paricCheda 1 - pratyakshasya lingAdyabAdhyatve bAdhakam

किं च परीक्षितत्वेनैव प्राबल्यं, नोपजीव्यत्वादिना। अनुमानशब्दबाध्यत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षेऽपि दर्शनात्।
The supremacy of a cognition depends on it being validated by testing, and does not arise because other means of knowledge depend on it, etc. - for it has been observed that even perception can be invalidated by inference and verbal testimony.

तथा हि- इदं रजतमिति प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानाप्तवचनाभ्यां, नभोनैल्यप्रत्यक्षस्य नीरूपत्वग्राहकानुमानेन, `गौरोऽहं' इत्यस्य `अहमिहैवास्मि सदने जानानः' इत्यस्य चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वप्रत्यक्षस्य चानुमानागमाभ्यां `पीतः शङ्खस्तिक्तो गुडः' इत्यादेश्चानुमानाप्तवचनाभ्यां बाधो दृश्यते।
Thus, the following is observed
a) The perception "this is silver" is invalidated by inference and the words of a trustworthy person.
b) The perception of the blueness of the sky is invalidated by an inference of space's formlessness.
c) Perceptual cognitions such as "I am fair-skinned", "I am in this house" or the "moon being a finger-length's size" are invalidated by scriptural texts and inferences.
d) The perception of the conch-shell as yellow, or jaggery as bitter are invalidated by inferences and the words of a trustworthy person.

Some ancient writers object to this view. Their objections are presented and refuted first.   They argue that invalid perceptual cognitions can be set aside only valid perceptual cognitions. 

ननु साक्षात्कारिभ्रमे साक्षात्कारिविशेषदर्शनमेव विरोधीत्यभ्युपेयम्; अन्यथा परोक्षप्रमाया अपरोक्षभ्रमनिवर्तकत्वोपपत्तौ वेदान्तवाक्यानामपरोक्ष ज्ञानजनकत्वव्युत्पादनप्रयासे व्यर्थः स्याद् - इति चेन्न।
"It must be admitted that erroneous perceptions can be disproved by valid perceptions alone. If that is not accepted, it will lead to the eventuality that valid, but indirect cognitions are capable of invalidating direct, but erroneous cognitions. That being so, it would render useless the effort undertaken (by early advaitin-s) to establish that scriptural texts of vedAnta are capable of producing direct, perceptual knowledge" - If this is the argument, no.

The siddhikAra argues that the cognition of a snake in place of a rope has three components - 1) The perception of the illusory snake 2) The notion of the validity of such a cognition and 3) The notion of reality of the snake. While (1) is a perceptual error, (2) and (3) are not - they are indirect cognitions. 

`नायं सर्पः' इत्यादिवाक्यादिना सविलासाज्ञाननिवृत्त्यभावेऽपि भ्रमगताप्रमाणत्वज्ञापनेन भ्रमप्रमाणत्वबुद्धेस्तद्विषयसत्यताबुद्धेश्च निवर्तनात्। While the statement "This is not a snake" is not capable of removing the ignorance of rope and its effects (snake), it removes the the notion of validity of the illusion and the reality of its object, by conveying the illusoriness of the cognition and its consequent invalidity.
तावता च भ्रमनिवर्तकत्वव्यपदेशात्। That much alone is meant to be conveyed by the invalidation of illusion (not the complete removal of ignorance - the root cause of the illusion - and its effects).
भ्रमे प्रामाण्यविभ्रमस्य तद्विषये सत्यताविभ्रमस्य च परोक्षत्वेनापरोक्षबाधानपेक्षत्वात्। As the mistaken notions of the validity of the illusion and the reality of its object are (themselves) indirect cognitions, there is no requirement that the cognition invalidating those two be direct. 
न हि दुष्टकरणाजन्यत्वमबाधितविषयत्वं वा प्रामाण्यं कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षम्। Even if such a requirement were to exist, the perception of such a validity is an impossibility. No one is capable of perceiving that the source of a cognition is faultless, nor perceptually conclude that its object is eternally unsublatable.  
न वा सर्वदेशसर्वकालसर्वपुरुषाबाध्यत्वरूपं विषयसत्यत्वम्। Similarly, nor is it possible to perceive a reality of the world which is of the nature of being unsublatable at all places, for all time, by all people.
अतस्तयोः परोक्षप्रमाबाध्यत्वमुचितमेव। Therefore, it is quite appropriate to hold that an illusory perception can be invalidated by a valid, indirect cognition.
तयोश्च बाधितयोः रजतादिभ्रमः स्वरूपेण सन्नपि स्वकार्याक्षमत्वादसन्निवेति बाधित इत्युच्यत इत्यनवद्यम्।There is no error therefore in saying that, even though the illusion of silver persists, the actions following the illusory cognition cease, and being as good as non-existent, it is considered invalidated. 


