paricCheda 1 - pratyaksha bAdhoddhAre sattva nirvachanam (part 5)
To recap, this chapter is a refutation of the argument that the inference of the world's unreality is contradicted by the perception of the world's reality. The dvaitin argues - As perception is a stronger proof in comparison to inference, when the two are in contradiction, perception will overrule inference. The perception of the world as real will overrule the advaitin's inference of the world as unreal.
In response, the siddhikAra raises two questions - what is real, and can it be perceived?
Having considered various definitions of existence here and here, the siddhikAra concludes that a reality that can overrule unreality is not perceptible; and that which is perceptible cannot overrule unreality.
The discussion led to a conclusion that only a reality, where every kind of absence associated with an object at a particular place and time are absent, can overrule unreality. The absence of every form of pot absence in a place proves the real existence of the pot there, and such a real existence can overrule an inference of the pot's unreality. The challenge for the dvaitin is that it is impossible to perceive every kind of the absence of anything anywhere. If the universe of absence is not perceptible, the absence of all absence (ie reality) would not be perceptible either.
To address this, the nyAyAmritakAra invokes the logician's doctrine of extrasensory perception, sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti or alaukika sannikarSha, to establish the perceptibility of the absence of all absence at a place. The basic theory is that when any absence of an object is known, one directly perceives all kinds of absence. Once such a universal absence is seen, the absence of universal absence is knowable as well.
It is a far-fetched theory, but the siddhikAra offers an elaborate rebuttal to the basic doctrine of sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti which serves as the foundation for the nyAyAmritakAra's argument.
This led to a lengthy discussion on the validity of the theory of jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti here and here. Six justifications were offered, and each of those were refuted by the siddhikAra.
Now another justification is being proposed.
The seventh argument refuting sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti
किञ्च धूमत्वादिसामान्यं न स्वरुपत: प्रत्यासत्ति:, धूलिपटले धूमभ्रमानन्तरं धूमत्वेन सकलधूमनिष्ठवह्निव्याप्तिग्रहानुदयप्रसङ्गात्, तत्र स्वरूपतो धूमत्वाभावात्, न चेष्टापत्ति: तदुत्तरकालमनुमित्यनुदयापत्ते:, तथा च धूमत्वज्ञानं प्रयासत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, तच्च धूमेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षदशायां धूमज्ञानात्प्राक् नास्त्येव |
किञ्च धूमत्वादिसामान्यं न स्वरुपत: प्रत्यासत्ति:, Moreover, the generic class of substances does not have any intrinsic connection to all individual instances of that class. For example, the generic class of smokeness does not have any intrinsic connection to all instances of smoke. Why?
धूलिपटले धूमभ्रमानन्तरं धूमत्वेन सकलधूमनिष्ठवह्निव्याप्तिग्रहानुदयप्रसङ्गात्, Because it is possible to mistake a dust cloud for smoke, following which, a smokeness led cognition of the concomitance between all smoke and fire would not arise.
तत्र स्वरूपतो धूमत्वाभावात्, न चेष्टापत्ति: तदुत्तरकालमनुमित्यनुदयापत्ते:, For smokeness is absent there. However, this is not desirable, for it will imply that an inference (of fire) will not subsequently occur.
To explain - the opponent wants to argue that any inference is possible only because of his theory of extraordinary perception. He says that the inference of fire in a mountain is possible because one has previously perceived the concomitance between mountain fire and mountain smoke, in the kitchen itself. The 'smokeness' of the kitchen smoke leads to the perception of all smoke, including mountain smoke (similarly, the 'fireness' of the kitchen fire leads to the perception of mountain fire as well). Thus in the kitchen, the seer draws a conclusion regarding the invariable concomitance of mountain smoke with mountain fire.
Later, when the same seer sees mountain smoke in the mountain, he remembers that invariable concomitance between mountain fire and mountain smoke he saw previously in the kitchen and infers that mountain fire also must be present now. The opponent uses this inference as a proof for the existence of extrasensory perception.
The siddhikAra rebuts this by alleging that smokeness cannot intrinsically lead to the perception of all smoke because there is no direct connection between smokeness and every instance of smoke. He cites an example of an illusion where a person sees a dust cloud and mistakes it for smoke. Let us assume that coincidentally, fire also happens to be present there. Thus a person sees what he thinks is smoke copresent with fire and draws a conclusion that where smoke is present, fire must be present. Wrong data, but right conclusion.
