paricCheda 1 - pratyaksha bAdhoddhAre sattva nirvachanam (part 3)

In the previous two posts, we examined various definitions of sat, existence, and concluded that none of these apply to the world. The siddhikAra had concluded this section by stating that the logician's theory of sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti (the perception of all individuals belonging to a class through the perception of the class) was untenable.

The opponent, the logician in this case, steps forward to postulate seven reasons in support of the perception of the universe of individuals.

The first reason
नच - महानसीयधूमेन्द्रिय संयोगेन तत्रैव व्याप्तिग्रहे पर्वतीयधूमादनुमितिर्न स्यात्, सामान्यस्य च धूमत्वादे: प्रत्यासत्तित्वे तस्यापि प्रत्यासन्नत्वात्तत्र व्याप्तिग्रहे ततोऽनुमितिरिति - वाच्यम् ;
When smoke is seen in the kitchen, by merely noting the concomitance between kitchen smoke and fire, it would not be possible to infer the presence of mountain fire by the presence of mountain smoke (unless the mountain smoke itself was seen directly in the kitchen in concomitance with fire). However, such an inference of fire in the mountain through the perception of smoke in the mountain does occur. Therefore, one must concede that mountain smoke itself is observed in the kitchen when the kitchen smoke is seen because of sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti (that is, if through the perception of the universal - smokeness - in the kitchen, every single instance of smoke is directly seen, including mountain smoke). As a result of the direct perception of the mountain smoke in concomitance with fire (in the kitchen), it is possible to infer the presence of fire later when the mountain smoke is seen.

The siddhikAra says: not so.

He gives the example of the "visual perception" of fragrant sandalwood. Fragrance is not an attribute that can be seen, it can only be smelt. However, when a piece of sandalwood is seen in close proximity, its fragrance is smelt directly too. Later, when another piece of sandalwood is seen, it is natural to say that a fragrant piece of sandalwood 'is seen', even though its fragrance is not smelt then. How is this statement tenable?

It is tenable because all the enabling factors for such a vishiShTa jnAna, cognition qualified by an attribute, are present. The enabling factors are:

1) This sandalwood (visheShya) is directly seen.
2) This triggers the memory of concomitance between the sandalwood and fragrance observed previously. Thus the cognition of the visheShya is endowed with the memory of concomitance (the concomitance is the visheShaNa).
3) There is nothing to say that this piece of sandalwood cannot be fragrant - no such contrarian factors are present.

As a result, the seer has the qualified cognition, "I see a fragrant piece of sandalwood", even though he may not be physically close enough to the sandalwood in this instance to smell its fragrance.

Similarly, when the mountain smoke is perceived, the memory of concomitance between smoke and fire is recollected. The comprehension of mountain smoke is endowed with the memory of concomitance between smoke and fire and there is no contrarian factor that would inhibit the presence of fire in the mountain. As a result, the inference of fire is possible even without resorting to a theory postulating that the mountain smoke is seen in the kitchen.

This is pithily said by the siddhikAra:
पर्वतीयधूमेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षदशायां धूमत्वेन प्रकारेण गृहीतस्मृतव्याप्तेस्तत्र वैशिष्ट्यग्रहसंभवात्, 'सुरभिचन्दन'मितिवत् विशेष्येन्द्रियसन्निकर्षविशेषणज्ञानासंसर्गाग्रहरूपाया: विशिष्टज्ञानसामग्र्या: पूर्णत्वात् | When someone sees a piece of sandalwood, the group of factors that enable the cognition of fragrant sandalwood are present - namely, direct perception of the visheShya (sandalwood), the cognition of visheShaNa (the concomitance of sandalwood with fragrance), and the absence of factors that overrule the presence of fragrance in this piece of sandalwood. Similarly, the cognition of mountain smoke concomitant with fire is possible, because the enabling factors for such a cognition are present - the mountain smoke is seen, the memory of concomitance between smoke (and not a particular smoke) with fire is present, and there are no contrarian factors that rule out the presence of fire in the mountain.

Earlier we had said that the mountain smoke endowed with the memory of concomitance serves as the cause for the inference to arise. Even that much is not necessary. One can simply say the following:

व्याप्तिस्मृतिप्रकारेण वा पक्षधर्मताज्ञानस्य हेतुता; Or alternatively, if the attribute present in the memory of concomitance (smoke-ness), is also seen to be present in the paksha (the mountain), then that commonality itself can serve as the cause for the inference to arise.

When smoke and fire are seen to be concomitant in the kitchen, the concomitance that is seen is between smoke, in general, with fire, in general - not a particular smoke with particular fire. Thus the memory of concomitance is between smoke-ness and fire-ness. If smoke-ness is later seen in the locus of inference (the paksha), the mountain, the memory of the concomitance of smoke-ness with fire-ness, is sufficient to trigger the inference of fire-ness in the mountain. In other words, the mountain is inferred to be on fire.

