paricCheda 1 - Agama bAdhoddhAra: (part 1)
This chapter refutes the charge that shruti disproves the mithyAtva of the world
The opponent says -
ननु - अस्तु शब्दबाध:, तथाहि - 'विश्वं सत्यं', 'यच्चिकेत सत्यमित्तन्न मोघं', 'याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान्व्यदधाच्छाश्वतीभ्य: समाभ्य:' इत्यादिश्रुतिभि:
Scripture refutes the inference of the world's mithyAtva. For example the shruti statements:
a) "The world is satyam, real",
b) "Whatever is considered as satyam is verily not an illusion",
c) "(It is Ishvara who maintains and preserves the universe), by appropriately allocating various functions of the universe to the various prajApati-s",
'असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदाहुरनीश्वर' मित्यादि स्मृतिभि:
The smRti (Bhagavat gIta) statement such as "Those who hold that the world is unreal, without any support, that there is no Ishvara, (are endowed with demonic qualities)",
'नाभाव उपलब्धे:' 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिव' दित्यादिसूत्रैश्च विश्वस्य सत्यत्वप्रतिपादनात् इति
the brahma sUtra statements such as "it cannot be absolutely unreal, because it is the object of experience", "the (world of the waking state) is different from the dream world", etc, all establish the reality of the world.
Thus each of the three main prasthAna-s (central texts of sanAtana dharma) - the shruti, the smRti and the nyAya prasthAna - all establish that the world is real.
The siddhikAra takes up this argument next:
- चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
श्रुतेस्तत्परत्वाभावात् | shruti does not have that meaning.
The full text of the mantra which contains the quoted section "vishvam satyam" is:
तथाहि - 'विश्वं सत्यं मघवाना युवोरिदापश्च न प्रमिणन्ति व्रतं वाम् | अच्छेन्द्राब्रह्मणस्पती हविर्नो अन्नं युजेव वाजिन जिगात' मिति ऋक्संहिताद्वितीयाष्टकवाक्यस्यायमर्थ: | This mantra is in the second aShTaka of the rig veda.
The siddhikAra provides the meaning of the entire mantra:
हे इन्द्राब्रह्मणस्पती ! Oh Indra and BrahmaNaspati,
मघवाना मघवानौ मघमिति धननाम, धनवन्तौ मघवन्ताविति वा | The word maghavAn is derived from the root magha which means wealth. Thus maghavAn means he who is endowed with wealth.
विश्वं सर्वं सत्यं कर्म, सद्भूतत्वात्, फलस्यावश्यम्भावित्वाद्वा | vishvam means 'all' and satyam means 'karma / rituals / actions', because it is existent, or called so because rituals will definitely bear fruit.
तादृशं कर्म युवयोरित् such rituals done for you (done to please you), will be effective
युवयो: इत् इत्थमवधारणे वा | Or alternatively, only those actions performed by you are effective. इत् means ittham, thus, or definitively.
युवामेवोद्दिश्य सर्वाणि कर्माण्यनुष्ठेयानीत्यर्थ: | The intended meaning is that all vedic rituals should be directed towards you two alone.
आपो व्यापनशीला देवता: | By Apa:, are meant the devatA-s, as they are all pervading, like the waters. That is, they can take a body anywhere and be present.
चनेत्येतत्पदद्वयपदसमुदाय:, ऐकपद्यं त्वध्यापकसंप्रदायसिद्धं | The word चन is a confluence of च and न, and have to be interpreted separately. The use of चन as one word by padakAra-s is by convention.
वां युवयोर्व्रतं संकल्पं कर्म वा | न प्रमिणन्ति न हिंसन्ति (मीङ् हिंसायां, क्रैयादिक:,) किन्त्वनुमोदन्त इति यावत् | vAm - your, vratam - vow, or action. na pramiNAnti - cannot be harmed. The root mIng means to hurt / harm. No one can block your actions, rather, they will support it. (Any ritual / action performed or blessed by you cannot be afflicted by anyone else. On the contrary, it will be supported by all).
नोऽस्माकं हविर्दध्यादिकं अन्नं च पुरोडाशादिकम् च | Our sacrificial offerings - such as curd, rice, puroDAshA etc
अच्छ अभिलक्ष्य acCha, made facing you
वाजिना वेगवन्तावश्वाविव | vAjinA, like fast horses
युजा युक्तौ सन्तौ | yujA, that are yoked.
जिगातं देवयजनमागच्छतम् | (जिगातिर्गतिकर्मा जौहोत्यादिक:) jigAtam, please come at once to consume our offerings at the sacrifice
अन्नं घासं प्रति अश्वाविवेति वा | like horses running towards grass.
In summary, one interpretation of this mantra is - Oh Indra and Brihaspati, you who are endowed with riches, all these rituals should be directed to you alone, as only your actions / rituals directed towards you certainly bear fruit, and no devatAs are able to harm or affect them, rather, they are supportive of them. Therefore, please come at once to this sacrifice and accept these offerings we make facing you, like fast horses galloping towards grass.
यद्वा - हे इन्द्राब्रह्मणस्पती! विश्वं सत्त्वेन परिदृश्यमानं जगत्, Alternatively - Oh Indra and BrahmaNaspati, the universe, which appears to be real
युवयोरित् युवयोरेव, युवाभ्यामेव सृष्टम् | is yours, has been created by you
अथवा - युवयोरेव विश्वं सर्वं स्तोत्रं, सत्यं यथार्थम् | Alternatively, all (vishvam = sarvam = all) the eulogies directed towards you are true (satyam = real).
यद्यत् गुणजातं स्तुत्वा प्रतिपाद्यते तत्सर्वं युवयोर्विद्यमानमेव न त्वारोपितमित्यर्थ: | Whatever qualities you are said to have in our praises, are all present in you in reality and not superimposed for the sake of eulogising. That is, our praises of you are no exaggeration - they are true statements.
आपो व्यापनशीला देवता:, अबुपलक्षितानि पञ्चभूतानि वा | Apa can refer to the devatAs due to them being all pervading. Alternatively, the term waters could refer to all the five elements by implication.
युवयोर्व्रतं जगदुत्पादानाख्यं कर्म न हिंसन्ति | इत्थं महानुभावौ युवां जिगातम् | When you two set out to create the world, no one can afflict it. Oh great ones, please come to our sacrifice.
शेषं पूर्ववद्व्याख्येयम् | The remaining is as per the previous interpretation.
तथाच स्तुतिपरतया नास्य विश्वसत्यत्वे तात्पर्यम् || As can been seen, the mantra is not speaking about the world's reality, its import is as a eulogy.
'शाक्मना शाको अरुण: सुपर्ण आयो मह: शूर: सनादनील: | यच्चिकेत सत्यमित्तन्न मोघं वसु स्पार्हमुत जेतोत दाता' इत्यस्याप्यष्टमाष्टकस्थस्येन्द्रस्तुतिपरतया न विश्वसत्यत्वे तात्पर्यम् |
The second quote (यच्चिकेत सत्यमित्तन्न मोघं), which occurs in the eighth aShTaka (8.17.6) of the rig veda is also a eulogy directed towards Indra, and not to talk of the world's reality
तथाहि - शाक्मना शाकैव शाक्मा तेन शाक्मना, बलेन | The word shAkmanA is derived from shAka meaning strength. Thus shakmAna means "with strength".
शाक: शक्त:, स्वशक्त्यैव सर्वं कर्तुं शक्त इत्यर्थ: | shAka: means 'the strong one', who is able to do everything with his own strength
नहीन्द्रस्य सहायान्तरापेक्षास्ति इन्द्रत्वादेव | Indra, by virtue of being Indra, is able to achieve his aims without anyone else's help.
अरुण: अरुणवर्ण: कश्चित् शोभवर्ण: पक्षी आगच्छतीत्यध्याहार:, उपसर्गश्रुते: | aruNa, a delightful, red coloured bird arrives. Only the letter आ is present in the mantra, but by the rule 'upasarga shrute: yogakriyA adhyAhAra:' - if only a preposition is present in the veda, a verb can be affixed to it, even if not explicitly present - the verb "moves" is affixed to आ to mean "arrives"
यो महो महान् शूर: विक्रान्त:, 'yo maho' the mighty one, 'shUra:' who uses his strength to great effect
सनात् पुराण:, is sanAt, ancient
अनील: अनीड: नीडस्याकर्ता | 'anIla', and has no need for a resting place.