If the opponent is right in holding that inference occurs because of extrasensory perception, as smokeness is not present in the dust cloud, the extrasensory perception of all smoke should not occur. He therefore should not be able to infer mountain fire when he sees mountain smoke later. However, in practice, that inference does occur in the mountain based on the prior perception of concomitance between fire and illusory smoke.
Thus even where smokeness is absent, an illusion of smoke can sometimes lead to the right conclusion of concomitance and the subsequent inference of fire. This means that even without extrasensory perception, inference is possible. As a consequence, the occurrence of inference is no proof for extrasensory perception.
तथा च धूमत्वज्ञानं प्रयासत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, To remedy such a defect, if it is instead said - it is not smokeness that leads to the perception of all smoke, rather, it is the cognition of smokeness that leads to it (and it is possible to incorrectly perceive smokeness).
Let us assume, for argument's sake, that the extrasensory perception of smoke through the perception of smokeness is valid. There are two possibilities for how this may occur. 1) The seer sees smokeness in general, after which he sees every instance of smoke. 2) He sees any particular instance of smoke. In it, he sees smokeness. That perception of smokeness leads him to see all other instances of smoke.
The siddhikAra refutes the first possibility now.
तच्च धूमेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षदशायां धूमज्ञानात्प्राक् नास्त्येव | When smoke comes into contact with the senses, the cognition of smokeness cannot arise prior to the cognition of smoke.
निर्विकल्पके मानाभावात्, To counter this, if it be said that the indeterminate cognition of smokeness precedes the cognition of smoke, such a postulate has no basis.
In nyAya, it is postulated that prior to every determinate cognition of an object, there is an indeterminate cognition of its qualifier. Therefore, if an object is seen with its attributes (in a determinate cognition), there is an indeterminate cognition of the attributes that precedes it - no one is aware of such a cognition, but it must necessarily exist because of the cause-effect relationship between the cognition of the qualifier and the cognition of the qualified. Such a cause-effect relationship is rejected by the siddhikAra.
विशिष्टज्ञानत्वेन विशेषणज्ञानत्वेन च कार्यकारणभावानभ्युपगमात्, However there is no cause-effect relationship between the cognition of the qualifier and the cognition of the qualified.
अवश्यक्लृप्तकार्यकारणभावविशेषेणैव सर्वव्यवहारोपपत्ते: | Any activity occurs only on the basis of the necessary causal factors.
Every aspect of the object that is in contact with the eye is seeable. If there is a man with a stick walking down a road, as long as there is contact between the eyes and both the man and his stick, the seer will have the qualified (vishiShTa) cognition of the man with his stick. There is no rule that the seer must see his stick (qualifier) first, and only after that is it possible to have the cognition of the man with his stick.
The siddhikAra then refutes the second possibility.
नच धूमत्वेन सन्निकृष्टधूमव्यक्तिज्ञाननन्तरं तत्समानाकारमसन्निकृष्टधूमगोचरं ज्ञानान्तरमुत्पद्यत इत्यत्र मानमस्ति ; There is no proof to claim that the perception of smokeness, seen by the eyes to be present in an individual instance of smoke, leads to the perception of all the smoke in the world similarly endowed with smokeness, even when such smoke is not directly in contact with the eyes.
धूमत्वेन पुरोवर्तिनं धूमं साक्षात्करोमि न व्यवहितमित्यनुभवाच्च | अन्यथा जगतीगतसकलधूमव्यक्तीरहं साक्षात्करोमीत्यनुव्यवसीयेत | For everyone's experience is "I see the smoke in front of my eyes". If the doctrine of extrasensory perception was correct, one should have the experience - "I see all the world's smoke in front of me".
नचैवमनुभवशरणीयैरभ्युपेयते । However, that does not happen, and thus those that set store by personal experience cannot accept such a theory.
The eighth argument refuting sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti
किञ्च सामान्यप्रत्यासत्त्यङ्गीकारे यत् प्रमेयं, तदभिदेयं, यत्प्रमेयवत्, तदभिधेयवदित्यादि व्याप्तिपरिच्छेदे सार्वज्ञापत्ति: | नचेष्टैव सा ; परज्ञानविषयो घटो न वेत्यादिसंशयानुपपत्ते: |
Moreover, if this doctrine of extrasensory perception is accepted, then on the basis of the invariable concomitance "that which is knowable is expressible, or that which has knowability, has expressibility", one would have omniscience. That is not desirable, because it would contradict experience. If one has omniscience, the doubt that one experiences - "do others see this pot or not?" would not arise.
