paricCheda 1 - sann ghaTa iti pratyakshe adhiShThAnAnuvedha:
The next chapter in the advaita siddhi is to establish that when objects in the world are perceived, the existence that each object appears to have, does not in reality belong to the object, but to the substratum, Brahman.
The siddhikAra starts off the chapter with this proposition:
'किन्चेदं रूप्यं' इत्यत्र इदमितिवत् 'सन् घट' इत्यत्रापि सदित्यधिष्ठानभूतं ब्रह्मैव भासते | When the shell silver is observed - "This is shell silver", it is Brahman, the substratum, that appears as existence in the aspect "This is".
नच - चाक्षुषादिज्ञाने रूपदिहीनस्य ब्रह्मण: कथं स्फुरणमिति - वाच्यम् ;
The opponent may ask - "How can Brahman, which is without form, appear?", but that is incorrect because:
रूपादिहीनस्यापि कालादिन्यायेन स्फुरणस्य प्रागेवोपपादितत्वात् | It has already been established that it is possible for formless entities, like time, to be perceived.
When a pot is seen, its temporal existence, (ie, "it is seen now") is also included within the range of perception. If time can be seen, then Brahman, as existence, which is the substratum for all objects, can be seen too.
नन्वेवं - 'नीलो घट: मिथ्या रूप्यमसन्नृशृङ्ग'मित्यादावपि 'नील' इत्यादिरधिष्ठानानुवेध इति स्यात्,
The opponent argues - If that is the case, in each of the following cognitions: "The pot is black", "The silver is unreal", "The hare's horn is non-existent", 'black', 'unreal' and 'non-existent' can also be said to be the substrata, and thus Brahman.
If being observed in every perception of an object makes it a substratum, then blackness, unreality or non-existence should also be Brahman.
नच - नैल्यं घटादिष्वस्ति, सत्त्वं तु नेति - वाच्यम् ; The advaitin may argue that while blackness exists in the pot, existence does not - however this would be an incorrect argument, because:
अस्यारोपितत्वसिद्ध्युत्तरकालीनत्वेनान्योन्याश्रयात्; because proving that (that existence does not belong to the pot) can happen only after it is proved that the pot is unreal, and therefore this suffers from the flaw of mutual dependence.
Existence can be said to not belong to the pot only if the pot is first proved to be unreal. However, this argument is being made in the context of trying to prove that the pot is unreal.
अन्यथा 'सत्यं ज्ञान' मित्यत्रापि सत्यमित्यधिष्ठानानुवेध एव स्यात् Otherwise, in (the definition of Brahman given in the taittirIya upaniShad as) "Existence, Consciousness, Bliss", it can be argued that Existence belongs to the substratum, onto which Brahman is superimposed.
These were the opponent's arguments against the idea of existence of objects really being Brahman, the substratum.
The siddhikAra now responds: - इति चेन्न; If this is your argument, no.
सन्नित्यस्य 'घट' इत्यनेन सामानिधिकरणस्य बाधित्वात् | Because there is a contradiction if existence were to be located in the pot.
तथाहि - सत्ताजातिस्फुरणनिबन्धनं वा स्वरुपसत्त्वनिबन्धनं वा कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वनिबन्धनं वा सामानिधिकरण्यं स्यात् | That (existence belonging to the pot) would only be possible if 1) existence was a jAti, a universal class, to which the pot belonged 2) existence was the nature of the pot, or 3) if the pot could not be sublated in any of the three periods of time.
नचाभावादिसाधारणसत्प्रतीतौ सत्ताजातिस्फुरणं संभवति; अभावादिषु त्वयापि तदनङ्गीकारात् | It cannot be the first, because in the perception of absence, when absence is seen to exist, it cannot be argued that it is existence as a class that is seen in absence. You too agree that absence cannot belong to a class of existent entities.
नच क्वचित्साक्षात्संबन्धेन क्वचित् परस्परासंबन्धेन सदिति प्रतीत्युपपत्ति:, One cannot say that some objects belong to the class of the existent directly (for example in existent objects such as pots), whereas in some other instances (like absence), they belong to the class of the existent indirectly (through the medium of the counterpositive of the absence, for instance).
विजातीयसम्बन्धेन समानाकारप्रतीत्यनुपपत्ते:, अन्यथा संबन्धभेद एव न सिद्ध्येत् | One cannot hold that two distinct (the existing pot and its absence) have a like appearance, otherwise, the cognition of difference itself would not be possible.