न हीन्द्रो अग्निवत् कुत्रचिदपि यज्ञे पक्षे निकेतनं करोति | Unlike agni, the devatA of fire, Indra does not reside in any place like the sacrificial altar, etc. He is ever on the move, never resting.
एवं सुपर्ण इत्यादिरूपकेणेन्द्रमाह | To Indra who is compared to such a bird, the following has been said:
स इन्द्र इदमिदानीं कर्तव्यमिति यच्चिकेत जानाति, तत्सत्यमित्सत्यमेव | If Indra decides (yacciketa) that "such and such" must be done now, that will certainly be done (satyam it).
न मोघं न व्यर्थं | without fail (na mogham)
स: स्पार्हं स्पृहणीयं, वसु निवासार्हं, धनं जेता जयति | शत्रुभ्य: सकाशात् | He wins unfritterable (vasu) wealth, the object of everyone's desire, (spArham), instantaneously from his enemies.
उत अपि, दाता ददाति च स्तोतृभ्य: | Not only does he win this wealth, he bestows this wealth upon his worshippers.
जेता दातेति तृन् तेन 'न लोके'त्यादिना षष्ठीप्रतिषेध: | By the application of the 'na loke' sUtra (from pANini's aShTAdhyAyi), the तृन् verbal suffix of the roots for winning (जेतृ) and donating (दातृ), is not used in the sixth case ending, but in the second case. Instead of saying धनस्य दाता it is meant in the sense of धनं दाता.
एवमेवान्यदपि सत्यत्वप्रतिपादकमुन्नेयम् | Thus one must understand that if the word 'satyam' is used in the context of the world, it has to be interpreted to reveal the correct meaning.
'याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान्व्यदधा'दित्यापि वाक्यं न प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वे प्रमाणम् | Nor is the sentence from the IshAvAsya upaniShad a proof for the world's reality either.
तस्य पूर्वसृष्टप्रकारेण सर्जनमर्थ: नतु जगत्सत्यत्वं जगत्सर्जनगतसत्यत्वं वा | The meaning of yathA and tathA are to indicate the creation of the universe in the current cycle is similar to the process in the previous cycle, and not to reveal the reality of the world, nor to state the reality of the process of creation.
यत्र च स्तुत्यादिपरत्वं नास्ति, तत्रापि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धानुवादकतया 'अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषज'मित्यादिवाक्यवन्न तत्परत्वम् | Even where the context is not as a eulogy, any references to the world's reality in the shruti are only repetitions of the world's reality discerned by direct perception, and therefore, like in the instance of the shruti statement 'fire is a remedy for coldness', the import is not in revealing what is already known.
Having demonstrated that the three instances quoted from the shruti do not have the import of revealing the world's reality, the siddhikAra turns his attention to the series of arguments put forward by the nyAyAmRtakAra in the corresponding chapter in the nyAyAmRta.
***First argument - the advaitin argues that the reality of the world is the reality of Brahman. However, that is not a fact that is known through perception. How can it be then held that a shruti statement that reveals the world's reality is simply a repetition of a reality known through perception? ***
नच - त्वन्मते सर्वत्र ब्रह्मसत्त्वस्यैव स्फुरणात्तदतिरिक्तस्य कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वरूपस्य घटादिसत्त्वस्य प्रत्यक्षेणाप्राप्ते: तद्बोधकत्वेन श्रुतेर्नानुवादकमिति - वाच्यम्;
He says: "In your system, it is Brahman's reality that appears everywhere else. However, perception does not reveal a reality of the pot etc that is unsublatable in all three periods of time. Thus, when shruti reveals such a reality to the world, it is not a repetition."
The siddhikAra says, no.
इतरसत्वबाधपुरस्सरत्वात् ब्रह्मसत्त्वस्फुरणाभ्युपगमस्य तत्रैव सत्यादिपदप्रवृत्तिस्वीकारेण तदतिरिक्तविश्वसत्यत्वस्य शाब्दबोधाविषयत्वात् तदादायानुवादकत्वापरिहारात् |
As it is Brahman's reality that appears everywhere, it presupposes that nothing else has a reality of its own. Therefore, the word real in a sentence can be used only to mean such a reality that belongs to that object, the reality revealed by statements speaking of the world's reality cannot be something other than that, it cannot be anything other than stating that the world has a reality of its own. Therefore the claim that the shruti is merely repeating what is discerned by perception still holds.
The pUrvapakshi changes tack. He wants to say there are some things whose existence cannot be known through perception. Thus shruti in saying the world is real is revealing the reality of all those things that are not known by perception, and the statement is not a case of superfluous repetition.
अथ - 'पृथिवी इतरभिन्ना' 'न हिंस्यात्सर्वा भूतानी' त्यादौ घटादावेकदेशे प्रत्यक्षेण, ब्राह्मणादवेकदेशे वाक्यान्तरेण, विधेयसिद्धावपि सर्वत्रासिद्धत्वात् यथा नानुवादकत्वं तथा विश्वमात्रसत्यत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षेणाप्राप्तत्वात् नानुवादकत्वमिति - मन्यसे, मैवम्;
He says -
Perception may reveal that the pot etc is different from some other particular object. Similarly, there is a sentence in the veda which prohibits violence against Brahmanas. Despite this, the statements "the earth is different from others" or "do no harm to any living creature" are not considered superfluous repetitions, because while the former pair of facts may be known in specific instances, that they are universally true is not known. Similarly, the vedic statement 'the world is real' is not a superfluous repetition, because there are things that are beyond perception and hence a statement to reveal their reality is necessary.
The siddhikAra says - That is not so. Because
दृष्टान्ते हि पृथिवीत्वं हिंसात्वं च एकोऽनुगतो धर्म इति तदवच्छेदेन विधेयस्याप्राप्तत्वेन तत्र नानुवादकत्वं युक्तम्,
In the examples cited, the attributes of violence and earthness are common to the objects in question. (In the case of violence, this includes everything capable of being the object of violence, such as an animal, human being, a particular group of humans, etc. In the case of earthness, it includes every earthen object.) Thus, as their reference in association with a particular instance may not be known, a universal statement that covers every particular instance where the attribute may apply can reveal a hitherto unknown fact, making the universal statement useful.
इह तु विश्वत्वं नाम नैको धर्मोऽस्ति, किन्तु विश्वशब्द: सर्वनामत्वात्तेन तेन रूपेण घटपटादीनामुपस्थापक: |
Here though, there is no one attribute called "everythingness" that pervades every single object of the world. Rather, as the word "everything" is a pronoun, it includes the pot, cloth within its ambit only as themselves individually. Thus, the pot is included within the ambit of "everything" not because there is a quality called "everythingness" that it possesses, rather it is included within "everything" as a pot - because it possesses "potness".
तेषु च प्रत्येकं सत्त्वं गृहीतमेवेति कथं नानुवादकत्वम् ; However, as each such object's existence is already known (if it wasn't known, it would not be included within the definition of "everything"), there is nothing new in a shruti statement whose meaning is interpreted as "everything is real". Therefore how can such a statement not be a superfluous repetition?
प्रकारवैलक्षण्याभावात् | There is no object based difference that is unknown.
***Second argument - the same statement can occur in two sub-branches of the veda, but not be considered a repetition, why is a shruti statement about the world's reality a repetition?***
नच - एकशाखास्थविधिवाक्यैकार्थशाखान्तरस्थविधिवाक्यस्य पुरुषान्तरं प्रतीव येन पुंसा वादिविप्रतिपत्त्यादिना घटादिसत्ता प्रत्यक्षेण न निर्णीता तं प्रत्यर्थवत्त्वेन नानुवादकत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ;
The opponent argues - An injunction occurring in one branch of the veda is not considered a repetition of the same injunction occurring in another branch of the veda, because the two injunctions are meant for two different people. Similarly, the vedic statement of the world's reality is meaningful for the person confused about the reality of the pot due to conflicting arguments made by opposing debaters, and for whom it is not certain that perception has revealed the reality of the pot. Thus, the vedic statement of the world's reality is not a repetition.
The siddhikAra rejects this saying:
एवं सत्यनुवादस्थलस्यैवाभावप्रसङ्गात् | If that is the case, there can be no place for a repetition at all. There will always be someone who does not know a particular fact, and as long as such a person exists, a statement of that fact will not be a repetition. This leads to the outcome that a superfluous repetition is only possible if everyone knows everything.
