paricCheda 1 - Agama bAdhoddhAra: (part 2)

***Sixth argument of the opponent - shruti talking of the reality of the world is a case of pratiprasava***
In pUrvamImAmsa, there is a category of statements called pratiprasava. The vidhi is an injunction (something ought to be done), the niShedha is a prohibition (something is forbidden). The pratiprasava is a negation of negation.

There is a shruti which mentions that a goat has 26 ribs, षड्विंशतिरस्य वङ्क्रय:. In another mantra, the 34 ribs of the horse are talked about, चतुस्त्रिंशद्वाजिनो देवबन्धो (RV 1.162.18). In the ashvamedha sacrifice, which involves the sacrifice of the horse, a question arises. Should the mantra referring to the ribs of the goat be used, or the one referring to the horse? Here it is determined that despite one thinking that the mantra referring to the horse ought to be used, it is the one referring to the goat that should be used instead - न चतुस्त्रिंशति इति ब्रूयात् षड्विंशतिरित्येव ब्रूयात्.

This is an example of pratiprasava, an exception to an exception, or a suspension of a prohibition. The opponent argues that the reality of the world that is known by perception, may be circumstantially refuted by the shruti talking of its mithyAtva, but that is subsequently reinstated by another shruti revealing its reality. This is the basic argument of the opponent.

He says:
ननु - 'षड्विंशतिरस्य वङ्क्रय:' इति मन्त्रस्याश्वमेधे चोदकप्राप्तस्य 'चतुस्त्रिंशद्वाजिनो देवबन्धो' रिति वैशेषिकमन्त्रेणापोदितस्य षड्विंशतिरित्येव ब्रूयादिति वचनवत् प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तजगत्सत्त्वस्य मिथ्यात्वश्रुत्यापाततोऽपोदितस्य प्रतिप्रसवार्थं सत्त्वश्रुति: - इति चेन्न;
The mantra "Twenty-six are its ribs" is the mantra that is to be used in the ashvamedha, on the basis of the injunction. Despite the mantra "Thirty-four ribs of the swift charger, kin of the gods" being specifically applicable in the ashvamedha, it is superseded by the statement "Use the mantra 'twenty six are the ribs' itself". Similarly, as the reality of the world based on perception would otherwise be negated by the mithyAtva of the world revealed by shruti, the purpose of the shruti talking of the world's reality is as a pratiprasava, to reinstate what it had denied previously.

The siddhikAra says - no.

मिथ्यात्वश्रुते: प्रत्यक्षबाधकत्वाभ्युपगमे तस्या: बलवत्त्वेन तद्विरोधात् सत्यत्वश्रुतेरन्यपरत्वाद्देवताधिकरण्यन्यायासंभवाच्च प्रतिप्रसवार्थत्वस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् | It is not possible to say that shruti statements talking of the world's reality are pratiprasava, because shruti being stronger than perception, the mithyAtva shruti is capable of overruling perception. Such a shruti which is revealing a matter of import is incapable of being superseded by another shruti which happens to be weaker, as its meaning is actually something else. The logic of the devatAdhikaraNA is not applicable.

In the devatAdhikaraNa of the brahma sUtra, it is argued that some eulogies (arthavAda) in the veda can be factually true. There is a sloka that describes three kinds of arthavAda - विरोधे गुणवादः स्यात् अनुवादोऽवधारिते । भूतार्थवादस्तद्धानात् अर्थवादस्त्रिधा मतः ॥ - one is guNavAda, which is contradicted by some other means of knowledge, another is anuvAda, which is a restatement of that which is already known, and the third is bhUtArthavAda, which is neither supported nor refuted by other means of knowledge - the last category must be taken as being factually true.

The siddhikAra says that one cannot invoke the devatAdhikaraNa nyAya, because there are several shruti statements that contradict the shruti statement talking of the world's reality.

***Seventh argument of the opponent - A shruti statement can be considered a repetition if it is a restatement of something valid ***
ननु - सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्ये तेनैव मिथ्यात्वश्रुत्यनुमानादिबाध:, तदप्रामाण्ये ने तेन सत्त्वश्रुतेरनुवादकत्वम्  - इति चेन्न; The opponent says - if the reality conveyed by perception is valid, that will overrule mithyAtva shruti and inference. If it is not valid, then the shruti which conveys the world's reality cannot be considered as a repetition.

