paricCheda 1 - Agama bAdhoddhAra: (part 3)
एतेन - 'नेह नाने'ति श्रुतिरेव 'विश्वं सत्य' मित्यबाध्यत्वरूपबाधनिषेधाय विज्ञानवादिप्राप्तविश्वनिषेधानुवादिनी किं न स्यादिति - निरस्तम् ;
From this, the following argument stands refuted: "In order to set aside the negation postulated by shruti "there is no multiplicity here", which would otherwise negate the reality of the world conveyed through sentences such as "the world is real", why can we not say that the mithyAtva shruti is only a repetition of the negation of the world's reality postulated by vijnAnavAdins?"
Why?
भावाभावयो: परस्परविरहरूपत्वे समेऽपि भावग्रहो निरपेक्षत्वात् नाभावग्रहमपेक्षते, अभावग्रहस्तु सप्रतियोगितया भावग्रहमपेक्षते |
Even though the existence and non-existence of a thing are of the nature of mutual absence of each other, as the existence of a thing does not depend on anything else, it does not depend on the non-existence of that thing too. However, the cognition of absence requires the cognition of the counterpositive of the absence.
अतो 'नेति नेति' श्रुतेरेव सत्त्वश्रुत्यपेक्षा, नतु सत्वश्रुतेर्नेति श्रुत्यपेक्षा; अन्यथा अन्योन्याश्रयापत्ते: |
Therefore, the shruti which says "not this, not this" presupposes the shruti which says "the world is real", whereas the reverse cannot be true - otherwise this will lead to mutual dependence
***Twelfth argument of the opponent - this is a case of the utsarga apavAda maxim***
ननु - उत्सर्गापवादन्यायोऽस्तु, यथा हि 'न हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानी'ति श्रुतिरविषेशप्रवृत्तापि हिंसात्वसामान्यस्य प्रत्यक्षादिप्राप्तत्वान्निषेध्योपस्थितौ नाग्नीषोमीयवाक्यमपि निषेध्यसमर्पणायापेक्षते,
The opponent argues - Let this be an instance where the utsarga-apavAda (the general and special rule) maxim applies (essentially if a general rule and specific rule are in contradiction, the special rule prevails). Just like in the case of the general prohibition "Do not harm any living creature", where it is known through perception that any violence in general is harm, it follows that violence is generally prohibited, it is accepted that the specific rule "In the agniShomIya sacrifice, the animal is sacrificed", is not overruled -
तथा 'नेति ने'त्यादिश्रुतिरविषेशप्रवृत्तापि प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तघटादिसत्त्वरूपनिषेध्यमादाय निराकाङ्क्षा सती न प्रत्यक्षाप्राप्तधर्माधर्मादिसत्यत्वबोधिकां 'विश्वं सत्य'मित्यादिश्रुतिमपि निषेध्यसमर्पणायापेक्षितुमर्हति,
In the same way, even though the shruti "not this, not this", negates in general the reality of the objects of perception such as pots etc, those which are outside the scope of perception, such as dharma and adharma, which are known to be the real from the shruti "the world is real", are incapable of being negated by the general negation.
यत्र तु मानान्तरेण निषेध्यस्याप्राप्तिस्तत्र निषेध्यसमर्पणाय श्रुत्यन्तरमपेक्षत एव ;
Where the object of negation is not known by any other means of knowledge, there is the expectation of another shruti which reveals that object to us.
यथा षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणयो:, मानान्तरेण निषेध्योपस्थितावपि वाक्यापेक्षणे अग्नीषोमीयहिंसाया अपि निषिद्धत्वेनाधर्मत्वं स्यात् -
Like the usage and non-usage of the ShoDashi vessel (that is, the negation of the usage of the ShoDashi vessel presupposes that there is another shruti sentence which postulates that such a vessel is capable of being used). Even if the object of negation is revealed through some other means of knowledge, if the killing of animals in the agniShomIya sacrifice was also said to be negated by the general prohibition of harm, then it would follow that the performance of the sacrifice would be adharma (which would be undesirable, as the veda-s would never enjoin anyone to the path of adharma).
इति चेत्, मैवम् ; To such an argument, the siddhikAra says: Not so.
His argument is that the maxim is not applicable here because of two major differences.
1) The prescription of the killing of the animal in the agniShomIya sacrifice is a specific incident, whereas the negation of violence to all creatures covers the entire universe of violence. It is a very small exception to a universal rule of non-violence. Whereas the object of negation (neti neti) and vishvam satyam are equal in scope. The entire negation would be negated if the latter prevailed.
2) Secondly, the prescription of the animal sacrifice is part of an injunction, a vidhi, where a specific benefit accrues as a result of the performance of a sacrifice. Such an action, performed for the accrual of the benefit, is not known otherwise, thus the vedic injunction has import, svArthatAtparya. Whereas, the words vishvam satyam occurs in the context of a eulogy. The eulogy does not have import, it serves as praise for another action.
अग्नीषोमीयवाक्यस्य निषेधविषयन्यूनविषयत्वेनानन्यशेषतया स्वार्थतात्पर्यवत्त्वेन च न निषेध्यसमर्पणद्वारेण निषेध्यवाक्यशेषता,
The object of the agniShomIya sentence (violence towards the animal in this specific context) being much smaller in scope than the negation (of violence towards all creatures), it is not subsidiary to another statement and the meaning of the sentence is the import of the shruti. Therefore, it is not the object that is being negated in the general prohibition.
'विश्वं सत्य'मित्यादेस्तु निषेधविषयसमविषयत्वेन स्वार्थतात्पर्यरहितत्वेन च निषेध्यसमर्पणद्वारेण निषेधवाक्यशेषतोचितैव | Whereas as the scope of the shruti "the world is real" is equal to the scope of the object of negation ("there is no multiplicity here"), and occurring as it does in the context of praising Indra's actions, the direct sentence meaning is not the import of shruti, it is appropriate to say that it too falls under the purview of the general negation of everything.
अतएव प्रत्यक्षाप्राप्तधर्मादिसत्त्वोपस्थापनेन वाक्यसाफल्यमपि | स्वार्थतात्पर्यरहितत्वेन च नाग्नीषोमीयवाक्यतुल्यत्वमित्युक्तम् | Therefore, that the sentence's purpose is served is in establishing the reality of dharma etc, which are beyond the ken of perception is also not comparable to the injunction "sacrifice the animal in the agniShomIya", as the direct sentence meaning is not the import of the shruti.
अतो दृश्यत्वादिहेतोर्धर्माद्यंशेऽपि श्रुत्या न बाध: | Thus the mithyAtva of dharma etc, which was established on account of their knowability, cannot be overruled by ("the world is real") shruti.
Until now, it was argued that the primary import of the "world is real" shruti was as a eulogy to Indra. He presents an alternative, as a concession to the opponent (tuShyatu durjana nyAya).
अथवा - व्यावहारिकसत्त्वपरेयं विश्वसत्यत्वश्रुति: | Alternatively, this shruti is revealing the empirical reality of the world.
