paricCheda 1 - sAkshi bAdhoddhAra:
Having dismissed the possibility of a contradiction of the inference of the world's unreality by two forms of perception (sensory perception, and extrasensory perception) in the previous chapter, the siddhikAra moves to the next argument raised by the nyAyAmritakAra in this chapter - that such an inference is contradicted by sAkshi pratyaksha, perception by the inner witness.
According to the dvaitin, sAkshi pratyaksha is the highest instrument available for valid knowledge. It is the purest form of sense organ, the witnessing consciousness, and the knowledge perceived by the sAkshi is incontrovertible.
With this background, the nyAyAmritakAra asks:
ननु - प्रत्यक्षस्य वर्तमानमात्रग्राहित्वे शुक्तिरूप्यादेः प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वरूपं मिथ्यात्वं कथं प्रत्यक्षं स्यात्? As perception can only perceive the present, how can it be claimed that the shell-silver etc. has an unreality of the nature of the absolute absence in all three periods of time in the locus of their appearance?
Therefore if it is said that the perception of unreality means that the perception of absence in all three periods of time is possible, it cannot be by ordinary perception, but by the witness, the sAkshi. Thus one must admit that the sAkshi perceives a future absence of the mithyA object.
अथ तत्र रजतत्वविरोधिशुक्तित्वे साक्षात्कृते तदन्यथानुपपत्त्या च रजतत्वाभावे निश्चिते मिथ्यैव रजतमभादिति तादृङ्निषेधप्रत्यय: स्वसंबन्धसर्वाभासकेन सक्षिणैवोपपन्न:, - Therefore, when the shell-ness, which happens to be mutually exclusive with silver-ness, is perceived, then as no other conclusion is possible (ie one can infer thus), one becomes certain of the absence of silver-ness. As a result, one comes to know that it was an unreal silver that appeared previously. Such a cognition of absence (in all three periods of time), is only possible for the sAkshi, which reveals everything that appears in front of it.
Therefore, as we have established that the sAkshi can see the future absence of an unreal object,
तर्हि साक्षात् स्वविषयस्य गगनादेर्भाविकालनिषेधाप्रतियोगित्वं सकलकालग्राहिणा साक्षिणा गृह्यतां - let us admit that space, which is directly witnessed by the sAkshi now, is also not sublated in the future. The sAkshi in revealing something as existing today, should also be capable of revealing the existence of that thing in all periods of time.
In the case of the perception of unreality by the sAkshi, that was through the medium of the inferential cognition (or arthApatti vritti, the cognition of circumstantial inference). If the sAkshi, through indirect perception, can deliver a verdict of the absence of silver in all three periods of time, why cannot the sAkshi, by directly perceiving the existence of space in the present, prove the existence of space in all three periods of time?
Extending this, if space is perceived by the sAkshi to exist in all three periods of time, the inference of its absence is contradicted by sAkshi pratyaksha, the inner witness' perception.
The siddhikAra responds to this line of argument:
इति - चेन्न; If this is your argument, no.
When unreality is defined as the absence in all three periods of time, there is no requirement that such an absence is perceived in all three periods of time for the cognition of unreality. Rather, all that is required is that the silver is absolutely absent - it has atyantAbhAva.
साक्षिणो विद्यमानसर्वावभासकत्वेनाविद्यमानभाविबाधाभावभासकत्वानुपपत्ते: Holding that the sAkshi reveals everything perceptible in its presence does not imply that the sAkshi can overrule a future sublation of the object.
The vivaraNakAra's intent is not to say that the absence of an objects in all three periods of time is perceptible. All he wishes to say is that the absence in the present is perceptible - however that absence happens to be an absence in all three periods of time.
ज्ञानस्य भ्रमप्रमासाधरणत्वेन प्रमाणाबाधकत्वाच्च | sAkshi will reveal both valid knowledge and invalid knowledge, and there is no way that such a perception by the sAkshi can overrule an inferential cognition.
The pUrvapakshi says:
ननु - ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं गृह्णन् साक्षी घटादिगतमबाध्यत्वम् गृह्णात्येव, नहि विषयाबाधमनन्तर्भाव्य प्रामाण्यग्रहणं नाम इति - चेन्न; If the sAkshi gathers that a knowledge, say the knowledge of a pot, is valid (it has prAmANya), then it must follow that the sAkshi gathers the unsublatability of the pot too. Knowing the validity of a cognition is nothing but knowing the unsublatability of the object of the cognition.