The siddhikAra says, no.
प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्येऽपि तत्सिद्धबोधकस्यानुवादकत्वसंभवात् | Even if perception is invalid, a repetition of what it reveals (existence) can be an anuvAda. anuvAda is a repetition of that which is known, not a repetition that which is known as valid.

नहि प्रमितप्रमापकत्वमनुवादकत्वम्, किन्तु पश्चाद्बोधोक्तवमात्रम् | A repetition of a thing revealed by valid knowledge is not anuvAda. Rather, it is the subsequent repetition of a thing already known.

पश्चात्त्वं च प्रमाणावधिकमप्रमाणावधिकं चेति न कश्चिद्विशेष: | Being 'subsequent' can mean revealing that which is known by either a valid, or an invalid means of knowledge.

नच - श्रुते: सर्वसिद्धप्रमाणभावाया: सदर्थत्वायानानुवादकत्वाय च प्रत्यक्षाप्राप्ततात्त्विकसत्त्वविषयत्वमवश्यम् वक्तव्यं, तथाचाप्रमाणेन प्रत्यक्षेण कथं श्रुतेरनुवादकत्वमिति - वाच्यं ;
Nor can it be argued thus - Everything that the shruti reveals is true. Therefore, in order for what is revealed to be true, and not a mere repetition, it must be accepted that the veda reveals the ultimate reality of the world, not otherwise known through perception. That being the case, how can it be held that the shruti is repeating perception which is not a valid means of knowledge (in this case)?

सत्त्वांशस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वेऽपि वाक्यार्थस्य क्रियादिसमभिव्याहारसिद्धस्यापूर्वत्वेन तद्विषयतयैवाननुवादकत्वोपपत्तावद्वैतश्रुतिविरुद्धतात्त्विकसत्त्वविषयत्वकल्पनायास्तदर्थमयोगात् | Even though the existence of a sentence is known through perception, as the relationship between its words is not known previously, the sentence meaning can be unknown, and in that respect, it is held that a particular sentence is non-repetitive. That being the case, the notion of the absolute reality of the world being revealed by the shruti is in direct contradiction with that shruti which reveals advaita. This cannot prove that (whatever it reveals is true and not a repetition).

परमार्थसद्विषयता तु सर्वश्रुतीनां शुद्धब्रह्मतात्पर्यकत्वेनैव | The import of all shruti-s lies in stating that ultimate reality is in Pure Brahman alone.

अवान्तरतात्पर्यमादाय व्यावहारिकसद्विषयतेति कर्मकाण्डप्रामाण्योपपादने वक्ष्यते | We will say that the ritualistic portions of the veda have a secondary import, and their validity is on the basis of their objects having empirical validity.

***Eighth argument of the opponent - Perception reveals a reality only with the blessing of the veda. Thus vedas are not a repeat of perception.***
नच - प्रत्यक्षं स्वप्रामाण्यनिर्णयार्थं श्रुतिसंवादमपक्षेत इति न तेन श्रुतेरनुवादकत्वम् ; अन्यथा 'सत्यं ज्ञानं' 'नेह नाने'त्यादिश्रुत्रप्यनुवादिनी स्यात्, ब्रह्मसत्त्वस्य लोकतो भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वेन लिङ्गेन च मिथ्यात्वस्य दृश्यत्वाद्यनुमानेनावेदमूलप्रवाहानादिविज्ञानवादादिना च प्राप्तेरिति,- वाच्यं;

Nor can it be argued thus -
"Perception is dependent upon the vedas for its own validity, thus shruti is not a repetition of perception.
Otherwise, vedic sentences such as "Existence, Consciousness" and "There is no multiplicity here" would end up being mere repetition. That Brahman is Existence is known in the world, as the substratum for illusions, and the mithyAtva of the world is known using inferences based on knowability, and through the works of vijnAnavAdin buddhists, who are outside vedic fold and argue that the universe is based on a beginningless series of illusions."

यदि दृष्टेऽप्यर्थे प्रत्यक्षं स्वप्रामाण्यनिर्णयाय श्रुतिसंवादमपेक्षेत तदा श्रुतिसंवादविरहिणि दृष्टे कुत्रापि निश्शङ्कप्रवृत्ति: न स्यात् | If the perception of things necessarily requires the support of veda for its validity, then it is impossible to have any certainty about the perception / experience of anything not mentioned in the veda.