The argument the siddhikAra makes is that if a thing is knowable, it has knowability. According to the pUrvapakshin, the cognisance of the universal class leads to the cognisance of every instance of that class. Knowability is the class of all things knowable - Thus everything knowable becomes cognised by perceiving knowability, if one accepts this theory. This leads to omniscience. This is not desirable for it contradicts everyone's experience. One does not know what someone else knows or does not, for instance.
नच- घटत्वप्रकारकघटविषयकनिश्चयो घटसंशयविरोधी, प्रमेयमिति निश्चयस्तु घटविषयोऽपि न घटत्वप्रकारक इति - वाच्यम् ;
The opponent argues - "Only the cognition which has pot as its object (viShaya), and potness as its attribute (prakAra), can overrule a doubt about (someone else's) cognisance of a pot. However, in the cognition "The pot is knowable", the prakAra is knowability, not potness. Thus the cognition of knowability cannot remove the doubt whether someone else sees this pot or not. As the doubt can still arise, extrasensory perception is not disproved."
The siddhikAra rebuts such an argument.
भासमानवैशिष्ट्यप्रतियोगिन एव प्रकारत्वात्, घटत्वस्यापि प्रमेयमिति ज्ञाने भासमानवैशिष्ट्यप्रतियोगित्वात्, This is not correct, as prakAra is the feature that appears to be present in the object of the cognition. In the cognition "the pot is knowable", potness is a feature that appears to be present. If the pot has knowability, it must have potness too. Otherwise it wouldn't be cognised as a pot that contains knowability. So potness is the prakAra even in that cognition.
घटत्वप्रकारकनिश्चयस्य घटत्वज्ञानजन्यविशेषणाददोष इति चेत्, if it is said - "As the cognition having potness as its attribute is born from the cognition of potness, there is no defect".
The opponent wishes to add one more condition for a pot's cognition to rule out any doubt about someone else's cognition of a pot seen by oneself - in addition to that cognition 1) having the pot as its object and 2) potness as its attribute (which was disproved by the siddhikAra), it is also said that 3) the pot-cognition is born from the cognition of potness.
The cognition "this pot is knowable" is not born from the cognition of potness, and therefore such a cognition, according to this rule, would be unable to overrule the doubt about someone else's cognition of the pot. Thus siddhikAra's argument against extrasensory perception does not stand.
If this is the opponent's argument:
न विशेषणज्ञानत्वेनैव तस्य जनकता वाच्या; तस्या: प्रागेव निरासात् ; (The opponent's) justification for adding such a condition is that the cognition of the qualified (vishiShTa) is born from the cognition of the qualifier (visheShaNa). However, this has already been disproved previously.
The siddhikAra's contention is that if the cognition of a pot qualified by potness is not necessarily born from the prior cognition of potness, then one cannot argue that the prior cognition of potness is absent in the cognition the "pot is knowable" and therefore it should be unable to overrule the said doubt. Therefore the doubt is overruled. If it is overruled, one would be omniscient, which is absurd. By reductio ad absurdum, extrasensory perception is disproven.
It was said by the advaitin that the relationship between the qualifier and the substance (potness and pot) was a qualifier-qualified relationship. The opponent may instead argue that their relationship is an intrinsic one, a svarUpa sambandha, and not a qualifier-qualified relationship. As a result, in the cognition "everything is known", as one does not cognise an intrinsic relationship between pot and potness, it cannot overrule a doubt about others' cognition of a pot. This argument is being refuted next.
स्वरूपसंबन्धविशेषाभ्युपगमे चानिर्वचनीयवादापत्ते:, If the relationship of the qualifier is intrinsic, it leads to the advatin's doctrine of inexpressibility. An intrinsic relationship is postulated only when every other relationship has been rendered impossible, that is, one cannot explain the nature of the relationship and therefore settles on calling it an intrinsic one. If an intrinsic relationship is ultimately inexpressible, the opponent is endorsing the advaitin's doctrine of inexpressibility.
The siddhikAra concludes this elaborate refutation of sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti
इत्यादिदूषणानि बहुतरमूहनीयानि | Thus one may infer several defects in such a doctrine.
Coming back to the primary topic of this chapter,
तस्मात् सामान्यप्रत्यासत्त्या निषेधमात्रप्रतियोगित्वोपस्थितौ तदभावग्रहात् बाध इत्यनुपपन्नमेव | As the doctrine of extrasensory perception on the basis of the perception of the universal is unacceptable, one cannot define reality as the absence of every negation about the object, and as a consequence, such a reality of the world is not perceptible and therefore the inference of the world's unreality cannot be overruled by the perception of its reality.