नच व्यावहारिकसत्त्वे सर्वाविप्रतिपत्तेस्तत्प्रतिपादनवैयर्थ्यम् ; Nor can it be argued that the shruti would be redundant here as the world's empirical reality is universally accepted.
दशाविशेषे स्वर्गनरकादिसत्त्वप्रतिपादनेन तत्प्राप्तिपरिहारार्थं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योरेव तत्प्रयोजनत्वात् | For the shruti serves the purpose of revealing the specific circumstances under which heaven and hell are attained, and the means to attain and avoid them.
It cannot be argued that such an interpretation would be contradictory to the shruti that talks of the world's mithyAtva, because:
व्यावहारिकत्वम् च ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाध्यत्वं न त्वबाध्यत्वम् ; मिथ्यात्वबोधकश्रुतिविरोधात् | empirical reality is the unsublatability of a thing by anything other than the cognition of brahman, rather than mere unsublatability, and therefore it is not contradictory to mithyAtva shruti.
नचैवं दृढभ्रान्तिजनकत्वात् अत्यन्ताप्रामाण्यापत्ति:, स्वप्नार्थप्रतिपादनवदुपपत्ते: | Nor does this mean that the veda becomes completely invalid on account of it teaching totally illusory things, because, like the scripture on the interpretation of dreams, it serves a purpose
एतावानेव विशेष: - तत्प्रातिभासिकं, इदं तु व्यावहारिकमिति | The difference between the two is this much - that is apparent reality, whereas this is empirical.
ननु - मिथ्यात्वश्रुतेर्लक्षणया अखण्डचिन्मात्रपरत्वेन विश्वसत्त्वबोधनाविरोधित्वमेव, न; अखण्डार्थबोधस्य द्वितीयाभावबुद्धिद्वारकत्वेन जगत्सत्यत्वविरोधित्वात् |
If it be argued - As mithyAtva shruti is indirectly referring to the impartite consciousness, it cannot contradict the shruti that reveals the world's reality - that is not true, because the knowledge of the impartite one is only possible through the knowledge of the absence of duality, and therefore it is in contrary to the shruti talking of the world's reality.
नच प्रपञ्चसत्वश्रुतेरप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्ग:, अतत्त्वावेदकत्वस्यावान्तरतात्पर्यमादायेष्टत्वात्, Nor can it be said that this leads to invalidity of the shruti that talks of the world's reality, because even if such a shruti reveals an object that is not ultimately real, it still serves a purpose by having a secondary import, which is desirable.
परमतात्पर्येण तु तत्त्वावेदकत्वं सर्वश्रुतीनामपि समम् ; From the point of view of ultimate import though, all shruti-s are unified in what they consider to be ultimately real.
प्रातिभासिकव्यावृत्तस्य व्यावहारिकस्य तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वादिरूपस्य निराकर्तमुशक्यत्वात् |
An empirical reality, differing from apparent reality, which happens to be of the nature a thing-as-it-is (the attribute present in the object matches the attribute in the cognition of the object), cannot be denied.
आसां व्यावहारिकं प्रामाण्यमव्याहतमेव | That the world's reality is empirically valid has not been denied by us.
'असद्वा इदमग्र आसी'दित्यादिश्रुत्यनुरोधेनापि 'तत्सत्य'मित्यादिर्श्रुतिर्न ब्रह्मणि व्यावहारिकसत्त्वपरा; ब्रह्मणो व्यवहारातीत्वात्, तस्यापरमार्थत्वे च निरधिष्ठानतया शून्यवादापत्ते:, किन्चित्तत्त्वमगृहीत्वा च बाधानुपपत्ते: |
In line with shruti such as 'Non-existence was verily present in the beginning', one cannot say that the intention of the shruti 'That is real' is to convey that Brahman's reality is empirical, because Brahman is beyond transactions. If Brahman is not ultimately real, there would be no substratum, leading to nihilism. Without holding on to any real entity, it would not be possible to deny anything either.
In order to talk of the absence of pot, we need to have known the presence of the substratum, the ground. Without holding on to the reality of the ground, one cannot talk of the absence of the pot.
अतएव सत्यत्वश्रुतिविरोधेन मिथ्यात्वश्रुतिरेवान्यपरेत्यपि न; षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गोपेतत्वेन मिथ्यात्वश्रुतेरनन्यपरतया प्रबलत्वात्, Thus, if it is said that it is the mithyAtva shruti that needs to be reinterpreted because it contradicts the shruti talking of reality, no, because, mithyAtva shruti, being endowed with the six-fold indicatory marks of import, it is the stronger of the two, and need not be reinterpreted.
वैदिकतात्पर्यविषयस्य च तात्त्विकत्वनियमेन तात्पर्यज्ञापकानामपि लिङ्गानामर्थतथात्व एव पर्यवसानात् | As a result of the rule that the object of the veda which has import must real, it follows that the indicatory marks of import must be meaningful.
सत्त्वश्रुतिवाक्यस्थपदानाम् चान्यपरत्वान्न सत्त्वे तात्पर्यलिङ्गाशङ्का | As the shruti that talks of the world's reality has some other import, one need not doubt whether indicatory marks of import are present in such a shruti or not.
ननु - यदि सत्त्वश्रुति: प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तार्थत्वान्न स्वार्थपरा, तर्हि मिथ्यात्वश्रुतिरपि तद्विरुद्धार्थत्वात् स्वार्थपरा न स्यात्, तत्प्राप्तितद्विरोधयोस्तात्पर्याभावहेत्वोरुभयत्रापि समत्वात् - इति चेन्न;
The opponent argues - If the shruti talking of reality does not have import in its sentence meaning because it is revealing something known through perception, mithyAtva shruti too cannot have import in its sentence meaning because it contradicts that (perception), as the cause for not having import - agreeing with another means of knowledge (hence not unique) and disagreeing with another means of knowledge (hence contradictory) - are common to both.
- इति चेन्न; the siddhikAra responds - if this is the argument, no.
प्रत्यक्षापेक्षया चन्द्राधिकपरिमाणबोधकागमस्येव मिथ्यात्वबोधकागमस्यापि बलवत्त्वेन प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तानुवादिसत्त्वश्रुत्यपेक्षयापि बलवत्त्वात् ; अन्यथोभयोरापि अप्रामाण्यापत्ते: |
Like the scripture that establishes that the size of the moon is larger than what is perceived, the scripture that reveals the world is mithyA is stronger than a shruti that simply repeats something reported by perception. If that is not accepted (if perception is indeed stronger than the two), neither mithyAtva shruti nor satyatva shruti would have validity (the former because it is contradicted, and the latter because it is simply repeating perception).
तदुक्तं सङ्क्षेपशारीरके - 'अतत्परा तत्परवेदवाक्यैर्विरुध्यमाना गुणवाद एवेति | Thus it was said in the sankshepa shAriraka - "the shruti which does not have import, and contradicts another shruti having import, is only a guNavAda".