न स्याच्चैवम'ग्निर्हिमस्य भेषज'मित्याद्यपि अनुवादकम् | By this logic, even vedic statements accepted as mere repetitions, such as "heat is the opposite of cold" would not be a repetition.

नचेष्टापत्ति:, मानान्तरगृहीतप्रमाणभावप्रत्यक्षनिर्णीते मानान्तरस्याननुवादकत्वे जगत्यनुवादकत्वकथोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् | Nor is that desirable, because if the determination of the validity of perception requires the support of some other means of knowledge, and as a result such a means of knowledge is not a repetition, the idea of some sentences being repetitions itself is an impossibility.

नच 'सत्यं ज्ञानं' 'नेह नाने'त्यादेरप्यनुवादकतापत्ति:, अनुवादकता हि न तावत् प्रत्यक्षेण; ब्रह्मत्वसामानाधिकरण्येन सत्त्वादिकं ह्यनेन प्रतिपादनीयम्, तच्च न प्रत्यक्षगम्यम् |
Nor can statements such as "Existence, Consciousness" and "There is no multiplicity here" end being repetitions. The former is not a repetition as a result of perceptive knowledge, for perception does not reveal that Existence is colocated with Brahman-hood.

नाप्यनुमानेन; नहि तर्क:, सर्वदेशकालीनपुरुषसाधारण इत्यादिना प्रागेव निराकृतत्वात् | Nor is it knowable by inference or logical reasoning. That It (Brahman being Existence, Consciousness etc) is something that is commonly accepted by everyone has been refuted already.

नापि प्रवाहानादिविज्ञानवादिमतेन; तस्यापौरुषेयश्रुत्यवधिकपूर्वत्वाभावात् | Nor is shruti repeating the vijnAnavAda system of beginningless sequence of cognitions, for such a system cannot precede the shruti which is the work of no individual.

***Ninth argument of the opponent - shruti is not a repetition because it reveals that the world is real independent of perception***
नच - सत्त्वश्रुते: सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षानपेक्षत्वात् न सापेक्षानुवादकत्वम्, निरपेक्षानुवादकत्वं तु धारावाहनवन्नाप्रामाण्यहेतु:, उक्तं हि नयविवेके - 'सापेक्षानुवादे हि न प्रमिति:, नतु दैवानुवादे, धारावाहनवदिति' इति वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus:
"shruti reveals the reality of the world independently of perception, thus it is not a case of dependent repetition. An independent repetition, like the sequence of cognitions involved in perception cannot be a cause for the invalidation of the revealed object. As has been stated in the mImAmsa work, nayaviveka (by bhavanAtha miSra) - A dependent repetition is not a valid means of knowledge, however, an incidental repetition is not invalid, like the sequence of cognitions".

यतो लाघवादनुवादकत्वमेवाप्रामाण्ये प्रयोजकम्, नतु सापेक्षानुवादकत्वम्;  Because, applying the principle of parsimony, it is repetition that implies the invalidity of the cognition, not dependent repetition.

The dependence of one means of knowledge on the other, does not determine its status as a valid means of knowledge, rather, it is whether it reveals something that is already known to the knower.

अनधिगतार्थबोधकत्वस्य प्रामाण्यघटकस्य तावतैव गतार्थत्वात् |
A means of knowledge can be considered a valid means of knowledge, only to the extent it reveals that which is not already known. 
नच तर्हि धारावाहनबुद्धावप्रामाण्यम् ; तस्या: वर्तमानार्थग्राहकत्वेन तत्तत्क्षणविशिष्टग्राहकतया अनुवादकत्वाभावात् किन्तु श्रुतेरतत्परत्वे प्राप्तत्वमात्रमेव प्रयोजकम्; But that does not mean that a sequence of perceptive cognitions is invalidated, because each instance of the cognition reveals the existence of the object in that present instant, and therefore the object revealed is qualified by that instant of time. As that changes with each instant, the successive cognition of the same object is not a repetition. Therefore, if something already known is mentioned by shruti, it follows that the import of the shruti is not in revealing that thing. 
अन्यथा वैफल्येन स्वाध्यायविधिग्रहणानुपपत्ते: | Otherwise, the statement to study one's own branch of the veda would be rendered unfruitful.

It will raise a question on whether commonly occurring statements in different branches of the vedas are a dependent or independent repetitions, leading to the loss of validity of one's own branch. The injunction is made because each branch of the veda is held to reveal a complete, useful body of information. If each branch's validity is not upheld independently, then the injunction to study one's own branch of the veda would fruitless.