नच सर्वाविवादस्थलमेवोदाहरणम् ; सर्वाविवादस्य निश्चेतुमशक्यत्वात् | Nor can it be said that a repetition is only possible for facts that are accepted by everyone, because there is no such fact that is universally accepted. Even if it were so accepted, how can we know that everyone accepts it? No conclusive determination of universal acceptance is possible. Even if some such thing is accepted by everyone today it may not be acceptable yesterday or in the future.
What determines whether something is the original statement (purovAda) in the veda and something else a repetition (anuvAda)?
पुरोवादपूर्वकत्वादनुवादस्यात्रायं पुरोवाद इत्यस्यैवाभावात् न शाखान्तरस्थावाक्यस्यानुवादकत्वप्रसंग: | It cannot be said that sentences occurring in one branch of the veda is a repetition of it occurring in another branch, because no one branch of the veda came before or after the other. Similarly, within one branch of the veda itself, no one sentence can be said to be occurring first.
***Third argument - a vedic statement about the world's reality cannot be a repetition because ShankarAchArya's logic would be contradicted***
In the sambandha bhAShya (introduction) to the bRhadAraNyaka upaniShad, ShankarAchArya establishes that perception does not reveal that the self is different from the body - if perception could reveal it, the materialist (chArvAka) who accepts the validity of perception alone, would not hold that the body itself is the self. Thus it follows that perception is incapable of revealing that the self is different from the body, and this establishes the ground for shruti to reveal this as fact.
The opponent cites this bhAShya to argue that the world's reality cannot be revealed by perception, because if it was so revealed, the advaitin who accepts the validity of perception, would not claim the world is unreal. That being the case, the veda, in claiming the world as real is not merely repeating what is otherwise known through perception.
यत्तु - बृहादारण्यकभाष्ये देहभिन्नात्मबोधिकाया: 'अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्य' इत्यादिश्रुते: प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तानुवादित्वमाशङ्क्य वादिविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनादित्यादिना तत्परिहृतं ; तथाच प्रत्यक्षसिद्धसत्त्वग्राहकत्वेऽपि वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासार्थकत्वेन नानुवादकत्वं प्रकृतेऽपीत्युक्तम् ; तदयुक्तम् ;
It is inappropriate to argue thus - In the bRhadAraNyaka bhAShya, it was argued that the kaTha shruti "It is known as 'It exists'" is not merely repeating a fact that is known through perception, by citing the opposing view of opponents. That being so, even if it were known through perception that the world is real, it can be argued that the shruti's statement serves to repudiate opposing views.
भाष्यार्थानवबोधात् | The meaning of the bhAShya has not been understood.
तथाहि - तत्र वादिविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनेन देहाव्यतिरिक्तत्वेनात्मन: प्रत्यक्षतैव नास्ति | To explain - there, by means of showing opposing views, it was established that the self as different from the body, is not a matter of direct perception.
अन्यथा प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण्यवादिनश्चार्वाकादेस्तत्र विप्रतिपत्तिर्न स्यादित्युक्तम्, नतु वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासेनास्तीत्यादेस्सार्थकत्वम्, अननुवादकत्वं वा | otherwise, the chArvAka who accepts only perception as valid, would not hold an opposing view. Therefore, the import of the bhAShya is not in establishing that the purposefulness of the shruti lies in refuting the opponent's views, nor is it in proving that the shruti is not a mere repetition of a known fact.
That is, the import of the bhAShya is only to say that the fact that the self is different from the body is not known by perception - which is established by means of showing the different views on the topic among various groups of philosophers. It is not to ascribe meaningfulness to the shruti's statement nor is it in proving the absence of repetition in the shruti statement.
तथाचोक्तं तत्रैव - "तस्माज्जन्मान्तरसंबन्ध्यात्मास्तित्वे जन्मान्तरेष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहारविशेषोपाये च शास्त्रं प्रवर्तत" इति | This has been said so in the bhAShya itself - "Therefore, scripture's aim is to establish the existence of a soul which has multiple births, to prescribe the means for obtaining desirable ends, and to reveal that which is to be avoided for avoiding undesirable ends in the life after."
The purpose of the bhAShya is not to save shruti from the charge of repetition, but to establish that perception cannot reveal the existence of a self different from the body.
***Fourth argument - shruti is revealing that the world is ultimately real, a fact which is hitherto unknown.***
The opponent wishes to argue that the reality known through perception is empirical (vyAvahArika), whereas shruti serves to prove that the world's reality is ultimate (pAramArthika). Thus shruti is not merely repeating perception.
To prove this, he takes the example of the chAturmAsya sacrifice. The ritual consists of four parvas, parts - वैश्वदेव, वरुणप्रघास, साकमेध, शुनासीरीय. There is a standard methodology for agni praNayanam, the ritualistic transportation of the sacrificial fire, common to all soma sacrifices. However, the two central parva-s in the chAturmAsya are said to have a different methodology for agni praNayanam on the basis that the vedic injunction द्वयो: प्रणयन्ति prescribes this special agni praNayanam for the two middle parva-s only because it occurs in the context of those two parva-s and not the other two.
The opponent says:
ननु - चातुर्मास्यमध्यपवर्णो: 'द्वयो: प्रणयन्ती'ति वाक्यस्य चोदकप्राप्ताग्निप्रणयनव्यतिरिक्ताग्निप्रणयनविधायकत्ववत् प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तव्यावहारिकसत्त्वविलक्षणत्रिकालनिषेधाप्रतियोगिवरूपसत्वप्रमापकत्वं प्रकृतेऽस्त्विति - चेन्न;
चतुर्मास्यमध्यपवर्णो: 'द्वयो: प्रणयन्ती'ति वाक्यस्य चोदकप्राप्ताग्निप्रणयनव्यतिरिक्ताग्निप्रणयनविधायकत्ववत् Like in the instance of the injunction "the fire is brought in the two", which is interpreted to mean that a special method of bringing the fire is to be used in the two middle parva-s of the chAturmAsya sacrifice, which is different from the common method of bringing the fire,
प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तव्यावहारिकसत्त्वविलक्षणत्रिकालनिषेधाप्रतियोगित्वरूपसत्वप्रमापकत्वं प्रकृतेऽस्त्विति Let it be so that in the present context, vedic sentences speaking of the world's reality ascribe a reality that is unsublated in three periods of time, which is different from the empirical reality revealed by perception.
The siddhikAra responds:
- इति चेन्न; If this is your argument no.
त्रैकालिकसत्त्वनिषेधकश्रुतिविरोधेन विश्वसत्यत्वश्रुतेस्त्रैकालिकसत्त्वपरत्वाभावात् | Because if the meaning of the shruti was interpreted thus, it would run contrary to other portions of the shruti (e.g. neha nAnAsti kinchana, udaramantaram kurute, etc) which negate the world in all three periods of time. Therefore the import of the shruti which talks of the world's reality cannot be in revealing its ultimate reality in all three periods of time.
The siddhikAra says:
नच - वैपरीत्यमेव किं न स्यात् ? विनिगमकाभावादिति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued thus - "Why cannot the opposite be true (that is, the shruti that talks of the reality of the world is true, and that which talks of the world's unreality is false) ? For, there is no basis to determine that only the one is correct and the other is not."
तात्पर्यान्यथानुपपत्तिगतिसामान्यामेव विनिगमकत्वात् | There are ways to determine which takes precedence, namely:
1) the one which reveals the true import of shruti 2) the incorrectness of the one which would lead to irreconcilable problems 3) that which has been supported by multiple shruti-s
अद्वैतश्रुतिर्हि षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गोपेता | The six primary marks of import are all present only in the shruti that teaches of the ultimate oneness of reality.
In an analysis that is quite unique to the advaita siddhi, MadhusUdana sarasvatI classifies the six marks of import into two categories - a triad that pertain to the idea/meaning being conveyed (artha niShTha) and a triad pertaining to the manner in which it is being conveyed (shabda niShTha).
The nature of the validity is said to possess three characteristics - 1) the object it reveals must be ajnAta, unknown. 2) It must not be abAdhita, contradicted. 3) It must be prayojanavat, have utility.
तत्र त्रिविधं तात्पर्यलिङ्गं प्रामाण्यशरीरघटकमर्थनिष्ठमज्ञातत्वमबाधितत्वं प्रयोजनवत्वं च | Three of the indicatory marks of import are central to the nature of the validity of a pramANa and directly speak to the idea / meaning that is being conveyed by shruti by establishing that 1) the idea revealed is ajnAta, unknown. 2) is abAdhita, contradicted. 3) is prayojanavat, has utility.