The siddhikAra replies,
व्यवहारकालाबाध्यत्वमात्रेण प्रवृत्तौ अविसंवादोपपत्ते:, तद्रूपगतप्रामाण्यस्य साक्षिणा ग्रहणेऽपि विरोधाभावात् | True, but as it is possible to transact with an object whose unsublatability is empirical, if the sAkshi were to gather a notion of validity limited to such an extent, it would be no contradiction to the inference of the world's unreality.
The siddhikAra is saying that for any object to have utility, it is sufficient if that object is unsublated transactionally. There is no requirement that the object is unsublatable in all periods of time for it to have utility. If the sAkshi reveals that the cognition of the object is valid empirical, such a knowledge would not be contradictory to the unreality of the object. For unreality is not incongruous with empirical unsublatability.
नहि घटादिज्ञानस्यसंवादिप्रवृत्तिजनकतावच्छेदकं प्रामाण्यं त्रिकालाबाध्यविषयकत्वं, किन्तु शुक्तिरूप्यादिज्ञानव्यावृत्तं व्यवहारकालाबाध्यविषयकसकलज्ञानवृत्ति व्यवहारकालाबाध्यविषयकत्वमेव |
The condition present in a pot cognition that leads to fruitful activity with the pot (and thus leading one to surmise that such a cognition is valid) is not because the pot is unsublatable in all time. Rather, the condition for fruitful activity is that the cognition is not of apparently real (prAtibhAsika) objects such as shell-silver etc., and that the object is unsublated empirically (during vyavahAra). Thus all that is implied by the validity of a cognition discerned on the basis of the cognition leading to fruitful activity, is that its object is not sublated during vyavahAra.
तच्च न भाविकालबाधविरोधीत्युक्तम् | Such a validity does not rule out the possibility of a future sublation.
Therefore if it is said that the sAkshi reveals the validity of a cognition (as postulated by the dvaitin), it does not certify that its object is unsublatable in all periods of time.
भाविकालबाधतदभावौ नच मानं विना साक्षिणा ग्रहीतुं शक्यौ, तस्य विद्यमानमात्रग्राहित्वादिति चोक्तम् | In fact, the sublation of objects in the future (or not) cannot be determined in the absence of a valid means of knowledge that establishes it, because as we have already said, the sAkshi reveals whatever is in front of it - be it real or unreal.
ननु - तर्हि देहात्मैक्यज्ञान"मुष्णं जल"मित्यादि ज्ञानं च प्रमा स्यात्, व्यवहारदशायां विषयाबाधात् - इति चेन्न ;
The pUrvapakshi asks: If as you say, the absence of sublation in vyavahAra is the criterion for validity, then the erroneous knowledge "I am this body", or the mistaken cognition "the water is hot" would end up being valid.
आब्रह्मज्ञानमबाधितत्वेन तेषामपि घटादिज्ञानसमानयोगक्षेमत्वात् | The siddhikAra says - that is not a problem, because we hold that until the rise of brahma jnAna, such erroneous cognitions have a similar level of reality to the cognitions of everyday objects such as pots, etc.
ननु - कालान्तरस्थमपि यत् बाधकं तदपि किं यत्कालावच्छेदेन अनेन स्वार्थो गृहितस्तत्कालावच्छेदेनैव तन्निषेधति, उतान्यकालावच्छेदेन, आद्ये कथमस्य प्रामाण्यम्? अन्त्ये अनित्यत्वादिकमेव - इति चेन्न;
The pUrvapakshi asks - in relation to the perception of objects that are sublated by a cognition arising at a different time, were they absent when they were seen, or is their absence only from the time the sublating cognition arises? If it is the former, the original perception cannot be a valid cognition? If it is the latter, sublation only establishes the object's impermanence, not its unreality.
The siddhikAra says - No.
अबाध्यत्वरूपप्रामाण्यस्य प्रपञ्चज्ञाने मयानङ्गीकारात्, यत्कालावच्छेदेनैवानेन स्वार्थो गृहीतस्तत्कालावच्छेदेनैव तन्निषेधाभ्युपगमात् | I do not accept that the validity of the world's perception is because the world's reality is unsublated. The world is absent even when it is seen. Then what kind of validity is accepted by the siddhikAra? He clarifies thus:
यच्च प्रामाण्यम् मयाभ्युपेयते तत् व्यवहारदशायां विपरीतप्रमारूपबाधकस्यानुत्पन्नत्वादस्त्येव | The validity of the world's cognition that I accept is (limited to) an empirical one, that is - (thus far), no other cognition disproving the former cognition's validity has arisen.
To summarise, the siddhikAra's position is that the validity of the world's perception is not because the world is unsublatable, but the validity is because nothing has (thus far) proven it to be invalid.