अपिचेयं सत्त्वश्रुतिरपि सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षसापेक्षत्वात् सापेक्षानुवादिन्येव | Moreover, as the shruti that reveals reality depends on the perception of reality, it too is dependent, making it a case of dependent repetition.
नहि सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षं विना तन्मूलशक्त्यादिग्रहमूलकशब्दप्रवृत्तिसंभव: | Without the perception of reality, the cognition of word meaning, and the usage of language to communicate itself would not be possible. 

That is, without actually seeing the object referred to by a word, it is not possible to know that this particular word corresponds to that object. Without revealing shakti, the direct connotation between word and meaning, verbal testimony cannot be considered a valid means of knowledge.

अतएव यत्र तु प्रमाणान्तरसंवादस्तत्र प्रमाणान्तरादिवार्थवादादपि सोऽर्थ: प्रसिध्यति द्वयो: परस्परानपेक्षयो: प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोरिवैकार्थप्रवृत्ते:, प्रमात्रपेक्षया त्वनुवादकत्वम् |
Therefore, just like where two means of knowledge agree with each other, it does not mean that one of them is automatically invalid, an arthavAda may also reveal the same meaning and if someone does not know it, for them it is a valid means of knowledge. Inference and perception may reveal the same meaning without depending on each other. Whether something is a repetition or not thus depends on the knowledge of the knower.   
प्रमाता ह्यव्युत्पन्न: प्रथमं प्रत्यक्षादिभ्यो यथा अर्थमवगच्छति, न तथाऽऽम्नायत: | The understanding gained by a person perceiving something for the first time, is not the same as someone who hears a word for the first time without knowing what object it corresponds to.

तत्र व्युत्पत्त्येपक्ष्त्वादिति वाचस्पतिमतमप्येतमर्थं संवादयति, तेनाम्नायस्य व्युत्पत्त्यपेक्षत्वेन प्रत्यक्षसापेक्षत्वस्यैवोक्ते: | Therefore, vAcaspati miSra argues that verbal testimony is dependent on the knowledge of the connection between word and meaning. Hence it was said that even the veda ends up becoming dependent on perception, because of its dependence on the knowledge of word-meaning connection.

***Tenth argument of the opponent - shruti is not a repetition because it serves a particular purpose***

नच - वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासप्रयोजनकत्वेन न निष्प्रयोजनानुवादकत्वं, सप्रयोजनानुवादकत्वं तु न स्वार्थपरत्वविरोधि:;
Nor can it be argued thus: "The veda mentions that the world is real to remove the doubt created by the opponent, and thus that repetition is not without use. A repetition that serves a purpose is not inimical to the direct import of its words.

This is further illustrated using a pUrvamImAmsa principle.


In darshapUrNamAsa sacrifices, which comprise 6 sacrifices in total, 3 corresponding to the full moon, and 3 to the new moon. There is a vedic injunction - दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्याम् स्वर्गकामो यजेत - "the one interested in heaven, must perform the darsha and pUrNamAsa sacrifices". The case ending is indicative of two sacrifices to be performed.  Here a dual number is referred to, but it is not two sacrifices, but a pair comprising three sacrifices each. 

There is another vedic sentence - य एवं विद्वान् पौर्णमासी यजते य एवं विद्वान् अमावास्यां यजते - "the wise one who performs the paurNamAsa sacrifice, the one who performs the amAvAsya sacrifice" - which refers to each sacrifice in the singular. This is a repetition, but according to pUrvamImAmsa, the repetition is not without use, for it is used to indicate that each sacrifice refers to a group of three, and the two together is a justification for the use of the dual number in the other injunction. 


The opponent argues:
विद्वद्वाक्ये समुदायद्वित्वापादनरूपप्रयोजनवत्त्वेनानुवाद्यस्वार्थपरताया दृष्टत्वात्, In the sentence referring to the wise person, the repetition is justified on the grounds of having the purpose of indicating two groups of sacrifices, and therefore such a repetition does result in its meaning having import. 

अत एव तत्र वाक्यैक्वाक्यतोक्ता; thus the two sentences even though physically separate, should be seen as one and interpreted to yield a coherent meaning. This is a case of vAkyaikya vAkyatA.

अन्यथा अर्थवादवत् पदैक्यवाक्यतैव स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
If that is not accepted, like any other eulogy, the second sentence would have to be reduced to one word (praise or censure).

