paricCheda 1 - upajIvyatvena pratyaksha prAbalya nirAkaraNam
अथोपजीव्यत्वेन प्रत्यक्षप्राबल्यनिराकरणम् |
The next chapter in the Advaita Siddhi is the refutation of the argument that as all means of knowledge are fundamentally dependent on perception, perception is supreme and incontrovertible by any of them.
The nyAyAmritakAra's opening arguments:
ननु - उक्तन्यायै: प्रत्यक्षस्य जात्या प्राबल्याभावेऽपि उपजीव्यत्वेन प्राबल्यम् ;
Even if perception's is not supreme on account of universal characteristics etc, it is stronger than other means of knowledge because they are all dependent on perception.
उपजीव्यत्वं चानुमानागमापेक्षिताशेषार्थग्राहकतया, सा च क्वचित् साक्षात् क्वचित्परंपरया ; The dependence on perception is necessary for every aspect of inference and scripture. That dependence can sometimes be direct, sometimes indirect.
दृष्टं चापेक्षितैकदेशग्राहिणामप्युजीव्यत्वम् तद्विरुद्धग्रहणे तेन बाधश्च ; For it has been observed that where even one aspect of the means of knowledge(e.g inference or scripture) is dependent on any other means, if their results end up contradicting the means upon which they depend, they themselves stand disproved as a whole.
For example:
यथा - घटविभुत्वानुमाने पक्षग्राहिणा अक्ष्णा, नरशिरश्शुचित्वानुमाने साध्यग्राहकेणागमेन, मनोवैभवानुमाने ज्ञानासमवाय्याधारत्वहेतुग्राहकेणानुमानेन, किमु वक्तव्यमपेक्षिताशेषग्राहिणा स्वविरुद्धग्राहकस्य बाध:?
1) घटविभुत्वानुमाने पक्षग्राहिणा अक्ष्णा, In the case of the (flawed) inference "the pot is all-pervading" (e.g. घट: विभु: सत्त्वात् गगनवत् - the pot is all pervading, because it is existent, like space), the paksha of the inference (pot's size) is a matter of perception. The result of the inference where its paksha is dependent on perception, cannot contradict the results of the perception of the paksha itself.
नरशिरश्शुचित्वानुमाने साध्यग्राहकेणागमेन, In the case of the (flawed) inference of the human skull being ritually pure (नरशिरःकपालं शुचि: प्राण्यंगत्वात् शंखवत् - the human skull is pure, because it is like the conch, a body part of a living creature), as the sAdhya of ritual purity can only be derived from scripture, the results of such a dependent inference cannot contradict the statements of scripture.
मनोवैभवानुमाने ज्ञानासमवाय्याधारत्वरूपहेतुग्राहकेणानुमानेन, In the (flawed) inference that the mind is all-pervading (मनः विभु ज्ञानासमावाय्याधारत्वात् आत्मवत् - the mind is all pervading, because it is the locus of contact with the self, and the self is all pervading, so the mind must also be all pervading), the hetu of the inference, "because the mind is a non-inherence based cause for cognition" contradicts the inference upon which it is dependent - that is, the inference that establishes that cognition is born out of the samyoga (contact) between the mind and the self.
To explain, in nyAya an inference is made which establishes that cognition, which inheres in the self (cognition and the self have a samavAya relationship), is born as a result of a non-inherent cause (asamavAyi kAraNa). The non-inherent cause is said to be the samyoga (contact) between the mind and the self. However, this very inference proves that the mind cannot be all-pervading. How? In order for samyoga to occur between two entities, at least one of the entities must be finite. This is because samyoga is a temporary relationship that is born when one entity comes into contact with the other. Two infinite entities cannot temporarily be in contact with each other. Either they are permanently in contact or not at all. The self is admitted to be all-pervading, therefore if the mind must come into contact with the self, the mind cannot be all-pervading.
If someone tried to argue that the mind was all-pervading, because it is like the self, and shares with the self the quality of being the locus of contact which is admitted to be the cause of cognition, then because this inference contradicts the very reason with which the inference is made, it stands refuted.
Using these examples, the nyAyAmritakAra argues - the contradiction of any one element of inference with the means of knowledge upon which that element is dependent, is sufficient to overrule the entire inference. That being so:
किमु वक्तव्यमपेक्षिताशेषग्राहिणा स्वविरुद्धग्राहकस्य बाध:? What can be said of the inference of the world's unreality, where every aspect of the inference is dependent upon perception, and is contradicted by perception?
He takes up scripture for analysis next.
चक्षुरादेश्च शब्दतज्जन्यज्ञानप्रामाण्याद्यग्राहित्वेऽपि तद्ग्राहिश्रोत्रसाक्ष्यादिसजातीयत्वादुपजीव्यत्वम् | While sight cannot reveal that which is known through scripture (i.e the world's unreality which is revealed by scripture, according to the advaitin), as the scripture is revealed via hearing, which belongs to the same species of sense organs as sight, shruti too is dependent on sensory perception, and cannot contradict it.
The advaitin cannot refute the argument that a means of knowledge cannot contradict any member of the species upon which it is dependent because such a species-based dependence is observed elsewhere.
दृष्टं च नरशिर:कपालाशुचित्वबोधकागामस्य तच्छुचित्वानुमानोपजीव्यशुचित्वागमसजातीयत्वेन तदनुमानात् प्राबल्यम्,
The inference of the purity of the human skull, uses the scripture that establishes the conch as pure as the illustration for its inference. There is a contradictory scripture which explicitly says that the human skull is ritually impure. Therefore an inference that depends on one section of scripture for its functioning cannot contradict another section of scripture, because all scripture belongs to the same species.
नचेन्द्रियमपि स्वज्ञानार्थमनुमानमुपजीवतीति सम एवोपजीव्योपजीवकभाव:, अज्ञातकरणतया ज्ञानजननार्थमनुमानानपेक्षणात् , अनुमानागमादिना तु ज्ञानजननार्थमेव तदपेक्षणादिति विशेषात् ;
One cannot say that the sense organs are dependent on inference to determine whether they are functioning well (or not) and therefore perception too is dependent on inference. The advaitin may argue that one checks whether one's eyes are functioning well by testing the results using inference. However, that example is not valid because, in order to reveal something, the sense organ requires neither the prior knowledge of its own existence nor the prior knowledge of its proper functioning. Whereas, inference and scripture require perception even for revealing things.
**** The siddhikAra's response:
- इति चेन्न; उपजीव्याविरोधात् | If this is the argument, no. There is no contradiction with a pramANa upon which it is dependent.
तथाहि - यत्स्वरूपमुपजीव्यते तन्न बाध्यते, बाध्यते च तात्त्विकत्वाकार:, स च न उपजीव्यते; कारणत्वे तस्याप्रवेशात् | That which inference and scripture are dependent upon is not contradicted by them. That which is contradicted by them is the ultimate reality of the world, however they are not dependent on the ultimate reality of the world for their functioning. The reality of the world is not a requirement for its perception.