The opponent makes his case.
ननु - `इदं रजतम्' इत्यत्र सयुक्तिकं प्रत्यक्षं बाधकं, न युक्तिमात्रम्।
The cognition "this is silver" is invalidated by perception backed by logical inference, not by logical inference alone. That is, the person who saw silver first and then saw that it was absent subsequently, is doubtful about the validity of the original cognition and uses logical inference to conclude that the first cognition was invalid and the second valid. Thus it is the sight of the absence of silver, backed up by logical analysis that led him to the right conclusion, not logical analysis alone.
`गौरोऽहम्' इत्यत्रापि `मम शरीरम्' इति बलवत् प्रत्यक्षमेव बाधकम्।
The cognition "I am fair-skinned" is also invalidated by the strong perception that "this is my body" (therefore this body and I must be different and fairness belongs to the body, not me).
`अहमिहैवास्मि सदने जानान' इति तु प्रमाणमेव, जीवस्याणुत्वाद् the cognition "I am here in this house" is valid, because the jIva is atomic by nature.

The siddhikAra refutes this line of argument
- इति चेन्न। If this is the argument, no.
रजताभेदशरीराभेदप्रत्यक्षयोर्जाग्रतोः युक्त्या प्रतिबन्धाक्षमत्वे तद्विषयप्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तेरेवानवकाशात्। So long as the perceptual cognitions "this is silver" and "I am the body" are present in full strength, they will prevent the rise of a contrary perception, until some amount of logical analysis has weakened them.
न च तत्र परम्परासम्बन्धेन कर्दमलिप्ते वस्त्रे `नीलं वस्त्रम्' इतिवद् `गौरोऽहम्' इति गौणम्; Nor can it be argued that the notion "I am fair-skinned" is figurative usage, like in the case of the cloth made dirty through contact with mud being called "a dirty cloth". The question is whether this is a case of an erroneous perception or merely figurative usage. The siddhikAra responds:
कर्दमवस्त्रयोरिव शरीरात्मनोर्भेदानध्यवसायेन दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोर्वैषम्यात्।  The example and the exemplified are different because, unlike the case of mud and the cloth (which are known to be different when the statement "dirty cloth" is made), the difference between the body and the self is not known. 
तथा चात्रैक्याध्यास एवोचितः। Therefore the (mutual) superimposition of the self with the body is quite appropriate. 
एवं च `उष्णं जलम्' इत्यत्रापि यदि कर्दमवस्त्रयोरिव तोयतेजसोर्भेदग्रहः, तदा गौणतैव। Similar is the case of the statement "the water is hot" - if it is made knowing that water and fire are different (and thus their properties - coolness and heat - cannot coexist), then like in the instance of the cloth and mud, such usage is figurative.
यदिच शरीरात्मवद् भेदानध्यवसायस्तदाऽध्यास एव। If one makes the statement without knowing their difference, like in the case of the statement "I am the body", then it is an erroneous statement indeed.
तथा च युक्तिबाध्यमेवेति तदप्युदाहरणम्। Thus, that too is an example to prove that one aspect of an illusory perception is invalidated by indirect cognitions like logical inference.
यत्त्वहमिहैवेति प्रमाणमित्युक्तम्, तन्न। However, if it is argued that the cognition "I am here in the house" is valid, that is incorrect.
आत्मनः `आकाशवत् सर्वगतश्च' इति सर्वगतत्वेन इहैवेति व्यवच्छेदस्याप्रमाणिकत्वात्। The self being all-pervading, based on the vedic statement "All-pervading, like space", for it to be limited to "here" would be invalid. 
न च जीवोऽणुः, युगपदेव पादशिरोऽवच्छेदेन सुखदुःखानुभवात्। Nor can the individual self held to be atomic, because of the experience of pleasure or pain simultaneously in the head and the foot.
न ह्योकोऽणुरेकदा व्यवहितदेशद्वयावच्छिन्नो भवति। An atomic particle cannot simultaneously be present in two separate locations.
नच युगपत्प्रतीतिर्भ्रमः, उत्सर्गसिद्धप्रामाण्यपरित्यागे बीजाभावात्। विस्तरेण चैतदग्रे वक्ष्यामः। Nor is the cognition of simultaneity an illusion, because there is no causal factor present which justifies giving up something which is experienced. This will be elaborately discussed later (in the second paricCheda).