The pUrvapakshi then says:
नच - यत् भवतां घटादिबुद्धे: प्रातिभासिकबुद्धितो वैलक्षण्यं विषयस्य व्यावहारिकसत्त्वसाधकं तदेवेह मम विषयस्य पारमार्थिकसत्त्वसाधकमस्त्विति - वाच्यम् ; You say that the cognition of pots etc. (vyAvahArika), is different from the cognition of the apparently real (prAtibhAsika). That difference establishes that the former has empirical existence (vyAvahArika sattA). Let it be that such a difference establishes the absolute reality of (pAramArthika sattA) those objects.
The siddhikAra says: Do not argue thus.
प्रातिभासिकबुद्धिवैलक्षण्यं हि घटादिबुद्धे: सप्रकारकज्ञानाबाध्यविषयकत्वादिरूपं, तन्न पारमार्थिकसत्त्वं घटादे: साधयितुं शक्तम्; The nature of the difference between the cognition of apparently real objects from the cognition of pots, etc., is of the nature of unsublatability by an attributive cognition (saprakAraka jnAna). That is, the sublating cognition reveals the prakAra, the attributes of the underlying object (saprakAraka jnAna). Such a cognition cannot prove the absolute reality of the pots etc.
Brahman, which is accepted as absolutely real by both the dvaitin and advaitin is unsublated by a non-attributive cognition of Brahman. The world, on the other hand is unsublated only by attributive cognitions. Thus in order to prove that the world is absolutely real, one needs to establish that a non-attributive cognition of Brahman leaves the world unsublated. An attributive cognition is not sufficient to prove the world's absolute reality.
देहात्मैक्यज्ञाने ब्रह्मज्ञानाव्यवहितभ्रमे च व्यभिचारात् | Moreover, there would be a contradiction in the case of the cognition of the body as the self, and in the case of an illusion subsisting in the instant before the rise of brahma jnAna.
To explain, the object of the erroneous cognition of the self as the body is unsublated by any attributive knowledge, but it is accepted even by the dvaitin as not ultimately real.
Secondly, if we assume that someone has had the vision of shell-silver at some time. Let us also assume that in the very next instant, the knowledge of brahman arises in his mind, which according to the advaitin, sublates the entire world. When the world itself gets sublated, so does the shell-silver. Thus one can say in this example that such a shell-silver is not sublated by an attributive cognition - the knowledge of brahman is non-attributive. According to the opponent's rule, this would make shell-silver absolutely real, as it is unsublated by any attributive cognition. That would be absurd.
ननु - 'घटस्सन्' 'रूप्यम् मिथ्येति' प्रतीत्योरविशेषे कथं 'घटो मिथ्या रूप्यमिथ्यात्वं न मिथ्ये'ति विशेष:?
The opponent asks : empirically, the cognition "the pot exists" and the cognition "shell-silver is unreal" both arise. There is no qualifying basis to say that one is valid and other is invalid. However, you say that the existence of the pot is unreal, but the unreality of shell-silver is not unreal. Why is that?
He continues:
नच तदपि मिथ्यैव; रूप्यतात्त्विकत्वापत्ते: You cannot say that the unreality of the shell-silver is also unreal, for that would make the shell-silver real.
- इति चेन्न; The siddhikAra says, not so.
मिथ्यात्वमिथ्यात्वेऽपि यथा न रूप्यस्य तात्त्विकत्वं तत्रोपपत्तेरुक्तत्वात् | As we have already said in the chapter on mithyAtva's mithyAtva, even if unreality is unreal, it will not lead to the shell-silver's reality.
नच - पारमार्थिकसत्त्वस्य प्रत्यक्षागोचारत्वे तन्निषेधश्रुतीनामप्रसक्तप्रतिषेधकता स्यादिति - वाच्यं
The opponent says - As absolute reality is beyond the reach of sensory perception, to interpret the vedas by saying that such a reality is absent in the world means they are denying something which was never known. The world's absolute reality is imperceptible, thus it need not be denied by the shruti.
The siddhikAra - don't argue thus, because:
तासां चक्षुरादिप्रसक्तद्वैतनिषेधपरत्वात्, The intention of those shrutis is to deny the reality of the duality that is cognised by the eyes etc.
पारमार्थिकत्वेन द्वैतनिषेधपरत्वेऽपि नाप्रसक्तनिषेधकत्वं; Even if it is argued that those shrutis do not claim the absolute absence of the world, but intend to deny that the existence of the world is ultimately real (that is, they do not say the world is absent, they merely say that the world does not really exist) - even then, such a denial is not the negation of something unstated. They still serve a purpose.
परोक्षप्रसक्ते: संभवात् Because, there is a possibility that such a reality is indirectly known. For instance, one may have a doubt that the world exists, as it is seen - thus, shrutis that deny ultimate reality to the world are not denying something that is not claimed by anyone.