The idea of multiple sentences having unitary meaning has been explored extensively in pUrvamImAmsa, which argues that ekavAkyatA is of two types - padaikyavAkyatA and vAkyaikyavAkyatApadaikavAkyatA where whole sentences are boiled down to a word such as praise or censure, to indicate that the group of sentences together serves as praise for an injunction or as censure that justify a prohibition. vAkyaikyavAkyatA where two sentences, even if they were to give a meaning on their own, but when when come together, serve to complete the other and give a unitary meaning.  


The siddhikAra says - Do not argue so, because:
प्रत्यक्षसिद्धे वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासरूपप्रयोजनवत्त्वेन प्रमाणान्तरस्य सप्रयोजनतया स्वार्थपरत्वोक्तौ 'अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषज' मित्याद्यपि तेनैव प्रयोजनेन सप्रयोजनं, स्वार्थपरं च स्यात् | If it is argued that even something known through perception can have import in its direct meaning if so happens to have the purpose of removing doubts, then even obviously repetitive statements such as "heat is the remedy for cold" will end as not being repetitions and it could be argued that the veda's purpose is in stating obviously superfluous things.

तथाच न प्रत्यक्षसिद्धे वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासार्थमन्यापेक्षा, दृष्टान्ते तु समुदायानुवादेन द्वित्वसम्पादनस्योद्देश्यस्यान्यतो लब्धुमशक्यतया तेन प्रयोजनेन स्वार्थपरत्वस्य वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् | That which is already known by perception, does not require some other means of knowledge to dispel a doubt created by an opponent; however, in the example, the repetition is made with the aim of ensuring the validity of the dual usage in the primary injunction, which would otherwise not be possible. Thus in that case it is possible to say that the repetition has import and is justified.

एतदभिप्रायं च पूर्वोक्तं नयविवेकवाक्यम् | This is the intended meaning of the previously stated sentence from the nayaviveka.

नच - अनुवादत्वेऽपि नैष्फल्यमात्रम्, नत्वप्रामाण्यम् याथार्थ्यमेव प्रामाण्यं, नत्वनधिगतार्थत्वे सति याथार्थ्यमिति - वाच्यम्;
Nor can it be argued thus - "Even it was a repetition, all it means is that will not yield a result, not that it is invalid - for validity arises from stating facts, and not that it reveals that which is unknown otherwise." - because:


तात्पर्यविषये शब्द: प्रमाणम् 'यत्पर: शब्द: स शब्दार्थ' इत्यभियुक्ताभ्युपगमात्, अन्यथा स्वाध्यायविधिग्रहणानुपपत्तेरुक्तत्वाच्च | The validity of the spoken word is in stating its import, based on the statement (from the shAbara bhAshya), "the meaning of shruti lies in its import." Otherwise the injunction to study one's own branch of the veda would be rendered meaningless. 

नह्यन्यत:सिद्धेऽर्थे शास्त्रतात्पर्यम्, अतो न तत्र प्रामाण्यम् | The import of scripture cannot be in revealing something that is known otherwise, thus its validity is not in such statements.

यदाहुर्भट्टाचार्या: - 'अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थव' दिति | As has been said by kumArila bhaTTa - "Scripture's purpose is in revealing the unknown."

ननु - अयमनुवाद: न 'वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवते'त्यादिवत् स्तुत्यर्थ:, न वा 'दध्ना जुहोती'त्यादिवदन्यविधानार्थ:, अनुवाद्यत्वेऽप्यन्यविधानाय प्रमाणानूदितस्य तात्तिविकत्वनियमात्, नहि 'व्रीहीन्प्रोक्षती' त्यादावारोपितव्रीह्यादेर्धी:, अनुवाद्यस्यासत्त्वे ह्याश्रयासिद्धौ धर्मधर्मिसंसर्गरूपानुमितिवेद्य इवानुवाद्यविधेयसंसर्गरूपवाक्यार्थो बाधित: स्यात् -
The opponent argues - "This repetition is not for the purpose of praise, like the statement "vAyu (wind) is verily a deity with speed" (used to indicate that the one who propitiates vAyu through the sacrifice can attain their desired result quickly. Nor is it used to prescribe something else, like the statement "offer curd in a sacrifice", for a repetition by a valid means of knowledge to reveal something else must necessarily reveal a real thing. The statement "sprinkle paddy" does not advocate the sprinkling of an unreal entity. If the object of a repetition is unreal, then the reference to it will suffer from the defect of AshrayAsiddhi. If the paksha in an inference is absent, then no inference between the paksha and sAdhya is possible, similarly if the object of a repetition is unreal, a prescription with regard to it stands contradicted. 

