paricCheda 1 - pratikarmavyavasthA (part 1)
अथ प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थोपपत्ति: |
From the panchapAdikA vivaraNam onwards, several works have considered this topic of pratikarmavyavasthA. By karma, jnAna viShaya is meant. The same object is seen by one, but may not be seen by someone else. What is the mechanism (vyavasthA) to explain for the difference in what is perceived by each person (prati karma)?
The nyAyAmRtakAra had cited several defects against the pratikarmavyavasthA postulated by the vivaraNakAra.
He says:
ननु - विश्वस्याध्यासिकत्वे प्रातिभासिकस्थल इव विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाधीनाया: प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थाया अनुपपत्तिरिति - चेन्न ;
If the world is mithyA, then like in the case of prAtibhAsika objects, the pratikarmavyavasthA that is subject to the contact between sense organs and the object is untenable.
Let's take the example of shell silver, a prAtibhAsika object. It is admitted that the shell silver only exists when it seen. However, it has to be accepted that it is not the eyes that see the shell silver, because for the eyes to see any object, there has to be some pre-existing connection possible between the eyes and the object. However, no such connection is possible, because the shell silver did not exist prior to its cognition. If the eyes do not see it, how to account for the fact that one person sees it, but others do not?
The siddhikAra says no.
वृत्ते: पूर्वमेव घटादीनां चैतन्येऽध्यासेन प्रातिभासिकस्थालापेक्षया वैलक्षण्यात् |
As the world, comprising of pots etc., is superimposed on consciousness even prior to the rise of the vRtti, it is different from prAtibhAsika.
Thus pratikarmavyavasthA for the objects of the world is possible.
तथाहि - अन्त: करणं चक्षुर्वत्तेर्जोवयवि | To explain - the mind, like the eyes is a product of fire (ie the fire principle is more predominant in the case of eyes and the mind).
The organ of sight get a connection with objects by traveling to the object. It does so quickly like a ray of light because it is a product of fire. Similar to sight, the mind also travels to the object in an instant and grasps it.
तच्चेन्द्रियद्वारेण तत्संयुक्तं विषयं व्याप्य तदाकार भवति |
The mind travels through the medium of sense organs pervades the object which is in contact with the sense organs and takes its AkAra (objectifies it).
यथा नद्याद्युदकं प्रणाड्या नि:सृत्य केदाराद्याकारं भवति, सैव वृत्तिरित्युच्यते |
Like water in a river is transported by a canal to a field and envelops the field and takes its shape, that transformation of the mind is called vRtti.
तत्र जीवचैतन्यमविद्योपाधिकं सत् सर्वगतं अन्त:करणोपाधिकं सत् परिच्छिन्नमिति मतद्वयम् | There are two schools of thought here, one which says that the jIvAtma is consciousness with avidyA upAdhi and is all pervading, and the other, which says that it is limited on account of being delimited by the mind.
तत्राद्ये विषयप्रकाशकं जीवचैतन्यम् |
In the first case, the all pervading jIva chaitanya is the revealer of everything.
द्वितीये ब्रह्मचैतन्यम् |
In the second case, brahman is the revealer of everything.
Then why does jIva not see everything in the first case?
आद्ये पक्षेऽपि जीवचैतन्यमविद्यानावृतम् आवृतं च |
The first case is divided into two – one where the jIva is veiled by ignorance and one where he is not.
In the school which holds that the jIva is covered by ignorance, until the vRtti destroys the covering over the object, he does not witness it. In the other school which says that the jIva is not covered by ignorance, until the vRtti establishes a connection between the jIva and the object, the jIva does not see the object.
तत्राद्ये वृत्तिर्जीवचैतन्यस्य विषयोपरागार्था |
In the former (where the jIva is not covered by ignorance), the vRtti is needed to establish the connection (for the jIva consciousness) with the object.
द्वितीये त्वावरणाभिभवार्था |
In the latter, however, (where the jIva is covered by ignorance), the vRtti is necessary to remove ignorance.