The opponent argues:
ननु- नभोनैल्यप्रत्यक्षस्य नीरूपत्वग्राहकानुमानेन न बाधः, लिङ्गाभावात्। There is no inferential reason (hetu / linga) to hold that the perception of the sky's blueness is invalidated by the inference of its formlessness.

The logician divides size into four categories - aNu (atomic), mahat (large), dIrgha (long) and hrasva (short). Both space and the self are accepted by the logician as being infinite in size (paramamahat), and therefore he uses the inferential reason of pramamahattva to argue that just like space is infinite in size like the self, it is also formless like the self. 

The second inferential reason that he uses is dravya anArambhakatvam - not being the cause of another substance. He holds that space is formless like the self because it is not the cause of any other substance, just like the self.

The opponent argues that neither of these inferential reasons apply to the advaitin and therefore he cannot argue that the perception of the sky's blueness is overruled by the inference of its formlessness.

न च परममहत्त्वद्रव्यानारम्भकत्वादेर्लिङ्गत्वम्, त्वन्मते असिद्धेः। Neither (1) infinite size nor (2) its non-causation of another substance are inferential reasons, because they do not apply in your position.
The advaitin holds that the self is larger than space from the vedic statement ज्यायानाकाशात् (shatapatha brAhmaNa 6.3.2), so space cannot be infinite in size. Similarly the vedic statement आकाशाद्वायुः (taittirIya upaniShad 2.1.1) says that from space, wind was born, so the non-causation of another substance cannot apply to space either.

निःस्पर्शत्वं तु तमसि व्यभिचारि। Nor can its (3) intangibility be said to be an inferential reason, for darkness is intangible, but it has form according to the advaitin.

पृथिव्यादित्रयेतरभूतत्वादि चाप्रयोजकम्। Nor can the reason be (4) "being a material substance different from the earth, water and fire", for there is no reason as to why that would imply the formlessness of space.

तथा च नीरूपत्वग्राहकसाक्षिप्रत्यक्षमेव तद्बाधकं वाच्यम्, therefore it must be admitted that the formlessness of space only arises due its perception as formless by the sAkshi, the inner witness.

न च रूपग्रहणासमर्थस्य साक्षिणः कथं नीरूपत्वग्राहकत्वमिति वाच्यम्। Now, it cannot be argued that the inner witness, being incapable of perceiving form, is incapable of perceiving formlessness as well.

पिशाचाग्राहकस्यापि चक्षुषस्तदभावग्राहकत्ववदुपपत्तेः, because even if eyes are incapable of perceiving the presence of ghosts, it is possible to say that the absence of ghosts is perceptible by them.

परेणापि साक्षिणोऽपि रूपवत्तमोग्राहकत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च Moreover, the opponent (advaitin) admits that the inner witness is capable of perceiving the form of darkness.

अचाक्षुषेऽपि नभसि वायाविव चक्षुषैव रूपाभावग्रहणसम्भवेन चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षबाधात् Therefore, even though eyes, cannot see space, the absence of form in space, like in the case of wind, can be the object of visual perception.

The siddhikAra responds to this argument:

इति चेन्न। If this is the argument, no.

`नीलं नभः' इति प्रत्यक्षे जाग्रति रूपाभावग्रहणस्य चक्षुषा साक्षिणा चासम्भवात्। When the perception "the sky is blue" arises, it prevents the possibility of the cognisance of the absence of form by the eyes and the inner witness.

तथा च बलवती युक्तिरेव तद्बाधिका। Only a very strong inferential cognition of its opposite can overrule it.

न च लिङ्गाभावः, चक्षुरन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायिरूपाविशेषितप्रतीतिविषयत्वाद्रूपवदिति लिङ्गसम्भवात्।There is a valid inferential reason for space's formlessness - it is revealed by the opening of eyes and concealed by their closing. The example for such an inference is form itself, which is revealed when the eyes are opened and concealed when they are closed. 

न चाप्रयोजकत्वम्, नभो यदि सरूपं स्यात्तदा चक्षुरन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायिप्रतीतौ रूपासम्बन्धितया विषयो न स्यादिति तर्कोपपत्तेः। Nor can it be said that such an inferential reason does not imply the formlessness of space - because logic to support this can be provided.  If space had form, it would not appear as formless when the eyes are opened.

न चेष्टापत्तिः, सविधे रूपासम्बन्धितया नभसः सिद्धेः सर्वजनसम्मतत्वात्। Nor is this (space's formlessness not being proven) desirable, because it is universally accepted that space, when proximate to the observer, is absolutely without any form.