End of the chapter.
Originally posted on 12th August 2018.
In response, the siddhikAra raises two questions - what is real, and can it be perceived?
Having considered various definitions of existence here and here, the siddhikAra concludes that a reality that can overrule unreality is not perceptible; and that which is perceptible cannot overrule unreality.
The discussion led to a conclusion that only a reality, where every kind of absence associated with an object at a particular place and time are absent, can overrule unreality. The absence of every form of pot absence in a place proves the real existence of the pot there, and such a real existence can overrule an inference of the pot's unreality. The challenge for the dvaitin is that it is impossible to perceive every kind of the absence of anything anywhere. If the universe of absence is not perceptible, the absence of all absence (ie reality) would not be perceptible either.
To address this, the nyAyAmritakAra invokes the logician's doctrine of extrasensory perception, sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti or alaukika sannikarSha, to establish the perceptibility of the absence of all absence at a place. The basic theory is that when any absence of an object is known, one directly perceives all kinds of absence. Once such a universal absence is seen, the absence of universal absence is knowable as well.
It is a far-fetched theory, but the siddhikAra offers an elaborate rebuttal to the basic doctrine of sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti which serves as the foundation for the nyAyAmritakAra's argument.
This led to a lengthy discussion on the validity of the theory of jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti here and here. Six justifications were offered, and each of those were refuted by the siddhikAra.
Now another justification is being proposed.
The seventh argument refuting sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti
किञ्च धूमत्वादिसामान्यं न स्वरुपत: प्रत्यासत्ति:, धूलिपटले धूमभ्रमानन्तरं धूमत्वेन सकलधूमनिष्ठवह्निव्याप्तिग्रहानुदयप्रसङ्गात्, तत्र स्वरूपतो धूमत्वाभावात्, न चेष्टापत्ति: तदुत्तरकालमनुमित्यनुदयापत्ते:, तथा च धूमत्वज्ञानं प्रयासत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, तच्च धूमेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षदशायां धूमज्ञानात्प्राक् नास्त्येव |
किञ्च धूमत्वादिसामान्यं न स्वरुपत: प्रत्यासत्ति:, Moreover, the generic class of substances does not have any intrinsic connection to all individual instances of that class. For example, the generic class of smokeness does not have any intrinsic connection to all instances of smoke. Why?
धूलिपटले धूमभ्रमानन्तरं धूमत्वेन सकलधूमनिष्ठवह्निव्याप्तिग्रहानुदयप्रसङ्गात्, Because it is possible to mistake a dust cloud for smoke, following which, a smokeness led cognition of the concomitance between all smoke and fire would not arise.
तत्र स्वरूपतो धूमत्वाभावात्, न चेष्टापत्ति: तदुत्तरकालमनुमित्यनुदयापत्ते:, For smokeness is absent there. However, this is not desirable, for it will imply that an inference (of fire) will not subsequently occur.
To explain - the opponent wants to argue that any inference is possible only because of his theory of extraordinary perception. He says that the inference of fire in a mountain is possible because one has previously perceived the concomitance between mountain fire and mountain smoke, in the kitchen itself. The 'smokeness' of the kitchen smoke leads to the perception of all smoke, including mountain smoke (similarly, the 'fireness' of the kitchen fire leads to the perception of mountain fire as well). Thus in the kitchen, the seer draws a conclusion regarding the invariable concomitance of mountain smoke with mountain fire.
Later, when the same seer sees mountain smoke in the mountain, he remembers that invariable concomitance between mountain fire and mountain smoke he saw previously in the kitchen and infers that mountain fire also must be present now. The opponent uses this inference as a proof for the existence of extrasensory perception.
The siddhikAra rebuts this by alleging that smokeness cannot intrinsically lead to the perception of all smoke because there is no direct connection between smokeness and every instance of smoke. He cites an example of an illusion where a person sees a dust cloud and mistakes it for smoke. Let us assume that coincidentally, fire also happens to be present there. Thus a person sees what he thinks is smoke copresent with fire and draws a conclusion that where smoke is present, fire must be present. Wrong data, but right conclusion.
If the opponent is right in holding that inference occurs because of extrasensory perception, as smokeness is not present in the dust cloud, the extrasensory perception of all smoke should not occur. He therefore should not be able to infer mountain fire when he sees mountain smoke later. However, in practice, that inference does occur in the mountain based on the prior perception of concomitance between fire and illusory smoke.
