paricCheda 1 - pratyaksha bAdhoddhAre sattva nirvachanam (part 4)
In this post, we shall consider other refutations of sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti (the perception of the universe of things through the perception of the individual) made by the siddhikAra.
The fourth argument for sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti
ननु - अभावज्ञानस्य प्रतियोगिज्ञानजन्यत्वात् प्रौढप्रकाशयावत्तेजोविरहरूपस्य तमस: प्रत्यक्षता न स्यात्, इति - चेन्न; The knowledge of absence requires the (prior) knowledge of the counterpositive. Therefore, unless one accepts the perception of the universe of things belonging to a class by the perception of an individual of that class, it would not be possible to perceive profound darkness, of the nature of the absence of any kind of light.
The opponent argues that the nature of absolute darkness is the absence of every form of light. It is accepted that darkness is seen. How is this possible? Seeing darkness, one must have seen the absence of all light. For this one must have seen all light somewhere. Therefore one must accept that this is possible because of sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
The siddhikAra says - this is not correct.
अस्मन्मते तमसो भावान्तरभावात् | According to advaita, darkness is not the absence of light, but the presence of some substance whose nature is contradictory to light. It is a bhAva padArtha, not abhAva padArtha.
There are gradations to darkness, which would not be possible if darkness was simply the absence of light, for absence cannot have gradation.
नच - तथापि तद्व्यञ्जकत्वात्तदपेक्षेति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue thus - "Even if darkness is some other existent entity, such a darkness can only exist in the absence of light. Thus the absence of light is a necessary requirement (an indicator) for the presence of darkness. Once that is accepted, one again is led to the requirement for the prior knowledge of all light (in order to perceive the absence of all light), which requires the perception of the universe of lights."
Such an argument is untenable because:
स्वरूपसत एव तादृक्तेजोविरहस्य तमोव्यञ्जकत्वम् न तु ज्ञातस्य मानाभावादित्यभ्युपगमात् | The absence of lights is intrinsically sufficient to indicate the presence of darkness, there is no requirement that one knows the absence of light, for there is no basis to postulate thus.
The presence of a thing can sometimes sufficient to lead to an outcome in certain cases (svarUpasata: kAraNa) - one need not be aware of its presence for it to lead to that outcome. In other cases, one necessarily needs to be aware of the presence of the cause for that to lead to the outcome (jnAtasya kAraNa). When a medicine is prescribed, the patient does need to know how it works, or even that it is medicine, or that it is being given to him, for the medicine to work.
अन्येषां मते तादृक्तेजोविरहज्ञानस्यापेक्षितत्वेऽपि प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्ञानादेव तत्संभवेन तदर्थे सकलप्रतियोगिज्ञानजनिकाया: सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तेरनुपयोगात् | Others may require the awareness of the absence of light for the perception of darkness, but even they admit that the awareness of the absence of all light is possible so long as that cognition contains the attribute of the counter-positive delimiter (pratiyogitAvacChedaka = tejatva). To explain, a cognition that has lightness as its attribute is sufficient to know the absence of such light, and that knowledge can lead to the cognition of darkness. Therefore, there is no need to accept the doctrine of sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti leading to the perception of all the counterpositives.
The fifth argument for pratyAsatti
The siddhikAra had said that it was possible to know the absence of all light if one has had a cognition that contains the light-ness as a qualifier. One does not need to have seen all light first in order to see the absence of all light. In general, the knowledge of the absence of a thing is a result of the knowledge of the absence which contains that thing-ness (pratiyogitAvacChedakam) as its qualifier.
In response, the opponent tries another tack.
नच - गोत्वाभावज्ञानं गोत्वत्वप्रकारकज्ञानजन्यम् तच्च गवेतरावृत्तित्वे सति सकलगोवृत्तिरूपं सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिमन्तरेण न शक्यमवगन्तुमिति - साम्प्रतम्;
गोत्वाभावज्ञानं गोत्वत्वप्रकारकज्ञानजन्यम् - (By your logic) The cognition of the absence of cow-ness is born from the cognition of cowness-ness
तच्च गवेतरावृत्तित्वे सति सकलगोवृत्तिरूपं That (cowness-ness) is that which is present in all cows, but which is not present in animals other than cows.
सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिमन्तरेण न शक्यमवगन्तुमिति However that cannot be known without sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
How can an attribute present in all cows, unless one has knowledge of all cows first? Only through sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
The siddhikAra dismisses this view and says:
यत्किन्चिद्गोव्यक्तेरेव गोत्वत्वरूपत्वात् | Cowness-ness is nothing but some individual cow.
Advaita does not recognise the idea of jAti or universals that is accepted by dvaita and nyAya. The only universal that is accepted is sat, or existence that pervades everything. Thus the class of cowness, is nothing but existence which pervades every individual. The corollary is that every individual inheres in that universal existence.
Thus cow-ness pervades all cows, and cowness-ness which inheres in cows, is nothing but the cow itself.
Put in another way, a pot on the ground can be described as 1) a pot, which is on the ground, or 2) the ground which contains a pot. Thus the pot and ground act as mutual qualifiers of each other. The same argument can be applied to cows and cowness.
एतेन प्रागभावप्रतीतिरपि व्याख्याता | By this, the cognisance of prior absence is also explained.
किं चानागतज्ञानस्यापेक्षितत्वे अनुमानादेव तद्भविष्यति; For the perception of prior absence would presuppose the cognition of something to come in the future. However that (a future cognition) is possible by inference alone.
The opponent wishes to argue that prior absence is unlike absolute absence. The absolute absence of something is knowable by the knowledge of any particular instance of the counterpositive. If I know some pot, I can know that there is no pot on the ground. However, to know the prior absence of a particular pot, I need to have known that particular pot first. However, that pot has not been created yet. How can one know the prior absence of something which is going to be created in the future? The opponent argues that it is by sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
The siddhikAra refutes this by saying that one can postulate prior absence only by means of inference, and not an extra sensory perception as argued by the logician. As argued in the nyAyAkusumAnjali by udayanAchArya:
तथा च न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलौ - "शङ्का चेदनुमास्त्येव न चेच्छङ्का ततस्तराम् | व्याघातावधिराशङ्का तर्क: शङ्कावधिर्मत: ||" Where there is doubt (about a concomitance in the future or the past), that can be remedied by inference alone. Where no such doubt exists, then it is even more so true (that is, one does not need to postulate something extraordinary). Doubt exists until it is remedied by inference, and the limit of inference is till the doubt is resolved.
इत्यत्र शङ्कोपपादकमनागतज्ञानमनुमानादेवेत्युक्तम्, अनुमानं च वर्तमानपाक: पाकपूर्वकालीन: पाकत्वादतीतपाकवदित्यादि | From the passage quoted above, it is by inference alone that a doubt regarding the occurrence of a future event is removed. For example, the following inference serves to establish a future event - The cooking in the present precedes a cooking that is going to occur, because it is cooking, just like the past cooking preceded this one.
नच चरमपाके व्यभिचार:, साध्यसिद्ध्युपजीवकस्य व्यभिचारज्ञानस्यादोषत्वात्, अन्यथा सिद्ध्यसिद्धिव्याघातात् | There is no inferential defect in the case of the final cooking (as it would precede no further cooking). Once the goal has been attained, that is once we can postulate there is some such thing as a final cooking, to claim that there is a further inferential flaw is not a problem, and without using the very same inference, one cannot postulate a series of cookings leading to the final one.
किञ्च शब्दादपि सकलधूमपाकादिगोचरज्ञानसंभव: | Moreover, by verbal testimony too one can postulate the cognition of all smoke, all cooking, (ie all instances in a class) etc. Therefore one need not postulate the perception of the entire universe of individuals belonging to the same class.
नच - शङ्कापूर्वे शब्दस्योपस्थितिनियमाभाव इति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue that it is not necessary as a rule that verbal testimony is necessarily present prior to the existence of a doubt (which is remedied by inference).
कदाचिदेव शब्दादनुभूतस्य तदानीं प्रमृष्टतत्ताकस्मृतिसंभवात् | The knowledge gained through verbal testimony at some other time is recollected then (at the time of inference), and thus even though he may not recollect the concomitance as arising out of verbal testimony, he recollects the concomitance which is sufficient for the inference to occur.
The sixth argument for pratyAsatti
The inference of the mountain on fire is a vishiShTa jnAna, a cognition of an object endowed with a qualifier. The opponent postulates that the knowledge of the qualifier is the cause for the knowledge of the substance endowed with that qualifier. In the inference of the fire in the mountain, the qualifier is the mountainous fire. However, prior to the inference of the mountain being on fire, one has not cognised mountainous fire. Therefore, the seer must have seen such a mountainous fire somewhere previously - let it be by sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti, in the kitchen itself.