तदुक्तम् - 'पूर्वसंबन्धनियमे हेतुत्वे तुल्य एव नौ | हेतुतत्त्वबहिर्भूतसत्त्वासत्त्वकथा वृथा ||' इति |
As has been said in the khaNDana khaNDa khAdya by Sri Harsha - 'The presence of the cause prior to the effect is accepted by both of us. However, the reality or unreality of the cause is extrinsic to its ability to cause its effect.'
किंचापेक्षितग्राहित्वमात्रेण चेदुपजीव्यता, तथा च बाधकत्वम्, तदाऽपेक्षितप्रतियोगिग्राहकत्वेन 'इदं रजत' मिति भ्रमस्य बाधोपजीव्यत्वात् कथं 'नेदं रजत' मिति बाधबुद्धिस्तद्विरुद्धोदीयात् ? If you say that the dependence of a thing (A) upon another thing (B), means the prior knowledge of (B), and therefore (B) cannot be contradicted by (A), then as the sublation of the illusion of shell-silver requires the prior cognition of the illusory shell-silver which is the object of sublation, the sublation will be 'dependent' upon the illusion (according to you), and the sublating cognition "this is not silver" can never remove the shell-silver illusion.
अथ निषेध्यार्थसमर्पकतया प्रतियोगिज्ञानत्वेन तस्योपजीव्यत्त्वेऽपि तत्प्रामाण्यं नोपजीव्यम्, Therefore, it must be admitted that even though the sublation requires the prior knowledge of the thing which is sublated, it does not require the validity of the knowledge of the object for its functioning.
नहि प्रतियोगिप्रमात्वेनाभावज्ञानजनकता ; गौरवात्, प्रतियोगिभ्रमादप्यभावज्ञानदर्शनाच्च, किन्तु तज्ज्ञानत्वेनैव; लाघवात्, The knowledge of the absence of an object is not an effect of the reality of that object. Such a requirement is superfluous. Moreover, even where the object is unreal, the (subsequent) cognition of its absence can arise. Rather, it is more parsimonious to say that all that is required for the cognisance of its absence is the prior knowledge of the object.
अतस्तद्विरुद्धविषयकं ज्ञानमुदीयादेवेति ब्रूषे, तुल्यमिदं प्रकृतेऽपि, पक्षज्ञानत्वादिना कारणता, नतु तत्प्रमात्वादिनापीति | Therefore, if you say that the cognition of absence of shell-silver requires its opposite, the prior perception of shell-silver, then that much is true in the current context too. We have no problems in admitting that the absence of the world, as established by inference and scripture, is dependent on the prior perception of the world. The dependence of inference upon perception is limited to revealing its components such as the paksha, hetu, etc, and does not stem from the validity of the perception of those things.
*** The second definition of dependence.
अथ - यत् प्रामाण्यं स्वरूपसिद्ध्यर्थमपवादनिरासार्थे च यत् प्रामाण्यमुपजीवति तत्तस्योपजीव्यम् ; यथा स्मृतेरनुभव:, नच रजतभ्रमस्तथा - इति चेत्,
Therefore, if you say - If the validity of a cognition is dependent on the validity of another cognition for its functioning, or to disprove its invalidity, then it is dependent on such a cognition. Like in the case of memory, it is dependent on the validity of prior experience. However, the negation of the illusory silver is not dependent on the validity of the illusory silver -
तर्हि व्याप्तिधियोऽपि नानुमित्युपजीव्यत्वं स्यात् ; लिङ्गाभासादपि वह्निमति वह्निप्रमादर्शनात् | Then the inference will no longer be dependent on invariable concomitance, because sometimes, even when the indicator is incorrectly perceived, the right conclusion can be inferred. For example, when fog is mistaken for smoke and fire is inferred, that conclusion may be correct, even when there is no fog in reality.
To explain, the opponent redefined dependence as the validity of a cognition being a result of the validity of another cognition. It is admitted that cause of inference is the cognition of invariable concomitance. However, where fire is rightly inferred (its cognition is valid) because of illusory smoke (its cognition is invalid), it must be admitted that under the opponent's definition, the inference of fire is not 'dependent' on invariable concomitance.
*** The third definition of dependence
The opponent says:
ननु - येन विना यस्योत्थानं नास्ति तत्तस्योपजीव्यमित्येव वक्तव्यम् ; The absence of which prevents the rise of the other, is the one upon which the latter is dependent.
तथाच रजतभ्रमस्योपजीव्यत्वमस्त्येव, नतु प्राबल्यम्; नह्युपजीव्यत्वमात्रेण प्राबल्यम् ; किन्तु परीक्षिततया | Thus, the negation of the illusory silver is dependent on the illusion of silver. Supremacy does not stem from dependence alone, but also from the verification of that upon which one is dependent.
परीक्षा च सजातीयविजातीयसंवादविसंवादाभावरूपा | Verification here means that the object which is cognised remains as is and does not change into something else.
नच तौ रजतभ्रमे स्त:; प्रकृते चाक्षस्य परीक्षितत्वेन प्राबल्यम् | These two aspects do not exist for the silver illusion (the silver does not remain as silver, it is proven to be shell later), whereas in our context, the world continues to remain as is (even after the rise of cognition of brahman), thus it is verified and therefore incontrovertible.
अस्ति हि 'सन्घट' इति विशेषदर्शनजन्यज्ञानानान्तरं घटार्थक्रियाप्रत्यक्षे क्लृप्तदूरादिदोषाभावाच्च | In the case of perception of the objects that constitute the world, like the cognition of the pot, etc., one verifies it by seeing the pot performing its function as expected, and disproves its invalidity by the absence of mitigating factors such as distance, which could have led to its misperception.
एवमेव जीवेशाभेदश्रुतौ निषेध्यार्पकभेदश्रुति: साक्षिप्रत्यक्षं चादोषत्वात् परीक्षितमिति तदपि न बाध्यम् |
Similarly, as the scriptural portions that speak of difference between the individual and God and the perception of the inner witness (sAkshi) are defect free, they are thus verified, and cannot be overruled by scriptural portions that speak of the unity of the individual and God.
The opponent adds a further requirement to the verification process - proving the absence of defects.
एवमेव च दोषाभावादिज्ञानरूपपरीक्षायामपि अनाश्वासे वेदे पौरुषेयत्वाभावज्ञाने त्वदुक्तानुमाने च योग्यानुपलब्ध्यादिना हेत्वाभासादिराहित्यज्ञाने ब्रह्ममीमांसायां प्रत्यधिकरणं सिद्धान्त्यभिप्रेत्यार्थे उपक्रमाद्यानुगुण्यज्ञाने चानाश्वास: स्यादिति प्रमाणतदाभासव्यवस्था न स्यात् ;
However, if one does not accept that verification includes the cognition of the absence of defects, one would end up disbelieving the following:
1) the absence of human agency in the creation of vedas,
2) the absence of defects such as imperceptibility in your inference (of the world's unreality),
3) the use of rules of textual interpretation such as the subject matter of the introductory portion of texts (upakramA), etc. by the advaitin in determining the import of scripture.