The siddhikAra responds:

इति चेन्न; अस्यानुवादस्याप्राप्तान्यप्राप्त्यर्थत्वात् |
If this is the argument, no. The meaning of this particular repetition is to reveal something else that is unknown. It is to reveal that Indra's actions will happen without obstruction.

नच प्रमाणानूदितस्य तात्त्विकत्वनियम:, स्वप्नाध्याये, शुक्तौ 'नेदं रजत' मिति वाक्ये च व्यभिचारात् | There is no rule that every object of a valid means of knowledge must be necessarily be real. That rule breaks down in the case of the scripture related to the interpretation of dreams and the statement in relation to the shell, "this is not silver" - the objects of both are not real.

अथ तत्र ज्ञानविषयतया निषेध्यतया चानुवाद इति न तात्त्विकत्वं, In each case, the invocation of an unreal entity is done as the object of a cognition, and with the purpose of negation, respectively.

तर्हि प्रकृतेऽपि 'नेह नाने' ति निषेधार्थत्वादस्यानुवादस्य न तात्त्विकत्वमिति ग्रहाण | Similarly, as the world has been invoked in the present context with a view to negate it in statements such as "there is no multiplicity here", one must gather that reality to the world is not conferred merely by a reference to it.

अतएव न वाक्यार्थस्यासत्त्वप्रसङ्ग:, तात्पर्यविषयस्य सत्त्वात् Thus the meaning of the sentence is not in an unreal thing, because the sentence of import. is referring to the non dual existence of Brahman, an absolutely real entity.

अथ - 'किञ्चने' त्यनेनैवानुवादस्य कृतत्वात् किमधिकेनेति - चेन्न; Therefore the following is refuted - "Having achieved the desired result by denying 'whatever' (kinchana) duality that exists through the sentence 'there is no multiplicity here whatsoever', what is achieved by further references to it?".

सामान्यतो निषेधस्य हि 'किञ्चने' त्यनेन निषेध्यसमर्पणेऽपि विशिष्य निषेधे विशिष्य निषेध्यसमर्पणस्योपयोगात् | Because, even if a general negation is achieved by 'whatsoever', there is some utility in further references for the purpose of negating some aspects specifically. It provides clarity about the nature of Brahman, that there are no divisions/attributes in Brahman at all.

अथ - निषेधवाक्यस्य न निषेध्यसमर्पकवाक्यान्तरापेक्षा; अन्यथा ' न कलञ्जं भक्षये' दित्यादावापि निषेध्यसमर्पणार्थे 'कलञ्जं भक्षये' दित्यादिवाक्यान्तरसापेक्षत्वप्रसङ्ग - इति चेन्न;
Therefore, if the following is said - "There is no necessity that a negation needs to invoke the object of negation first. Otherwise, the prohibition "Do not eat meat" would presuppose an injunction to 'Eat meat' " - no.
 
सर्वत्रापेक्षानियमाभावात्, सति संभवे प्रकृते त्यागायोगात्, There is no rule that a negation necessarily requires an affirmation first. However, as the affirmation exists in our context, there is no need to renounce it.

'अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति' 'नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाती'-त्यादौ वाक्यान्तरप्राप्तस्य निषेधदर्शनाच्च | In the atirAtra sacrifice, the use of the ShoDashi vessel is both prescribed and denied. Here the denial is of something that is first prescribed. That is considered a vikalpa, a choice - one may use the ShoDashi, or not - it is  a choice.

नच तद्वदेव विकल्पापत्ति:, सिद्धे वस्तुनि विकल्पायोगात्, The present context is not a choice (one cannot choose the world to be either real or unreal - it can only be one of the two) like that. While an action can have choice, a fact about an object cannot be a matter of choice

ग्रहणाग्रहणवाक्ययोरुभयोरपि मानान्तराप्राप्तविषयत्वेन तुल्यबलत्ववदिह सत्त्वश्रुतेर्मानान्तरप्राप्तविषयत्वेन निषेधश्रुतेश्चाप्राप्तविषयत्वेन तुल्यबलत्वाभावाच्च | As the use of a particular vessel, or its prohibition is not available from any other source of knowledge, both statements are considered of equal strength. Unlike that, here the reality of the world is known from another means of knowledge, whereas its negation is not known from other means of knowledge - Thus the shruti conveying the world's reality and its mithyAtva are not of equal strength.