त्रिविधं तु शब्दनिष्ठमतिप्रसङ्गवारकमुपक्रमोपसंहारयोरैकरूप्यं अभ्यास: अर्थवादश्चेति | Whereas the remaining three are necessary to exclude extraneous matters not central to the import of the shruti in question, by describing the manner in which the idea is conveyed - they are:
1) upakrama / upasamhAra - if the opening and concluding passages of a particular section in question speak of the same idea, then it is clear that that idea is the import of that shruti section.
2) abhyAsa - if the same message is repeated multiple times within the same section, that too indicates that that message is the import.
3) arthavAda - if a story is used to convey the importance of the message, one can gather that the message is the import.
तत्र शब्दनिष्ठलिङ्गत्रये तावन्न विवाद:, सर्वासामेवोपनिषदामेवं प्रवृत्तत्वात् | There can be no argument that the triad corresponding to the manner in which an idea is conveyed is present in the shruti sections that talk of advaita - for these are present in that manner in every upaniShad.
मानान्तरासिद्धतया मोक्षहेतुज्ञानविषयतया च अज्ञातत्वम् सप्रयोजनत्वं च निर्विवादमेव | Moreover, that the object is unknown and that it has utility is not in doubt, for advaita is not known through any other means of knowledge, and its cognition is the direct cause of liberation.
अबाधितत्वमात्रं सन्दिग्धम् | There can only be some doubt in relation to whether such a cognition is contradicted.
तच्चान्यथानुपपत्तिगतिसामान्याभ्यां च निर्णीयते | This can be clarified by the untenability of an alternative explanation and by the unity in the message of the upaniShad-s.
To explain:
नहि सर्वप्रपञ्चनिषेधरूपमद्वैतम् व्यावहारिकम्, येन तत्र श्रुतेर्व्यावहारिकं प्रामाण्यं स्यात् ; अतस्तत्र तात्त्विकमेव प्रामाण्यम्, द्वैतसत्यत्वं तु व्यावहारिकम्; अतस्तत्र न श्रुतेस्तात्त्विकं प्रामाण्यम्;
Advaita, which by definition is only possible when the entire world has been negated, cannot be empirical (for there is nothing to transact with). If it was empirical, one could possible argue that the shruti that conveys advaita has empirical validity. Therefore it must follow that that shruti can only have absolute validity. Whereas there is a benefit from considering the empirical reality of the world for day to day transactions. Therefore, there is no need to claim the absolute validity of the shruti that conveys the duality of the world.
If advaita shruti is not absolutely valid, it leads to the outcome that it has no validity at all. It cannot have empirical validity, because the validity of advaita shruti empirically is an impossibility, when we encounter a real world in day to day transactions. However, all shruti must have some validity - whether empirical or ultimate. Therefore, when all other alternatives have been exhausted, what remains must be the truth - advaita shruti has ultimate validity.
परस्परविरुद्धयोर्द्वयोस्तात्त्विकत्वायोगात्, वस्तुनि च विकल्पासंभवात्,
Only one of two contradictory outcomes can be absolutely valid, for there can be no choice in the nature of a thing.
तात्त्विकव्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यभेदेन च व्यवस्थोपपत्ते: अतत्परत्वेनावधारितस्य विश्वसत्यत्ववाक्यस्यैवान्यथा व्याख्यातुमुचितत्वात् |
Because it is possible to accommodate one as empirically valid, and the other as ultimately valid, it is appropriate to reinterpret the shruti which speaks of the reality of the world in a different manner, for conveying such a reality is not the import of shruti.
How is it possible to reinterpret the statement "vishvam satyam", the world is real? The words in the sentence are in sAmAnAdhikaraNyam, that is, their case endings are the same.
तथा हि - चतुर्धा हि सामानाधिकरण्यम् ; अध्यासे 'इदं रजत' मित्यादौ, बाधायां 'स्थाणु: पुमानि'त्येवमादौ विशेषणविशेष्यभावे 'नीलमुत्पल' मित्यादौ अभेदे 'तत्त्वमसी'त्येवमादौ |
Grammatically, there are four possible kinds of sAmAnAdhikaraNyam:
1) in the case of superimposition, such as "idam rajatam" "this (is) silver"
2) in the case of sublation, "sthANu: pumAn" "the pillar is a person"
3) in the case of adjective and noun, "blue lotus"
4) identity "you are that".
अत्र च बाधायामध्यासे वा सामानाधिकरण्योपपत्तेर्न सत्यत्वबोधकश्रुते: षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गोपेताद्वैतश्रुतिबाधकत्वम् | If the shruti spoke of the reality (of the world) as a sublation or superimposition, such a sentence is incapable of overruling the shruti conveying advaita, which has been established as the import of shruti by way of the six indicatory marks of import.
The opponent tries to refute this:
ननु - आत्मन आनन्दत्वबोधिका श्रुतिरपि 'सुखं सुप्तोऽस्मी'ति साक्षिप्रत्यक्षसिद्धानन्दानुवादिनी सत्त्वश्रुतिवद्भवेत् - इति चेन्न;
"(By extension then), the shruti which reveals the nature of the self as bliss, like the shruti that reveals the world as real, is also a repetition of the common experience "I slept well", which is a matter of direct perception by the inner witness, the sAkshi".
The siddhikAra says no.
साक्षिण उपहितानन्दविषयत्वेन श्रुतेश्च निरुपाधिकानन्दविषयत्वेन भिन्नविषयत्वादनुवादत्वायोगात् | The experience by the inner witness during deep sleep is of bliss conditioned by the adjunct (ignorance), whereas, the bliss of the self revealed by the shruti is unconditioned by any adjuncts. As their subject matter is different, shruti cannot be a repetition.
तदा हि स्वरूपानन्दो गृह्यते | स्वरूपं चाज्ञानोपहितमेव साक्षिविषय: | The bliss that is the nature of oneself is experienced, but it one conditioned by ignorance.
***Fifth argument - shruti, by confirming the reality of the world already known, is strengthening the conviction of the world's reality.***
ननु - 'तत्त्वमसी'त्यादौ नवकृत्वोऽभ्यासवत् पिपासितस्य जलगोचरप्रमाणसंप्लववद्वैक्ये षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गवद्भावरूपाज्ञाने प्रत्यक्षसिद्धे 'तम आसी'दित्यादिश्रुतिवत् सत्त्वश्रुतिर्दार्ढ्यार्था - इति चेन्न ;
The opponent argues: The shruti that conveys the reality of the world is to strengthen the conviction in the world's reality (and not a repetition to be dismissed), like
1) The nine-fold repetition of the statement "That Thou Art" in the ChAndogya upaniShad
2) A thirsty person seeking to confirm whether his vision of water is indeed real
3) The six-fold indicatory marks of import
4) Despite the direct experience of an ignorance which is of the nature of a positive entity, the nAsadIya sUkta confirms this with the statement "There was darkness"
The siddhikAra responds: If this is the argument, no.
अशेषविशेषग्राहितप्रत्यक्षप्राप्ते तद्दार्ढ्यार्थमन्यानपेक्षणात् | When perception reveals the object with all its features directly, there is no need to take reinforce it with an indirect means of knowledge which only reveals the object partially.
पिपासितस्य शब्दलिङ्गानन्तरं जले प्रत्यक्षमपेक्षितम्, न तु प्रत्यक्षानन्तरं शब्दलिङ्गे | all kinds of specificity being revealed by perception, there is no reason to strengthen this with another means of knowledge. A thirsty man, after inferring the presence of water, will seek to confirm by directly seeing it. Once someone has already seen water directly, there is no need to strengthen it further with inference and verbal testimony.
नच - तर्हि 'तम आसी'दित्यादे: न किञ्चिदवेषिदमिति प्रत्यक्षसिद्धाज्ञान दार्ढ्यार्थत्वं न स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be insisted thus - "If that is so, it must be admitted that the shruti statement 'There was darkness' does not have validity because it does not reinforce the experience of ignorance in the cognition 'I do not know anything' ".
'तम आसी' दित्यस्य सृष्टिपूर्वकालसंबन्धित्वेनाज्ञानग्राहितया सुषुप्तिकालसंबन्धित्वेनाज्ञानग्राहकं प्रत्यक्षमपेक्ष्य भिन्नविषयत्वेनैव प्रामाण्यसंभवात् | The shruti, in saying "There was darkness" is revealing the presence of ignorance before creation, whereas the experience of ignorance in deep sleep is revealing the presence of ignorance in sleep, therefore their subject matter being different, shruti still has validity.