नच स्वरूपसत्त्वेनाभावादौ तत्प्रतीति:, अननुगमात्, It cannot be said that in the case of absence, the relationship with existence is inherent (whereas in the case of existent entities, the relationship of class and particulars), because that would be an inconsistent postulation.
अननुगतेनापि अनुगतप्रतीतौ जातिमात्रोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् | Even if that inconsistency was ignored for the sake of the argument, we have to remember that the reason why existence as a class was introduced in the first place was to explain how many objects appear to exist. If it is now said that completely different entities, such as an object and its absence, can have a common relationship with existence, there is no reason to postulate that existence is a class. If everything exists, then there is no need to postulate existence as a class to which everything belongs.
अतएव न सर्वत्रापि सर्वरूपसत्त्वेनैव सद्व्यवहार:, एकेनैव सर्वानुगतेन सर्वत्र सत्प्रतीत्युपपत्तौ बहुनां तद्धेतुत्वकल्पने मानाभावात् | Therefore (if existence is seen in every perception of objects), it cannot be said that the experience everywhere is an unique one inherent to that object. When every perception of existence is of the same existence, there is no basis to claim that the existence seen in every object is inherently different.
नापि कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वनिबन्धनं तत् ; तस्य चक्षुराद्यगम्यत्वस्योक्तत्वात्, 'सदिदं रजत' मित्यादिभ्रमे अभावाच्च | Nor is the existence of something, the absence of its sublation in all three periods of time, because the perceptibility of such an existence has already been disproven; moreover, in the illusion "This is silver", such an existence does not exist.
तस्मादेकं सर्वाधिष्ठानमेव सदिति सर्वत्रानुभूयत इति युक्तम्, Therefore, it is appropriate to say that it is the one existence that is the substratum of everything and is experienced everywhere.
The opponent had argued that blackness, unreality and non-existence can also be Brahman. That is being disproven next.
नीलादेस्तु घटादिसामानाधिकरण्ये किमपि नास्ति बाधकम्, (While there is a contradiction if existence belonged to pots,) there is no contradiction if blackness etc, belonged to pots, etc.
न वा नीलादेरधिष्ठानत्वम् संभवति; प्रागसत्त्वात् Nor can blackness be said to be their substratum, for in the absence of the pot, there is no blackness either. Moreover, the pot may not be black in the past, it may be black now. Therefore, one cannot say that pot is superimposed on blackness.
नीलपीतादिप्रातिस्विकानन्ताधिष्ठानकल्पने गौरवात्, Further, to grant the status of substratum to different colours like black, yellow is a needless addition of assumptions that makes the proposition unwieldy.
अधिष्ठेयतुल्ययोगक्षेमत्वाच्च | अधिष्ठेयविषमसत्ताकमेव ह्यधिष्ठानं भवति; Moreover, they (colours) have the same order of reality as the objects (pots, etc.) they inhere in, and thus cannot be the substratum which necessarily has a different (higher) order of reality than the superimposed.
'मिथ्या रूप्यमसन्नृशृङ्ग' मित्यादौ मिथ्यात्वासत्त्वयोरधिष्ठानत्वशङ्कापि नास्तीति शून्यवादापत्ते: | Therefore, there cannot even be a trace of a doubt that unreality or non-existence can be the substratum, because that would lead to nihilism.
तत्र चानुपपत्तिरुक्ता; वक्ष्यते च | The impossibility of that (nihilism) has been said, and will be explained further later.
यत्तु - 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्त' मित्यत्रापि तथा स्यात् - इति | तन्न; यतो न तत्र सत्तासम्बन्धेन सत्त्वम् किन्तु स्वरूपेणैवेत्युक्तदोषानवकाशात् | It was said that the existence in vedic sentences such as "Existence, Consciosuness, Bliss" etc also can be a substratum for Brahman. That is not possible, because the existence there (in Brahman) is not a relativistic one, but an inherent one. Thus, to claim that Brahman is superimposed (a relation) on existence is not possible at all.
नचैवं घटादावपि स्वरूपेणैव तथात्वम् ; पूर्वमेव निराकृतत्वात्, One cannot argue thereby that the existence of pots, etc., is also inherent , as that has been disproved already.