Therefore, there would be no basis to determine if a cognition is valid or not.
The siddhikAra responds:
- इति चेन्न; If this is your argument, then no.
परीक्षा हि प्रवृत्ति संवादविसंवादाभावदोषाभावादिरूपा , तया च स्वसमानदेशकालीनविषयाबाध्यत्वं प्रामाण्यस्य व्यवस्थाप्यते धूमेन स्वसमानदेशकालीनवह्निरेव |
Verification is testing if the cognition of the object leads to fruitful action, whether it changes into anything else and if it is free from defects. By such a verification, all that is proven is a validity which is of the nature of the absence of negation of an object at the same time and place as its cognition, like the co-presence of fire in the same time and location as smoke.
तथाच व्यवहारदशामात्राबाध्यत्वम् देहात्मैक्यसाधारणं परीक्षितप्रमाणे व्यवस्थितमिति
Therefore, such a validity is at the same level as the notion of the body as the self (which has been accepted as ultimately erroneous by the opponent himself), that is, the absence of negation is only in a transactional sense.
कथमत्यन्ताबाध्यत्वाभावग्राहकागमानुमानयो: प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् ? Therefore, why would inference and scripture, which stipulate the absence of absolute unsbulatability in the world, not be fruitful?
तस्माद्विश्वासप्रमाणतदाभासव्यवस्था जिवेशभेदादिकं च व्यावहारिकमित्युपपन्नमेव सर्वे जगन्मिथ्येति || The validity and invalidity of a cognition being thus accounted for, the difference cognised between the individual and God etc., is proven to be only transactional and the entire world's unreality stands proven.
The opponent asks:
ननु - प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्ये तत्सिद्धस्य व्याप्त्यादेर्बाधेनानुमेयादेरनुमित्यादिप्रामाण्यस्य च बाध:, अनुमेयादेर्व्याप्त्यादिना अनुमितिप्रामाण्यादिना च समानयोगक्षेमत्वात्,
If perception is invalid, the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is dependent on perception is invalidated. Thereby, the inferred object and the inferential cognition are also negated. The inferred object, the invariable concomitance and the validity of inferential cognition must all have the same level of reality as a rule.
If it is not accepted that they have the same level of reality,
अन्यथा प्रातिभासिकव्याप्त्यादिमता बाष्प्याध्यस्तधूमेन तात्त्विको व्यावहारिको वाग्निः The apparent smoke superimposed on fog, in conjunction with an apparent invariable concomitance will end up implying an absolutely real fire, or a transactionally real fire
व्यावहारिकव्याप्त्यादिमता धूमेन तात्त्विकोऽग्निः or, a transactionally real invariable concomitance and smoke will end up implying an absolutely real fire
व्यावहारिकेणाबाधेन विरुद्धधर्माधिकरणत्वेन च विश्वस्य जीवेशभेदस्य च तात्त्विकं सत्त्वं सिद्ध्येत् And similarly, because it is transactionally unsublated and because it would end up having contradictory attributes, the world and the difference between the individual and God would end up absolutely real.
The siddhikAra replies:
- इति चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
एतावता हि व्याप्त्यादिसमानसत्ताकमनुमेयं सिद्ध्यत्वित्यापत्ते: फलितार्थ:, स चास्माकमिष्टं एव ; नहि ब्रह्मभिन्नं क्वचिदत्यन्ताबाध्यमस्ति | By your argument, all that is proven is that the invariable concomitance and inferential cognition have the same level of reality as the inferred object. That is desirable for us, because we hold that nothing apart from Brahman is ultimately unsublatable. Therefore, if your rule was correct, the inferred object, the inference and the concomitance would all be only transactionally real. According to advaita, the inference of unreality - even unreality itself - is unreal.
नचायमनुमेयादेर्व्याप्त्यादिना समसत्ताकत्वनियमोऽप्यस्ति; However, your rule that "the inferred object, etc. must necessarily have the same level of reality", is not true.
व्यभिचारिणापि लिङ्गेन साध्यवति पक्षे अनुमितिप्रमादर्शनात्, Because (as we have already said), even if the hetu is incorrect, it can lead to an inference where the sAdhya is present in the paksha.
The siddhikAra gives two examples:
ध्वनिधर्मह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वादिविशिष्टत्वेन मिथ्याभूतैरपि नित्यैर्विभुभिर्वर्णै: सत्या शाब्दप्रतीति: क्रियत इति मीमाम्सकैरभ्युपगमात्,
Even though, according to pUrva mImAmsa, the eternal and all pervading phonemes (varNas), are unreal when associated with sound (dhvani) attributes such as short, elongated etc, they are able to reveal a real meaning.
In pUrva mImAmsa, the word नगः and नागः may have the same real phonemes (na and ga), which are unreal when associated with different sounds, they reveal valid but different meanings.
The previous case was an illustration of where the indicator was unreal, but the indicated object was real. Now the situation where the indicator is real, but the indicated object is unreal will be illustrated.
This example is from nyAya. According to nyAya, earth (clay) has the attribute of smell. The pot, which is a creation of the clay, also must have the attribute of smell. The naiyyAyika however holds that in the first instant after its creation from clay, the attribute of smell is not present in the pot - the pot generates the attribute within itself from the second instant of its creation. Thus, in the first instant, the prior absence of smell is present in the pot.
गन्धप्रागभावावच्छिन्ने घटे तात्त्विकव्याप्त्यादिमतापि पृथिवीत्वेनातात्त्विकगन्धानुमितिर्दर्शनात्, In the instant where the pot contains the prior absence of smell, there may be a valid concomitance (where there is earth, there is smell), but when the pot is seen as earth, the result of the concomitance (smell) is not present.
प्रतिबिम्बेन च बिम्बानुमितिर्दर्शनात् | Similarly, one is able to infer the presence of the real object from its unreal reflection.
नच - तत्रापि बिम्बरहितावृत्तिरुपा व्याप्तिस्तात्त्विक्येवेति - वाच्यम् ; The opponent may argue - 'In that case, the invariable concomitance of the form "where the original is absent, the reflection is absent" is real. So it is a real invariable concomitance that proves the real inferred object.' - but that is not correct, because:
एवं सत्यवृत्तिगगनादेरपि व्याप्यतापत्ते: | That cannot be a real concomitance, because if it were real, space, which is not located anywhere, would end up present everywhere (the invariable concomitance of the opponent is similar to the argument that if no location in the world exists, space does not exist too).
नच - तत्र बिम्बपूर्वकत्वमेवानुमीयते, बिम्बव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तव्यतिरेकप्रतियोगित्वरूपेणाप्रातिभासिकेन हेतुनेति,
Do not argue thus: There (in the example), the object that is inferred is the precedence of the reflection by the original, which is real. The means of proving this is real too (not prAtibhAsika) - because the reflection happens to be the counter-positive of the absence occurring as a result of the absence of the original. Thus, a real means proves a real result.