To be continued.
The opponent says -
ननु - अस्तु शब्दबाध:, तथाहि - 'विश्वं सत्यं', 'यच्चिकेत सत्यमित्तन्न मोघं', 'याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान्व्यदधाच्छाश्वतीभ्य: समाभ्य:' इत्यादिश्रुतिभि:
Scripture refutes the inference of the world's mithyAtva. For example the shruti statements:
a) "The world is satyam, real",
b) "Whatever is considered as satyam is verily not an illusion",
c) "(It is Ishvara who maintains and preserves the universe), by appropriately allocating various functions of the universe to the various prajApati-s",
'असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदाहुरनीश्वर' मित्यादि स्मृतिभि:
The smRti (Bhagavat gIta) statement such as "Those who hold that the world is unreal, without any support, that there is no Ishvara, (are endowed with demonic qualities)",
'नाभाव उपलब्धे:' 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिव' दित्यादिसूत्रैश्च विश्वस्य सत्यत्वप्रतिपादनात् इति
the brahma sUtra statements such as "it cannot be absolutely unreal, because it is the object of experience", "the (world of the waking state) is different from the dream world", etc, all establish the reality of the world.
Thus each of the three main prasthAna-s (central texts of sanAtana dharma) - the shruti, the smRti and the nyAya prasthAna - all establish that the world is real.
The siddhikAra takes up this argument next:
- चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
श्रुतेस्तत्परत्वाभावात् | shruti does not have that meaning.
The full text of the mantra which contains the quoted section "vishvam satyam" is:
तथाहि - 'विश्वं सत्यं मघवाना युवोरिदापश्च न प्रमिणन्ति व्रतं वाम् | अच्छेन्द्राब्रह्मणस्पती हविर्नो अन्नं युजेव वाजिन जिगात' मिति ऋक्संहिताद्वितीयाष्टकवाक्यस्यायमर्थ: | This mantra is in the second aShTaka of the rig veda.
The siddhikAra provides the meaning of the entire mantra:
हे इन्द्राब्रह्मणस्पती ! Oh Indra and BrahmaNaspati,
मघवाना मघवानौ मघमिति धननाम, धनवन्तौ मघवन्ताविति वा | The word maghavAn is derived from the root magha which means wealth. Thus maghavAn means he who is endowed with wealth.
विश्वं सर्वं सत्यं कर्म, सद्भूतत्वात्, फलस्यावश्यम्भावित्वाद्वा | vishvam means 'all' and satyam means 'karma / rituals / actions', because it is existent, or called so because rituals will definitely bear fruit.
तादृशं कर्म युवयोरित् such rituals done for you (done to please you), will be effective
युवयो: इत् इत्थमवधारणे वा | Or alternatively, only those actions performed by you are effective. इत् means ittham, thus, or definitively.
युवामेवोद्दिश्य सर्वाणि कर्माण्यनुष्ठेयानीत्यर्थ: | The intended meaning is that all vedic rituals should be directed towards you two alone.
आपो व्यापनशीला देवता: | By Apa:, are meant the devatA-s, as they are all pervading, like the waters. That is, they can take a body anywhere and be present.
चनेत्येतत्पदद्वयपदसमुदाय:, ऐकपद्यं त्वध्यापकसंप्रदायसिद्धं | The word चन is a confluence of च and न, and have to be interpreted separately. The use of चन as one word by padakAra-s is by convention.
वां युवयोर्व्रतं संकल्पं कर्म वा | न प्रमिणन्ति न हिंसन्ति (मीङ् हिंसायां, क्रैयादिक:,) किन्त्वनुमोदन्त इति यावत् | vAm - your, vratam - vow, or action. na pramiNAnti - cannot be harmed. The root mIng means to hurt / harm. No one can block your actions, rather, they will support it. (Any ritual / action performed or blessed by you cannot be afflicted by anyone else. On the contrary, it will be supported by all).
नोऽस्माकं हविर्दध्यादिकं अन्नं च पुरोडाशादिकम् च | Our sacrificial offerings - such as curd, rice, puroDAshA etc
अच्छ अभिलक्ष्य acCha, made facing you
वाजिना वेगवन्तावश्वाविव | vAjinA, like fast horses
युजा युक्तौ सन्तौ | yujA, that are yoked.
जिगातं देवयजनमागच्छतम् | (जिगातिर्गतिकर्मा जौहोत्यादिक:) jigAtam, please come at once to consume our offerings at the sacrifice
अन्नं घासं प्रति अश्वाविवेति वा | like horses running towards grass.
In summary, one interpretation of this mantra is - Oh Indra and Brihaspati, you who are endowed with riches, all these rituals should be directed to you alone, as only your actions / rituals directed towards you certainly bear fruit, and no devatAs are able to harm or affect them, rather, they are supportive of them. Therefore, please come at once to this sacrifice and accept these offerings we make facing you, like fast horses galloping towards grass.
यद्वा - हे इन्द्राब्रह्मणस्पती! विश्वं सत्त्वेन परिदृश्यमानं जगत्, Alternatively - Oh Indra and BrahmaNaspati, the universe, which appears to be real
युवयोरित् युवयोरेव, युवाभ्यामेव सृष्टम् | is yours, has been created by you
अथवा - युवयोरेव विश्वं सर्वं स्तोत्रं, सत्यं यथार्थम् | Alternatively, all (vishvam = sarvam = all) the eulogies directed towards you are true (satyam = real).
यद्यत् गुणजातं स्तुत्वा प्रतिपाद्यते तत्सर्वं युवयोर्विद्यमानमेव न त्वारोपितमित्यर्थ: | Whatever qualities you are said to have in our praises, are all present in you in reality and not superimposed for the sake of eulogising. That is, our praises of you are no exaggeration - they are true statements.
आपो व्यापनशीला देवता:, अबुपलक्षितानि पञ्चभूतानि वा | Apa can refer to the devatAs due to them being all pervading. Alternatively, the term waters could refer to all the five elements by implication.
युवयोर्व्रतं जगदुत्पादानाख्यं कर्म न हिंसन्ति | इत्थं महानुभावौ युवां जिगातम् | When you two set out to create the world, no one can afflict it. Oh great ones, please come to our sacrifice.
शेषं पूर्ववद्व्याख्येयम् | The remaining is as per the previous interpretation.
तथाच स्तुतिपरतया नास्य विश्वसत्यत्वे तात्पर्यम् || As can been seen, the mantra is not speaking about the world's reality, its import is as a eulogy.
'शाक्मना शाको अरुण: सुपर्ण आयो मह: शूर: सनादनील: | यच्चिकेत सत्यमित्तन्न मोघं वसु स्पार्हमुत जेतोत दाता' इत्यस्याप्यष्टमाष्टकस्थस्येन्द्रस्तुतिपरतया न विश्वसत्यत्वे तात्पर्यम् |
The second quote (यच्चिकेत सत्यमित्तन्न मोघं), which occurs in the eighth aShTaka (8.17.6) of the rig veda is also a eulogy directed towards Indra, and not to talk of the world's reality
तथाहि - शाक्मना शाकैव शाक्मा तेन शाक्मना, बलेन | The word shAkmanA is derived from shAka meaning strength. Thus shakmAna means "with strength".
शाक: शक्त:, स्वशक्त्यैव सर्वं कर्तुं शक्त इत्यर्थ: | shAka: means 'the strong one', who is able to do everything with his own strength
नहीन्द्रस्य सहायान्तरापेक्षास्ति इन्द्रत्वादेव | Indra, by virtue of being Indra, is able to achieve his aims without anyone else's help.
अरुण: अरुणवर्ण: कश्चित् शोभवर्ण: पक्षी आगच्छतीत्यध्याहार:, उपसर्गश्रुते: | aruNa, a delightful, red coloured bird arrives. Only the letter आ is present in the mantra, but by the rule 'upasarga shrute: yogakriyA adhyAhAra:' - if only a preposition is present in the veda, a verb can be affixed to it, even if not explicitly present - the verb "moves" is affixed to आ to mean "arrives"
यो महो महान् शूर: विक्रान्त:, 'yo maho' the mighty one, 'shUra:' who uses his strength to great effect
सनात् पुराण:, is sanAt, ancient
अनील: अनीड: नीडस्याकर्ता | 'anIla', and has no need for a resting place.
न हीन्द्रो अग्निवत् कुत्रचिदपि यज्ञे पक्षे निकेतनं करोति | Unlike agni, the devatA of fire, Indra does not reside in any place like the sacrificial altar, etc. He is ever on the move, never resting.