इति सन्घट इति प्रत्यक्षेऽधिष्ठानानुवेधनिरूपणम् | Therefore, it is the existence-substratum that appears in the perception "The pot exists".
The siddhikAra starts off the chapter with this proposition:
'किन्चेदं रूप्यं' इत्यत्र इदमितिवत् 'सन् घट' इत्यत्रापि सदित्यधिष्ठानभूतं ब्रह्मैव भासते | When the shell silver is observed - "This is shell silver", it is Brahman, the substratum, that appears as existence in the aspect "This is".
नच - चाक्षुषादिज्ञाने रूपदिहीनस्य ब्रह्मण: कथं स्फुरणमिति - वाच्यम् ;
The opponent may ask - "How can Brahman, which is without form, appear?", but that is incorrect because:
रूपादिहीनस्यापि कालादिन्यायेन स्फुरणस्य प्रागेवोपपादितत्वात् | It has already been established that it is possible for formless entities, like time, to be perceived.
When a pot is seen, its temporal existence, (ie, "it is seen now") is also included within the range of perception. If time can be seen, then Brahman, as existence, which is the substratum for all objects, can be seen too.
नन्वेवं - 'नीलो घट: मिथ्या रूप्यमसन्नृशृङ्ग'मित्यादावपि 'नील' इत्यादिरधिष्ठानानुवेध इति स्यात्,
The opponent argues - If that is the case, in each of the following cognitions: "The pot is black", "The silver is unreal", "The hare's horn is non-existent", 'black', 'unreal' and 'non-existent' can also be said to be the substrata, and thus Brahman.
If being observed in every perception of an object makes it a substratum, then blackness, unreality or non-existence should also be Brahman.
नच - नैल्यं घटादिष्वस्ति, सत्त्वं तु नेति - वाच्यम् ; The advaitin may argue that while blackness exists in the pot, existence does not - however this would be an incorrect argument, because:
अस्यारोपितत्वसिद्ध्युत्तरकालीनत्वेनान्योन्याश्रयात्; because proving that (that existence does not belong to the pot) can happen only after it is proved that the pot is unreal, and therefore this suffers from the flaw of mutual dependence.
Existence can be said to not belong to the pot only if the pot is first proved to be unreal. However, this argument is being made in the context of trying to prove that the pot is unreal.
अन्यथा 'सत्यं ज्ञान' मित्यत्रापि सत्यमित्यधिष्ठानानुवेध एव स्यात् Otherwise, in (the definition of Brahman given in the taittirIya upaniShad as) "Existence, Consciousness, Bliss", it can be argued that Existence belongs to the substratum, onto which Brahman is superimposed.
These were the opponent's arguments against the idea of existence of objects really being Brahman, the substratum.
The siddhikAra now responds: - इति चेन्न; If this is your argument, no.
सन्नित्यस्य 'घट' इत्यनेन सामानिधिकरणस्य बाधित्वात् | Because there is a contradiction if existence were to be located in the pot.
तथाहि - सत्ताजातिस्फुरणनिबन्धनं वा स्वरुपसत्त्वनिबन्धनं वा कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वनिबन्धनं वा सामानिधिकरण्यं स्यात् | That (existence belonging to the pot) would only be possible if 1) existence was a jAti, a universal class, to which the pot belonged 2) existence was the nature of the pot, or 3) if the pot could not be sublated in any of the three periods of time.
नचाभावादिसाधारणसत्प्रतीतौ सत्ताजातिस्फुरणं संभवति; अभावादिषु त्वयापि तदनङ्गीकारात् | It cannot be the first, because in the perception of absence, when absence is seen to exist, it cannot be argued that it is existence as a class that is seen in absence. You too agree that absence cannot belong to a class of existent entities.
नच क्वचित्साक्षात्संबन्धेन क्वचित् परस्परासंबन्धेन सदिति प्रतीत्युपपत्ति:, One cannot say that some objects belong to the class of the existent directly (for example in existent objects such as pots), whereas in some other instances (like absence), they belong to the class of the existent indirectly (through the medium of the counterpositive of the absence, for instance).
विजातीयसम्बन्धेन समानाकारप्रतीत्यनुपपत्ते:, अन्यथा संबन्धभेद एव न सिद्ध्येत् | One cannot hold that two distinct (the existing pot and its absence) have a like appearance, otherwise, the cognition of difference itself would not be possible.