नभसः साक्षिवेद्यतायामपि चक्षुरन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानमवर्जनीयमेव। अन्यथाऽन्धस्यापि तद्ग्रहणं स्यात्। Therefore, even if space is cognised by the inner witness, the fact that its perception by the witness is dependent on the eye being open, cannot be set aside. If the inner self did not depend on the eyes to be available, then even the blind would be able to perceive space. Therefore, the perception of space by the inner witness is dependent on the eyes. The eyes reveal form, and because they do not reveal form, space has no form. 

Sri Appayya DIkshitar, in another context, considers another opponent's argument for space possessing form. The opponent argues that space's form is not seen due to it being in extremely close proximity to the eyes. He compares this to the case of a fog, which is not seen when one is close to it, but it is perceptible from a distance. Appayya DIkshitar, in response, argues that the case of space and fog is different - neither fog nor its form are seen at close quarters, whereas space is seen, but its form is not.

न च पञ्चीकरणाद्रूपवदारब्धत्वेन नभसो नीरूपत्वं बाधितमिति वाच्यम्।
Nor can it be argued that the process of quintuplication of space leads to the contradiction of the absence of form. 

pancIkaraNa or quintuplication is a process described in advaita scripture for the creation of gross elements from subtle elements. Each gross element is created from one half of the main subtle element, and one-eighth from each of the other four subtle elements. So gross space consists of one-half subtle space and one-eighth of subtle wind, fire, water and earth. 

A doubt arises in this context. pancIkaraNa implies that space has form, because it consists of parts of fire, water and earth, each of which have form. The siddhikAra refutes this argument.

त्रिवृत्करणपक्षेऽस्य दूषणस्यानवकाशात्। There is a view that shruti conveys that trivRtkaraNa, triplication, is the process that is outlined in shruti (not pancIkaraNa). If that was true, then the defect outlined would not apply.

The process of trivRtkaraNa is based on the ChAndogya mantra 6.3.3 तासां त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतमेकैकां करवाणीति सेयं देवतेमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेनैव जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरोत्.  The three elements which combine to form gross elements are Fire, Water and Earth - space is outside the scope of trivRtkaraNa, and therefore it cannot be invoked to prove that space has form.

The bhAmati holds that the right view of creation is trivRtkaraNa, not pancIkaraNa, and the reason outlined in amalAnanda's commentary (kalpataru) is that this is because pancIkaraNa would imply that space has form. However this view is not accepted in mainstream advaita - pancIkaraNa is the accepted process. 

Therefore, the siddhikAra provides a stronger refutation.
पञ्चीकरणपक्षेऽपि अपञ्चीकरणदशायां यस्मिन् भूते यो गुणः स पञ्चीकरणाद्व्यवहारयोग्यो भवतीत्येतावन्मात्राभ्युपगमान्नाकाशे रूपारम्भप्रसङ्गः।
However, even if creation was on the basis of quintuplication, the attributes that are present in the main subtle element are the ones that become manifest in the gross element, making them perceptible to the sense organs, and therefore it cannot be asserted that by quintuplication itself, the attributes of form present in other subtle elements become available for perception in gross space.

न च `नायं सर्पः' इत्युक्तोऽपि, `किमेवं वदसि परम् ? अपि पुनः परामृश्य पश्यसि ?' इति प्रतिवचनदर्शनान्न शब्दमात्रं रज्जुसर्पादिभ्रमनिवर्त्तकम्, किं तु प्रत्यक्षमेवेति वाच्यम्।
Nor can it be argued thus - "It cannot be said that verbal testimony by itself is capable of rejecting the illusion of snake in  the rope, rather it is perception alone (that is so capable) - because, even if someone (trustworthy) says 'This is not a snake', the seer reverts with a counterquestion - 'Do you merely say so, or do you actually see it to be so?'

प्रतिवचनस्थले भ्रमप्रमादादिशङ्काक्रान्तत्वेन `नायं सर्पः' इत्यादेर्दुर्बलतया न भ्रमनिवर्तकत्वम्। यत्र तु तादृक्शङ्कानाक्रान्तत्वं तत्र भ्रमनिवर्तकतैव। अत एव तादृक्शङ्कानाक्रान्तपित्रादिवचसि नेदृक्प्रतिवचनं, किन्तु सिद्धवत्प्रवृत्त्यादिकमेव।
In the case of such a response, it is evident that if the words 'this is not a snake' are accompanied by doubts about their validity, they are weak, and hence incapable of supplanting the illusion. However, where they are not accompanied by such doubts, they are certainly capable of overruling the illusion. That is why when someone trustworthy, like one's father for instance, speaks these words, the hearer is not afflicted by such doubts, does not respond in the said manner, accepts the validity of the statement, and proceeds accordingly.