This is incorrect, because:
प्रयुक्तत्वं हि न तज्जन्यजन्यत्वादिरूपम् ; व्यतिरेकयो: परस्परं तदभावात्, In the hetu cited, the words "occurring as a result of" cannot mean "that which causes" or "is caused by"; because no causality is possible between two absences.
किन्तु व्याप्यव्यापकभाव:, तथाच बिम्बव्यतिरेकव्यापकव्यतिरेकप्रतियोगित्वं हेतु:, स चाकाशादौ व्यभिचार्येव | Therefore, what it ought to mean is that one is invariably concomitant with the other. Therefore, the hetu in your inference should be - "because the reflection is the counter-positive of the absence which is invariably concomitant with the absence of the original" - which is the same concomitance which failed due to vyabhichAra in the case of space, etc.
vyabhichAra occurs where the hetu is present, but the sAdhya is absent. Space is absent when all loci are absent (hetu is present), but space is not preceded by its locus (sAdhya is absent).
तस्मात्तत्र प्रतिबिम्बेनैव बिम्बानुमानम्, Therefore, it must be admitted that the existence of the original object is inferred by the reflection alone.
अनुमेयस्य लिङ्गव्याप्त्यादिसमानसत्ताकत्वनियमस्यापास्तत्वात् | Therefore, the rule that "the inferred object has to have the same level of reality as the reason, invariable concomitance etc," has been disproved.
Inference and scripture were said to be dependent on perception. Until now, we have dealt with inference. The siddhikAra takes up scripture next.
एतेन - शब्देऽपि योग्यतासमानसत्ताकेन शब्दार्थेन भवितव्यम्, योग्यतावाक्यार्थयो: समानसत्ताकत्वनियमादिति कथं वेदान्तवाक्यार्थो योग्यताबाधेऽप्यबाधित: स्यादिति - परास्तम् ;
By this the following statement stands refuted - "In the case of verbal cognition too, the compatibility of words (yogyatA) must be of the same order of reality as the word meaning (the objects they denote), because verbal compatibility and sentence meaning must go hand-in-hand. Therefore, if the verbal compatibility in vedAntic sentences is denied validity, how can their sentence meaning be ultimately real?"
It stands refuted because:
वेदान्तवाक्ये अखण्डार्थरूपवाक्यार्थाबाधरूपाया योग्यताया अप्यबाधाच्च | In the case of vedAntic sentences, verbal compatibility, which is of the nature of the impartite, unsublatable sentence meaning, is itself unsublated.
Impartite sentences, are a separate class of sentences in advaita vedAnta, which lead to the rise of valid knowledge which consist of nothing other than the direct or indirect meaning recalled by non-synonymous words taken as one whole. The verba compatibility in such sentences is non-different from sentence meaning, which in the case of vedAntic sentences, is the unsublatable Brahman.
नच - तथापि वेदान्ततज्ज्ञानप्रामाण्यमिथ्यात्वे कथं तात्त्विकाद्वैतसिद्धिरीति वाच्यम्;
Do not argue thus - "Even then, as the validity of vedAnta, and the cognition it gives rise to, is unreal, how can they lead one to an ultimately real Non-Duality?"
शब्दतज्ज्ञान तात्त्विकत्वं हि न विषयतात्त्विकत्वे तन्त्रम्, Because the reality of words, or the cognition they produce, does not confer reality to the meaning they denote / their object, and vice versa.
इदं रजतमित्यनाप्तवाक्यस्य तज्जन्यभ्रमस्य च त्वन्मते तात्त्विकत्वेऽपि तद्विषयस्यतात्त्विकत्वात् | For, according to you, the sentence "this is silver" uttered by an untrustworthy individual and the cognition of illusion are both real, but the object of the sentence (and illusion) is unreal.
नच - ज्ञानप्रामाण्यस्य मिथ्यात्वे विषयस्यापि मिथ्यात्वं शुक्तिरूप्यज्ञाने दृष्टमिति प्रकृतेऽपि ज्ञानप्रामाण्यमिथ्यात्वे विषयस्यापि मिथ्यात्वं स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue - "The validity of cognition being unreal (false), its object is also unreal, like in the instance of the cognition of shell-silver. Similarly, in our context, the validity of the cognition derived from vedAntic sentences being unreal, its object (Non-duality) also must be unreal."
प्रामाण्यमिथ्यात्वम् हि न विषयमिथ्यात्वे प्रयोजकम् , The unreality of the validity of a cognition does not always imply the unreality of its object.
भ्रमप्रमाबहिर्भूते निर्विकल्पके विषयबाधाभावात्, Non-determinate cognitions, which are admitted to be neither valid nor invalid, do not have a sublatable object.
Non-determinate cognitions are a special class of cognitions in nyAya which do not fall under the purview of valid or invalid knowledge.
किन्तु तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकत्वादिरूपमप्रामाण्यमेव तथा तच्च प्रकृते नास्त्येव | Rather, it is an invalidity which is of the nature of cognising an object as something which it is not, that implies the sublatability of the cognised. However, as that does not apply in the case of vedAntic sentences, one cannot say that their object is sublatable.
नच - अर्थाबाधरूपप्रामाण्यस्य मिथ्यात्वादर्थस्यापि मिथ्यात्वं स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue thus - "If the validity of cognition is of the nature of having an unsublatable object, and if the validity is unreal, the object of the sentence must also be sublatable."
अबाधितार्थविषयत्वं हि यत् प्रामाण्यं तस्य मिथ्यात्वम् प्रकृतेनार्थाबाधात्; If the validity of sentences means the unsublatability of their object, then in our context, even if the validity of vedAntic sentences is sublated, the meaning, Brahman is not.
तद्बाधकप्रमाणासंभवात्, तस्य सर्वबाधावधित्वात्, किन्तु तद्विषयत्वरूपसंबन्धबाधात्तथा |
For, there is no cognition that is capable of sublating the object of those sentences (Brahman ) - because Brahman is that which remains when everything else has been sublated. Rather, it has been said so (that is, the validity of the nature of having an 'unsublatable object' was said to be sublatable) on account of the sublation of the relationship between sentences and their sentence meaning, Brahman.
That is, if validity means having an unsublatable object (abAdhitArtha viShayatva), and if that validity is sublated, it is not the unsublatability of Brahman (abAdhitArthatva) that is sublated, but Brahman's objectification (viShayatva).
तथाचाबाधितार्थविषयत्वरुपप्रामाण्यमिथ्यात्वेऽपि नार्थो मिथ्या | Therefore, even if the validity of cognitions, of the nature of "having an unsublatable object", is unreal, their object need not be unreal.
विशिष्टस्यैकांशमिथ्यात्वेऽप्यपरांशसत्यत्वात्, यथा दण्डबाधनिबन्धनदण्डिपुरुषबाधेऽपि पुरुषो न बाधित एवेति || For, it is possible for one aspect of a qualified object to be real, even if another part is unreal - like in the instance of sublation of the qualified cognition "the man with a stick", because of the sublation of the stick, the man need not be sublated.