ननु - अनुमितेर्विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वेन सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिसिद्धि:, न चानुमानान्तराद्विशेषणज्ञानमनवस्थानात् - इति चेन्न ;
The inference of the mountain on fire is a result of the cognition of the qualifier, and that is the proof for sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti. One cannot argue that the qualifier was known through some other inference as that would lead to infinite regress.
The siddhikAra says, not so.
विशेषणतावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्ञानादेव साध्यविशेषणकपक्षविशेष्यकानुमितिसंभवात् | The cognition of (fire) as being endowed with visheShaNatAvacChedaka, the characteristic that allows it to be the qualifier (fire-ness) in the inferential cognition, is sufficient to lead to the inference having the sAdhya as the qualifier and the paksha as the qualified.
Put simply, one does not need to know the prior knowledge of a mountainous fire to infer the presence of fire in the mountain, it is sufficient to know what fire is in general.
एतेन - "सुरभि चन्दन"मित्यादिविशिष्टज्ञानाय कल्पिता ज्ञानलक्षणा प्रत्यासत्तिरपि - निरस्ता; By this reason, the postulation of jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti to justify the occurrence of the visual compound cognition (vishiShTa jnAna) "the sandalwood is fragrant", also stands refuted.
There is no need to say that the eyes must have had prior contact with fragrance through jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti for the compound visual cognition to arise. Why ?
चन्दनत्वेन सुरभित्वानुमानोपपत्ते:, Because such a cognition is possible by inferring the presence of fragrance in the presence of sandalwood.
अन्यथा साध्यविशिष्टपक्षप्रत्यक्षोपपत्तेरनुमानमात्रोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् | Otherwise, if it is insisted that one must have had the direct perception of the object (which happens to be the paksha in the inference) being endowed with the qualifier (which happens to be the sAdhya in the inference), and this happens through jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti, then inference would be rendered impossible.
If one can directly perceive the mountain on fire by jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti, what purpose would an inference of fire in the mountain serve? More directly, how would the inference of an object even arise if perception has already shown it?
The pUrvapakshi tries to argue that inference would be possible where the factors enabling the inference are stronger than the factors enabling direct perception.
नच - अभावसाध्यक केवलव्यतिरेकिणि साध्यप्रसिद्धेरनङ्गत्वात्तत्र क्लृप्ताया अनुमितिसामग्र्या: प्रत्यक्षसामग्रीतो बलवत्वमिति वाच्यम् ; In the case where the sAdhya is not known, like in the case of the kevala vyatireka inference where the absence of something is being proven, as the factors enabling direct perception are weaker than the factors enabling inference, inference is still possible.
To explain - the logician wants to prove that earth needs to be classified as a separate element. To do this, he argues that earth is different from the other four elements because it contains a quality - the characteristic of smell - that is not present in any of the other four. Thus it deserves to be a separate category of its own.
However, there is no example he can give to prove this, because other than the paksha (earth), the only elements are the four elements themselves and the quality of difference from the four elements is absent in them (sAdhya is aprasiddha). Thus he uses a vyatireka logic (argument of discordance / difference) for this. He says: where one of the other four elements are present (or the difference from the four elements is absent), fragrance (and thus earthness) is absent. By corollary, where earthness is present, difference from the other elements is present. This is a case of kevala vyatireka logic, which is resorted to when anvaya logic is not possible because the sAdhya is not known anywhere.
In the case where the sAdhya is not known anywhere, jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti would not be possible (if no individual of a class has been seen before, the perception of all the members of the class would not be possible), and in such instances, the factors enabling inference are stronger than the factors enabling perception. Thus inference can arise. The siddhAntin's argument that the inference would be rendered impossible has been disproven.
The pUrvapakshi however adds a qualifier and says that inference is possible where an argument of discordance (kevala vyatireka) proves the absence of something (abhAva sAdhyaka kevala vyatireka). This is so because where kevala vyatireka proves the presence of something, such a thing must be first be possible for the argument to be valid. If someone argues that a field has been tilled by a hare's horn on the grounds that it is a field, and that which is not tilled by a hare's horn is not a field (and therefore the reverse must also be true), such a kevala vyatireka anumAna is not acceptable, because the sAdhya must be an entity which is within the realms of possibility. A hare's horn is absolutely non-existent. Therefore, where the kevala vyatireka anumAna proves the existence of something, that thing must not be an impossibility (ie sAdhya prasiddhi is expected), but where the kevala vyatireka anumAna proves the absence of something, sAdhya prasiddhi is not expected.
As jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti is not possible in the case of kevala vyatireka anumAna proving the absence of something, one must conclude that inference is possible, and therefore the siddhAntin's argument that jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti renders inference as an impossibility stands refuted. This is the opponent's argument.
The siddhikAra says नच वाच्यम् - One cannot say that because:
अर्थापत्तिवादिभिरस्माभिस्तदनभ्युपगमात् | we (advaitins) hold that knowledge is gained in such instances through arthApatti, circumstantial inference, instead.
The logician had tried to cite an example where inference is possible but jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti is impossible. The siddhikAra says, inference would still be impossible, because we hold that it is not inference that arises there, but arthApatti, which is a different pramANa from anumAna (inference).
There is an alternative refutation possible. The opponent had argued that the knowledge of the sAdhya needs to precede the knowledge of the paksha endowed with the sAdhya, and the knowledge of the sAdhya is only possible because of jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti. This according to him, was because the sAdhya is the qualifier and the paksha is the qualified entity in the inference. However, it is possible to simply restate the inference such that the paksha is the qualifier and the sAdhya is the qualified. That is the subject-object relationship in the inference can be reversed. If instead of saying the mountain is on fire, if it is said fire is in the mountain, then fire is the subject(visheShya) and mountain is the object (visheShaNa). The visheShaNa is directly seen, so one need not postulate jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti to see it. If the visheShaNa is known, the inference of the visheShya endowed with the visheShaNa is possible.
"पर्वतवृत्तिधूमो वह्निव्याप्य" इति परामर्शात् साध्यविशेष्यकपक्षविशेषणकानुमित्यभ्युपगमे तु नैव काप्यनुपपत्ति: | If the consideration (paramArsha) in the inference is that the smoke located in the mountain implies fire, it is possible for it to lead to the inference where the sAdhya is the visheShya and the paksha is the visheShaNa. There is no fallacy therefore.
अनुमिते: पक्षविशेष्यत्वनियमे मानाभावात् | Moreover, there is no rule that the paksha has to be the visheShya in the inferential cognition.
To be continued.
Originally posted on 15th July.
The fourth argument for sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti
ननु - अभावज्ञानस्य प्रतियोगिज्ञानजन्यत्वात् प्रौढप्रकाशयावत्तेजोविरहरूपस्य तमस: प्रत्यक्षता न स्यात्, इति - चेन्न; The knowledge of absence requires the (prior) knowledge of the counterpositive. Therefore, unless one accepts the perception of the universe of things belonging to a class by the perception of an individual of that class, it would not be possible to perceive profound darkness, of the nature of the absence of any kind of light.
The opponent argues that the nature of absolute darkness is the absence of every form of light. It is accepted that darkness is seen. How is this possible? Seeing darkness, one must have seen the absence of all light. For this one must have seen all light somewhere. Therefore one must accept that this is possible because of sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
The siddhikAra says - this is not correct.
अस्मन्मते तमसो भावान्तरभावात् | According to advaita, darkness is not the absence of light, but the presence of some substance whose nature is contradictory to light. It is a bhAva padArtha, not abhAva padArtha.
There are gradations to darkness, which would not be possible if darkness was simply the absence of light, for absence cannot have gradation.
नच - तथापि तद्व्यञ्जकत्वात्तदपेक्षेति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue thus - "Even if darkness is some other existent entity, such a darkness can only exist in the absence of light. Thus the absence of light is a necessary requirement (an indicator) for the presence of darkness. Once that is accepted, one again is led to the requirement for the prior knowledge of all light (in order to perceive the absence of all light), which requires the perception of the universe of lights."
Such an argument is untenable because:
स्वरूपसत एव तादृक्तेजोविरहस्य तमोव्यञ्जकत्वम् न तु ज्ञातस्य मानाभावादित्यभ्युपगमात् | The absence of lights is intrinsically sufficient to indicate the presence of darkness, there is no requirement that one knows the absence of light, for there is no basis to postulate thus.
The presence of a thing can sometimes sufficient to lead to an outcome in certain cases (svarUpasata: kAraNa) - one need not be aware of its presence for it to lead to that outcome. In other cases, one necessarily needs to be aware of the presence of the cause for that to lead to the outcome (jnAtasya kAraNa). When a medicine is prescribed, the patient does need to know how it works, or even that it is medicine, or that it is being given to him, for the medicine to work.