परिच्छिन्नत्वपक्षे तु जीवचैतन्यस्य विषयप्रकाशकतदधिष्ठानचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्त्यर्था |
Where the jIva is limited, the vRtti is necessary to unite the jIva consciousness with the substratum consciousness which reveals the object.
अनावृतत्वपक्षे ह्यनावृतं सर्वगतमपि जीवचैतन्यं तत्तदाकारवृत्त्यैवोपरज्यते, न तु विषयै:, असङ्गत्वात्,
Where the jIva is not veiled by ignorance, the jIva consciousness, despite being unobstructed and all pervading, cannot have any relationship with objects, being relationless, (therefore) the vRtti objectifying the object serves as the connecting medium with objects.
यथा गोत्वं सर्वगतमपि सास्नादिमद्व्यक्त्याऽभिव्यज्यते, न तु केसरादिमद्व्यक्त्या ;
For example, despite the (jAti) gotva being all pervading, it is manifest only in the individuals having a dewlap, not in individuals having manes.
यथावा प्रदीप्रभा आकाशगन्धरसादिव्यापिन्यापि तान्न प्रकाशयन्ती रूपसंसर्गितया रूपमेव प्रकाशयति तद्वत्,
Or, despite a ray of light pervading space, fragrance, taste etc, it does not reveal them, but only reveals form, when it happens to be in contact with it.
A question may be raised here – As the jIva is free of relations, how can it have a relationship with vRtti? Because that is its nature. The jIva in this school is defined as consciousness delimited by ignorance, so by nature, it has a relationship with vRtti. However, as it is relationless, it has no relation with objects.
केवलाग्न्यदाह्यस्यापि अय:पिण्डादिसमारूढाग्निदाह्यत्ववच्च केवलचैतन्याप्रकाश्यस्यापि घटादेस्तत्तदाकारवृत्त्युपारूढचैतन्यप्रकाश्यत्वम् युक्तम् |
Even though, fire on its own (ie without fuel) cannot burn, when in association with an iron ball, burns, consciousness by itself cannot reveal objects, but when reflected in vRtti objectifying pots, etc., can reveal them.
एवञ्चानावृतत्वपक्षे तत्तदाकारवृत्तिद्वारा चैतन्यस्य तत्तदुपरागे तत्तदर्थप्रकाश: |
Therefore, in the school where consciousness is unveiled, it is through the association with thought objectifying each object, that consciousness is able to reveal them.
आवृतत्वपक्षे तत्तदाकारवृत्त्या तत्तद्विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणाभिभवेन तत्तदर्थप्रकाश: |
Where the jIva consciousness is veiled, the object is revealed when the veil obstructing the consciousness delimited by the object is removed by the vRtti objectifying the object.
अन्त:करणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यरूपत्वे जीवस्यावच्छेदकान्त:करणतत्तद्विष्याकारवृत्त्या तत्तद्विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्य्याभेदााभिव्यक्तौ तत्तत्प्रकाश: |
Where the jIva is consciousness delimited by the mind, the object is revealed when the vRtti belonging to the mind, which happens to the delimiter of the jIva, objectifies the object, and through that vRtti, the jIva consciousness becomes one with the object delimited consciousness.
यद्यपि प्रकाशकमधिष्ठानचैतन्यं सर्वगतं जीवचैतन्यंचान्त:करणावच्छिन्नम् ; तथापि चैतन्याभेदेनाभिव्यक्तत्वात् व्यवस्थोपपत्ति: |
Even though the revealer is the substratum consciousness which is all pervading and the jIva consciousness is delimited, the mechanism (for pratikarmavyavasthA) is possible because of the jIva consciousness becoming one with the substratum consciousness.
Until now the siddhikAra provided a very quick summary of the three primary prakriyA-s (teaching methodologies) within advaita for pratikarmavyavasthA. He then cites the key objections from the nyAyAmRtakAra on this topic:
ननु - इयं प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थानोपपद्यते, तथाहि - स्वसन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियजन्यस्वज्ञानात् पूर्वं घटादे: सत्वे प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वव्याप्तकाल्पनिकत्वायोग: |
This pratikarmavyavasthA is untenable, because if objects such as pots, etc exist prior to the cognitions born from the senses that come into contact them, then they cannot be mithyA where things exist only when they are cognised.