एवं सुपर्ण इत्यादिरूपकेणेन्द्रमाह | To Indra who is compared to such a bird, the following has been said:
स इन्द्र इदमिदानीं कर्तव्यमिति यच्चिकेत जानाति, तत्सत्यमित्सत्यमेव | If Indra decides (yacciketa) that "such and such" must be done now, that will certainly be done (satyam it).
न मोघं न व्यर्थं | without fail (na mogham)
स: स्पार्हं स्पृहणीयं, वसु निवासार्हं, धनं जेता जयति | शत्रुभ्य: सकाशात् | He wins unfritterable (vasu) wealth, the object of everyone's desire, (spArham), instantaneously from his enemies.
उत अपि, दाता ददाति च स्तोतृभ्य: | Not only does he win this wealth, he bestows this wealth upon his worshippers.
जेता दातेति तृन् तेन 'न लोके'त्यादिना षष्ठीप्रतिषेध: | By the application of the 'na loke' sUtra (from pANini's aShTAdhyAyi), the तृन् verbal suffix of the roots for winning (जेतृ) and donating (दातृ), is not used in the sixth case ending, but in the second case. Instead of saying धनस्य दाता it is meant in the sense of धनं दाता.
एवमेवान्यदपि सत्यत्वप्रतिपादकमुन्नेयम् | Thus one must understand that if the word 'satyam' is used in the context of the world, it has to be interpreted to reveal the correct meaning.
'याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान्व्यदधा'दित्यापि वाक्यं न प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वे प्रमाणम् | Nor is the sentence from the IshAvAsya upaniShad a proof for the world's reality either.
तस्य पूर्वसृष्टप्रकारेण सर्जनमर्थ: नतु जगत्सत्यत्वं जगत्सर्जनगतसत्यत्वं वा | The meaning of yathA and tathA are to indicate the creation of the universe in the current cycle is similar to the process in the previous cycle, and not to reveal the reality of the world, nor to state the reality of the process of creation.
यत्र च स्तुत्यादिपरत्वं नास्ति, तत्रापि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धानुवादकतया 'अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषज'मित्यादिवाक्यवन्न तत्परत्वम् | Even where the context is not as a eulogy, any references to the world's reality in the shruti are only repetitions of the world's reality discerned by direct perception, and therefore, like in the instance of the shruti statement 'fire is a remedy for coldness', the import is not in revealing what is already known.
Having demonstrated that the three instances quoted from the shruti do not have the import of revealing the world's reality, the siddhikAra turns his attention to the series of arguments put forward by the nyAyAmRtakAra in the corresponding chapter in the nyAyAmRta.
***First argument - the advaitin argues that the reality of the world is the reality of Brahman. However, that is not a fact that is known through perception. How can it be then held that a shruti statement that reveals the world's reality is simply a repetition of a reality known through perception? ***
नच - त्वन्मते सर्वत्र ब्रह्मसत्त्वस्यैव स्फुरणात्तदतिरिक्तस्य कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वरूपस्य घटादिसत्त्वस्य प्रत्यक्षेणाप्राप्ते: तद्बोधकत्वेन श्रुतेर्नानुवादकमिति - वाच्यम्;
He says: "In your system, it is Brahman's reality that appears everywhere else. However, perception does not reveal a reality of the pot etc that is unsublatable in all three periods of time. Thus, when shruti reveals such a reality to the world, it is not a repetition."
The siddhikAra says, no.
इतरसत्वबाधपुरस्सरत्वात् ब्रह्मसत्त्वस्फुरणाभ्युपगमस्य तत्रैव सत्यादिपदप्रवृत्तिस्वीकारेण तदतिरिक्तविश्वसत्यत्वस्य शाब्दबोधाविषयत्वात् तदादायानुवादकत्वापरिहारात् |
As it is Brahman's reality that appears everywhere, it presupposes that nothing else has a reality of its own. Therefore, the word real in a sentence can be used only to mean such a reality that belongs to that object, the reality revealed by statements speaking of the world's reality cannot be something other than that, it cannot be anything other than stating that the world has a reality of its own. Therefore the claim that the shruti is merely repeating what is discerned by perception still holds.
The pUrvapakshi changes tack. He wants to say there are some things whose existence cannot be known through perception. Thus shruti in saying the world is real is revealing the reality of all those things that are not known by perception, and the statement is not a case of superfluous repetition.
अथ - 'पृथिवी इतरभिन्ना' 'न हिंस्यात्सर्वा भूतानी' त्यादौ घटादावेकदेशे प्रत्यक्षेण, ब्राह्मणादवेकदेशे वाक्यान्तरेण, विधेयसिद्धावपि सर्वत्रासिद्धत्वात् यथा नानुवादकत्वं तथा विश्वमात्रसत्यत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षेणाप्राप्तत्वात् नानुवादकत्वमिति - मन्यसे, मैवम्;
He says -
Perception may reveal that the pot etc is different from some other particular object. Similarly, there is a sentence in the veda which prohibits violence against Brahmanas. Despite this, the statements "the earth is different from others" or "do no harm to any living creature" are not considered superfluous repetitions, because while the former pair of facts may be known in specific instances, that they are universally true is not known. Similarly, the vedic statement 'the world is real' is not a superfluous repetition, because there are things that are beyond perception and hence a statement to reveal their reality is necessary.
The siddhikAra says - That is not so. Because
दृष्टान्ते हि पृथिवीत्वं हिंसात्वं च एकोऽनुगतो धर्म इति तदवच्छेदेन विधेयस्याप्राप्तत्वेन तत्र नानुवादकत्वं युक्तम्,
In the examples cited, the attributes of violence and earthness are common to the objects in question. (In the case of violence, this includes everything capable of being the object of violence, such as an animal, human being, a particular group of humans, etc. In the case of earthness, it includes every earthen object.) Thus, as their reference in association with a particular instance may not be known, a universal statement that covers every particular instance where the attribute may apply can reveal a hitherto unknown fact, making the universal statement useful.
इह तु विश्वत्वं नाम नैको धर्मोऽस्ति, किन्तु विश्वशब्द: सर्वनामत्वात्तेन तेन रूपेण घटपटादीनामुपस्थापक: |
Here though, there is no one attribute called "everythingness" that pervades every single object of the world. Rather, as the word "everything" is a pronoun, it includes the pot, cloth within its ambit only as themselves individually. Thus, the pot is included within the ambit of "everything" not because there is a quality called "everythingness" that it possesses, rather it is included within "everything" as a pot - because it possesses "potness".
तेषु च प्रत्येकं सत्त्वं गृहीतमेवेति कथं नानुवादकत्वम् ; However, as each such object's existence is already known (if it wasn't known, it would not be included within the definition of "everything"), there is nothing new in a shruti statement whose meaning is interpreted as "everything is real". Therefore how can such a statement not be a superfluous repetition?
प्रकारवैलक्षण्याभावात् | There is no object based difference that is unknown.
***Second argument - the same statement can occur in two sub-branches of the veda, but not be considered a repetition, why is a shruti statement about the world's reality a repetition?***
नच - एकशाखास्थविधिवाक्यैकार्थशाखान्तरस्थविधिवाक्यस्य पुरुषान्तरं प्रतीव येन पुंसा वादिविप्रतिपत्त्यादिना घटादिसत्ता प्रत्यक्षेण न निर्णीता तं प्रत्यर्थवत्त्वेन नानुवादकत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ;
The opponent argues - An injunction occurring in one branch of the veda is not considered a repetition of the same injunction occurring in another branch of the veda, because the two injunctions are meant for two different people. Similarly, the vedic statement of the world's reality is meaningful for the person confused about the reality of the pot due to conflicting arguments made by opposing debaters, and for whom it is not certain that perception has revealed the reality of the pot. Thus, the vedic statement of the world's reality is not a repetition.
The siddhikAra rejects this saying:
एवं सत्यनुवादस्थलस्यैवाभावप्रसङ्गात् | If that is the case, there can be no place for a repetition at all. There will always be someone who does not know a particular fact, and as long as such a person exists, a statement of that fact will not be a repetition. This leads to the outcome that a superfluous repetition is only possible if everyone knows everything.