अन्येषां मते तादृक्तेजोविरहज्ञानस्यापेक्षितत्वेऽपि प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्ञानादेव तत्संभवेन तदर्थे सकलप्रतियोगिज्ञानजनिकाया: सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तेरनुपयोगात् | Others may require the awareness of the absence of light for the perception of darkness, but even they admit that the awareness of the absence of all light is possible so long as that cognition contains the attribute of the counter-positive delimiter (pratiyogitAvacChedaka = tejatva). To explain, a cognition that has lightness as its attribute is sufficient to know the absence of such light, and that knowledge can lead to the cognition of darkness. Therefore, there is no need to accept the doctrine of sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti leading to the perception of all the counterpositives.
The fifth argument for pratyAsatti
The siddhikAra had said that it was possible to know the absence of all light if one has had a cognition that contains the light-ness as a qualifier. One does not need to have seen all light first in order to see the absence of all light. In general, the knowledge of the absence of a thing is a result of the knowledge of the absence which contains that thing-ness (pratiyogitAvacChedakam) as its qualifier.
In response, the opponent tries another tack.
नच - गोत्वाभावज्ञानं गोत्वत्वप्रकारकज्ञानजन्यम् तच्च गवेतरावृत्तित्वे सति सकलगोवृत्तिरूपं सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिमन्तरेण न शक्यमवगन्तुमिति - साम्प्रतम्;
गोत्वाभावज्ञानं गोत्वत्वप्रकारकज्ञानजन्यम् - (By your logic) The cognition of the absence of cow-ness is born from the cognition of cowness-ness
तच्च गवेतरावृत्तित्वे सति सकलगोवृत्तिरूपं That (cowness-ness) is that which is present in all cows, but which is not present in animals other than cows.
सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिमन्तरेण न शक्यमवगन्तुमिति However that cannot be known without sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
How can an attribute present in all cows, unless one has knowledge of all cows first? Only through sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
The siddhikAra dismisses this view and says:
यत्किन्चिद्गोव्यक्तेरेव गोत्वत्वरूपत्वात् | Cowness-ness is nothing but some individual cow.
Advaita does not recognise the idea of jAti or universals that is accepted by dvaita and nyAya. The only universal that is accepted is sat, or existence that pervades everything. Thus the class of cowness, is nothing but existence which pervades every individual. The corollary is that every individual inheres in that universal existence.
Thus cow-ness pervades all cows, and cowness-ness which inheres in cows, is nothing but the cow itself.
Put in another way, a pot on the ground can be described as 1) a pot, which is on the ground, or 2) the ground which contains a pot. Thus the pot and ground act as mutual qualifiers of each other. The same argument can be applied to cows and cowness.
एतेन प्रागभावप्रतीतिरपि व्याख्याता | By this, the cognisance of prior absence is also explained.
किं चानागतज्ञानस्यापेक्षितत्वे अनुमानादेव तद्भविष्यति; For the perception of prior absence would presuppose the cognition of something to come in the future. However that (a future cognition) is possible by inference alone.
The opponent wishes to argue that prior absence is unlike absolute absence. The absolute absence of something is knowable by the knowledge of any particular instance of the counterpositive. If I know some pot, I can know that there is no pot on the ground. However, to know the prior absence of a particular pot, I need to have known that particular pot first. However, that pot has not been created yet. How can one know the prior absence of something which is going to be created in the future? The opponent argues that it is by sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
The siddhikAra refutes this by saying that one can postulate prior absence only by means of inference, and not an extra sensory perception as argued by the logician. As argued in the nyAyAkusumAnjali by udayanAchArya:
तथा च न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलौ - "शङ्का चेदनुमास्त्येव न चेच्छङ्का ततस्तराम् | व्याघातावधिराशङ्का तर्क: शङ्कावधिर्मत: ||" Where there is doubt (about a concomitance in the future or the past), that can be remedied by inference alone. Where no such doubt exists, then it is even more so true (that is, one does not need to postulate something extraordinary). Doubt exists until it is remedied by inference, and the limit of inference is till the doubt is resolved.