अतएवानन्यशेषमिथ्यात्वश्रुतिविरोधात् न प्रत्यक्षागृहीतत्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपसत्यत्वपरा जगत्सत्यत्वश्रुतिरित्युक्तम् |
Therefore, as mithyAtva shruti's purpose is to reveal only that and not something else, it cannot be argued that satyatva shruti is revealing a reality to the world unknown from perception which is unsublated in any period of time.
अद्वैतश्रुतेश्च प्राबल्ये निरवकाशत्वतात्पर्यवत्त्वादिकमेव प्रयोजकम्, न निषेधवाक्यत्वम् | The reason why advaita shruti is stronger, is because if its direct sentence meaning is not taken, then it will have no scope for application at all, not because it simply happens to be a statement of negation.
एतेन - निषेधवाक्यत्वेन प्राबल्ये किति तद्धिते वृद्धिविधायकात् 'कितिचे' ति सूत्रात् सामान्यतो गुणवृद्धिनिषेधकं 'किङ्गि चे'ति सूत्रं बलवत्स्यात् , अग्नीषोमीयवाक्यादहिंसावाक्यं षोडशिनो ग्रहणवाक्यादग्रहणवाक्यम् 'सत्यं ज्ञान' मित्यादिवाक्यात्, 'असद्वा इदमग्र आसी'दित्यादिवाक्यं च बलवत्स्यादित्यपास्तम् |
By this, the following argument is refuted:
"If the statement of negation is always stronger than the statement of injunction, then
a) the aShTAdhyAyi sUtra कितिचेत्, which stipulates that the इ and उ in the कित् suffix attain guNa and vRddhi (ie become ऐ and औ respectively) would be negated by the sUtra किङ्गिचेत् which says that vriddhi and guNa should not be be brought in,
b) The performed of the agnIShOmIya sacrifice would be committing adharma, for it would violate the general prohibition of violence,
c) The option of taking the soma juice in the ShoDashi will be overruled by the negation,
d) The sentence "Brahman is Existence, Consciousness, Bliss" will be overruled by the sentence "Non-existence was all that was present in the beginning".
The siddhikAra refutes these arguments because his argument was not that the sentence of negation is necessarily stronger than the injunction.
सामान्यविशेषभावादिना सावकाशत्वनिरवकाशत्वादिरूपबलवैपरीत्यात्, 'विश्वं सत्य'मित्यादेस्तु व्यावहारिकसत्यविषयतया अन्यशेषतया च सावकाशत्वादे: प्रागुक्तत्वात् | As a specific statement is stronger than a general one, it follows that a statement which cannot be interpreted otherwise will be stronger than a statement with multiple interpretations, the sentence "the world is real" can have the meaning of empirical reality and is subsidiary to another sentence, it can be interpreted otherwise.
तस्मान्न सत्त्वश्रुतिविरोध: || Therefore, mithyAtva shruti is not in contradiction with satyatva shruti.
Until now the topic of contradiction by shruti was taken up. Next the topic of contradiction by smRti will be taken up.
नापि 'असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदाहुरनीश्वरम् | एतां बुद्धिमवष्टभ्य नष्टात्मनोऽल्पबुद्धय: ||' इत्यादिस्मृतिविरोध:, Nor is the world's unreality contradicted by smRti "Those who say that the world is non-existent, has no basis, and say that there is no God in the world" "Holding on to this view, they are of depraved character, of poor intellect"
सद्विविक्तत्वादिनो जगत्यसद्वैलक्षण्याङ्गीकारेण तत्प्रतिपादकस्मृतिविरोधाभावात् | Those who say that the world is different from the existent, also accept that it is different from the non-existent, therefore there is no contradiction with the smRti which refers to those that argue that it is non-existent.
Next the siddhikAra establishes that there is no contradiction with the brahmasUtra.
ननु - 'नाभाव उपलब्धे:' 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिव' दिति सूत्रद्वयेन जगत: पारमार्थिकसत्त्वबोधनेन विरोध:,
The opponent says - The two sUtra-s 'It is not absolutely non-existent, because it is available for perception' and 'Because it has different attributes compared to the dream' establish that the world is ultimately real and thus contradict the mithyAtva of the world.
He continues:
नचानेन शून्यवादिनिरासार्थेनासद्वैलक्षण्यमात्रप्रतिपादनान्न विरोध:, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वलक्षण्यस्यासद्वैलक्षण्यस्य शून्यवादिमतेऽपि सत्त्वेन तन्मतनिरासार्थत्वानुपपत्ते:, Nor can it be argued that these sUtra-s only refute the nihilist (shUnyavAdin buddhist) by showing that the world is not non-existent and therefore there is no contradiction - because, the shUnyavAdin-s also accept that the world has a utility which is absent from the purely non-existent, and the sUtra-s cannot refute them on such an interpretation.
निषेधाप्रतियोगित्वरूपस्यासद्वैलक्षण्यस्य त्वयाप्यनङ्गीकारात् असद्वैलक्षण्यमात्रस्य साधने सूत्रे स्वप्नवैलक्षण्योक्त्ययोगाच्च, You too agree that the world is not of the nature of an unsublatable non-existence, thus the mere show of difference from non-existence in the sUtra, is insufficient to establish that the world is different from a dream.
व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वमात्रेण स्वप्नवैलक्षण्यस्य त्वयाप्यङ्गीकारात्, असद्वैलक्षण्यमात्रस्य तन्मतेऽपि सत्त्वाच्च, You too agree that the world being empirically real is different from the dream, and that the real in your system is totally different from the non-existent.
तदुक्तं बौद्धै: - 'द्वे सत्त्वे समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना' The Buddhist says -"Our acceptance of reality is by accepting two truths (not being non-existent and having utility)".
Thus, it follows that these two sUtra-s must necessarily establish the ultimate reality of the world.
The siddhikAra responds:
इति - चेन्न; सूत्रार्थानवबोधात् Not so, because the meaning of the sUtra-s has not been understood by you.
तथाहि - सद्रूपात् ब्रह्मणो जगत्सर्गं वदत: समन्वयस्य सर्वमसदित्यनुमानेन विरोधसन्देहे 'न सन्नासन्न सदसत् न चानुभयतत्त्वकम् | विमतं तर्कपीड्यत्वान्मरीचिषु यथोदकम् ||' इति ब्रह्मसाधारणयान्निस्तत्त्वतायां प्राप्तायां सूत्रेण परिहार: |
To explain - There is a doubt as to how to reconcile the view of those who argue that it is from the Existence, Brahman, that the world is created, with the inference that everything is non-existent. The Buddhists say that - "it is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor existent and non-existent, nor neither. The object under discussion (the world) is beyond logic, like the appearance of water in the mirage." From this it appears that Brahman too shares the characteristic of not being each of the four categories, and therefore it too is shUnya (void). It is this doubt that is being addressed by the sUtra-s.
How?