नच सर्वाविवादस्थलमेवोदाहरणम् ; सर्वाविवादस्य निश्चेतुमशक्यत्वात् | Nor can it be said that a repetition is only possible for facts that are accepted by everyone, because there is no such fact that is universally accepted. Even if it were so accepted, how can we know that everyone accepts it? No conclusive determination of universal acceptance is possible. Even if some such thing is accepted by everyone today it may not be acceptable yesterday or in the future.
What determines whether something is the original statement (purovAda) in the veda and something else a repetition (anuvAda)?
पुरोवादपूर्वकत्वादनुवादस्यात्रायं पुरोवाद इत्यस्यैवाभावात् न शाखान्तरस्थावाक्यस्यानुवादकत्वप्रसंग: | It cannot be said that sentences occurring in one branch of the veda is a repetition of it occurring in another branch, because no one branch of the veda came before or after the other. Similarly, within one branch of the veda itself, no one sentence can be said to be occurring first.
***Third argument - a vedic statement about the world's reality cannot be a repetition because ShankarAchArya's logic would be contradicted***
In the sambandha bhAShya (introduction) to the bRhadAraNyaka upaniShad, ShankarAchArya establishes that perception does not reveal that the self is different from the body - if perception could reveal it, the materialist (chArvAka) who accepts the validity of perception alone, would not hold that the body itself is the self. Thus it follows that perception is incapable of revealing that the self is different from the body, and this establishes the ground for shruti to reveal this as fact.
The opponent cites this bhAShya to argue that the world's reality cannot be revealed by perception, because if it was so revealed, the advaitin who accepts the validity of perception, would not claim the world is unreal. That being the case, the veda, in claiming the world as real is not merely repeating what is otherwise known through perception.
यत्तु - बृहादारण्यकभाष्ये देहभिन्नात्मबोधिकाया: 'अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्य' इत्यादिश्रुते: प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तानुवादित्वमाशङ्क्य वादिविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनादित्यादिना तत्परिहृतं ; तथाच प्रत्यक्षसिद्धसत्त्वग्राहकत्वेऽपि वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासार्थकत्वेन नानुवादकत्वं प्रकृतेऽपीत्युक्तम् ; तदयुक्तम् ;
It is inappropriate to argue thus - In the bRhadAraNyaka bhAShya, it was argued that the kaTha shruti "It is known as 'It exists'" is not merely repeating a fact that is known through perception, by citing the opposing view of opponents. That being so, even if it were known through perception that the world is real, it can be argued that the shruti's statement serves to repudiate opposing views.
भाष्यार्थानवबोधात् | The meaning of the bhAShya has not been understood.
तथाहि - तत्र वादिविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनेन देहाव्यतिरिक्तत्वेनात्मन: प्रत्यक्षतैव नास्ति | To explain - there, by means of showing opposing views, it was established that the self as different from the body, is not a matter of direct perception.
अन्यथा प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण्यवादिनश्चार्वाकादेस्तत्र विप्रतिपत्तिर्न स्यादित्युक्तम्, नतु वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासेनास्तीत्यादेस्सार्थकत्वम्, अननुवादकत्वं वा | otherwise, the chArvAka who accepts only perception as valid, would not hold an opposing view. Therefore, the import of the bhAShya is not in establishing that the purposefulness of the shruti lies in refuting the opponent's views, nor is it in proving that the shruti is not a mere repetition of a known fact.
That is, the import of the bhAShya is only to say that the fact that the self is different from the body is not known by perception - which is established by means of showing the different views on the topic among various groups of philosophers. It is not to ascribe meaningfulness to the shruti's statement nor is it in proving the absence of repetition in the shruti statement.
तथाचोक्तं तत्रैव - "तस्माज्जन्मान्तरसंबन्ध्यात्मास्तित्वे जन्मान्तरेष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहारविशेषोपाये च शास्त्रं प्रवर्तत" इति | This has been said so in the bhAShya itself - "Therefore, scripture's aim is to establish the existence of a soul which has multiple births, to prescribe the means for obtaining desirable ends, and to reveal that which is to be avoided for avoiding undesirable ends in the life after."
The purpose of the bhAShya is not to save shruti from the charge of repetition, but to establish that perception cannot reveal the existence of a self different from the body.
***Fourth argument - shruti is revealing that the world is ultimately real, a fact which is hitherto unknown.***
The opponent wishes to argue that the reality known through perception is empirical (vyAvahArika), whereas shruti serves to prove that the world's reality is ultimate (pAramArthika). Thus shruti is not merely repeating perception.
To prove this, he takes the example of the chAturmAsya sacrifice. The ritual consists of four parvas, parts - वैश्वदेव, वरुणप्रघास, साकमेध, शुनासीरीय. There is a standard methodology for agni praNayanam, the ritualistic transportation of the sacrificial fire, common to all soma sacrifices. However, the two central parva-s in the chAturmAsya are said to have a different methodology for agni praNayanam on the basis that the vedic injunction द्वयो: प्रणयन्ति prescribes this special agni praNayanam for the two middle parva-s only because it occurs in the context of those two parva-s and not the other two.
The opponent says:
ननु - चातुर्मास्यमध्यपवर्णो: 'द्वयो: प्रणयन्ती'ति वाक्यस्य चोदकप्राप्ताग्निप्रणयनव्यतिरिक्ताग्निप्रणयनविधायकत्ववत् प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तव्यावहारिकसत्त्वविलक्षणत्रिकालनिषेधाप्रतियोगिवरूपसत्वप्रमापकत्वं प्रकृतेऽस्त्विति - चेन्न;
चतुर्मास्यमध्यपवर्णो: 'द्वयो: प्रणयन्ती'ति वाक्यस्य चोदकप्राप्ताग्निप्रणयनव्यतिरिक्ताग्निप्रणयनविधायकत्ववत् Like in the instance of the injunction "the fire is brought in the two", which is interpreted to mean that a special method of bringing the fire is to be used in the two middle parva-s of the chAturmAsya sacrifice, which is different from the common method of bringing the fire,
प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तव्यावहारिकसत्त्वविलक्षणत्रिकालनिषेधाप्रतियोगित्वरूपसत्वप्रमापकत्वं प्रकृतेऽस्त्विति Let it be so that in the present context, vedic sentences speaking of the world's reality ascribe a reality that is unsublated in three periods of time, which is different from the empirical reality revealed by perception.
The siddhikAra responds:
- इति चेन्न; If this is your argument no.
त्रैकालिकसत्त्वनिषेधकश्रुतिविरोधेन विश्वसत्यत्वश्रुतेस्त्रैकालिकसत्त्वपरत्वाभावात् | Because if the meaning of the shruti was interpreted thus, it would run contrary to other portions of the shruti (e.g. neha nAnAsti kinchana, udaramantaram kurute, etc) which negate the world in all three periods of time. Therefore the import of the shruti which talks of the world's reality cannot be in revealing its ultimate reality in all three periods of time.
The siddhikAra says:
नच - वैपरीत्यमेव किं न स्यात् ? विनिगमकाभावादिति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued thus - "Why cannot the opposite be true (that is, the shruti that talks of the reality of the world is true, and that which talks of the world's unreality is false) ? For, there is no basis to determine that only the one is correct and the other is not."
तात्पर्यान्यथानुपपत्तिगतिसामान्यामेव विनिगमकत्वात् | There are ways to determine which takes precedence, namely:
1) the one which reveals the true import of shruti 2) the incorrectness of the one which would lead to irreconcilable problems 3) that which has been supported by multiple shruti-s
अद्वैतश्रुतिर्हि षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गोपेता | The six primary marks of import are all present only in the shruti that teaches of the ultimate oneness of reality.
In an analysis that is quite unique to the advaita siddhi, MadhusUdana sarasvatI classifies the six marks of import into two categories - a triad that pertain to the idea/meaning being conveyed (artha niShTha) and a triad pertaining to the manner in which it is being conveyed (shabda niShTha).
The nature of the validity is said to possess three characteristics - 1) the object it reveals must be ajnAta, unknown. 2) It must not be abAdhita, contradicted. 3) It must be prayojanavat, have utility.
तत्र त्रिविधं तात्पर्यलिङ्गं प्रामाण्यशरीरघटकमर्थनिष्ठमज्ञातत्वमबाधितत्वं प्रयोजनवत्वं च | Three of the indicatory marks of import are central to the nature of the validity of a pramANa and directly speak to the idea / meaning that is being conveyed by shruti by establishing that 1) the idea revealed is ajnAta, unknown. 2) is abAdhita, contradicted. 3) is prayojanavat, has utility.