'नान्तरिक्षेऽग्निश्चेतव्य' इत्यादिवदप्रस्क्तप्रतिषेधस्याप्युपपत्तेश्च | Even if it is denying an impossibility, such statements are seen in the veda. For example, this statement occurs in the vedas "do not perform a sacrifice in space". It is not possible to build an altar in space, so how can a sacrifice be performed there? Thus the denial of an impossibility does not imply the invalidity of the statement.
The pUrvapakshi then asks,
नच - अतात्त्विकप्रपञ्चे यदि तात्त्विकत्वमप्यध्यक्षेण न गृह्यते, कथं तर्हि तस्यातत्त्वावेदकत्वम् ? If perception is not capable of revealing the unreal world as real, why is it claimed (by you, the advaitin) that perception does not have a truth-declaring character?
नहि तदेव तत्त्वेनावेदयत् अत्तात्त्विकं नाम, दृश्यते च सार्वलौकिकप्रपञ्चे पारमार्थिकत्वानुभव To reveal something "as it actually is", means that it reveals the reality of things. It is observed from everyone's experience of the world, that it is absolutely real. Therefore, if perception reveals the reality of the world, it must be true, and if it is true, such a perception will overrule any inference which contradicts it.
इति - वाच्यम् ; The siddhikAra says - Do not argue thus, because
नह्यस्माकम् तत्त्वावेदकत्वं तद्वति प्रकराकत्वं, तद्भिन्नत्वमतत्त्वावेदकत्वम्, The truth-declaring character of any means of knowledge, according to us, is not in revealing "a thing as it is", nor is the absence of truth-declaring character in revealing something that does not exist as existing.
किन्त्वबाधितविषयत्वं तत्त्वावेदकत्वम्, बाधितविषयत्वं चातत्त्वावेदकत्वम्, Rather, the truth-declaring character of a means of knowledge is in revealing that which is not sublated, and its absence is in revealing that which is sublated.
अबाधितविषयत्वं च श्रौते ब्रह्मज्ञान एव, न तद्भिन्नज्ञाने तात्पर्यवद्वेदत्वेनैव तत्त्वावबोधकत्वात् | Having an unsublatable object is ultimately true only in the case of the cognition of brahman, which cognition is born from the shruti, and not for any other means of knowledge. Even shruti sentences that speak of things other than Brahman (perform agnihotra sacrifice, do no harm, etc.), are not unsublatable. Does this make some part of vedic revelation truthful, and another part not truthful? No, when we talk of truth-declaring character being only in sentences that reveal brahman, what is meant is that the ultimate import of veda is in revealing those sentences - all other revelation have secondary import.
तथाच प्रपञ्चप्रत्यक्षस्य तात्विकत्वागोचरत्वेऽप्यतत्त्वावेदकत्वं सङ्गच्छते | Therefore, even though the perception of the world does not reveal its ultimate reality, one can say that perception does not have a truth-declaring character.
It was said that the experience of everyone is that the world is real, therefore one perceives the reality of the world. Such a perception has the ability to overcome the inference of the world's unreality. That is not true. Even when there is an indirect experience of something, one tends to mistakenly call it as direct perception.
सार्वलौकिकी पारमार्थिकत्वप्रसिद्धिस्तु जलगतपिपासोपशमनसामर्थ्यप्रसिद्धिवत् परोक्षतयाप्युपपन्ना नापरोक्षत्वपर्यवसायिनी । The common experience of reality of the world, does not mean that the experience is a direct one. For example, the knowledge that water quenches thirst is an inferential one, and thus an indirect experience. I knew that a glass of water quenched my thirst in the past. I am thirsty now, thus another glass of water should quench my thirst, but that cognition is not perception because one has not drunk that glass of water yet. Therefore, it is only an inference, and thus indirect. However, because one is intimately aware of it, one thinks it is a matter of perception.
Just because one is intimately aware of the world's reality, one cannot declare that such an experience is perception. Therefore, one cannot argue that by virtue of it being perception, it can overrule the inference of the world's unreality.
Thus we say so in the following verse:
तस्मादध्यक्षयोग्यस्य सत्त्वस्येहानिरुक्तित: |
नाध्यक्षबाधो मिथ्यात्वलिङ्गस्यात्रोपपद्यते ||
Therefore, that which is capable of being perceived, cannot be declared as real. What is known by an inference of unreality cannot be disproved by perception.
न लौकिकं न सामन्यजन्यं साक्ष्यात्मकं न च |
प्रत्यक्षं बाधते लिङ्गं मिथ्यात्वस्यानुमापकम् ||
Neither sensory perception, nor extra-sensory perception (sAmAnya lakshaNa pratyAsatti / alaukika pratyaksha), nor the perception by the sAkshi can disprove the inference of unreality.