Thus even where smokeness is absent, an illusion of smoke can sometimes lead to the right conclusion of concomitance and the subsequent inference of fire. This means that even without extrasensory perception, inference is possible. As a consequence, the occurrence of inference is no proof for extrasensory perception.
तथा च धूमत्वज्ञानं प्रयासत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, To remedy such a defect, if it is instead said - it is not smokeness that leads to the perception of all smoke, rather, it is the cognition of smokeness that leads to it (and it is possible to incorrectly perceive smokeness).
Let us assume, for argument's sake, that the extrasensory perception of smoke through the perception of smokeness is valid. There are two possibilities for how this may occur. 1) The seer sees smokeness in general, after which he sees every instance of smoke. 2) He sees any particular instance of smoke. In it, he sees smokeness. That perception of smokeness leads him to see all other instances of smoke.
The siddhikAra refutes the first possibility now.
तच्च धूमेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षदशायां धूमज्ञानात्प्राक् नास्त्येव | When smoke comes into contact with the senses, the cognition of smokeness cannot arise prior to the cognition of smoke.
निर्विकल्पके मानाभावात्, To counter this, if it be said that the indeterminate cognition of smokeness precedes the cognition of smoke, such a postulate has no basis.
In nyAya, it is postulated that prior to every determinate cognition of an object, there is an indeterminate cognition of its qualifier. Therefore, if an object is seen with its attributes (in a determinate cognition), there is an indeterminate cognition of the attributes that precedes it - no one is aware of such a cognition, but it must necessarily exist because of the cause-effect relationship between the cognition of the qualifier and the cognition of the qualified. Such a cause-effect relationship is rejected by the siddhikAra.
विशिष्टज्ञानत्वेन विशेषणज्ञानत्वेन च कार्यकारणभावानभ्युपगमात्, However there is no cause-effect relationship between the cognition of the qualifier and the cognition of the qualified.
अवश्यक्लृप्तकार्यकारणभावविशेषेणैव सर्वव्यवहारोपपत्ते: | Any activity occurs only on the basis of the necessary causal factors.
Every aspect of the object that is in contact with the eye is seeable. If there is a man with a stick walking down a road, as long as there is contact between the eyes and both the man and his stick, the seer will have the qualified (vishiShTa) cognition of the man with his stick. There is no rule that the seer must see his stick (qualifier) first, and only after that is it possible to have the cognition of the man with his stick.
The siddhikAra then refutes the second possibility.
नच धूमत्वेन सन्निकृष्टधूमव्यक्तिज्ञाननन्तरं तत्समानाकारमसन्निकृष्टधूमगोचरं ज्ञानान्तरमुत्पद्यत इत्यत्र मानमस्ति ; There is no proof to claim that the perception of smokeness, seen by the eyes to be present in an individual instance of smoke, leads to the perception of all the smoke in the world similarly endowed with smokeness, even when such smoke is not directly in contact with the eyes.
धूमत्वेन पुरोवर्तिनं धूमं साक्षात्करोमि न व्यवहितमित्यनुभवाच्च | अन्यथा जगतीगतसकलधूमव्यक्तीरहं साक्षात्करोमीत्यनुव्यवसीयेत | For everyone's experience is "I see the smoke in front of my eyes". If the doctrine of extrasensory perception was correct, one should have the experience - "I see all the world's smoke in front of me".
नचैवमनुभवशरणीयैरभ्युपेयते । However, that does not happen, and thus those that set store by personal experience cannot accept such a theory.
The eighth argument refuting sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti
किञ्च सामान्यप्रत्यासत्त्यङ्गीकारे यत् प्रमेयं, तदभिदेयं, यत्प्रमेयवत्, तदभिधेयवदित्यादि व्याप्तिपरिच्छेदे सार्वज्ञापत्ति: | नचेष्टैव सा ; परज्ञानविषयो घटो न वेत्यादिसंशयानुपपत्ते: |
Moreover, if this doctrine of extrasensory perception is accepted, then on the basis of the invariable concomitance "that which is knowable is expressible, or that which has knowability, has expressibility", one would have omniscience. That is not desirable, because it would contradict experience. If one has omniscience, the doubt that one experiences - "do others see this pot or not?" would not arise.