त्रिविधं तु शब्दनिष्ठमतिप्रसङ्गवारकमुपक्रमोपसंहारयोरैकरूप्यं अभ्यास: अर्थवादश्चेति | Whereas the remaining three are necessary to exclude extraneous matters not central to the import of the shruti in question, by describing the manner in which the idea is conveyed - they are:
1) upakrama / upasamhAra - if the opening and concluding passages of a particular section in question speak of the same idea, then it is clear that that idea is the import of that shruti section.
2) abhyAsa - if the same message is repeated multiple times within the same section, that too indicates that that message is the import.
3) arthavAda - if a story is used to convey the importance of the message, one can gather that the message is the import.
तत्र शब्दनिष्ठलिङ्गत्रये तावन्न विवाद:, सर्वासामेवोपनिषदामेवं प्रवृत्तत्वात् | There can be no argument that the triad corresponding to the manner in which an idea is conveyed is present in the shruti sections that talk of advaita - for these are present in that manner in every upaniShad.
मानान्तरासिद्धतया मोक्षहेतुज्ञानविषयतया च अज्ञातत्वम् सप्रयोजनत्वं च निर्विवादमेव | Moreover, that the object is unknown and that it has utility is not in doubt, for advaita is not known through any other means of knowledge, and its cognition is the direct cause of liberation.
अबाधितत्वमात्रं सन्दिग्धम् | There can only be some doubt in relation to whether such a cognition is contradicted.
तच्चान्यथानुपपत्तिगतिसामान्याभ्यां च निर्णीयते | This can be clarified by the untenability of an alternative explanation and by the unity in the message of the upaniShad-s.
To explain:
नहि सर्वप्रपञ्चनिषेधरूपमद्वैतम् व्यावहारिकम्, येन तत्र श्रुतेर्व्यावहारिकं प्रामाण्यं स्यात् ; अतस्तत्र तात्त्विकमेव प्रामाण्यम्, द्वैतसत्यत्वं तु व्यावहारिकम्; अतस्तत्र न श्रुतेस्तात्त्विकं प्रामाण्यम्;
Advaita, which by definition is only possible when the entire world has been negated, cannot be empirical (for there is nothing to transact with). If it was empirical, one could possible argue that the shruti that conveys advaita has empirical validity. Therefore it must follow that that shruti can only have absolute validity. Whereas there is a benefit from considering the empirical reality of the world for day to day transactions. Therefore, there is no need to claim the absolute validity of the shruti that conveys the duality of the world.
If advaita shruti is not absolutely valid, it leads to the outcome that it has no validity at all. It cannot have empirical validity, because the validity of advaita shruti empirically is an impossibility, when we encounter a real world in day to day transactions. However, all shruti must have some validity - whether empirical or ultimate. Therefore, when all other alternatives have been exhausted, what remains must be the truth - advaita shruti has ultimate validity.
परस्परविरुद्धयोर्द्वयोस्तात्त्विकत्वायोगात्, वस्तुनि च विकल्पासंभवात्,
Only one of two contradictory outcomes can be absolutely valid, for there can be no choice in the nature of a thing.
तात्त्विकव्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यभेदेन च व्यवस्थोपपत्ते: अतत्परत्वेनावधारितस्य विश्वसत्यत्ववाक्यस्यैवान्यथा व्याख्यातुमुचितत्वात् |
Because it is possible to accommodate one as empirically valid, and the other as ultimately valid, it is appropriate to reinterpret the shruti which speaks of the reality of the world in a different manner, for conveying such a reality is not the import of shruti.
How is it possible to reinterpret the statement "vishvam satyam", the world is real? The words in the sentence are in sAmAnAdhikaraNyam, that is, their case endings are the same.
तथा हि - चतुर्धा हि सामानाधिकरण्यम् ; अध्यासे 'इदं रजत' मित्यादौ, बाधायां 'स्थाणु: पुमानि'त्येवमादौ विशेषणविशेष्यभावे 'नीलमुत्पल' मित्यादौ अभेदे 'तत्त्वमसी'त्येवमादौ |
Grammatically, there are four possible kinds of sAmAnAdhikaraNyam:
1) in the case of superimposition, such as "idam rajatam" "this (is) silver"
2) in the case of sublation, "sthANu: pumAn" "the pillar is a person"
3) in the case of adjective and noun, "blue lotus"
4) identity "you are that".
अत्र च बाधायामध्यासे वा सामानाधिकरण्योपपत्तेर्न सत्यत्वबोधकश्रुते: षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गोपेताद्वैतश्रुतिबाधकत्वम् | If the shruti spoke of the reality (of the world) as a sublation or superimposition, such a sentence is incapable of overruling the shruti conveying advaita, which has been established as the import of shruti by way of the six indicatory marks of import.
The opponent tries to refute this:
ननु - आत्मन आनन्दत्वबोधिका श्रुतिरपि 'सुखं सुप्तोऽस्मी'ति साक्षिप्रत्यक्षसिद्धानन्दानुवादिनी सत्त्वश्रुतिवद्भवेत् - इति चेन्न;
"(By extension then), the shruti which reveals the nature of the self as bliss, like the shruti that reveals the world as real, is also a repetition of the common experience "I slept well", which is a matter of direct perception by the inner witness, the sAkshi".
The siddhikAra says no.
साक्षिण उपहितानन्दविषयत्वेन श्रुतेश्च निरुपाधिकानन्दविषयत्वेन भिन्नविषयत्वादनुवादत्वायोगात् | The experience by the inner witness during deep sleep is of bliss conditioned by the adjunct (ignorance), whereas, the bliss of the self revealed by the shruti is unconditioned by any adjuncts. As their subject matter is different, shruti cannot be a repetition.
तदा हि स्वरूपानन्दो गृह्यते | स्वरूपं चाज्ञानोपहितमेव साक्षिविषय: | The bliss that is the nature of oneself is experienced, but it one conditioned by ignorance.
***Fifth argument - shruti, by confirming the reality of the world already known, is strengthening the conviction of the world's reality.***
ननु - 'तत्त्वमसी'त्यादौ नवकृत्वोऽभ्यासवत् पिपासितस्य जलगोचरप्रमाणसंप्लववद्वैक्ये षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गवद्भावरूपाज्ञाने प्रत्यक्षसिद्धे 'तम आसी'दित्यादिश्रुतिवत् सत्त्वश्रुतिर्दार्ढ्यार्था - इति चेन्न ;
The opponent argues: The shruti that conveys the reality of the world is to strengthen the conviction in the world's reality (and not a repetition to be dismissed), like
1) The nine-fold repetition of the statement "That Thou Art" in the ChAndogya upaniShad
2) A thirsty person seeking to confirm whether his vision of water is indeed real
3) The six-fold indicatory marks of import
4) Despite the direct experience of an ignorance which is of the nature of a positive entity, the nAsadIya sUkta confirms this with the statement "There was darkness"
The siddhikAra responds: If this is the argument, no.
अशेषविशेषग्राहितप्रत्यक्षप्राप्ते तद्दार्ढ्यार्थमन्यानपेक्षणात् | When perception reveals the object with all its features directly, there is no need to take reinforce it with an indirect means of knowledge which only reveals the object partially.
पिपासितस्य शब्दलिङ्गानन्तरं जले प्रत्यक्षमपेक्षितम्, न तु प्रत्यक्षानन्तरं शब्दलिङ्गे | all kinds of specificity being revealed by perception, there is no reason to strengthen this with another means of knowledge. A thirsty man, after inferring the presence of water, will seek to confirm by directly seeing it. Once someone has already seen water directly, there is no need to strengthen it further with inference and verbal testimony.
नच - तर्हि 'तम आसी'दित्यादे: न किञ्चिदवेषिदमिति प्रत्यक्षसिद्धाज्ञान दार्ढ्यार्थत्वं न स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be insisted thus - "If that is so, it must be admitted that the shruti statement 'There was darkness' does not have validity because it does not reinforce the experience of ignorance in the cognition 'I do not know anything' ".
'तम आसी' दित्यस्य सृष्टिपूर्वकालसंबन्धित्वेनाज्ञानग्राहितया सुषुप्तिकालसंबन्धित्वेनाज्ञानग्राहकं प्रत्यक्षमपेक्ष्य भिन्नविषयत्वेनैव प्रामाण्यसंभवात् | The shruti, in saying "There was darkness" is revealing the presence of ignorance before creation, whereas the experience of ignorance in deep sleep is revealing the presence of ignorance in sleep, therefore their subject matter being different, shruti still has validity.
To be continued.