इति अद्वैतसिद्धौ प्रत्यक्षोपजीव्यत्वभङ्ग: || This concludes the chapter on the rejection of the primacy of perception, on account of universal dependence.
The next chapter in the Advaita Siddhi is the refutation of the argument that as all means of knowledge are fundamentally dependent on perception, perception is supreme and incontrovertible by any of them.
The nyAyAmritakAra's opening arguments:
ननु - उक्तन्यायै: प्रत्यक्षस्य जात्या प्राबल्याभावेऽपि उपजीव्यत्वेन प्राबल्यम् ;
Even if perception's is not supreme on account of universal characteristics etc, it is stronger than other means of knowledge because they are all dependent on perception.
उपजीव्यत्वं चानुमानागमापेक्षिताशेषार्थग्राहकतया, सा च क्वचित् साक्षात् क्वचित्परंपरया ; The dependence on perception is necessary for every aspect of inference and scripture. That dependence can sometimes be direct, sometimes indirect.
दृष्टं चापेक्षितैकदेशग्राहिणामप्युजीव्यत्वम् तद्विरुद्धग्रहणे तेन बाधश्च ; For it has been observed that where even one aspect of the means of knowledge(e.g inference or scripture) is dependent on any other means, if their results end up contradicting the means upon which they depend, they themselves stand disproved as a whole.
For example:
यथा - घटविभुत्वानुमाने पक्षग्राहिणा अक्ष्णा, नरशिरश्शुचित्वानुमाने साध्यग्राहकेणागमेन, मनोवैभवानुमाने ज्ञानासमवाय्याधारत्वहेतुग्राहकेणानुमानेन, किमु वक्तव्यमपेक्षिताशेषग्राहिणा स्वविरुद्धग्राहकस्य बाध:?
1) घटविभुत्वानुमाने पक्षग्राहिणा अक्ष्णा, In the case of the (flawed) inference "the pot is all-pervading" (e.g. घट: विभु: सत्त्वात् गगनवत् - the pot is all pervading, because it is existent, like space), the paksha of the inference (pot's size) is a matter of perception. The result of the inference where its paksha is dependent on perception, cannot contradict the results of the perception of the paksha itself.
नरशिरश्शुचित्वानुमाने साध्यग्राहकेणागमेन, In the case of the (flawed) inference of the human skull being ritually pure (नरशिरःकपालं शुचि: प्राण्यंगत्वात् शंखवत् - the human skull is pure, because it is like the conch, a body part of a living creature), as the sAdhya of ritual purity can only be derived from scripture, the results of such a dependent inference cannot contradict the statements of scripture.
मनोवैभवानुमाने ज्ञानासमवाय्याधारत्वरूपहेतुग्राहकेणानुमानेन, In the (flawed) inference that the mind is all-pervading (मनः विभु ज्ञानासमावाय्याधारत्वात् आत्मवत् - the mind is all pervading, because it is the locus of contact with the self, and the self is all pervading, so the mind must also be all pervading), the hetu of the inference, "because the mind is a non-inherence based cause for cognition" contradicts the inference upon which it is dependent - that is, the inference that establishes that cognition is born out of the samyoga (contact) between the mind and the self.
To explain, in nyAya an inference is made which establishes that cognition, which inheres in the self (cognition and the self have a samavAya relationship), is born as a result of a non-inherent cause (asamavAyi kAraNa). The non-inherent cause is said to be the samyoga (contact) between the mind and the self. However, this very inference proves that the mind cannot be all-pervading. How? In order for samyoga to occur between two entities, at least one of the entities must be finite. This is because samyoga is a temporary relationship that is born when one entity comes into contact with the other. Two infinite entities cannot temporarily be in contact with each other. Either they are permanently in contact or not at all. The self is admitted to be all-pervading, therefore if the mind must come into contact with the self, the mind cannot be all-pervading.
If someone tried to argue that the mind was all-pervading, because it is like the self, and shares with the self the quality of being the locus of contact which is admitted to be the cause of cognition, then because this inference contradicts the very reason with which the inference is made, it stands refuted.
Using these examples, the nyAyAmritakAra argues - the contradiction of any one element of inference with the means of knowledge upon which that element is dependent, is sufficient to overrule the entire inference. That being so:
किमु वक्तव्यमपेक्षिताशेषग्राहिणा स्वविरुद्धग्राहकस्य बाध:? What can be said of the inference of the world's unreality, where every aspect of the inference is dependent upon perception, and is contradicted by perception?
He takes up scripture for analysis next.
चक्षुरादेश्च शब्दतज्जन्यज्ञानप्रामाण्याद्यग्राहित्वेऽपि तद्ग्राहिश्रोत्रसाक्ष्यादिसजातीयत्वादुपजीव्यत्वम् | While sight cannot reveal that which is known through scripture (i.e the world's unreality which is revealed by scripture, according to the advaitin), as the scripture is revealed via hearing, which belongs to the same species of sense organs as sight, shruti too is dependent on sensory perception, and cannot contradict it.
The advaitin cannot refute the argument that a means of knowledge cannot contradict any member of the species upon which it is dependent because such a species-based dependence is observed elsewhere.
दृष्टं च नरशिर:कपालाशुचित्वबोधकागामस्य तच्छुचित्वानुमानोपजीव्यशुचित्वागमसजातीयत्वेन तदनुमानात् प्राबल्यम्,
The inference of the purity of the human skull, uses the scripture that establishes the conch as pure as the illustration for its inference. There is a contradictory scripture which explicitly says that the human skull is ritually impure. Therefore an inference that depends on one section of scripture for its functioning cannot contradict another section of scripture, because all scripture belongs to the same species.
नचेन्द्रियमपि स्वज्ञानार्थमनुमानमुपजीवतीति सम एवोपजीव्योपजीवकभाव:, अज्ञातकरणतया ज्ञानजननार्थमनुमानानपेक्षणात् , अनुमानागमादिना तु ज्ञानजननार्थमेव तदपेक्षणादिति विशेषात् ;
One cannot say that the sense organs are dependent on inference to determine whether they are functioning well (or not) and therefore perception too is dependent on inference. The advaitin may argue that one checks whether one's eyes are functioning well by testing the results using inference. However, that example is not valid because, in order to reveal something, the sense organ requires neither the prior knowledge of its own existence nor the prior knowledge of its proper functioning. Whereas, inference and scripture require perception even for revealing things.
**** The siddhikAra's response:
- इति चेन्न; उपजीव्याविरोधात् | If this is the argument, no. There is no contradiction with a pramANa upon which it is dependent.
तथाहि - यत्स्वरूपमुपजीव्यते तन्न बाध्यते, बाध्यते च तात्त्विकत्वाकार:, स च न उपजीव्यते; कारणत्वे तस्याप्रवेशात् | That which inference and scripture are dependent upon is not contradicted by them. That which is contradicted by them is the ultimate reality of the world, however they are not dependent on the ultimate reality of the world for their functioning. The reality of the world is not a requirement for its perception.