According to the dvaitin, sAkshi pratyaksha is the highest instrument available for valid knowledge. It is the purest form of sense organ, the witnessing consciousness, and the knowledge perceived by the sAkshi is incontrovertible.
With this background, the nyAyAmritakAra asks:
ननु - प्रत्यक्षस्य वर्तमानमात्रग्राहित्वे शुक्तिरूप्यादेः प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वरूपं मिथ्यात्वं कथं प्रत्यक्षं स्यात्? As perception can only perceive the present, how can it be claimed that the shell-silver etc. has an unreality of the nature of the absolute absence in all three periods of time in the locus of their appearance?
Therefore if it is said that the perception of unreality means that the perception of absence in all three periods of time is possible, it cannot be by ordinary perception, but by the witness, the sAkshi. Thus one must admit that the sAkshi perceives a future absence of the mithyA object.
अथ तत्र रजतत्वविरोधिशुक्तित्वे साक्षात्कृते तदन्यथानुपपत्त्या च रजतत्वाभावे निश्चिते मिथ्यैव रजतमभादिति तादृङ्निषेधप्रत्यय: स्वसंबन्धसर्वाभासकेन सक्षिणैवोपपन्न:, - Therefore, when the shell-ness, which happens to be mutually exclusive with silver-ness, is perceived, then as no other conclusion is possible (ie one can infer thus), one becomes certain of the absence of silver-ness. As a result, one comes to know that it was an unreal silver that appeared previously. Such a cognition of absence (in all three periods of time), is only possible for the sAkshi, which reveals everything that appears in front of it.
Therefore, as we have established that the sAkshi can see the future absence of an unreal object,
तर्हि साक्षात् स्वविषयस्य गगनादेर्भाविकालनिषेधाप्रतियोगित्वं सकलकालग्राहिणा साक्षिणा गृह्यतां - let us admit that space, which is directly witnessed by the sAkshi now, is also not sublated in the future. The sAkshi in revealing something as existing today, should also be capable of revealing the existence of that thing in all periods of time.
In the case of the perception of unreality by the sAkshi, that was through the medium of the inferential cognition (or arthApatti vritti, the cognition of circumstantial inference). If the sAkshi, through indirect perception, can deliver a verdict of the absence of silver in all three periods of time, why cannot the sAkshi, by directly perceiving the existence of space in the present, prove the existence of space in all three periods of time?
Extending this, if space is perceived by the sAkshi to exist in all three periods of time, the inference of its absence is contradicted by sAkshi pratyaksha, the inner witness' perception.
The siddhikAra responds to this line of argument:
इति - चेन्न; If this is your argument, no.
When unreality is defined as the absence in all three periods of time, there is no requirement that such an absence is perceived in all three periods of time for the cognition of unreality. Rather, all that is required is that the silver is absolutely absent - it has atyantAbhAva.
साक्षिणो विद्यमानसर्वावभासकत्वेनाविद्यमानभाविबाधाभावभासकत्वानुपपत्ते: Holding that the sAkshi reveals everything perceptible in its presence does not imply that the sAkshi can overrule a future sublation of the object.
The vivaraNakAra's intent is not to say that the absence of an objects in all three periods of time is perceptible. All he wishes to say is that the absence in the present is perceptible - however that absence happens to be an absence in all three periods of time.
ज्ञानस्य भ्रमप्रमासाधरणत्वेन प्रमाणाबाधकत्वाच्च | sAkshi will reveal both valid knowledge and invalid knowledge, and there is no way that such a perception by the sAkshi can overrule an inferential cognition.
The pUrvapakshi says:
ननु - ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं गृह्णन् साक्षी घटादिगतमबाध्यत्वम् गृह्णात्येव, नहि विषयाबाधमनन्तर्भाव्य प्रामाण्यग्रहणं नाम इति - चेन्न; If the sAkshi gathers that a knowledge, say the knowledge of a pot, is valid (it has prAmANya), then it must follow that the sAkshi gathers the unsublatability of the pot too. Knowing the validity of a cognition is nothing but knowing the unsublatability of the object of the cognition.
The siddhikAra replies,
व्यवहारकालाबाध्यत्वमात्रेण प्रवृत्तौ अविसंवादोपपत्ते:, तद्रूपगतप्रामाण्यस्य साक्षिणा ग्रहणेऽपि विरोधाभावात् | True, but as it is possible to transact with an object whose unsublatability is empirical, if the sAkshi were to gather a notion of validity limited to such an extent, it would be no contradiction to the inference of the world's unreality.