नच काल्पनिकत्वविशेष: प्रातिभासिकत्वादिरेव तद्व्याप्त:, गौरवात्,
Nor can it be argued that such a definition of mithyAtva only applies for prAtibhAsika objects, because such a qualifier is superfluous. It will lead to the defect of vyApyatvAsiddhi, because apart from objects such as shell silver which have this quality (of existing only when they appear), there are no other mithyA objects.
नच प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वाभावेऽपि ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वादिनैव कल्पितत्वं भविष्यति ;
Nor can it be argued that even in the absence of existence only at the time of appearance, a mithyAtva of the nature of being sublatable by cognition etc, will be possible.
प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वाभावेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वाभावस्याप्यापाद्यत्वात्,
Because, if existence at the time of cognition is absent, sublation by cognition also will be absent.
If this is true then the world is real, how can it appear? He says
प्रतीतेर्विश्वसत्यत्वेन वा, मिथ्यात्वेऽपि स्वप्नादिवदिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षनिरपेक्षतयावोपपत्ते:,
The appearance of the world is still possible if the world was real, and even if the world was mithyA, like in the case of the dream, it is possible to see things even without the contact of sense organs with things.
Thus pratikarmavyavasthA is untenable with advaita.
Then how to account for the difference between objects such as pots and shell silver?
व्यावहारिकत्वस्यापि भ्रान्तिदैर्घ्यमात्रेणोपपत्तेश्चेति
Concepts like empirical reality (vyAvahArikatva) can be simply explained by the duration of the illusion
Having quoted the objections of the nyAyAmRtakAra, the siddhikAra says
- चेत्, मैवम्; It is not as you say.
प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वस्य कल्पितत्वं न व्याप्यम् ; दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धानुपपत्त्यादिसहकृतोक्तानुमानात् प्रपञ्चे कल्पितत्वे सिद्धे प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलाच्च स्थायित्वे तत्रैव व्यभिचारात् | the
mithyAtva does not imply existence only at the time of appearance, because as
mithyAtva of the world has already been established by an inference supported by the impossibility of any relationship between consciousness and the seen, and the continued existence of the world is established by recognition (the object seen now was the same object seen yesterday), there is an exception to such a rule right there.
The opponent had cited the concomitance – wherever there is mithyAtva, there is existence only at the time of cognition. However, the inference of mithyAtva has already revealed that the object is mithyA. At the same time, pratyabhijnA, recognition, has established that the same object existed even before the cognition now, so right there, there is an exception to the concomitance.
नच - शुक्तिरूप्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञासाम्यं प्रकृतप्रत्यभिज्ञाया इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that the recognition cited here is of the same nature as the recognition of illusory silver (one may have mistaken the shell for silver many times, and draw a false recognition).
प्रतीत्यविशेषेऽपि वणिग्वीथीस्थशुक्तिरूप्ययो: परिक्षितत्वापरिक्षितत्वाभ्यां स्थायित्वास्थायित्वरूपविशेषसंभवात् |
There is a difference in the recognition of the shop silver and shell silver in that one has been confirmed and the other is unconfirmed, one recognition persists and the other recognition does not.
Thus the first objection has been discussed.
तथापिवा परोक्षवृत्तेरिवापरोक्षवृत्तेरपि प्रकाशत्वमस्तु, किं तदुपरक्तचैतन्येनेति चेन्न ;
If you say – “Even so, let the case of perception be like for indirect cognition (which does not travel to the object) revealing its object. What is gained by saying that it is revealed by consciousness associated with cognition?” - No.
परोक्षस्थलेऽपि परोक्षवृत्त्युपरक्तचैतन्यस्यैव प्रकाशकत्वात् |
Because we hold that even in the case of indirect cognition, it is consciousness associated with the vRtti that is the revealer.
अथ तत्राप्यपरोक्षैकरसचैतन्योपरागे विषयापरोक्ष्यप्रसङ्ग: न;
If it is thought that as consciousness is ever perceived, every cognition will be a perception (even indirect cognitions), no.