तदुक्तम् - 'पूर्वसंबन्धनियमे हेतुत्वे तुल्य एव नौ | हेतुतत्त्वबहिर्भूतसत्त्वासत्त्वकथा वृथा ||' इति |
As has been said in the khaNDana khaNDa khAdya by Sri Harsha - 'The presence of the cause prior to the effect is accepted by both of us. However, the reality or unreality of the cause is extrinsic to its ability to cause its effect.'
किंचापेक्षितग्राहित्वमात्रेण चेदुपजीव्यता, तथा च बाधकत्वम्, तदाऽपेक्षितप्रतियोगिग्राहकत्वेन 'इदं रजत' मिति भ्रमस्य बाधोपजीव्यत्वात् कथं 'नेदं रजत' मिति बाधबुद्धिस्तद्विरुद्धोदीयात् ? If you say that the dependence of a thing (A) upon another thing (B), means the prior knowledge of (B), and therefore (B) cannot be contradicted by (A), then as the sublation of the illusion of shell-silver requires the prior cognition of the illusory shell-silver which is the object of sublation, the sublation will be 'dependent' upon the illusion (according to you), and the sublating cognition "this is not silver" can never remove the shell-silver illusion.
अथ निषेध्यार्थसमर्पकतया प्रतियोगिज्ञानत्वेन तस्योपजीव्यत्त्वेऽपि तत्प्रामाण्यं नोपजीव्यम्, Therefore, it must be admitted that even though the sublation requires the prior knowledge of the thing which is sublated, it does not require the validity of the knowledge of the object for its functioning.
नहि प्रतियोगिप्रमात्वेनाभावज्ञानजनकता ; गौरवात्, प्रतियोगिभ्रमादप्यभावज्ञानदर्शनाच्च, किन्तु तज्ज्ञानत्वेनैव; लाघवात्, The knowledge of the absence of an object is not an effect of the reality of that object. Such a requirement is superfluous. Moreover, even where the object is unreal, the (subsequent) cognition of its absence can arise. Rather, it is more parsimonious to say that all that is required for the cognisance of its absence is the prior knowledge of the object.
अतस्तद्विरुद्धविषयकं ज्ञानमुदीयादेवेति ब्रूषे, तुल्यमिदं प्रकृतेऽपि, पक्षज्ञानत्वादिना कारणता, नतु तत्प्रमात्वादिनापीति | Therefore, if you say that the cognition of absence of shell-silver requires its opposite, the prior perception of shell-silver, then that much is true in the current context too. We have no problems in admitting that the absence of the world, as established by inference and scripture, is dependent on the prior perception of the world. The dependence of inference upon perception is limited to revealing its components such as the paksha, hetu, etc, and does not stem from the validity of the perception of those things.
*** The second definition of dependence.
अथ - यत् प्रामाण्यं स्वरूपसिद्ध्यर्थमपवादनिरासार्थे च यत् प्रामाण्यमुपजीवति तत्तस्योपजीव्यम् ; यथा स्मृतेरनुभव:, नच रजतभ्रमस्तथा - इति चेत्,
Therefore, if you say - If the validity of a cognition is dependent on the validity of another cognition for its functioning, or to disprove its invalidity, then it is dependent on such a cognition. Like in the case of memory, it is dependent on the validity of prior experience. However, the negation of the illusory silver is not dependent on the validity of the illusory silver -
तर्हि व्याप्तिधियोऽपि नानुमित्युपजीव्यत्वं स्यात् ; लिङ्गाभासादपि वह्निमति वह्निप्रमादर्शनात् | Then the inference will no longer be dependent on invariable concomitance, because sometimes, even when the indicator is incorrectly perceived, the right conclusion can be inferred. For example, when fog is mistaken for smoke and fire is inferred, that conclusion may be correct, even when there is no fog in reality.
To explain, the opponent redefined dependence as the validity of a cognition being a result of the validity of another cognition. It is admitted that cause of inference is the cognition of invariable concomitance. However, where fire is rightly inferred (its cognition is valid) because of illusory smoke (its cognition is invalid), it must be admitted that under the opponent's definition, the inference of fire is not 'dependent' on invariable concomitance.
*** The third definition of dependence
The opponent says:
ननु - येन विना यस्योत्थानं नास्ति तत्तस्योपजीव्यमित्येव वक्तव्यम् ; The absence of which prevents the rise of the other, is the one upon which the latter is dependent.
तथाच रजतभ्रमस्योपजीव्यत्वमस्त्येव, नतु प्राबल्यम्; नह्युपजीव्यत्वमात्रेण प्राबल्यम् ; किन्तु परीक्षिततया | Thus, the negation of the illusory silver is dependent on the illusion of silver. Supremacy does not stem from dependence alone, but also from the verification of that upon which one is dependent.
परीक्षा च सजातीयविजातीयसंवादविसंवादाभावरूपा | Verification here means that the object which is cognised remains as is and does not change into something else.
नच तौ रजतभ्रमे स्त:; प्रकृते चाक्षस्य परीक्षितत्वेन प्राबल्यम् | These two aspects do not exist for the silver illusion (the silver does not remain as silver, it is proven to be shell later), whereas in our context, the world continues to remain as is (even after the rise of cognition of brahman), thus it is verified and therefore incontrovertible.
अस्ति हि 'सन्घट' इति विशेषदर्शनजन्यज्ञानानान्तरं घटार्थक्रियाप्रत्यक्षे क्लृप्तदूरादिदोषाभावाच्च | In the case of perception of the objects that constitute the world, like the cognition of the pot, etc., one verifies it by seeing the pot performing its function as expected, and disproves its invalidity by the absence of mitigating factors such as distance, which could have led to its misperception.
एवमेव जीवेशाभेदश्रुतौ निषेध्यार्पकभेदश्रुति: साक्षिप्रत्यक्षं चादोषत्वात् परीक्षितमिति तदपि न बाध्यम् |
Similarly, as the scriptural portions that speak of difference between the individual and God and the perception of the inner witness (sAkshi) are defect free, they are thus verified, and cannot be overruled by scriptural portions that speak of the unity of the individual and God.
The opponent adds a further requirement to the verification process - proving the absence of defects.
एवमेव च दोषाभावादिज्ञानरूपपरीक्षायामपि अनाश्वासे वेदे पौरुषेयत्वाभावज्ञाने त्वदुक्तानुमाने च योग्यानुपलब्ध्यादिना हेत्वाभासादिराहित्यज्ञाने ब्रह्ममीमांसायां प्रत्यधिकरणं सिद्धान्त्यभिप्रेत्यार्थे उपक्रमाद्यानुगुण्यज्ञाने चानाश्वास: स्यादिति प्रमाणतदाभासव्यवस्था न स्यात् ;
However, if one does not accept that verification includes the cognition of the absence of defects, one would end up disbelieving the following:
1) the absence of human agency in the creation of vedas,
2) the absence of defects such as imperceptibility in your inference (of the world's unreality),
3) the use of rules of textual interpretation such as the subject matter of the introductory portion of texts (upakramA), etc. by the advaitin in determining the import of scripture.
Therefore, there would be no basis to determine if a cognition is valid or not.