The siddhikAra is saying that for any object to have utility, it is sufficient if that object is unsublated transactionally. There is no requirement that the object is unsublatable in all periods of time for it to have utility. If the sAkshi reveals that the cognition of the object is valid empirical, such a knowledge would not be contradictory to the unreality of the object. For unreality is not incongruous with empirical unsublatability.
नहि घटादिज्ञानस्यसंवादिप्रवृत्तिजनकतावच्छेदकं प्रामाण्यं त्रिकालाबाध्यविषयकत्वं, किन्तु शुक्तिरूप्यादिज्ञानव्यावृत्तं व्यवहारकालाबाध्यविषयकसकलज्ञानवृत्ति व्यवहारकालाबाध्यविषयकत्वमेव |
The condition present in a pot cognition that leads to fruitful activity with the pot (and thus leading one to surmise that such a cognition is valid) is not because the pot is unsublatable in all time. Rather, the condition for fruitful activity is that the cognition is not of apparently real (prAtibhAsika) objects such as shell-silver etc., and that the object is unsublated empirically (during vyavahAra). Thus all that is implied by the validity of a cognition discerned on the basis of the cognition leading to fruitful activity, is that its object is not sublated during vyavahAra.
तच्च न भाविकालबाधविरोधीत्युक्तम् | Such a validity does not rule out the possibility of a future sublation.
Therefore if it is said that the sAkshi reveals the validity of a cognition (as postulated by the dvaitin), it does not certify that its object is unsublatable in all periods of time.
भाविकालबाधतदभावौ नच मानं विना साक्षिणा ग्रहीतुं शक्यौ, तस्य विद्यमानमात्रग्राहित्वादिति चोक्तम् | In fact, the sublation of objects in the future (or not) cannot be determined in the absence of a valid means of knowledge that establishes it, because as we have already said, the sAkshi reveals whatever is in front of it - be it real or unreal.
ननु - तर्हि देहात्मैक्यज्ञान"मुष्णं जल"मित्यादि ज्ञानं च प्रमा स्यात्, व्यवहारदशायां विषयाबाधात् - इति चेन्न ;
The pUrvapakshi asks: If as you say, the absence of sublation in vyavahAra is the criterion for validity, then the erroneous knowledge "I am this body", or the mistaken cognition "the water is hot" would end up being valid.
आब्रह्मज्ञानमबाधितत्वेन तेषामपि घटादिज्ञानसमानयोगक्षेमत्वात् | The siddhikAra says - that is not a problem, because we hold that until the rise of brahma jnAna, such erroneous cognitions have a similar level of reality to the cognitions of everyday objects such as pots, etc.
ननु - कालान्तरस्थमपि यत् बाधकं तदपि किं यत्कालावच्छेदेन अनेन स्वार्थो गृहितस्तत्कालावच्छेदेनैव तन्निषेधति, उतान्यकालावच्छेदेन, आद्ये कथमस्य प्रामाण्यम्? अन्त्ये अनित्यत्वादिकमेव - इति चेन्न;
The pUrvapakshi asks - in relation to the perception of objects that are sublated by a cognition arising at a different time, were they absent when they were seen, or is their absence only from the time the sublating cognition arises? If it is the former, the original perception cannot be a valid cognition? If it is the latter, sublation only establishes the object's impermanence, not its unreality.
The siddhikAra says - No.
अबाध्यत्वरूपप्रामाण्यस्य प्रपञ्चज्ञाने मयानङ्गीकारात्, यत्कालावच्छेदेनैवानेन स्वार्थो गृहीतस्तत्कालावच्छेदेनैव तन्निषेधाभ्युपगमात् | I do not accept that the validity of the world's perception is because the world's reality is unsublated. The world is absent even when it is seen. Then what kind of validity is accepted by the siddhikAra? He clarifies thus:
यच्च प्रामाण्यम् मयाभ्युपेयते तत् व्यवहारदशायां विपरीतप्रमारूपबाधकस्यानुत्पन्नत्वादस्त्येव | The validity of the world's cognition that I accept is (limited to) an empirical one, that is - (thus far), no other cognition disproving the former cognition's validity has arisen.
To summarise, the siddhikAra's position is that the validity of the world's perception is not because the world is unsublatable, but the validity is because nothing has (thus far) proven it to be invalid.
The pUrvapakshi then says:
नच - यत् भवतां घटादिबुद्धे: प्रातिभासिकबुद्धितो वैलक्षण्यं विषयस्य व्यावहारिकसत्त्वसाधकं तदेवेह मम विषयस्य पारमार्थिकसत्त्वसाधकमस्त्विति - वाच्यम् ; You say that the cognition of pots etc. (vyAvahArika), is different from the cognition of the apparently real (prAtibhAsika). That difference establishes that the former has empirical existence (vyAvahArika sattA). Let it be that such a difference establishes the absolute reality of (pAramArthika sattA) those objects.