इत्यत्र शङ्कोपपादकमनागतज्ञानमनुमानादेवेत्युक्तम्, अनुमानं च वर्तमानपाक: पाकपूर्वकालीन: पाकत्वादतीतपाकवदित्यादि | From the passage quoted above, it is by inference alone that a doubt regarding the occurrence of a future event is removed. For example, the following inference serves to establish a future event - The cooking in the present precedes a cooking that is going to occur, because it is cooking, just like the past cooking preceded this one.
नच चरमपाके व्यभिचार:, साध्यसिद्ध्युपजीवकस्य व्यभिचारज्ञानस्यादोषत्वात्, अन्यथा सिद्ध्यसिद्धिव्याघातात् | There is no inferential defect in the case of the final cooking (as it would precede no further cooking). Once the goal has been attained, that is once we can postulate there is some such thing as a final cooking, to claim that there is a further inferential flaw is not a problem, and without using the very same inference, one cannot postulate a series of cookings leading to the final one.
किञ्च शब्दादपि सकलधूमपाकादिगोचरज्ञानसंभव: | Moreover, by verbal testimony too one can postulate the cognition of all smoke, all cooking, (ie all instances in a class) etc. Therefore one need not postulate the perception of the entire universe of individuals belonging to the same class.
नच - शङ्कापूर्वे शब्दस्योपस्थितिनियमाभाव इति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue that it is not necessary as a rule that verbal testimony is necessarily present prior to the existence of a doubt (which is remedied by inference).
कदाचिदेव शब्दादनुभूतस्य तदानीं प्रमृष्टतत्ताकस्मृतिसंभवात् | The knowledge gained through verbal testimony at some other time is recollected then (at the time of inference), and thus even though he may not recollect the concomitance as arising out of verbal testimony, he recollects the concomitance which is sufficient for the inference to occur.
The sixth argument for pratyAsatti
The inference of the mountain on fire is a vishiShTa jnAna, a cognition of an object endowed with a qualifier. The opponent postulates that the knowledge of the qualifier is the cause for the knowledge of the substance endowed with that qualifier. In the inference of the fire in the mountain, the qualifier is the mountainous fire. However, prior to the inference of the mountain being on fire, one has not cognised mountainous fire. Therefore, the seer must have seen such a mountainous fire somewhere previously - let it be by sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti, in the kitchen itself.
ननु - अनुमितेर्विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वेन सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिसिद्धि:, न चानुमानान्तराद्विशेषणज्ञानमनवस्थानात् - इति चेन्न ;
The inference of the mountain on fire is a result of the cognition of the qualifier, and that is the proof for sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti. One cannot argue that the qualifier was known through some other inference as that would lead to infinite regress.
The siddhikAra says, not so.
विशेषणतावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्ञानादेव साध्यविशेषणकपक्षविशेष्यकानुमितिसंभवात् | The cognition of (fire) as being endowed with visheShaNatAvacChedaka, the characteristic that allows it to be the qualifier (fire-ness) in the inferential cognition, is sufficient to lead to the inference having the sAdhya as the qualifier and the paksha as the qualified.
Put simply, one does not need to know the prior knowledge of a mountainous fire to infer the presence of fire in the mountain, it is sufficient to know what fire is in general.
एतेन - "सुरभि चन्दन"मित्यादिविशिष्टज्ञानाय कल्पिता ज्ञानलक्षणा प्रत्यासत्तिरपि - निरस्ता; By this reason, the postulation of jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti to justify the occurrence of the visual compound cognition (vishiShTa jnAna) "the sandalwood is fragrant", also stands refuted.
There is no need to say that the eyes must have had prior contact with fragrance through jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti for the compound visual cognition to arise. Why ?
चन्दनत्वेन सुरभित्वानुमानोपपत्ते:, Because such a cognition is possible by inferring the presence of fragrance in the presence of sandalwood.
अन्यथा साध्यविशिष्टपक्षप्रत्यक्षोपपत्तेरनुमानमात्रोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् | Otherwise, if it is insisted that one must have had the direct perception of the object (which happens to be the paksha in the inference) being endowed with the qualifier (which happens to be the sAdhya in the inference), and this happens through jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti, then inference would be rendered impossible.
If one can directly perceive the mountain on fire by jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti, what purpose would an inference of fire in the mountain serve? More directly, how would the inference of an object even arise if perception has already shown it?
The pUrvapakshi tries to argue that inference would be possible where the factors enabling the inference are stronger than the factors enabling direct perception.