सतो ब्रह्मणो नाभाव: न शून्यत्वं, उपलब्धे: सत्त्वेन प्रमाणात् प्रतीते: | The sUtra, "It is not non-existent, because it is capable of being perceived" means - Existence, or Brahman, is not of the nature of non-existence, not a void, because it is capable of being perceived, that is it is known as existing from a valid means of knowledge.
तथाच किञ्चित्परमार्थसदवश्यम् शून्यवादिनापि स्वीकार्यम्; अन्यथा बाधस्य निरवधिकत्वप्रसङ्गादिति सूत्रार्थ: सच न प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वविरोधी | Further, even the shUnyavAdin-s have to agree to some entity that is ultimately real, for it will lead to a sublation into a void. Thus, this sUtra is not to prove that the world is not mithyA.
तथाचोक्तं - 'बाधितोऽपह्नवो मानै: व्यावहारिकमानता | मानानां तात्त्विकं किञ्चित् वस्तु नाश्रित्य दुर्भणे'ति |
Thus it has been said - "The negation of empirical reality can be (only) by a valid means of knowledge, and unless those means of knowledge rest upon a real substratum, they cannot perform their function".
नापि स्वप्नावैधर्म्योक्त्ययोग:, तस्या: 'विमतं निस्तत्त्वं तर्कपीड्यत्वात् मरुमरीचिकाजलव'दित्यनुमाने बाध्यत्वप्रमाणागम्यत्वदोषजन्यत्वाद्युपाधिप्रदर्शनपरत्वात् विज्ञानवादिनिराकरणपरेणापि नानेन सूत्रेण विरोध: |
Nor is the statement that "it is different from the dream" inappropriate. Its purpose is to prove that the inference "The object under discussion (the world) is void, because it is beyond logic, like mirage water", has the following defects of upAdhi (adjunct) (1) sublatability (upon waking up) - the dream has that, the world does not, (2) it is not observed by a valid means of knowledge - the dream is not seen by any valid means of knowledge, whereas the world is, (3) it is born from a defective source - the dream is caused due to sleep obscuring the senses, the world is not. The sUtra can also be said to refute the vijnAnavAdin buddhists. Therefore for these two reasons, the sUtra does not refute the reality of the world.
रूपादिरहितब्रह्मजगदुपादानत्वप्रतिपादकसमन्वयस्य नीलाद्याकारं विज्ञानं साध्यता अनुमानेन विरोधसन्देहे A doubt may arise here: Advaita, which holds that the attributeless Brahman is the material cause of the universe is contrary to the vijnAnavAdin, who holds that forms such as blue etc are only forms of momentary consciousness.
They quote a verse in this regard:
'स्वप्नधीसाम्यतो बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्याऽर्थस्य सहेक्षणात् | तद्भेदेनानिरूप्यत्वात् ज्ञानाकारोऽर्थ ईष्यताम् ||
External objects are like objects seen in dreams, where the object and cognitions are seen together, and it is impossible to prove that there is a difference between the two - therefore it follows that objects are simply forms in consciousness.
They also cite an inference in this regard:
विमता धी:, न ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तालम्बना, धीत्वात्, स्वप्नधीवत् | The object under discussion (the world) is only a cognition, because it cannot be known without a cognition, like dream objects.
विपक्षे च ज्ञानाभानेऽप्यर्थभानप्रसङ्गो बाधक: | If that is not true, then it would be possible to know a thing even without cognising it.
नहि भिन्न्योरश्वमहिषयो: सहोपलम्भनियमोऽस्ति | Otherwise there is nothing stopping an animal to simultaneously appear as the horse and as the buffalo, which are two intrinsically different animals.
तस्मान्न ज्ञानातिरिक्तम् सदिति प्राप्ते परिहारसूत्रम् 'नाभाव उपलब्धे'रित्यादि | Therefore, as it appears that there is no object apart from its cognition, the sUtra-s such as "it is not not-existent, because it appears" are needed to refute such views.
बाधेन सोपाधिकतानुमाने उपायभावेन सहोपलम्भ: सारूप्यतो बुद्धितदर्थभेदस्थूलार्थभङ्गे भवतोऽपि तुल्य: |
There are 3 defects in the inference: 1) the illustration (dream) is sublated 2) the simultaneous presence of the two (objects and their cognition) is because one is the means for the other, and so, it does not mean that they are the same (the eye is not the pot, even though we need the eyes to see the pot) 3) the similarity between cognition and its object implies that there are two things, not one (because the relation of similarity two things that are similar). Even though you may claim that there is no gross object, you have to accept there is some object.
सूत्रार्थस्तु, नाभाव: - ज्ञानातिरिक्तस्यार्थस्य नासत्त्वम्, किन्तु व्यवहारदशाबाध्यार्थक्रियाकारितवरूपं सत्त्वमेव | उपलब्धे: - ज्ञानातिरेकेण प्रमाणैरुपलब्धे: | The meaning of the sUtra, in this context, becomes - Not non-existent, the object in the absence of cognition is not non-existent, for it has an empirical reality of the nature of being unsublated and having utility; because it is perceived, it is known by a means of knowledge that is different from consciousness.
स्वप्नवैध्यर्म्योक्ति: बाध्यत्वाद्युपाधिप्रदर्शनाय | The sUtra "it being different from a dream" is for the purpose of showing the defect such as the adjunct of sublatability, etc.
तेन बाधात् सोपाधिकत्वाच्च पूर्वानुमानं दुष्टमित्यर्थ: | The inference mentioned previously is defective because it is contradicted by it (the sUtra), and because it has the defect of adjunct.
तस्मान्नैवमपि विरोधशङ्का | Thus even in this interpretation, one need not doubt whether the world's mithyAtva is refuted.
तदुक्तं तस्मान्न ज्ञानाकारोऽर्थ:, किन्तु बाह्य: | स चार्थक्रियाकारित्वसत्त्वोपेतोऽपि अद्वैतश्रुतिवशात् ब्रह्मणि कल्पितो न परमार्थसन्नितिसिद्धान्तस्य सुगतमताद्भेद इति | Thus it was said - There are external objects, and one cannot say that cognition alone is the external world. It has empirical reality of the nature of utility, and not ultimate reality, on the basis of advaita shruti, which says that the world is superimposed on Brahman. This is the difference with Buddhism.
उक्तंचात्मत्त्वविवेके - 'न ग्राह्यभेदमवधूय धियोऽस्ति वृत्तिस्तत्द्बाधने बलिनि वेदनये जयश्री: | नोचेदनित्यमिदमीदृशमेव विश्वं तथ्यं तथागतमतस्य तु कोऽवकाश:||' इति |
Thus it was said in the Atma tattva viveka by udayanAchArya against the Buddhists - "There is no connection between external objects and their cognitions. When the objects are sublated, it is the position of (advaita) veda that attains victory compared to the rest. If that is not accepted (if the objects are not sublated), then the world is temporary and must be accepted as such. In either position, where is the scope for the way of the Buddha?"
धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधश्च प्रागेव परिहृत इति शिवम् || That the very pramANa that reveals the object contradicts the advaitin's view that it is mithyA, has already been refuted.