ज्वालैक्यप्रत्यक्षमप्येवमेव युक्तिबाध्यम्।
Similarly, the cognition that it is one identical flame that burns continuously is also overruled by the right inference.
न च निर्वापितारोपितस्थले स्पष्टतरभेदप्रत्यक्षबाधितं तदित्यन्यत्रापि दीर्घेयं न ह्रस्वेति भेदप्रत्यक्षमेव तद्बाधकमिति वाच्यम्।
Nor can it be argued thus - "When the flame is blown out and lit again, it becomes quite clear that what appears as one flame is actually a series of different flames that continuously appear and disappear, and elsewhere too, when sometimes the flame is long, and sometimes short, it is the direct perception of different flames that overrules an erroneous perception of identity."
निर्वापितारोपितातिरिक्तस्थले तावदयं विचारः। तत्र च दीर्घेयं न ह्रस्वेति भेदप्रत्यक्षं वक्तुमशक्यम्। यैव ह्रस्वा सैवेदानीं दीर्घेति ह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वाभ्यामुपस्थितयोरभेदस्य साक्षात्क्रियमाणत्वात्।
Where the flame is not blown out and lit again, it is not possible to say that one has a direct perception of different flames, such as "this is long, that was short", etc - because, the direct cognition that people have is one of identity, that is, "that which was short is the one that which is long now"
तथा च ज्वालाप्रत्यभिज्ञा युक्तिबाध्यैव। Therefore, the recognition of the flame as the same throughout is repudiated by logical reasoning alone, not direct perception. 

सर्वदा पित्तदूषितनेत्रस्य `पीतः शङ्खः' इति प्रत्यक्षे चन्द्रप्रादेशत्वप्रत्यक्षे च परोक्षातिरिक्तस्य बाधकस्य शङ्कितुमप्यशक्यत्वात् युक्त्यादिबाध्यतैव वक्तव्या।

The repudiation of the erroneous cognition "the conch-shell is yellow" for someone who is permanently afflicted by jaundice, or the erroneous cognition of the moon being the size of a prAdeshika (finger span) by any cognition other than an indirect one being impossible, it must be admitted that the overruling of perception in such cases is by reasoning alone. 
 
The opponent objects:

ननु सर्वत्रैवात्र प्रकारान्तरेणासत्कल्पे प्रत्यक्षे मानान्तरप्रवृत्तिः। In all these instances, when perception arises, it does so accompanied by a doubt about its validity, its only then that other means of cognition start having a scope for application.

तथा हि - द्विविधं ज्ञानम्। द्विकोटिकमेककोटिकं च। अन्त्यमपि द्विविधं अप्रामाण्यशङ्काकलङ्कितं तदकलङ्कितं च।
To explain, cognitions are of two types. (1) those which entertain the possibility of two alternatives (in the case of doubt, etc.) (2) those where only one alternative is presented. The latter case is further subdivided into two. a) those which are accompanied by a doubt about their invalidity and b) those which are not so tainted.
तत्राद्यौ सर्वप्रमाणावकाशदौ। अर्थापरिच्छेदकत्वादप्रामाण्यशङ्काकलङ्कितत्वाच्च। Of these, the first option in each category, allows for the operation of other means of cognition, because of two reasons - 1) there is no certainty in the outcome revealed and 2) it is accompanied by a doubt about its validity.
अप्रामाण्यधीकलङ्कितत्वं च द्वेधा भवति। दुष्टकरणकत्वनिश्चयादर्थाभावनिश्चयाच्च। A cognition can be accompanied by a doubt about its validity due to two reasons - 1) if there is certainty that the instrument of knowledge giving rise to the cognition is faulty, or 2) if there is certainty that the object revealed by the cognition does not exist.