The siddhikAra says: Do not argue thus.
प्रातिभासिकबुद्धिवैलक्षण्यं हि घटादिबुद्धे: सप्रकारकज्ञानाबाध्यविषयकत्वादिरूपं, तन्न पारमार्थिकसत्त्वं घटादे: साधयितुं शक्तम्; The nature of the difference between the cognition of apparently real objects from the cognition of pots, etc., is of the nature of unsublatability by an attributive cognition (saprakAraka jnAna). That is, the sublating cognition reveals the prakAra, the attributes of the underlying object (saprakAraka jnAna). Such a cognition cannot prove the absolute reality of the pots etc.
Brahman, which is accepted as absolutely real by both the dvaitin and advaitin is unsublated by a non-attributive cognition of Brahman. The world, on the other hand is unsublated only by attributive cognitions. Thus in order to prove that the world is absolutely real, one needs to establish that a non-attributive cognition of Brahman leaves the world unsublated. An attributive cognition is not sufficient to prove the world's absolute reality.
देहात्मैक्यज्ञाने ब्रह्मज्ञानाव्यवहितभ्रमे च व्यभिचारात् | Moreover, there would be a contradiction in the case of the cognition of the body as the self, and in the case of an illusion subsisting in the instant before the rise of brahma jnAna.
To explain, the object of the erroneous cognition of the self as the body is unsublated by any attributive knowledge, but it is accepted even by the dvaitin as not ultimately real.
Secondly, if we assume that someone has had the vision of shell-silver at some time. Let us also assume that in the very next instant, the knowledge of brahman arises in his mind, which according to the advaitin, sublates the entire world. When the world itself gets sublated, so does the shell-silver. Thus one can say in this example that such a shell-silver is not sublated by an attributive cognition - the knowledge of brahman is non-attributive. According to the opponent's rule, this would make shell-silver absolutely real, as it is unsublated by any attributive cognition. That would be absurd.
ननु - 'घटस्सन्' 'रूप्यम् मिथ्येति' प्रतीत्योरविशेषे कथं 'घटो मिथ्या रूप्यमिथ्यात्वं न मिथ्ये'ति विशेष:?
The opponent asks : empirically, the cognition "the pot exists" and the cognition "shell-silver is unreal" both arise. There is no qualifying basis to say that one is valid and other is invalid. However, you say that the existence of the pot is unreal, but the unreality of shell-silver is not unreal. Why is that?
He continues:
नच तदपि मिथ्यैव; रूप्यतात्त्विकत्वापत्ते: You cannot say that the unreality of the shell-silver is also unreal, for that would make the shell-silver real.
- इति चेन्न; The siddhikAra says, not so.
मिथ्यात्वमिथ्यात्वेऽपि यथा न रूप्यस्य तात्त्विकत्वं तत्रोपपत्तेरुक्तत्वात् | As we have already said in the chapter on mithyAtva's mithyAtva, even if unreality is unreal, it will not lead to the shell-silver's reality.
नच - पारमार्थिकसत्त्वस्य प्रत्यक्षागोचारत्वे तन्निषेधश्रुतीनामप्रसक्तप्रतिषेधकता स्यादिति - वाच्यं
The opponent says - As absolute reality is beyond the reach of sensory perception, to interpret the vedas by saying that such a reality is absent in the world means they are denying something which was never known. The world's absolute reality is imperceptible, thus it need not be denied by the shruti.
The siddhikAra - don't argue thus, because:
तासां चक्षुरादिप्रसक्तद्वैतनिषेधपरत्वात्, The intention of those shrutis is to deny the reality of the duality that is cognised by the eyes etc.
पारमार्थिकत्वेन द्वैतनिषेधपरत्वेऽपि नाप्रसक्तनिषेधकत्वं; Even if it is argued that those shrutis do not claim the absolute absence of the world, but intend to deny that the existence of the world is ultimately real (that is, they do not say the world is absent, they merely say that the world does not really exist) - even then, such a denial is not the negation of something unstated. They still serve a purpose.
परोक्षप्रसक्ते: संभवात् Because, there is a possibility that such a reality is indirectly known. For instance, one may have a doubt that the world exists, as it is seen - thus, shrutis that deny ultimate reality to the world are not denying something that is not claimed by anyone.
