the implying condition is absent, the implied cannot be present.
The opponent then provides various examples where sambandha must be accepted even in the presence of spatio-temporal distance. The relationship between the seer and the seen is similar to these.
नन्वेवं - 1) ध्वंसादेरतीतादिना, There must be a relationship between the destruction (of a pot and the pot) with past objects (The counterpositive of destruction is in the past having been destroyed).
Without it, even after a hammer blow breaks the pot, one will have to say that the pot does not get destroyed. Rather one will have to say that another entity called destruction gets added to it. Ie Destruction and the pot will simultaneously exist. That is an absurd proposition. Therefore, there must be a relationship between destruction and the object destroyed. However these two never temporally coexist.
2) मिथ्यात्वलक्षणान्तर्गतस्यात्यन्ताभावस्य प्रतियोगिना, The absolute absence included within the (second) definition of mithyAtva and its counterpositive (must have a relationship).
The absolute absence is for all time, but its counterpositive appears to exist only in the present. If no relationship existed between the two prior to the object's appearance, then mithyAtva itself will not exist.
3) शक्ते: शक्येन, the power (present in the cause to produce an effect) and the effect (must necessarily have a relationship).
If it did not, anything can be created from anything.
4) अज्ञानस्याज्ञेयेन, ignorance and its object (must necessarily have a relationship).
These two need not exist simultaneously, so can we say that ignorance has no relationship with its object?
5) इच्छाया इष्यमाणेन, desire and its object (must have a relationship), but they don't exist together at the same time. One desires something that one does not have. If one acquires the object of desire, he stops desiring it.
6) व्यवहारस्य व्यवहर्तव्येन, transactions (speech) and the transacted (must have a relationship). Alternatively, perceptual cognitions and their object must have a relationship.
7) वाक्यस्यार्थेन, sentence and its meaning (must have a relationship). However a sentence and its meaning are not located in the same place.
8) वृत्तिरूपज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयेन, a thought and its object (must have a relationship).
संबन्धो नेति त्वद्वाक्योक्तसंबन्धाभावस्य ज्ञानेनासम्बन्धात् स्वन्यायस्वक्रियास्ववचनविरोधा: स्यु:, If cognition and its object don't have a relationship, your statement will also be unrelated to its meaning, leading to a violation of your own rule, actions and speech.
Contd