तथा शैलाग्रस्थितविटपिनां प्रादेशिकत्वप्रतीतिर्दूरदोषनिबन्धना दृष्टेति दूरतस्थस्य चन्द्रमसः प्रादेशिकत्वप्रत्ययो दोषनिबन्धन एवेति निर्णीयते। Therefore, because of the knowledge of distance between the seer and the perceived objects, there is certainty that the size of trees on the top of a hill cannot be the size of a finger's length, even though perception reveals them to be so. It follows that the moon, which is even further away, cannot be the size of a finger, even though it appears to be as such.
एवमाकाशे समीपे नीरूपत्वनिश्चयाद्दूरे रूपवत्त्वधीर्दूरदोषजन्येति प्रागेव निश्चियते। Similarly, because proximate space is known with certainty to be colourless, it is clear that the perception of sky in the distance being blue must be due to a defect. 
`पीतः शङ्खः' इत्यादि प्रत्यक्षं तु प्राथमिकपरीक्षितप्रत्यक्षेण `शङ्खो न पीतः' इत्यर्थाभाव निश्चयादप्रामाण्यज्ञानास्कन्दितमेवोत्पद्यते। A person who sees the yellowness of the conch already has the verified knowledge that the conch is white, therefore his perception of yellowness is accompanied by the certainty of its incorrectness.
एवं सवितृसुषिरादिप्रत्यक्षमपि ।Similarly, the perception of a hole in the sun, which happens to some people, is also wrong.
तथा च चन्द्रादिप्रादेशिकत्वप्रत्यक्षं दूरादिदोषनिश्चयात्, `पीतः शङ्खः' इत्यदिप्रत्यक्षं प्राथमिकार्थाभावनिश्चयादेव बाधितमिति पश्चादनुमानागमादिप्रसर इति न ताभ्यां तद्बाध:। Therefore the perception of the smallness of the moon is disproved by the certain knowledge that the perception suffers from the defect of distance, and the yellowness of the conch is disproved by the certainty that it cannot be yellow, and it is after they have been thus repudiated, that there is any scope for the operation of inference or scripture. That being so, scripture and inference are not the ones that are contradicting perception.

येन हि यस्य भ्रमत्वं ज्ञायतेः, तत्तस्य बाधकमित्युच्यते। The cognition that reveals the illusoriness of another cognition is the one that can be called the overruling or contradicting cognition.
न च चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वादिप्रत्यक्षस्यागमादिना भ्रमत्वं ज्ञायते। भ्रमत्वज्ञानोत्तरकालमेव तत्प्रवृत्तेः। Scriptural cognitions etc., cannot be called the overruling cognitions because they do not reveal the illusoriness of the perception of the smallness of the moon, for they (scriptural cognitions) only start operating after their (the perception of the size of the moon) illusoriness has already been established.
अप्रमाण्यज्ञानाकलङ्कितं तु स्वार्थपरिच्छेदकं निःशङ्कप्रवृत्तिजननयोग्यम्। A cognition not afflicted by a doubt about its validity is the one that is capable of revealing its object with certainty, and of leading to fruitful activity backed by conviction. 
यथा `वह्निरुष्ण एव',`प्रस्तरो यजमानभिन्न एव', `घटः सन्नेव इत्यादि तन्नान्यस्यावकाशदर्शनान्नान्येन बाध्यम्। For example, the cognitions "fire is hot indeed", "the prastara is certainly different from the sacrificer", "the pot certainly exists", do not allow room for any other means of knowledge, and therefore cannot be contradicted by any other cognitions.
न ह्यत्र प्रागेव दूरादिदोषधीर्वा अर्थाभावनिश्चयो वा कोट्यन्तरालम्बित्वं वाऽस्ति। In none of these cognitions, is there a prior cognition of defects (such as distance), or certainty that their objects do not exist, or the possibility of any other alternative outcome.

The opponent next invokes the six summary indicators of meaning according to pUrva mImAmsa - shruti, linga, vAkya, sthAna, prakaraNa, samAkhya (ref: pUrva mImAmsa sUtra 3.3.14) - to prove his point.

A short explanation of each of the terms is provided below for ease of comprehension.
1) shruti - when a word or collection of words independently conveys its primary / conventional meaning, without relying on other words or the context. 
2) linga - when the meaning of a word is not clear and its suggestive meaning is brought by some other word.
3) vAkya - when the meaning of a word or word-collection is derived from a self-contained sentence unit.
4) sthAna - when the location of a sentence or a certain order of the text contributes largely to its interpretation.
5) prakaraNa - when the sentence meaning is not clear and it is derived from the context in which it occurs.
6) samAkhya - when a compound word is split into its components and its meaning is thus determined. 

The general rule of interpretation is that the one that occurs previously in the sUtra (shruti, linga, vAkya, sthAna, prakaraNa, samAkhya) is stronger than the one that occurs later. So shruti is the strongest and samAkhya is the weakest. However, there are exceptions. Sometimes, prakaraNa backed by shruti is stronger than linga.