This is explained.
महानासीय एव धूम धूमत्वेन व्याप्तिस्मृतिविषयो भवति, तच्च सामान्यलक्षणाम् विनैव तावतैवनुमितिसिद्धे: धूमत्वेन पर्वतीयधूमज्ञानं चापि जातम् | The individual kitchen smoke, as smoke-ness, becomes the object of the memory of concomitance. Thus without sAmAnya lakshaNA itself, the fact that the perception of smoke in the mountain is also endowed with the same smoke-ness, the inference of fire is possible

There is no need to postulate an extra sensory perception of all the smoke in the world for the inference of fire to be tenable.

The second reason
The siddhikAra refutes the second argument for sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
नच - सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिं विना धूमो वह्निव्यभिचारी न वेति अनुभूयमानसंशयो न स्यात् प्रसिद्धधूमे वह्निसंबन्धावगमात् अप्रसिद्धस्य चाज्ञानादिति - वाच्यम्;
Do not argue thus - Without accepting the perception of all individuals belonging to a class, the doubt that one experiences - "Can smoke be present without fire, or not?" would not be possible. For, one only observes the concomitance between the known smoke (in the kitchen) and fire, whereas the unknown smoke's concomitance with fire is unknown.

Because:
प्रसिद्धधूम एव तत्तद्धूमत्वादिना व्याप्तिनिश्चयेऽपि धूमत्वेन तत्संशयोपपत्ते: | In the known smoke itself, while there can be certainty that a particular smoke has concomitance with fire, whether that concomitance extends to smoke in general can still be under doubt. Such a doubt is possible even without the perception of every individual instance of smoke.

The author of tattvachintAmaNi himself has admitted such a possibility.
तथा च मणिकृता - 'घटत्वेनेतरभेदनिश्चयेऽपि पृथिवीत्वादिना तत्र संशयसिषाधयिषे भवत एवेति | He says - even though one can be certain that a pot is different, as a pot, from other things, whether it is different, as earth, from other things or not, can still be doubtful. As such a doubt is possible, the desire to prove by means of inference that the element earth is different from other elements is a worthwhile endeavour.

As a general rule, while there may be certainty with regards to the object when viewed as being endowed with one attribute, when viewed as being endowed with another attribute, a doubt about the same object, in the same context, is possible.
Now an alternative explanation for the possibility of doubt is given.
निश्चितेऽप्यर्थे प्रामाण्यसंशयाहितसंशयवत् धूमत्वं वह्निव्यभिचारिवृत्ति न वेत्ति संशयादपि तादृशसंशयोपपत्तेश्च | Like in the instance where one clearly knows that an object is present, it is still possible to have a doubt "whether such knowledge is valid or not", "whether smokeness is concomitant with fire or not" can be in doubt, which can lead to the doubt whether smoke is concomitant with fire.
That is, while being certain the smoke is concomitant with fire in the kitchen, one can still doubt whether smokeness in general is concomitant with fire or not. If such a doubt is possible, then whether smoke is concomitant with fire or not, in general, is also necessarily possible.
एतेन वायू रूपवान्न वेति संशयोऽपि वयाख्यात: | By this, the doubt "whether wind has a visible form or not" is also explained.
This relates to a situation when one is certain that of the five elements, earth, water, and fire have a visible form. However, when a person does not know that only those elements can have form, by merely knowing that earth, water and fire have form, one can still be doubtful whether wind has form or not. Therefore, even if one is certain about one aspect of a thing, a doubt is possible in regard to it, provided that one does not have the certainty that all other possibilities are ruled out.  

The third reason
ननु - सिद्धे नेच्छा, किन्तु असिद्धे, सा च स्वसमानविषयकज्ञानजन्या, तच्च ज्ञानं न सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिं विना |
The logician presents his third reason for the perception of universals - One does not desire a thing which one already possesses, rather desire is possible only for that which one does not have. Thus desire is for an object because it will lead to the experience of happiness when one possesses it in the future. The experience of future happiness is only possible if one cognises that future happiness in the present. This is not possible without the perception of universals.

नच - सिद्धगोचरसुखत्वप्रकारकज्ञानादेवाज्ञाते सुखे भवतीच्छा, समानप्रकारकत्वमात्रस्य नियामकत्वादिति - वाच्यम्;
The pUrvapakshi anticipates a possible response from the siddhAntin and counters it. He says: "Do not say that it is the experience of happiness encountered with an obtained object that leads to the desire for an unobtained object - therefore, the cause of desire for an unobtained object is the common presence of happiness in both the cognition of an obtained object and the experience of an obtained object."

रजतत्वेन प्रकारेण रजते अनुभूयमाने घटादौ रजतत्वप्रकारकेच्छाप्रसङ्गात् | The pUrvapakshi argues why such an explanation is incorrect - If desire is generated on the basis of a common qualifier between the cognition of the obtained and the cognition of the unobtained, upon the cognition of silver as endowed with silver-ness, one can have a desire of silver-ness in a pot, etc.