विषयचैन्याभिव्यक्तावेव विषयस्यापरोक्ष्यम् | नच परोक्षस्थले तदस्ति ; विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाभावेन विषयपर्यन्तं वृत्तेरगमनात्, अन्तरेष तत्र धीसमुल्लासात् |
The object is perceived only when the object delimited consciousness becomes manifest, ie, the ignorance in the object delimited consciousness is removed. That does not happen in the case of indirect cognition, as the vRtti stays inside the mind itself and does not reach the location of the object on account of the senses not being connected to the object.
अपरोक्षस्थाले तु प्रमातृचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्ताधिष्ठानचैतन्योपरागो विषयेऽस्ति ;
Wherease in the case of perception, consciousness becomes associated with the object when the knower-consciousness becomes one with the substratum-consciousness.
In the case of perception, the vRtti travels to the object, removes the ignorance located in the consciousness delimited by the object, which reveals the object, and the seer perceives it when the consciousness delimited by the mind, becomes one with the consciousness delimited by the object through the connection of the consciousness delimited by the vRtti.
It is held that any kAraka, a factor in action, is a cause for the kriya, the action. In the case of perception, the object is the karma kAraka, the object of the cognition. Therefore, it is admitted that one of the causes of the perception of objects is the object itself. However, in the case of indirect cognitions, the object cannot be said to be the cause, because there may be scenarios when the object itself does not exist but the object is cognised, like in the case of memory, etc.
तत्र विषयस्य कर्मकारकत्वात् | There (in perceptions), the object is the karma kAraka,
नच वृत्तिगतविशेषादापरोक्ष्यं ; Nor can it be said that perception is simply a type of vRtti.
तत्र हि विशेषो विषयकृतश्चेदोमिति ब्रूम: | However, if it is said that the type of vRtti becomes perception on account of the object, that is acceptable to us.
जातिकृतस्तु विशेषो न संभवति ; But if it is said that is some jAti, that is not possible.
सोऽयमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञायां परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वयो: सङ्करप्रसङ्गात्, Because sometimes there are elements of perception and indirect cognition can be mixed up in the same cognition itself – for example, in the recognition “This one (perceived here) is that (the one recalled)”. This mixing up or sankara, is inimical to there being a jAti of cognitions called pratyaksha jAti or paroksha jAti.
अव्याप्यवृत्तित्वात्, Moreover, parokshatva or perception-ness does not fully pervade the cognition. Every jAti has to fully pervade its vyakti, whereas in the case of recognition etc, a part of it is perception and a part of it is memory.
प्रमात्वादिना सङ्करप्रसङ्गाच्च | Further the same cognition can have validity mixed-up.
pramAtva is present in some cognitions, pratyakshatva in some other cognitions. pramAtva and pratyakshatva or not always present together - sometimes bhramatva and pratyakshatva are present together, and sometimes pramAtva and parokshatva are present together. Thus pratyakshatva and pramAtva can be mixed up sometimes.
किंच वृत्तेर्जडत्वादेव न प्रकाशकत्वम् | Moreover, as cognition is inert, it cannot reveal anything.
The nyAyAmRtakAra argues that while the mind may be inert, it is not necessary that its product, vRtti will be inert too.
नच - वृत्तावन्त:करणावृत्त्यापि स्वप्रकाशत्वं ज्ञानत्ववदिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that - Just like jnAnatva is present in vRtti, but not in the mind, svaprakAshatva, self effulgence, can be present in vritti, but not in the mind.
स्वप्रकाशात्मसंबन्धेनैव तस्या: प्रकाशत्वोपपत्तौ तत्स्वप्रकाशत्वे मानाभावात् |
It is only through its association with the self effulgent Atma that the vRtti is luminous, there is no proof to state that it is self-effulgent.
किंच घटं जानामीत्यनुभूयमानसकर्मकवृत्त्यन्या संवित् घटप्रकाशरूपा घट: प्रकाशत इत्याकारकानुभवसिद्धैव |
Moreover, it is known from experience that the consciousness that illuminates the pot “The pot shines”, which has no object, is different to the cognition "I know the pot" which happens to be sakarmaka, has an object.