'नान्तरिक्षेऽग्निश्चेतव्य' इत्यादिवदप्रस्क्तप्रतिषेधस्याप्युपपत्तेश्च | Even if it is denying an impossibility, such statements are seen in the veda. For example, this statement occurs in the vedas "do not perform a sacrifice in space". It is not possible to build an altar in space, so how can a sacrifice be performed there? Thus the denial of an impossibility does not imply the invalidity of the statement.
The pUrvapakshi then asks,
नच - अतात्त्विकप्रपञ्चे यदि तात्त्विकत्वमप्यध्यक्षेण न गृह्यते, कथं तर्हि तस्यातत्त्वावेदकत्वम् ? If perception is not capable of revealing the unreal world as real, why is it claimed (by you, the advaitin) that perception does not have a truth-declaring character?
नहि तदेव तत्त्वेनावेदयत् अत्तात्त्विकं नाम, दृश्यते च सार्वलौकिकप्रपञ्चे पारमार्थिकत्वानुभव To reveal something "as it actually is", means that it reveals the reality of things. It is observed from everyone's experience of the world, that it is absolutely real. Therefore, if perception reveals the reality of the world, it must be true, and if it is true, such a perception will overrule any inference which contradicts it.
इति - वाच्यम् ; The siddhikAra says - Do not argue thus, because
नह्यस्माकम् तत्त्वावेदकत्वं तद्वति प्रकराकत्वं, तद्भिन्नत्वमतत्त्वावेदकत्वम्, The truth-declaring character of any means of knowledge, according to us, is not in revealing "a thing as it is", nor is the absence of truth-declaring character in revealing something that does not exist as existing.
किन्त्वबाधितविषयत्वं तत्त्वावेदकत्वम्, बाधितविषयत्वं चातत्त्वावेदकत्वम्, Rather, the truth-declaring character of a means of knowledge is in revealing that which is not sublated, and its absence is in revealing that which is sublated.
अबाधितविषयत्वं च श्रौते ब्रह्मज्ञान एव, न तद्भिन्नज्ञाने तात्पर्यवद्वेदत्वेनैव तत्त्वावबोधकत्वात् | Having an unsublatable object is ultimately true only in the case of the cognition of brahman, which cognition is born from the shruti, and not for any other means of knowledge. Even shruti sentences that speak of things other than Brahman (perform agnihotra sacrifice, do no harm, etc.), are not unsublatable. Does this make some part of vedic revelation truthful, and another part not truthful? No, when we talk of truth-declaring character being only in sentences that reveal brahman, what is meant is that the ultimate import of veda is in revealing those sentences - all other revelation have secondary import.
तथाच प्रपञ्चप्रत्यक्षस्य तात्विकत्वागोचरत्वेऽप्यतत्त्वावेदकत्वं सङ्गच्छते | Therefore, even though the perception of the world does not reveal its ultimate reality, one can say that perception does not have a truth-declaring character.
It was said that the experience of everyone is that the world is real, therefore one perceives the reality of the world. Such a perception has the ability to overcome the inference of the world's unreality. That is not true. Even when there is an indirect experience of something, one tends to mistakenly call it as direct perception.
सार्वलौकिकी पारमार्थिकत्वप्रसिद्धिस्तु जलगतपिपासोपशमनसामर्थ्यप्रसिद्धिवत् परोक्षतयाप्युपपन्ना नापरोक्षत्वपर्यवसायिनी । The common experience of reality of the world, does not mean that the experience is a direct one. For example, the knowledge that water quenches thirst is an inferential one, and thus an indirect experience. I knew that a glass of water quenched my thirst in the past. I am thirsty now, thus another glass of water should quench my thirst, but that cognition is not perception because one has not drunk that glass of water yet. Therefore, it is only an inference, and thus indirect. However, because one is intimately aware of it, one thinks it is a matter of perception.
Just because one is intimately aware of the world's reality, one cannot declare that such an experience is perception. Therefore, one cannot argue that by virtue of it being perception, it can overrule the inference of the world's unreality.
Thus we say so in the following verse:
तस्मादध्यक्षयोग्यस्य सत्त्वस्येहानिरुक्तित: |
नाध्यक्षबाधो मिथ्यात्वलिङ्गस्यात्रोपपद्यते ||
Therefore, that which is capable of being perceived, cannot be declared as real. What is known by an inference of unreality cannot be disproved by perception.
न लौकिकं न सामन्यजन्यं साक्ष्यात्मकं न च |
प्रत्यक्षं बाधते लिङ्गं मिथ्यात्वस्यानुमापकम् ||
Neither sensory perception, nor extra-sensory perception (sAmAnya lakshaNa pratyAsatti / alaukika pratyaksha), nor the perception by the sAkshi can disprove the inference of unreality.