इति विश्वमिथ्यत्वस्यागमादिबाधोद्धार: | This concludes the chapter on the refutation of the contradiction of the world's unreality by scripture.
From this, the following argument stands refuted: "In order to set aside the negation postulated by shruti "there is no multiplicity here", which would otherwise negate the reality of the world conveyed through sentences such as "the world is real", why can we not say that the mithyAtva shruti is only a repetition of the negation of the world's reality postulated by vijnAnavAdins?"
Why?
भावाभावयो: परस्परविरहरूपत्वे समेऽपि भावग्रहो निरपेक्षत्वात् नाभावग्रहमपेक्षते, अभावग्रहस्तु सप्रतियोगितया भावग्रहमपेक्षते |
Even though the existence and non-existence of a thing are of the nature of mutual absence of each other, as the existence of a thing does not depend on anything else, it does not depend on the non-existence of that thing too. However, the cognition of absence requires the cognition of the counterpositive of the absence.
अतो 'नेति नेति' श्रुतेरेव सत्त्वश्रुत्यपेक्षा, नतु सत्वश्रुतेर्नेति श्रुत्यपेक्षा; अन्यथा अन्योन्याश्रयापत्ते: |
Therefore, the shruti which says "not this, not this" presupposes the shruti which says "the world is real", whereas the reverse cannot be true - otherwise this will lead to mutual dependence
***Twelfth argument of the opponent - this is a case of the utsarga apavAda maxim***
ननु - उत्सर्गापवादन्यायोऽस्तु, यथा हि 'न हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानी'ति श्रुतिरविषेशप्रवृत्तापि हिंसात्वसामान्यस्य प्रत्यक्षादिप्राप्तत्वान्निषेध्योपस्थितौ नाग्नीषोमीयवाक्यमपि निषेध्यसमर्पणायापेक्षते,
The opponent argues - Let this be an instance where the utsarga-apavAda (the general and special rule) maxim applies (essentially if a general rule and specific rule are in contradiction, the special rule prevails). Just like in the case of the general prohibition "Do not harm any living creature", where it is known through perception that any violence in general is harm, it follows that violence is generally prohibited, it is accepted that the specific rule "In the agniShomIya sacrifice, the animal is sacrificed", is not overruled -
तथा 'नेति ने'त्यादिश्रुतिरविषेशप्रवृत्तापि प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तघटादिसत्त्वरूपनिषेध्यमादाय निराकाङ्क्षा सती न प्रत्यक्षाप्राप्तधर्माधर्मादिसत्यत्वबोधिकां 'विश्वं सत्य'मित्यादिश्रुतिमपि निषेध्यसमर्पणायापेक्षितुमर्हति,
In the same way, even though the shruti "not this, not this", negates in general the reality of the objects of perception such as pots etc, those which are outside the scope of perception, such as dharma and adharma, which are known to be the real from the shruti "the world is real", are incapable of being negated by the general negation.
यत्र तु मानान्तरेण निषेध्यस्याप्राप्तिस्तत्र निषेध्यसमर्पणाय श्रुत्यन्तरमपेक्षत एव ;
Where the object of negation is not known by any other means of knowledge, there is the expectation of another shruti which reveals that object to us.
यथा षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणयो:, मानान्तरेण निषेध्योपस्थितावपि वाक्यापेक्षणे अग्नीषोमीयहिंसाया अपि निषिद्धत्वेनाधर्मत्वं स्यात् -
Like the usage and non-usage of the ShoDashi vessel (that is, the negation of the usage of the ShoDashi vessel presupposes that there is another shruti sentence which postulates that such a vessel is capable of being used). Even if the object of negation is revealed through some other means of knowledge, if the killing of animals in the agniShomIya sacrifice was also said to be negated by the general prohibition of harm, then it would follow that the performance of the sacrifice would be adharma (which would be undesirable, as the veda-s would never enjoin anyone to the path of adharma).
इति चेत्, मैवम् ; To such an argument, the siddhikAra says: Not so.
His argument is that the maxim is not applicable here because of two major differences.
1) The prescription of the killing of the animal in the agniShomIya sacrifice is a specific incident, whereas the negation of violence to all creatures covers the entire universe of violence. It is a very small exception to a universal rule of non-violence. Whereas the object of negation (neti neti) and vishvam satyam are equal in scope. The entire negation would be negated if the latter prevailed.
2) Secondly, the prescription of the animal sacrifice is part of an injunction, a vidhi, where a specific benefit accrues as a result of the performance of a sacrifice. Such an action, performed for the accrual of the benefit, is not known otherwise, thus the vedic injunction has import, svArthatAtparya. Whereas, the words vishvam satyam occurs in the context of a eulogy. The eulogy does not have import, it serves as praise for another action.
अग्नीषोमीयवाक्यस्य निषेधविषयन्यूनविषयत्वेनानन्यशेषतया स्वार्थतात्पर्यवत्त्वेन च न निषेध्यसमर्पणद्वारेण निषेध्यवाक्यशेषता,
The object of the agniShomIya sentence (violence towards the animal in this specific context) being much smaller in scope than the negation (of violence towards all creatures), it is not subsidiary to another statement and the meaning of the sentence is the import of the shruti. Therefore, it is not the object that is being negated in the general prohibition.
'विश्वं सत्य'मित्यादेस्तु निषेधविषयसमविषयत्वेन स्वार्थतात्पर्यरहितत्वेन च निषेध्यसमर्पणद्वारेण निषेधवाक्यशेषतोचितैव | Whereas as the scope of the shruti "the world is real" is equal to the scope of the object of negation ("there is no multiplicity here"), and occurring as it does in the context of praising Indra's actions, the direct sentence meaning is not the import of shruti, it is appropriate to say that it too falls under the purview of the general negation of everything.
अतएव प्रत्यक्षाप्राप्तधर्मादिसत्त्वोपस्थापनेन वाक्यसाफल्यमपि | स्वार्थतात्पर्यरहितत्वेन च नाग्नीषोमीयवाक्यतुल्यत्वमित्युक्तम् | Therefore, that the sentence's purpose is served is in establishing the reality of dharma etc, which are beyond the ken of perception is also not comparable to the injunction "sacrifice the animal in the agniShomIya", as the direct sentence meaning is not the import of the shruti.
अतो दृश्यत्वादिहेतोर्धर्माद्यंशेऽपि श्रुत्या न बाध: | Thus the mithyAtva of dharma etc, which was established on account of their knowability, cannot be overruled by ("the world is real") shruti.
Until now, it was argued that the primary import of the "world is real" shruti was as a eulogy to Indra. He presents an alternative, as a concession to the opponent (tuShyatu durjana nyAya).
अथवा - व्यावहारिकसत्त्वपरेयं विश्वसत्यत्वश्रुति: | Alternatively, this shruti is revealing the empirical reality of the world.
नच व्यावहारिकसत्त्वे सर्वाविप्रतिपत्तेस्तत्प्रतिपादनवैयर्थ्यम् ; Nor can it be argued that the shruti would be redundant here as the world's empirical reality is universally accepted.