The siddhikAra responds:
- इति चेन्न; If this is your argument, then no.
परीक्षा हि प्रवृत्ति संवादविसंवादाभावदोषाभावादिरूपा , तया च स्वसमानदेशकालीनविषयाबाध्यत्वं प्रामाण्यस्य व्यवस्थाप्यते धूमेन स्वसमानदेशकालीनवह्निरेव |
Verification is testing if the cognition of the object leads to fruitful action, whether it changes into anything else and if it is free from defects. By such a verification, all that is proven is a validity which is of the nature of the absence of negation of an object at the same time and place as its cognition, like the co-presence of fire in the same time and location as smoke.
तथाच व्यवहारदशामात्राबाध्यत्वम् देहात्मैक्यसाधारणं परीक्षितप्रमाणे व्यवस्थितमिति
Therefore, such a validity is at the same level as the notion of the body as the self (which has been accepted as ultimately erroneous by the opponent himself), that is, the absence of negation is only in a transactional sense.
कथमत्यन्ताबाध्यत्वाभावग्राहकागमानुमानयो: प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् ? Therefore, why would inference and scripture, which stipulate the absence of absolute unsbulatability in the world, not be fruitful?
तस्माद्विश्वासप्रमाणतदाभासव्यवस्था जिवेशभेदादिकं च व्यावहारिकमित्युपपन्नमेव सर्वे जगन्मिथ्येति || The validity and invalidity of a cognition being thus accounted for, the difference cognised between the individual and God etc., is proven to be only transactional and the entire world's unreality stands proven.
The opponent asks:
ननु - प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्ये तत्सिद्धस्य व्याप्त्यादेर्बाधेनानुमेयादेरनुमित्यादिप्रामाण्यस्य च बाध:, अनुमेयादेर्व्याप्त्यादिना अनुमितिप्रामाण्यादिना च समानयोगक्षेमत्वात्,
If perception is invalid, the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is dependent on perception is invalidated. Thereby, the inferred object and the inferential cognition are also negated. The inferred object, the invariable concomitance and the validity of inferential cognition must all have the same level of reality as a rule.
If it is not accepted that they have the same level of reality,
अन्यथा प्रातिभासिकव्याप्त्यादिमता बाष्प्याध्यस्तधूमेन तात्त्विको व्यावहारिको वाग्निः The apparent smoke superimposed on fog, in conjunction with an apparent invariable concomitance will end up implying an absolutely real fire, or a transactionally real fire
व्यावहारिकव्याप्त्यादिमता धूमेन तात्त्विकोऽग्निः or, a transactionally real invariable concomitance and smoke will end up implying an absolutely real fire
व्यावहारिकेणाबाधेन विरुद्धधर्माधिकरणत्वेन च विश्वस्य जीवेशभेदस्य च तात्त्विकं सत्त्वं सिद्ध्येत् And similarly, because it is transactionally unsublated and because it would end up having contradictory attributes, the world and the difference between the individual and God would end up absolutely real.
The siddhikAra replies:
- इति चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
एतावता हि व्याप्त्यादिसमानसत्ताकमनुमेयं सिद्ध्यत्वित्यापत्ते: फलितार्थ:, स चास्माकमिष्टं एव ; नहि ब्रह्मभिन्नं क्वचिदत्यन्ताबाध्यमस्ति | By your argument, all that is proven is that the invariable concomitance and inferential cognition have the same level of reality as the inferred object. That is desirable for us, because we hold that nothing apart from Brahman is ultimately unsublatable. Therefore, if your rule was correct, the inferred object, the inference and the concomitance would all be only transactionally real. According to advaita, the inference of unreality - even unreality itself - is unreal.
नचायमनुमेयादेर्व्याप्त्यादिना समसत्ताकत्वनियमोऽप्यस्ति; However, your rule that "the inferred object, etc. must necessarily have the same level of reality", is not true.
व्यभिचारिणापि लिङ्गेन साध्यवति पक्षे अनुमितिप्रमादर्शनात्, Because (as we have already said), even if the hetu is incorrect, it can lead to an inference where the sAdhya is present in the paksha.
The siddhikAra gives two examples:
ध्वनिधर्मह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वादिविशिष्टत्वेन मिथ्याभूतैरपि नित्यैर्विभुभिर्वर्णै: सत्या शाब्दप्रतीति: क्रियत इति मीमाम्सकैरभ्युपगमात्,
Even though, according to pUrva mImAmsa, the eternal and all pervading phonemes (varNas), are unreal when associated with sound (dhvani) attributes such as short, elongated etc, they are able to reveal a real meaning.
In pUrva mImAmsa, the word नगः and नागः may have the same real phonemes (na and ga), which are unreal when associated with different sounds, they reveal valid but different meanings.
The previous case was an illustration of where the indicator was unreal, but the indicated object was real. Now the situation where the indicator is real, but the indicated object is unreal will be illustrated.
This example is from nyAya. According to nyAya, earth (clay) has the attribute of smell. The pot, which is a creation of the clay, also must have the attribute of smell. The naiyyAyika however holds that in the first instant after its creation from clay, the attribute of smell is not present in the pot - the pot generates the attribute within itself from the second instant of its creation. Thus, in the first instant, the prior absence of smell is present in the pot.
गन्धप्रागभावावच्छिन्ने घटे तात्त्विकव्याप्त्यादिमतापि पृथिवीत्वेनातात्त्विकगन्धानुमितिर्दर्शनात्, In the instant where the pot contains the prior absence of smell, there may be a valid concomitance (where there is earth, there is smell), but when the pot is seen as earth, the result of the concomitance (smell) is not present.
प्रतिबिम्बेन च बिम्बानुमितिर्दर्शनात् | Similarly, one is able to infer the presence of the real object from its unreal reflection.
नच - तत्रापि बिम्बरहितावृत्तिरुपा व्याप्तिस्तात्त्विक्येवेति - वाच्यम् ; The opponent may argue - 'In that case, the invariable concomitance of the form "where the original is absent, the reflection is absent" is real. So it is a real invariable concomitance that proves the real inferred object.' - but that is not correct, because:
एवं सत्यवृत्तिगगनादेरपि व्याप्यतापत्ते: | That cannot be a real concomitance, because if it were real, space, which is not located anywhere, would end up present everywhere (the invariable concomitance of the opponent is similar to the argument that if no location in the world exists, space does not exist too).
नच - तत्र बिम्बपूर्वकत्वमेवानुमीयते, बिम्बव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तव्यतिरेकप्रतियोगित्वरूपेणाप्रातिभासिकेन हेतुनेति,
Do not argue thus: There (in the example), the object that is inferred is the precedence of the reflection by the original, which is real. The means of proving this is real too (not prAtibhAsika) - because the reflection happens to be the counter-positive of the absence occurring as a result of the absence of the original. Thus, a real means proves a real result.
This is incorrect, because:
प्रयुक्तत्वं हि न तज्जन्यजन्यत्वादिरूपम् ; व्यतिरेकयो: परस्परं तदभावात्, In the hetu cited, the words "occurring as a result of" cannot mean "that which causes" or "is caused by"; because no causality is possible between two absences.