The opponent argues:
 
किं च क्वचित् प्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यक्षान्तरगौरवाद्युक्तिबाध्यं भवतु, क्वचिच्च लिङ्गादिकं श्रुतिगौरवात् श्रुत्यनुसारिप्रकरणादिबाध्यं भवतु, राजामात्य इव राजगौरवेण राजभृत्यबाध्यः, 
Sometimes, we may admit that perception is overruled by reasoning, but that is due to the support of some other, more valid perceptual cognitions. Sometimes, implied indication (linga) may be overruled by context (prakaraNa), but only when it is backed by the power of direct connotation (shruti). Like for example a minister is sometimes overruled by the king's servant, on account of the authority vested in him by the king.
तथापि न युक्तिमात्रस्य प्रकरणमात्रस्य वा प्रत्यक्षलिङ्गादिबाधकत्वम्। प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुसारित्वस्य सर्वत्राभावात्।
Even so, it must be recognised that neither reasoning on its own, nor context on its own is universally capable of overruling perception and implied indication, respectively, because the support of perception etc. (and shruti) cannot be present in every instance.

न हि प्रधानभूताचमनादिपदार्थविषयया `आचामेदुपवीति दक्षिणाचारः' इत्यादिस्मृत्या पदार्थधर्मभूतक्रमादिविषया `वेदं कृत्वा वेदिं करोति' इति श्रुतिर्वेदकरणानन्तरं क्षुतनिमित्तकाचमनोपनिपाते बाध्यत इत्यन्यत्रापि तथा भवितव्यम्
It may so happen that the smRti injunction "if one sneezes in the middle of a ritual, perform an Achamanam" sometimes overrules the shruti injunction "commence the construction of the vedi (altar) immediately after making the veda (a clump of darbha grass)" - because the sacrificer happens to have sneezed just after the veda was made, necessitating him to perform the Achamanam before proceeding to construct the vedi. However, that by itself does not mean that smRti overrules shruti everywhere.

The siddhikAra responds to this argument.
इति चेत्, मैवम्। If this is said, not so.
यतो युक्तिरेवैषा। Because it is by reasoning that one proves that perception is flawed.
यत् यद्दूरस्थाल्पपरिमाणज्ञानं, तत् तद्दूरदोषनिबन्धनमप्रमा, शैलाग्रस्थविटप्यल्पपरिमाणज्ञानवत् इदमपि तथेति। Wherever the object of perception appears small, it is because of the discrepancy of distance and such a cognition is incorrect. Like in the instance of the trees on the hilltop appearing small. This too is like that.  
तथा चैवंरूपया युक्त्यैव चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वादिप्रत्यक्षस्य बाधं वदन् युक्त्या न प्रत्यक्षस्य बाध इति वचनेनाजैषीः परं मन्दबुद्धे ! मन्दाक्षम्, न तु परम्।
Thus even as you are arguing for the repudiation of the perception on the basis of logical reasoning, you insist that logical reasoning is incapable of overthrowing perception. In arguing so, you have only forsaken shame, not achieved victory.
एवं `पीतः शङ्खः' इति प्रत्यक्षेऽपि प्राचीनार्थाभावप्रत्यक्षं न बाधकम्, तस्येदानीमभावात्। Similarly, the rejection of the cognition "the conch-shell is yellow" is not due to a pre-existing perceptual cognition of its whiteness, for the latter is not present at the time of the former cognition.
न च तत्स्मृतिर्बाधिका, तस्या अनुभवात् दुर्बलत्वात्। Nor can the memory of its whiteness overrule the present perception of yellowness, because memory is weaker than direct experience.
केवलं युक्त्युत्पादन एव सोपयुज्यते। तेन युक्त्यागमाभ्यामेवोदाहृतस्थलेषु बाधः। The only purpose that it (memory) serves is to trigger the reasoning process. Therefore, it must be admitted that in all the cases under discussion, the repudiation of perceptual cognitions is by reasoning and scripture.


यत्तु क्वचिद्युक्त्यादेर्बाधकत्वदर्शनमात्रेण सर्वत्र न बाधकत्वं वक्तुं शक्यम्, युक्त्यादिबाधकताया अनुस्रियमाणप्रत्यक्षगौरवनिबन्धनत्वात् इत्युक्तम्। तदनुक्तोपालम्भनम्।
It was argued that "it is not possible to extrapolate as a general rule that reasoning and scripture are able to overrule perception on the basis of a few examples, because in such instances, reasoning etc have the support of a stronger perception which confers them with the ability to overthrow (the weaker) perception - however, this is not universally true" - This is refuting something we never stated in the first place.

न हि मया क्वचिद्दर्शनमात्रेण युक्तर्बाधकता सर्वत्रोच्यते, अपि तु चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वशङ्खपीतत्वप्रत्यक्षादौ यावदागमादेर्बाधकताप्रयोजकं दृष्टं तावत्सत्त्वेन।
I did not claim that reasoning is capable of overruling all perception on the basis of a few examples alone. Rather, the argument made was - if the conditions which allow reasoning and scripture to overrule the perception of the smallness of the moon and the yellowness of the conch, are present in other instances, then they too will overrule perceptions.
 