The argument the siddhikAra makes is that if a thing is knowable, it has knowability. According to the pUrvapakshin, the cognisance of the universal class leads to the cognisance of every instance of that class. Knowability is the class of all things knowable - Thus everything knowable becomes cognised by perceiving knowability, if one accepts this theory. This leads to omniscience. This is not desirable for it contradicts everyone's experience. One does not know what someone else knows or does not, for instance.
नच- घटत्वप्रकारकघटविषयकनिश्चयो घटसंशयविरोधी, प्रमेयमिति निश्चयस्तु घटविषयोऽपि न घटत्वप्रकारक इति - वाच्यम् ;
The opponent argues - "Only the cognition which has pot as its object (viShaya), and potness as its attribute (prakAra), can overrule a doubt about (someone else's) cognisance of a pot. However, in the cognition "The pot is knowable", the prakAra is knowability, not potness. Thus the cognition of knowability cannot remove the doubt whether someone else sees this pot or not. As the doubt can still arise, extrasensory perception is not disproved."
The siddhikAra rebuts such an argument.
भासमानवैशिष्ट्यप्रतियोगिन एव प्रकारत्वात्, घटत्वस्यापि प्रमेयमिति ज्ञाने भासमानवैशिष्ट्यप्रतियोगित्वात्, This is not correct, as prakAra is the feature that appears to be present in the object of the cognition. In the cognition "the pot is knowable", potness is a feature that appears to be present. If the pot has knowability, it must have potness too. Otherwise it wouldn't be cognised as a pot that contains knowability. So potness is the prakAra even in that cognition.
घटत्वप्रकारकनिश्चयस्य घटत्वज्ञानजन्यविशेषणाददोष इति चेत्, if it is said - "As the cognition having potness as its attribute is born from the cognition of potness, there is no defect".
The opponent wishes to add one more condition for a pot's cognition to rule out any doubt about someone else's cognition of a pot seen by oneself - in addition to that cognition 1) having the pot as its object and 2) potness as its attribute (which was disproved by the siddhikAra), it is also said that 3) the pot-cognition is born from the cognition of potness.
The cognition "this pot is knowable" is not born from the cognition of potness, and therefore such a cognition, according to this rule, would be unable to overrule the doubt about someone else's cognition of the pot. Thus siddhikAra's argument against extrasensory perception does not stand.
If this is the opponent's argument:
न विशेषणज्ञानत्वेनैव तस्य जनकता वाच्या; तस्या: प्रागेव निरासात् ; (The opponent's) justification for adding such a condition is that the cognition of the qualified (vishiShTa) is born from the cognition of the qualifier (visheShaNa). However, this has already been disproved previously.
The siddhikAra's contention is that if the cognition of a pot qualified by potness is not necessarily born from the prior cognition of potness, then one cannot argue that the prior cognition of potness is absent in the cognition the "pot is knowable" and therefore it should be unable to overrule the said doubt. Therefore the doubt is overruled. If it is overruled, one would be omniscient, which is absurd. By reductio ad absurdum, extrasensory perception is disproven.
It was said by the advaitin that the relationship between the qualifier and the substance (potness and pot) was a qualifier-qualified relationship. The opponent may instead argue that their relationship is an intrinsic one, a svarUpa sambandha, and not a qualifier-qualified relationship. As a result, in the cognition "everything is known", as one does not cognise an intrinsic relationship between pot and potness, it cannot overrule a doubt about others' cognition of a pot. This argument is being refuted next.
स्वरूपसंबन्धविशेषाभ्युपगमे चानिर्वचनीयवादापत्ते:, If the relationship of the qualifier is intrinsic, it leads to the advatin's doctrine of inexpressibility. An intrinsic relationship is postulated only when every other relationship has been rendered impossible, that is, one cannot explain the nature of the relationship and therefore settles on calling it an intrinsic one. If an intrinsic relationship is ultimately inexpressible, the opponent is endorsing the advaitin's doctrine of inexpressibility.
The siddhikAra concludes this elaborate refutation of sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti
इत्यादिदूषणानि बहुतरमूहनीयानि | Thus one may infer several defects in such a doctrine.
Coming back to the primary topic of this chapter,
तस्मात् सामान्यप्रत्यासत्त्या निषेधमात्रप्रतियोगित्वोपस्थितौ तदभावग्रहात् बाध इत्यनुपपन्नमेव | As the doctrine of extrasensory perception on the basis of the perception of the universal is unacceptable, one cannot define reality as the absence of every negation about the object, and as a consequence, such a reality of the world is not perceptible and therefore the inference of the world's unreality cannot be overruled by the perception of its reality.
End of the chapter.
Originally posted on 12th August 2018.