नच स्वरूपसत्त्वेनाभावादौ तत्प्रतीति:, अननुगमात्, It cannot be said that in the case of absence, the relationship with existence is inherent (whereas in the case of existent entities, the relationship of class and particulars), because that would be an inconsistent postulation.
अननुगतेनापि अनुगतप्रतीतौ जातिमात्रोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् | Even if that inconsistency was ignored for the sake of the argument, we have to remember that the reason why existence as a class was introduced in the first place was to explain how many objects appear to exist. If it is now said that completely different entities, such as an object and its absence, can have a common relationship with existence, there is no reason to postulate that existence is a class. If everything exists, then there is no need to postulate existence as a class to which everything belongs.
अतएव न सर्वत्रापि सर्वरूपसत्त्वेनैव सद्व्यवहार:, एकेनैव सर्वानुगतेन सर्वत्र सत्प्रतीत्युपपत्तौ बहुनां तद्धेतुत्वकल्पने मानाभावात् | Therefore (if existence is seen in every perception of objects), it cannot be said that the experience everywhere is an unique one inherent to that object. When every perception of existence is of the same existence, there is no basis to claim that the existence seen in every object is inherently different.
नापि कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वनिबन्धनं तत् ; तस्य चक्षुराद्यगम्यत्वस्योक्तत्वात्, 'सदिदं रजत' मित्यादिभ्रमे अभावाच्च | Nor is the existence of something, the absence of its sublation in all three periods of time, because the perceptibility of such an existence has already been disproven; moreover, in the illusion "This is silver", such an existence does not exist.
तस्मादेकं सर्वाधिष्ठानमेव सदिति सर्वत्रानुभूयत इति युक्तम्, Therefore, it is appropriate to say that it is the one existence that is the substratum of everything and is experienced everywhere.
The opponent had argued that blackness, unreality and non-existence can also be Brahman. That is being disproven next.
नीलादेस्तु घटादिसामानाधिकरण्ये किमपि नास्ति बाधकम्, (While there is a contradiction if existence belonged to pots,) there is no contradiction if blackness etc, belonged to pots, etc.
न वा नीलादेरधिष्ठानत्वम् संभवति; प्रागसत्त्वात् Nor can blackness be said to be their substratum, for in the absence of the pot, there is no blackness either. Moreover, the pot may not be black in the past, it may be black now. Therefore, one cannot say that pot is superimposed on blackness.
नीलपीतादिप्रातिस्विकानन्ताधिष्ठानकल्पने गौरवात्, Further, to grant the status of substratum to different colours like black, yellow is a needless addition of assumptions that makes the proposition unwieldy.
अधिष्ठेयतुल्ययोगक्षेमत्वाच्च | अधिष्ठेयविषमसत्ताकमेव ह्यधिष्ठानं भवति; Moreover, they (colours) have the same order of reality as the objects (pots, etc.) they inhere in, and thus cannot be the substratum which necessarily has a different (higher) order of reality than the superimposed.
'मिथ्या रूप्यमसन्नृशृङ्ग' मित्यादौ मिथ्यात्वासत्त्वयोरधिष्ठानत्वशङ्कापि नास्तीति शून्यवादापत्ते: | Therefore, there cannot even be a trace of a doubt that unreality or non-existence can be the substratum, because that would lead to nihilism.
तत्र चानुपपत्तिरुक्ता; वक्ष्यते च | The impossibility of that (nihilism) has been said, and will be explained further later.
यत्तु - 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्त' मित्यत्रापि तथा स्यात् - इति | तन्न; यतो न तत्र सत्तासम्बन्धेन सत्त्वम् किन्तु स्वरूपेणैवेत्युक्तदोषानवकाशात् | It was said that the existence in vedic sentences such as "Existence, Consciosuness, Bliss" etc also can be a substratum for Brahman. That is not possible, because the existence there (in Brahman) is not a relativistic one, but an inherent one. Thus, to claim that Brahman is superimposed (a relation) on existence is not possible at all.
नचैवं घटादावपि स्वरूपेणैव तथात्वम् ; पूर्वमेव निराकृतत्वात्, One cannot argue thereby that the existence of pots, etc., is also inherent , as that has been disproved already.
इति सन्घट इति प्रत्यक्षेऽधिष्ठानानुवेधनिरूपणम् | Therefore, it is the existence-substratum that appears in the perception "The pot exists".
Originally posted on 24th October 2018.