अतएव निषेधवाक्यप्राबल्यात्तदनुरोधेनेतरन्नीयते ; Thus as the statement of negation is stronger, the other statement needs to be reinterpreted accordingly.

अप्राप्तान्यप्राप्त्यर्थत्वेऽप्यलौकिकस्य 'आपश्च न प्रमिणन्ती'त्यादिपदार्थसंसर्गस्य विधेयस्य सत्वान्न निषेध्यार्थानुवादकत्वमिति - चेन्न;
If the following is said - Even if a sentence revealing the unknown is stronger than that which is otherwise known, as the meaning of the veda mantra "waters (the gods) cannot block (your efforts)" is referring to an (unknown) other worldly matter and the interrelationship between the words that leads to sentence meaning was not previously known, the reality of the world is spoken in such a context, it cannot be argued that the sentence is a repetition made for the purpose of subsequent negation - no.

तदन्यपरत्वस्य प्रागेवोक्तत्वात् | Because the intended meaning of the mantra is something else (it is to eulogise Indra), not proving the world's reality, as has been said before.

***Eleventh argument of the opponent - shruti is not a repetition because the statement does not follow the syntax of a repetition***

ननु - 'यत्तन्ने' ति निषेधानुवादलिङ्गाभावान्नानुवाद:, न; यत्किञ्चिल्लिङ्गाभावेन लैङ्गिकाभावस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् |
If it is said - The indicatory marks of repetition with a view to subsequent negation, words such as "Whatever is ", and "That is", being absent, this is not a case of repetition -  No. The absence of the indicatory marks does not signify the absence of the indicated repetition.


ननु - तर्हि 'तत्सत्यमि'त्याद्यपि 'न सत्तन्नासदुच्यत' इति, 'असद्वा इदमग्र आसी' दिति च निषेधाय 'सन्घट:' 'सद्घटज्ञानं' 'सत्सुखस्फुरण' मित्यादिसिद्धब्रह्मसत्त्वानुवादि स्यात् - इति चेन्न;
If it is said - Then, the vedic sentence 'that is real' etc, is also a repetition for the negation that occurs in other sentences like 'it is neither real, nor unreal", "There was non existence in the beginning, verily". The existence of Brahman, as revealed in the shruti, would be a repetition of the existence that is revealed in cognitions such "The pot exists", "The cognition of the pot exists", "The cognition of happiness exists" - no.

ब्रह्मत्वसामानाधिकरण्येन सत्त्वस्य प्रत्यक्षादिभ्योऽप्राप्ते: शून्यवादप्रसङ्गेन तस्य निषेधायोगाच्च | Because, an existence that is colocated with Brahman-hood is not an object of perception. Moreover, this argument would lead to Brahman being non-existent which is shUnyavAda.

'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मे' त्यत्रानुवादलिङ्गसम्भवेन कल्पनाच्च | If the indicatory marks of repetition are insisted upon, the statement "Whatever is all this, is the self" meets the requirement.

एवमानन्दश्रुतेरपि, 'अदु:खमसुखं सम' मिति निषेधाय न प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तानन्दानुवादित्वम् ;
In response to the charge that shruti speaking of Brahman's bliss is a repetition of experiential bliss, it can be argued that the shruti statement 'it is different from both happiness and sadness' serves to negate that Brahman's bliss is experienceable. Thus the object of shruti talking of Brahman's bliss is not referring to experiential bliss and hence that is not a repetition of a known fact. 

दु:खसाहचर्येण सुखस्यापि वैषयिकस्यैव ग्रहणेन तन्निषेधाय ब्रह्मरूपसुखानुवादायोगात् | Moreover, as any happiness experienced through objects is accompanied by sadness, a statement talking of Brahman's bliss is not a repetition. 

एतच्च सर्वमुक्तं विवरणे - निषप्रपञ्चास्थूलादिवाक्यानुसारेण 'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मे' त्यादीनि निषेध्यसमर्पकत्वेनैकवाक्यतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते ; सुषुप्तौ निष्प्रपञ्चतायां पुरुषार्थत्वदर्शनादिति |
All this has been said in the panchapAdikA vivaraNa - Sentences such as "all this is the Self" must be interpreted in such a way as to indicate the negation of the world's reality, so that there is consistency of meaning with sentences that reveal the nature of Brahman as one completely devoid of the world, such as "not gross", etc; for the achievement of the fundamental aims of human existence lies in the attainment of Brahman in which the world is completely absent, which is experienced in deep sleep.