न च तत्रानुस्रियमाणं प्रत्यक्षमस्ति, यद्गौरवेण बाधकतायामन्यथासिद्धिं ब्रूयाः। On the other hand, there is no other stronger perception that supports reasoning and scripture in the instances quoted - one has not had the direct perception of the true size of the moon, so to argue that reasoning is able to overrule the perception of moon's smallness only with the aid of a stronger perception is not valid. If the perception of a different object, or of the same object, but from a different time, is invoked as support, that is only describing the process of inference and memory, not proving that it is perception that contradicts perception.

तस्माच्चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वप्रत्यक्षस्य प्रपञ्चसत्त्वप्रत्यक्षस्य च तुल्यवदेव बाध्यता। युक्त्यागमयोश्च तुल्यवदेव बाधकतेति।  Therefore, the perception of the smallness of the moon and the world's reality are equal in their capacity to be sublated; the sublating ability of reasoning and scripture are also similarly equal.

न हि चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वप्रत्यक्षेऽपि प्रागेव दुष्टकरणकत्वनिश्चयः। नैकट्यस्यापि क्वचिद्दोषत्वेन सर्वत्र परिमाणज्ञानाविश्वासप्रसङ्गात्। Nor can it be argued that the perception of the moon's smallness was already known to be defective (because of the discrepancy introduced by distance), because even if the object happens to be too close, it appears to be unnaturally large. Thus, any faith in the validity of the size cognition will be lost if you say that the presence of discrepancies is already known.
किन्त्वागमादिना बाधानन्तरमेव। Rather, the cognition that the perception of the smallness of moon is incorrect because it is far away from earth - is only known after the original perception has been overruled by verbal testimony and logical reasoning first.

तद्वत् प्रकृतेऽपि मिथ्यात्वसिद्ध्यनन्तरमेवाविद्यारूपदोषनिश्चयः। Similarly, in our context too, only after there is the certain cognition of the unreality of the world as a result of inferential reasoning and vedic scripture, does one have the certainty that the prior notion of reality was because of the defect of ignorance.

तथा च सर्वात्मना साम्यम्। Thus this is similar to the example.

यत्तु दृष्टस्य वस्तुनो बलवद्दृष्टिं विना अन्यद्बाधकं नास्तीत्युक्तं तत् दुर्बलशब्दलिङ्गादिविषयम्। What was said elsewhere - "that which is known through perception can only be repudiated by a stronger perception, and nothing else" - must be understood to mean to cover instances where the validity of reasoning and verbal testimony has not been validated by examination.

यदप्युक्तं विवरणे, `यत्राविचारपुरस्सरमेव प्रत्यक्षावभासमप्यनुमानादिना बाधितमुच्छिन्नव्यवहारं भवति। तत्र तथा भवतु। यत्र पुनर्विचार पदवीमुपारूढयोर्ज्ञानयोर्बलाबलचिन्तया बाधनिश्चयस्तत्र नानुमानादिना प्रत्यक्षस्य मिथ्यात्वसिद्धिः' इति,
In the instance of the sentence from the panchapAdika vivaraNa (quoted by the nyAyAmRtakAra): "If without enquiry, it has been determined that that perception is overruled by reasoning etc., so be it. However, if the relative strength of two contradictory cognitions is enquired into, and one is determined to be stronger than the other, then it must follow that inference cannot disprove perception".

On the face of it, this quote seems to prove the nyAyAmRtakAra's position that perception cannot be overturned by reasoning and scripture. However, the siddhikAra clarifies the intent of the vivaraNakAra:

तदपि गृहीतप्रामाण्यकशब्दतदुपजीव्यनुमानातिरिक्तयुक्तिविषयम् । Here too, the sentence is only concerned with those instances where the validity of scripture, and inferences that are dependent on such scripture, has not been verified. 
एकत्र प्रामाण्यनिश्चये बलाबलचिन्ताया एवानवकाशात्।। Where the validity (of scripture and inference) has been confirmed, there is no requirement for a consideration of the relative strengths of one pramANa versus the other.

Thus an enquiry into the relative strength of pramANa-s is only needed when one is unsure of the validity of a scriptural statement. If one has verified the validity of scripture, then it can certainly overturn perception. In the case of shruti revealing the mithyAtva of the world, there is certainty in its validity, so the vivaraNa sentence does not apply in this context.

।। इति प्रत्यक्षस्य लिङ्गाद्यबाध्यत्वे बाधकम्।।
This concludes the chapter on the refutation of the impossibility of inference and scripture overruling perception.