नच - अभावसाध्यक केवलव्यतिरेकिणि साध्यप्रसिद्धेरनङ्गत्वात्तत्र क्लृप्ताया अनुमितिसामग्र्या: प्रत्यक्षसामग्रीतो बलवत्वमिति वाच्यम् ; In the case where the sAdhya is not known, like in the case of the kevala vyatireka inference where the absence of something is being proven, as the factors enabling direct perception are weaker than the factors enabling inference, inference is still possible.
To explain - the logician wants to prove that earth needs to be classified as a separate element. To do this, he argues that earth is different from the other four elements because it contains a quality - the characteristic of smell - that is not present in any of the other four. Thus it deserves to be a separate category of its own.
However, there is no example he can give to prove this, because other than the paksha (earth), the only elements are the four elements themselves and the quality of difference from the four elements is absent in them (sAdhya is aprasiddha). Thus he uses a vyatireka logic (argument of discordance / difference) for this. He says: where one of the other four elements are present (or the difference from the four elements is absent), fragrance (and thus earthness) is absent. By corollary, where earthness is present, difference from the other elements is present. This is a case of kevala vyatireka logic, which is resorted to when anvaya logic is not possible because the sAdhya is not known anywhere.
In the case where the sAdhya is not known anywhere, jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti would not be possible (if no individual of a class has been seen before, the perception of all the members of the class would not be possible), and in such instances, the factors enabling inference are stronger than the factors enabling perception. Thus inference can arise. The siddhAntin's argument that the inference would be rendered impossible has been disproven.
The pUrvapakshi however adds a qualifier and says that inference is possible where an argument of discordance (kevala vyatireka) proves the absence of something (abhAva sAdhyaka kevala vyatireka). This is so because where kevala vyatireka proves the presence of something, such a thing must be first be possible for the argument to be valid. If someone argues that a field has been tilled by a hare's horn on the grounds that it is a field, and that which is not tilled by a hare's horn is not a field (and therefore the reverse must also be true), such a kevala vyatireka anumAna is not acceptable, because the sAdhya must be an entity which is within the realms of possibility. A hare's horn is absolutely non-existent. Therefore, where the kevala vyatireka anumAna proves the existence of something, that thing must not be an impossibility (ie sAdhya prasiddhi is expected), but where the kevala vyatireka anumAna proves the absence of something, sAdhya prasiddhi is not expected.
As jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti is not possible in the case of kevala vyatireka anumAna proving the absence of something, one must conclude that inference is possible, and therefore the siddhAntin's argument that jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti renders inference as an impossibility stands refuted. This is the opponent's argument.
The siddhikAra says नच वाच्यम् - One cannot say that because:
अर्थापत्तिवादिभिरस्माभिस्तदनभ्युपगमात् | we (advaitins) hold that knowledge is gained in such instances through arthApatti, circumstantial inference, instead.
The logician had tried to cite an example where inference is possible but jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti is impossible. The siddhikAra says, inference would still be impossible, because we hold that it is not inference that arises there, but arthApatti, which is a different pramANa from anumAna (inference).
There is an alternative refutation possible. The opponent had argued that the knowledge of the sAdhya needs to precede the knowledge of the paksha endowed with the sAdhya, and the knowledge of the sAdhya is only possible because of jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti. This according to him, was because the sAdhya is the qualifier and the paksha is the qualified entity in the inference. However, it is possible to simply restate the inference such that the paksha is the qualifier and the sAdhya is the qualified. That is the subject-object relationship in the inference can be reversed. If instead of saying the mountain is on fire, if it is said fire is in the mountain, then fire is the subject(visheShya) and mountain is the object (visheShaNa). The visheShaNa is directly seen, so one need not postulate jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti to see it. If the visheShaNa is known, the inference of the visheShya endowed with the visheShaNa is possible.
"पर्वतवृत्तिधूमो वह्निव्याप्य" इति परामर्शात् साध्यविशेष्यकपक्षविशेषणकानुमित्यभ्युपगमे तु नैव काप्यनुपपत्ति: | If the consideration (paramArsha) in the inference is that the smoke located in the mountain implies fire, it is possible for it to lead to the inference where the sAdhya is the visheShya and the paksha is the visheShaNa. There is no fallacy therefore.
अनुमिते: पक्षविशेष्यत्वनियमे मानाभावात् | Moreover, there is no rule that the paksha has to be the visheShya in the inferential cognition.
To be continued.
Originally posted on 15th July.