अथ - निष्प्रपञ्चता न पुरुषार्थ:, मूर्च्छायाम् तत्त्वादर्शनात्, नच - तदा तदज्ञानमात्रं नतु तदभाव इति - वाच्यम् ; समं सुषुप्तावपीति - चेन्न ;

Therefore if the following is said (by the opponent): The negation of the world is not the fundamental aim of human pursuit, because that is even experienced in a coma. Nor can it be argued that in a coma, ignorance is present, but not the absence of the world, because such a state is comparable to deep sleep - no.

मूर्च्छायां स्वरूपसुखस्फुरणाभावात् | In a coma, the experience of one's own bliss is not had.

तथाच सूत्रम् - "मुग्धेऽर्धसंपत्ति: परिशेषा' दिति | As was said in the brahmasUtra, "The comatose state is a partial attainment (of the deep sleep), that being the remaining alternative". 

सुषुप्तिमुक्तिकालीननिष्प्रपञ्चातायां स्वरूपसुखानुभवेन तस्या: पुरुषार्थत्वात् | In deep sleep and the liberated state, the absence of the world and experience of bliss that is one's own nature being present, the attainment of the object of human endeavour is present.

तथाच श्रुति: - 'द्वितीयाद्वै भयं भवतीति |' As a result, shruti makes the statement - "It is from a sense of duality that fear persists."
 

अथ 'तस्मादेकाकी न रमत' इति श्रुते: सप्रपञ्चतापि पुरुषार्थ:, न; तस्या दु:खसाधनत्वेन पुरुषार्थत्वायोगात्, कर्मकाण्डवदस्या: श्रुते: अविवेकिपुरुषपरत्वाच्च | Thus, if it was said that the vedic statement "Hence the single person does not enjoy himself" indicates that duality is the object of human endeavour, no - because,  as it is a cause of sorrow, it cannot be the object of human pursuit. Like the vedic portion dealing with rituals, the sentence is directed towards the ignorant.

ननु - 'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेती' ति भेदज्ञानस्य मोक्षहेतुत्वश्रवणात् कथं न सप्रपञ्चता पुरुषार्थ - इति चेन्न;  
The opponent says - "The shruti statement 'By knowing the highest self, the impeller, as different from oneself, one attains immortality' indicates that it is by knowledge of difference that liberation is attained - that being the case,  how can duality not be the aim of human endeavour?".

The siddhikAra says no.

मते: पूर्वं ममापि प्रेरकपृथक्त्वदृष्टे: सगुणब्रह्मज्ञानवत् प्रेरकत्वेन ब्रह्मज्ञानस्यापि परम्परयोपकारकत्वात्, 'एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्य'मित्यादिवाक्यस्वारस्यादभेदज्ञानस्यैव साक्षात् मोक्षहेतुत्वात् |
My view too is that prior to knowledge, one sees the impeller as different from oneself. Like the knowledge of Brahman with attributes, seeing Brahman as the impeller does help in the attainment of Brahman, albeit indirectly. Sentences such as "It should be known in one form only", because they use terms such as 'only', indicate that it is the knowledge of identity alone that is the direct cause of liberation.

अतएव प्रेरकत्वज्ञानस्य जोषहेतुत्वमुक्तम् | Thus, where the knowledge of the impeller has been said to be a cause of bliss, it refers to empirical, temporary bliss.

तथोत्तरत्रापि 'वेदविदो विदित्वा लीना ब्रह्मणि तत्परा ये विमुक्तास्तदात्मतत्त्वं प्रसमीक्ष्य देही एक: कृतार्थो भवते वीतशोक' इत्यभेद एव श्रूयते | In the very same mantra, identity has been referred to - "Learning about Brahman from the knowers of the veda, abiding in Brahman, and dwelling there constantly, the ones freed from birth and death clearly see that the true nature of the self is free from embodiedness and become one, fulfilled, and free from sorrow."

अतो न भेदज्ञानस्य मोक्षहेतुत्वम् | Thus the cognition of difference cannot be a cause for liberation.

To be continued.