दशाविशेषे स्वर्गनरकादिसत्त्वप्रतिपादनेन तत्प्राप्तिपरिहारार्थं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योरेव तत्प्रयोजनत्वात् | For the shruti serves the purpose of revealing the specific circumstances under which heaven and hell are attained, and the means to attain and avoid them.
It cannot be argued that such an interpretation would be contradictory to the shruti that talks of the world's mithyAtva, because:
व्यावहारिकत्वम् च ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाध्यत्वं न त्वबाध्यत्वम् ; मिथ्यात्वबोधकश्रुतिविरोधात् | empirical reality is the unsublatability of a thing by anything other than the cognition of brahman, rather than mere unsublatability, and therefore it is not contradictory to mithyAtva shruti.
नचैवं दृढभ्रान्तिजनकत्वात् अत्यन्ताप्रामाण्यापत्ति:, स्वप्नार्थप्रतिपादनवदुपपत्ते: | Nor does this mean that the veda becomes completely invalid on account of it teaching totally illusory things, because, like the scripture on the interpretation of dreams, it serves a purpose
एतावानेव विशेष: - तत्प्रातिभासिकं, इदं तु व्यावहारिकमिति | The difference between the two is this much - that is apparent reality, whereas this is empirical.
ननु - मिथ्यात्वश्रुतेर्लक्षणया अखण्डचिन्मात्रपरत्वेन विश्वसत्त्वबोधनाविरोधित्वमेव, न; अखण्डार्थबोधस्य द्वितीयाभावबुद्धिद्वारकत्वेन जगत्सत्यत्वविरोधित्वात् |
If it be argued - As mithyAtva shruti is indirectly referring to the impartite consciousness, it cannot contradict the shruti that reveals the world's reality - that is not true, because the knowledge of the impartite one is only possible through the knowledge of the absence of duality, and therefore it is in contrary to the shruti talking of the world's reality.
नच प्रपञ्चसत्वश्रुतेरप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्ग:, अतत्त्वावेदकत्वस्यावान्तरतात्पर्यमादायेष्टत्वात्, Nor can it be said that this leads to invalidity of the shruti that talks of the world's reality, because even if such a shruti reveals an object that is not ultimately real, it still serves a purpose by having a secondary import, which is desirable.
परमतात्पर्येण तु तत्त्वावेदकत्वं सर्वश्रुतीनामपि समम् ; From the point of view of ultimate import though, all shruti-s are unified in what they consider to be ultimately real.
प्रातिभासिकव्यावृत्तस्य व्यावहारिकस्य तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वादिरूपस्य निराकर्तमुशक्यत्वात् |
An empirical reality, differing from apparent reality, which happens to be of the nature a thing-as-it-is (the attribute present in the object matches the attribute in the cognition of the object), cannot be denied.
आसां व्यावहारिकं प्रामाण्यमव्याहतमेव | That the world's reality is empirically valid has not been denied by us.
'असद्वा इदमग्र आसी'दित्यादिश्रुत्यनुरोधेनापि 'तत्सत्य'मित्यादिर्श्रुतिर्न ब्रह्मणि व्यावहारिकसत्त्वपरा; ब्रह्मणो व्यवहारातीत्वात्, तस्यापरमार्थत्वे च निरधिष्ठानतया शून्यवादापत्ते:, किन्चित्तत्त्वमगृहीत्वा च बाधानुपपत्ते: |
In line with shruti such as 'Non-existence was verily present in the beginning', one cannot say that the intention of the shruti 'That is real' is to convey that Brahman's reality is empirical, because Brahman is beyond transactions. If Brahman is not ultimately real, there would be no substratum, leading to nihilism. Without holding on to any real entity, it would not be possible to deny anything either.
In order to talk of the absence of pot, we need to have known the presence of the substratum, the ground. Without holding on to the reality of the ground, one cannot talk of the absence of the pot.
अतएव सत्यत्वश्रुतिविरोधेन मिथ्यात्वश्रुतिरेवान्यपरेत्यपि न; षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गोपेतत्वेन मिथ्यात्वश्रुतेरनन्यपरतया प्रबलत्वात्, Thus, if it is said that it is the mithyAtva shruti that needs to be reinterpreted because it contradicts the shruti talking of reality, no, because, mithyAtva shruti, being endowed with the six-fold indicatory marks of import, it is the stronger of the two, and need not be reinterpreted.
वैदिकतात्पर्यविषयस्य च तात्त्विकत्वनियमेन तात्पर्यज्ञापकानामपि लिङ्गानामर्थतथात्व एव पर्यवसानात् | As a result of the rule that the object of the veda which has import must real, it follows that the indicatory marks of import must be meaningful.
सत्त्वश्रुतिवाक्यस्थपदानाम् चान्यपरत्वान्न सत्त्वे तात्पर्यलिङ्गाशङ्का | As the shruti that talks of the world's reality has some other import, one need not doubt whether indicatory marks of import are present in such a shruti or not.
ननु - यदि सत्त्वश्रुति: प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तार्थत्वान्न स्वार्थपरा, तर्हि मिथ्यात्वश्रुतिरपि तद्विरुद्धार्थत्वात् स्वार्थपरा न स्यात्, तत्प्राप्तितद्विरोधयोस्तात्पर्याभावहेत्वोरुभयत्रापि समत्वात् - इति चेन्न;
The opponent argues - If the shruti talking of reality does not have import in its sentence meaning because it is revealing something known through perception, mithyAtva shruti too cannot have import in its sentence meaning because it contradicts that (perception), as the cause for not having import - agreeing with another means of knowledge (hence not unique) and disagreeing with another means of knowledge (hence contradictory) - are common to both.
- इति चेन्न; the siddhikAra responds - if this is the argument, no.
प्रत्यक्षापेक्षया चन्द्राधिकपरिमाणबोधकागमस्येव मिथ्यात्वबोधकागमस्यापि बलवत्त्वेन प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तानुवादिसत्त्वश्रुत्यपेक्षयापि बलवत्त्वात् ; अन्यथोभयोरापि अप्रामाण्यापत्ते: |
Like the scripture that establishes that the size of the moon is larger than what is perceived, the scripture that reveals the world is mithyA is stronger than a shruti that simply repeats something reported by perception. If that is not accepted (if perception is indeed stronger than the two), neither mithyAtva shruti nor satyatva shruti would have validity (the former because it is contradicted, and the latter because it is simply repeating perception).
तदुक्तं सङ्क्षेपशारीरके - 'अतत्परा तत्परवेदवाक्यैर्विरुध्यमाना गुणवाद एवेति | Thus it was said in the sankshepa shAriraka - "the shruti which does not have import, and contradicts another shruti having import, is only a guNavAda".