The pUrvapakshi takes the siddhAntin's words literally and argues - you did not say that the current object and future object need to share a common attribute. Rather, you said that the experience of the current object and experience of future object need to share a common attribute. If that is the case, the cognition of silverness in silver can lead to the desire of silverness in a completely different object such as a pot.

He anticipates another response from the siddhAntin and says:
नच - प्रकाराश्रयत्वमपि नियामकम् ; Do not say that the attribute must reside in the unobtained substance also (in addition to the attribute being shared in the two cognitions).
Why?
रजतभ्रमाच्छुक्ताविच्छान्नुदयप्रसङ्गात् | If the requirement for desire was that the common attribute should also reside in the unobtained object, it would not lead to the desire to pick up a shell mistaken for silver - because silver-ness does not actually exist in the shell, and because you say that the attribute must exist in the object in order to desire it, one should not desire to pick up the shell mistaken for silver. However, such desire is observed in common experience.
तथा च समानप्रकारकत्वे सति समानविषयकत्वं तन्त्रम् | As a result, not only is there a requirement for a common attribute in the cognitions, there is also the requirement for the objects to be similar too.
अत एवाख्यातिपक्षे रजतस्मरणस्यैव शुक्तौ प्रवर्तकत्वमित्यपास्तम् Therefore, the stand of the akhyAti vAdin who postulates that the memory of silver leads to the motivation towards picking up the shell stands disproved. akhyAti vAda is the theory of error which holds that an illusion of silver is not really an illusion - Rather, the memory of silver triggered upon perceiving a shell leads one to pick up the shell. This is the view advocated by the prAbhAkara school of mImAmsa.

Until now, the pUrvapakshi anticipated possible responses from the siddhAntin and countered it. The siddhikAra now presents the view of the siddhAnta:
इति चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
यतो रजतभ्रमाच्छुक्ताविच्छा नास्त्येव, किंत्वनिर्वचनीये रजत इत्यनिर्वनीयख्यातौ वक्ष्यते | We do not say that one desires for shell in the illusion of the shell-silver, rather, one desires for silver, which happens to be anirvachanIya, (indescribable as existing or non-existing), in other words, a silver which is mithyA, according to the first definition of mithyAtva. The description of the advaitin theory of error will be explained further in the section dealing with anirvachanIya khyAti - the theory of error postulating the creation of the indescribable.
प्रकाराश्रयत्वं नियामकं वदन्नख्यातिवादी परमेवं विभीषणीय: | If the akhyAti vAdin says that the memory of silver leads to the desire of shell having silverness as its attribute, then your argument would apply to him.
तथा च प्रकाराश्रयत्वस्य नियामकत्वादन्यथाख्यातिपक्षोऽपि निरस्त एव | However by such an argument, the anyathAkhyAti vAdin (the pUrvapakshi) too stands refuted as he stipulates the presence of the attribute in the desired object.
The argument the siddhikAra makes is that one cannot say that an attribute present in some other substance (silver) is present in the shell, as the anyathA khyAti vAdin argues. The logician argues that when one sees the shell, the silver which is present somewhere else, appears directly in front of him by the process of alaukika sannikarSha, extra sensory perception. The siddhikAra argues that such a theory is absurd, because any object can only have attributes that belong to it - it cannot have attributes belonging to some other object. If such is the requirement for desire, then no desire is possible.

The counter question that the opponent asks is - how is error / illusion possible then? If, according to the anirvachanIya khyAti of the advaitin, silver-ness is present in silver itself (albeit indescribable silver), how is this an illusion? If a foreign attribute is not mistakenly seen in the object, then such a cognition is not an illusion.
नच - तर्हि भ्रमत्वं न स्यात् इदं रजतमिति भ्रमत्वाभिमतज्ञानस्य व्यधिकरणप्रकारत्वानभ्युपगमादिति - वाच्यम् | Do not argue thus - "By that account, no illusions are possible. If the silver in the erroneous cognition "This is silver", does not contain a vyadhikaraNa dharma, an attribute that does not belong to it, then the cognition is not an illusion at all."
Why? Because:
बाधितविषयत्वेन हि भ्रमत्वं न तु व्यधिकरणप्रकारत्वेन तस्यापि विषयबाधप्रयोज्यत्वादिति हि वक्ष्यते | The cognition of an object is termed an illusion by us because of the subsequent sublation of the object, not because it contains an attribute that does not belong to it. Containing a foreign attribute is also indicative of illusion only because of the ultimate sublation of the object. If the object was not sublated, how would one determine that an attribute that was seen previously, is foreign?

Thus far, we have seen three reasons postulated by the opponent for sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti. In the next and final post of this chapter, we will consider four other reasons.

To be continued.
Originally posted on 12th June 2018.