किन्तु व्याप्यव्यापकभाव:, तथाच बिम्बव्यतिरेकव्यापकव्यतिरेकप्रतियोगित्वं हेतु:, स चाकाशादौ व्यभिचार्येव | Therefore, what it ought to mean is that one is invariably concomitant with the other. Therefore, the hetu in your inference should be - "because the reflection is the counter-positive of the absence which is invariably concomitant with the absence of the original" - which is the same concomitance which failed due to vyabhichAra in the case of space, etc.
vyabhichAra occurs where the hetu is present, but the sAdhya is absent. Space is absent when all loci are absent (hetu is present), but space is not preceded by its locus (sAdhya is absent).
तस्मात्तत्र प्रतिबिम्बेनैव बिम्बानुमानम्, Therefore, it must be admitted that the existence of the original object is inferred by the reflection alone.
अनुमेयस्य लिङ्गव्याप्त्यादिसमानसत्ताकत्वनियमस्यापास्तत्वात् | Therefore, the rule that "the inferred object has to have the same level of reality as the reason, invariable concomitance etc," has been disproved.
Inference and scripture were said to be dependent on perception. Until now, we have dealt with inference. The siddhikAra takes up scripture next.
एतेन - शब्देऽपि योग्यतासमानसत्ताकेन शब्दार्थेन भवितव्यम्, योग्यतावाक्यार्थयो: समानसत्ताकत्वनियमादिति कथं वेदान्तवाक्यार्थो योग्यताबाधेऽप्यबाधित: स्यादिति - परास्तम् ;
By this the following statement stands refuted - "In the case of verbal cognition too, the compatibility of words (yogyatA) must be of the same order of reality as the word meaning (the objects they denote), because verbal compatibility and sentence meaning must go hand-in-hand. Therefore, if the verbal compatibility in vedAntic sentences is denied validity, how can their sentence meaning be ultimately real?"
It stands refuted because:
वेदान्तवाक्ये अखण्डार्थरूपवाक्यार्थाबाधरूपाया योग्यताया अप्यबाधाच्च | In the case of vedAntic sentences, verbal compatibility, which is of the nature of the impartite, unsublatable sentence meaning, is itself unsublated.
Impartite sentences, are a separate class of sentences in advaita vedAnta, which lead to the rise of valid knowledge which consist of nothing other than the direct or indirect meaning recalled by non-synonymous words taken as one whole. The verba compatibility in such sentences is non-different from sentence meaning, which in the case of vedAntic sentences, is the unsublatable Brahman.
नच - तथापि वेदान्ततज्ज्ञानप्रामाण्यमिथ्यात्वे कथं तात्त्विकाद्वैतसिद्धिरीति वाच्यम्;
Do not argue thus - "Even then, as the validity of vedAnta, and the cognition it gives rise to, is unreal, how can they lead one to an ultimately real Non-Duality?"
शब्दतज्ज्ञान तात्त्विकत्वं हि न विषयतात्त्विकत्वे तन्त्रम्, Because the reality of words, or the cognition they produce, does not confer reality to the meaning they denote / their object, and vice versa.
इदं रजतमित्यनाप्तवाक्यस्य तज्जन्यभ्रमस्य च त्वन्मते तात्त्विकत्वेऽपि तद्विषयस्यतात्त्विकत्वात् | For, according to you, the sentence "this is silver" uttered by an untrustworthy individual and the cognition of illusion are both real, but the object of the sentence (and illusion) is unreal.
नच - ज्ञानप्रामाण्यस्य मिथ्यात्वे विषयस्यापि मिथ्यात्वं शुक्तिरूप्यज्ञाने दृष्टमिति प्रकृतेऽपि ज्ञानप्रामाण्यमिथ्यात्वे विषयस्यापि मिथ्यात्वं स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue - "The validity of cognition being unreal (false), its object is also unreal, like in the instance of the cognition of shell-silver. Similarly, in our context, the validity of the cognition derived from vedAntic sentences being unreal, its object (Non-duality) also must be unreal."
प्रामाण्यमिथ्यात्वम् हि न विषयमिथ्यात्वे प्रयोजकम् , The unreality of the validity of a cognition does not always imply the unreality of its object.
भ्रमप्रमाबहिर्भूते निर्विकल्पके विषयबाधाभावात्, Non-determinate cognitions, which are admitted to be neither valid nor invalid, do not have a sublatable object.
Non-determinate cognitions are a special class of cognitions in nyAya which do not fall under the purview of valid or invalid knowledge.
किन्तु तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकत्वादिरूपमप्रामाण्यमेव तथा तच्च प्रकृते नास्त्येव | Rather, it is an invalidity which is of the nature of cognising an object as something which it is not, that implies the sublatability of the cognised. However, as that does not apply in the case of vedAntic sentences, one cannot say that their object is sublatable.
नच - अर्थाबाधरूपप्रामाण्यस्य मिथ्यात्वादर्थस्यापि मिथ्यात्वं स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue thus - "If the validity of cognition is of the nature of having an unsublatable object, and if the validity is unreal, the object of the sentence must also be sublatable."
अबाधितार्थविषयत्वं हि यत् प्रामाण्यं तस्य मिथ्यात्वम् प्रकृतेनार्थाबाधात्; If the validity of sentences means the unsublatability of their object, then in our context, even if the validity of vedAntic sentences is sublated, the meaning, Brahman is not.
तद्बाधकप्रमाणासंभवात्, तस्य सर्वबाधावधित्वात्, किन्तु तद्विषयत्वरूपसंबन्धबाधात्तथा |
For, there is no cognition that is capable of sublating the object of those sentences (Brahman ) - because Brahman is that which remains when everything else has been sublated. Rather, it has been said so (that is, the validity of the nature of having an 'unsublatable object' was said to be sublatable) on account of the sublation of the relationship between sentences and their sentence meaning, Brahman.
That is, if validity means having an unsublatable object (abAdhitArtha viShayatva), and if that validity is sublated, it is not the unsublatability of Brahman (abAdhitArthatva) that is sublated, but Brahman's objectification (viShayatva).
तथाचाबाधितार्थविषयत्वरुपप्रामाण्यमिथ्यात्वेऽपि नार्थो मिथ्या | Therefore, even if the validity of cognitions, of the nature of "having an unsublatable object", is unreal, their object need not be unreal.
विशिष्टस्यैकांशमिथ्यात्वेऽप्यपरांशसत्यत्वात्, यथा दण्डबाधनिबन्धनदण्डिपुरुषबाधेऽपि पुरुषो न बाधित एवेति || For, it is possible for one aspect of a qualified object to be real, even if another part is unreal - like in the instance of sublation of the qualified cognition "the man with a stick", because of the sublation of the stick, the man need not be sublated.
इति अद्वैतसिद्धौ प्रत्यक्षोपजीव्यत्वभङ्ग: || This concludes the chapter on the rejection of the primacy of perception, on account of universal dependence.