अतएवानन्यशेषमिथ्यात्वश्रुतिविरोधात् न प्रत्यक्षागृहीतत्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपसत्यत्वपरा जगत्सत्यत्वश्रुतिरित्युक्तम् |
Therefore, as mithyAtva shruti's purpose is to reveal only that and not something else, it cannot be argued that satyatva shruti is revealing a reality to the world unknown from perception which is unsublated in any period of time.
अद्वैतश्रुतेश्च प्राबल्ये निरवकाशत्वतात्पर्यवत्त्वादिकमेव प्रयोजकम्, न निषेधवाक्यत्वम् | The reason why advaita shruti is stronger, is because if its direct sentence meaning is not taken, then it will have no scope for application at all, not because it simply happens to be a statement of negation.
एतेन - निषेधवाक्यत्वेन प्राबल्ये किति तद्धिते वृद्धिविधायकात् 'कितिचे' ति सूत्रात् सामान्यतो गुणवृद्धिनिषेधकं 'किङ्गि चे'ति सूत्रं बलवत्स्यात् , अग्नीषोमीयवाक्यादहिंसावाक्यं षोडशिनो ग्रहणवाक्यादग्रहणवाक्यम् 'सत्यं ज्ञान' मित्यादिवाक्यात्, 'असद्वा इदमग्र आसी'दित्यादिवाक्यं च बलवत्स्यादित्यपास्तम् |
By this, the following argument is refuted:
"If the statement of negation is always stronger than the statement of injunction, then
a) the aShTAdhyAyi sUtra कितिचेत्, which stipulates that the इ and उ in the कित् suffix attain guNa and vRddhi (ie become ऐ and औ respectively) would be negated by the sUtra किङ्गिचेत् which says that vriddhi and guNa should not be be brought in,
b) The performed of the agnIShOmIya sacrifice would be committing adharma, for it would violate the general prohibition of violence,
c) The option of taking the soma juice in the ShoDashi will be overruled by the negation,
d) The sentence "Brahman is Existence, Consciousness, Bliss" will be overruled by the sentence "Non-existence was all that was present in the beginning".
The siddhikAra refutes these arguments because his argument was not that the sentence of negation is necessarily stronger than the injunction.
सामान्यविशेषभावादिना सावकाशत्वनिरवकाशत्वादिरूपबलवैपरीत्यात्, 'विश्वं सत्य'मित्यादेस्तु व्यावहारिकसत्यविषयतया अन्यशेषतया च सावकाशत्वादे: प्रागुक्तत्वात् | As a specific statement is stronger than a general one, it follows that a statement which cannot be interpreted otherwise will be stronger than a statement with multiple interpretations, the sentence "the world is real" can have the meaning of empirical reality and is subsidiary to another sentence, it can be interpreted otherwise.
तस्मान्न सत्त्वश्रुतिविरोध: || Therefore, mithyAtva shruti is not in contradiction with satyatva shruti.
Until now the topic of contradiction by shruti was taken up. Next the topic of contradiction by smRti will be taken up.
नापि 'असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदाहुरनीश्वरम् | एतां बुद्धिमवष्टभ्य नष्टात्मनोऽल्पबुद्धय: ||' इत्यादिस्मृतिविरोध:, Nor is the world's unreality contradicted by smRti "Those who say that the world is non-existent, has no basis, and say that there is no God in the world" "Holding on to this view, they are of depraved character, of poor intellect"
सद्विविक्तत्वादिनो जगत्यसद्वैलक्षण्याङ्गीकारेण तत्प्रतिपादकस्मृतिविरोधाभावात् | Those who say that the world is different from the existent, also accept that it is different from the non-existent, therefore there is no contradiction with the smRti which refers to those that argue that it is non-existent.
Next the siddhikAra establishes that there is no contradiction with the brahmasUtra.
ननु - 'नाभाव उपलब्धे:' 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिव' दिति सूत्रद्वयेन जगत: पारमार्थिकसत्त्वबोधनेन विरोध:,
The opponent says - The two sUtra-s 'It is not absolutely non-existent, because it is available for perception' and 'Because it has different attributes compared to the dream' establish that the world is ultimately real and thus contradict the mithyAtva of the world.
He continues:
नचानेन शून्यवादिनिरासार्थेनासद्वैलक्षण्यमात्रप्रतिपादनान्न विरोध:, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वलक्षण्यस्यासद्वैलक्षण्यस्य शून्यवादिमतेऽपि सत्त्वेन तन्मतनिरासार्थत्वानुपपत्ते:, Nor can it be argued that these sUtra-s only refute the nihilist (shUnyavAdin buddhist) by showing that the world is not non-existent and therefore there is no contradiction - because, the shUnyavAdin-s also accept that the world has a utility which is absent from the purely non-existent, and the sUtra-s cannot refute them on such an interpretation.
निषेधाप्रतियोगित्वरूपस्यासद्वैलक्षण्यस्य त्वयाप्यनङ्गीकारात् असद्वैलक्षण्यमात्रस्य साधने सूत्रे स्वप्नवैलक्षण्योक्त्ययोगाच्च, You too agree that the world is not of the nature of an unsublatable non-existence, thus the mere show of difference from non-existence in the sUtra, is insufficient to establish that the world is different from a dream.
व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वमात्रेण स्वप्नवैलक्षण्यस्य त्वयाप्यङ्गीकारात्, असद्वैलक्षण्यमात्रस्य तन्मतेऽपि सत्त्वाच्च, You too agree that the world being empirically real is different from the dream, and that the real in your system is totally different from the non-existent.
तदुक्तं बौद्धै: - 'द्वे सत्त्वे समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना' The Buddhist says -"Our acceptance of reality is by accepting two truths (not being non-existent and having utility)".
Thus, it follows that these two sUtra-s must necessarily establish the ultimate reality of the world.
The siddhikAra responds:
इति - चेन्न; सूत्रार्थानवबोधात् Not so, because the meaning of the sUtra-s has not been understood by you.
तथाहि - सद्रूपात् ब्रह्मणो जगत्सर्गं वदत: समन्वयस्य सर्वमसदित्यनुमानेन विरोधसन्देहे 'न सन्नासन्न सदसत् न चानुभयतत्त्वकम् | विमतं तर्कपीड्यत्वान्मरीचिषु यथोदकम् ||' इति ब्रह्मसाधारणयान्निस्तत्त्वतायां प्राप्तायां सूत्रेण परिहार: |
To explain - There is a doubt as to how to reconcile the view of those who argue that it is from the Existence, Brahman, that the world is created, with the inference that everything is non-existent. The Buddhists say that - "it is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor existent and non-existent, nor neither. The object under discussion (the world) is beyond logic, like the appearance of water in the mirage." From this it appears that Brahman too shares the characteristic of not being each of the four categories, and therefore it too is shUnya (void). It is this doubt that is being addressed by the sUtra-s.
How?
सतो ब्रह्मणो नाभाव: न शून्यत्वं, उपलब्धे: सत्त्वेन प्रमाणात् प्रतीते: | The sUtra, "It is not non-existent, because it is capable of being perceived" means - Existence, or Brahman, is not of the nature of non-existence, not a void, because it is capable of being perceived, that is it is known as existing from a valid means of knowledge.
तथाच किञ्चित्परमार्थसदवश्यम् शून्यवादिनापि स्वीकार्यम्; अन्यथा बाधस्य निरवधिकत्वप्रसङ्गादिति सूत्रार्थ: सच न प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वविरोधी | Further, even the shUnyavAdin-s have to agree to some entity that is ultimately real, for it will lead to a sublation into a void. Thus, this sUtra is not to prove that the world is not mithyA.
तथाचोक्तं - 'बाधितोऽपह्नवो मानै: व्यावहारिकमानता | मानानां तात्त्विकं किञ्चित् वस्तु नाश्रित्य दुर्भणे'ति |
Thus it has been said - "The negation of empirical reality can be (only) by a valid means of knowledge, and unless those means of knowledge rest upon a real substratum, they cannot perform their function".
नापि स्वप्नावैधर्म्योक्त्ययोग:, तस्या: 'विमतं निस्तत्त्वं तर्कपीड्यत्वात् मरुमरीचिकाजलव'दित्यनुमाने बाध्यत्वप्रमाणागम्यत्वदोषजन्यत्वाद्युपाधिप्रदर्शनपरत्वात् विज्ञानवादिनिराकरणपरेणापि नानेन सूत्रेण विरोध: |
Nor is the statement that "it is different from the dream" inappropriate. Its purpose is to prove that the inference "The object under discussion (the world) is void, because it is beyond logic, like mirage water", has the following defects of upAdhi (adjunct) (1) sublatability (upon waking up) - the dream has that, the world does not, (2) it is not observed by a valid means of knowledge - the dream is not seen by any valid means of knowledge, whereas the world is, (3) it is born from a defective source - the dream is caused due to sleep obscuring the senses, the world is not. The sUtra can also be said to refute the vijnAnavAdin buddhists. Therefore for these two reasons, the sUtra does not refute the reality of the world.
रूपादिरहितब्रह्मजगदुपादानत्वप्रतिपादकसमन्वयस्य नीलाद्याकारं विज्ञानं साध्यता अनुमानेन विरोधसन्देहे A doubt may arise here: Advaita, which holds that the attributeless Brahman is the material cause of the universe is contrary to the vijnAnavAdin, who holds that forms such as blue etc are only forms of momentary consciousness.
They quote a verse in this regard:
'स्वप्नधीसाम्यतो बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्याऽर्थस्य सहेक्षणात् | तद्भेदेनानिरूप्यत्वात् ज्ञानाकारोऽर्थ ईष्यताम् ||
External objects are like objects seen in dreams, where the object and cognitions are seen together, and it is impossible to prove that there is a difference between the two - therefore it follows that objects are simply forms in consciousness.
They also cite an inference in this regard:
विमता धी:, न ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तालम्बना, धीत्वात्, स्वप्नधीवत् | The object under discussion (the world) is only a cognition, because it cannot be known without a cognition, like dream objects.
विपक्षे च ज्ञानाभानेऽप्यर्थभानप्रसङ्गो बाधक: | If that is not true, then it would be possible to know a thing even without cognising it.
नहि भिन्न्योरश्वमहिषयो: सहोपलम्भनियमोऽस्ति | Otherwise there is nothing stopping an animal to simultaneously appear as the horse and as the buffalo, which are two intrinsically different animals.
तस्मान्न ज्ञानातिरिक्तम् सदिति प्राप्ते परिहारसूत्रम् 'नाभाव उपलब्धे'रित्यादि | Therefore, as it appears that there is no object apart from its cognition, the sUtra-s such as "it is not not-existent, because it appears" are needed to refute such views.
बाधेन सोपाधिकतानुमाने उपायभावेन सहोपलम्भ: सारूप्यतो बुद्धितदर्थभेदस्थूलार्थभङ्गे भवतोऽपि तुल्य: |
There are 3 defects in the inference: 1) the illustration (dream) is sublated 2) the simultaneous presence of the two (objects and their cognition) is because one is the means for the other, and so, it does not mean that they are the same (the eye is not the pot, even though we need the eyes to see the pot) 3) the similarity between cognition and its object implies that there are two things, not one (because the relation of similarity two things that are similar). Even though you may claim that there is no gross object, you have to accept there is some object.
सूत्रार्थस्तु, नाभाव: - ज्ञानातिरिक्तस्यार्थस्य नासत्त्वम्, किन्तु व्यवहारदशाबाध्यार्थक्रियाकारितवरूपं सत्त्वमेव | उपलब्धे: - ज्ञानातिरेकेण प्रमाणैरुपलब्धे: | The meaning of the sUtra, in this context, becomes - Not non-existent, the object in the absence of cognition is not non-existent, for it has an empirical reality of the nature of being unsublated and having utility; because it is perceived, it is known by a means of knowledge that is different from consciousness.
स्वप्नवैध्यर्म्योक्ति: बाध्यत्वाद्युपाधिप्रदर्शनाय | The sUtra "it being different from a dream" is for the purpose of showing the defect such as the adjunct of sublatability, etc.
तेन बाधात् सोपाधिकत्वाच्च पूर्वानुमानं दुष्टमित्यर्थ: | The inference mentioned previously is defective because it is contradicted by it (the sUtra), and because it has the defect of adjunct.
तस्मान्नैवमपि विरोधशङ्का | Thus even in this interpretation, one need not doubt whether the world's mithyAtva is refuted.
तदुक्तं तस्मान्न ज्ञानाकारोऽर्थ:, किन्तु बाह्य: | स चार्थक्रियाकारित्वसत्त्वोपेतोऽपि अद्वैतश्रुतिवशात् ब्रह्मणि कल्पितो न परमार्थसन्नितिसिद्धान्तस्य सुगतमताद्भेद इति | Thus it was said - There are external objects, and one cannot say that cognition alone is the external world. It has empirical reality of the nature of utility, and not ultimate reality, on the basis of advaita shruti, which says that the world is superimposed on Brahman. This is the difference with Buddhism.
उक्तंचात्मत्त्वविवेके - 'न ग्राह्यभेदमवधूय धियोऽस्ति वृत्तिस्तत्द्बाधने बलिनि वेदनये जयश्री: | नोचेदनित्यमिदमीदृशमेव विश्वं तथ्यं तथागतमतस्य तु कोऽवकाश:||' इति |
Thus it was said in the Atma tattva viveka by udayanAchArya against the Buddhists - "There is no connection between external objects and their cognitions. When the objects are sublated, it is the position of (advaita) veda that attains victory compared to the rest. If that is not accepted (if the objects are not sublated), then the world is temporary and must be accepted as such. In either position, where is the scope for the way of the Buddha?"
धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधश्च प्रागेव परिहृत इति शिवम् || That the very pramANa that reveals the object contradicts the advaitin's view that it is mithyA, has already been refuted.
इति विश्वमिथ्यत्वस्यागमादिबाधोद्धार: | This concludes the chapter on the refutation of the contradiction of the world's unreality by scripture.