The shining has no object (The pot does not shine at something), whereas the cognition has an object (it is the cognition of the pot). This follows that there are two elements in every knowledge – the illumination by consciousness, and the cognition (removal of ignorance) by a vRtti.
नच - करोति यतते चलति गच्छतीत्यादवेकार्थत्वेऽपि सकर्मकाकर्मकस्वभावत्वदर्शनात् अत्राप्येकार्थत्वेऽपि तथा स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be said – “Even though the words karoti (kRn) and yatate (yat) both mean the same (doing), but the root kRn is sakarmaka, whereas the root yat is akarmaka. Similarly while calati and gacChati both mean the same (to go), the former is akarmaka and the latter is sakarmaka. Let this also be the same (prakAshate which is akarmaka is the same as jAnAmi which is sakarmaka)”.
The siddhikAra responds
तत्राप्येकार्थत्वाभावात् | अनुकूलयत्नो हि कृञ् धात्वर्थ:, यत्यर्थस्तु यत्नमात्रम्,
There too the verbs do not denote the same meaning. The root
the root kRn is indicative of causative action, whereas yat is merely indicating an attempt.
There is a kArika that outlines the circumstances in which some well known sakarmaka verb roots become akarkama
धातो: अर्थान्तरे वृत्ते: धात्वर्थेन उपसङ्ग्रहात् प्रसिद्धे: अविवक्षात: कर्मण: अकर्मिका क्रिया
1) भारं वहति - He bears the load. Here vahati is sakarmakam. Whereas, नदी वहति - the river is flowing. Here vahati is akarmaka. There is a difference in the meaning (अर्थान्तरे वृत्ते:)
2) इच्छति / स्पर्धते - स: अपरस्य पराभिभवम् इच्छति (he wishes to defeat the other person). स: तेन सह स्पर्धते (he is competing / fighting with him). In the first case, the defeat of the opponent is not part of the meaning of the word icChati, whereas in the latter, the defeat of the opponent is included within the meaning of the word spardhate (धात्वर्थेन उपसङ्ग्रहात्)
3) In some cases, the object of the verb is very obvious (प्रसिद्धे:), like the word वर्षति does not require us to say पर्जन्यो वर्षति. However, if some other object is to be intended, which is not naturally known in association with the verb (देवा: पुष्पाणि वर्षन्ति), it becomes sakarmaka.
4) Sometimes it is not intended to say what is the object of the verb (अविवक्षात:). So there the verb can become akarmaka - स: गच्छति.
This is a kArika that occurs in vyAkaraNa. Here the siddhikAra says that as karoti contains some aspect not included in yatate, it is said to be different. There is another kArika that specifically addresses this. कृञ: अकर्मकतापत्ते: नहि यत्नोऽर्थ: इष्यते किन्तु उत्पादनमेव अत: कर्मवत्स्यात् यगादपि |
एवं गम्यर्थ उत्तरसंयोगफलक: स्पन्द:, चलत्यर्थस्तु स्पन्दमात्रम् ;
Similarly, there is a difference between gacChati and calati. calati means movement. Whereas gacChati is a movement that is capable of moving from one place to another.
तथाचैकार्थकत्वे कुत्रापि न सकर्मकत्वाकर्मकत्वव्यवस्था |
Therefore it is not appropriate to say that the same meaning can sometimes be sakarmaka and sometimes akarmaka.
नच - त्वन्मते परिणतेतरकर्मकत्वात् परिणतिविशेषभूताया वृत्ते: कथं सकर्मकत्वमिति - वाच्यम्,
Nor can it be argued – “As the verb pariNate (transforms) is akarmaka in your system, so how can vRtti, which is a kind of transformation (of the mind) be sakarmaka?”
एकस्य हि सकर्मकत्वाकर्मकत्वे एकरूपेण विरुद्धे न तु रूपान्तरेणापि ; मानाभावात्,
Just because something cannot be both akarmakatva and sakarmakatva in one form of the action, there is no basis to say it cannot be akarmaka and sakarmaka in a different form of the same action.
For example, even though pariNAmatva is akarmaka, but jnAnatva, icChAtva, which are pariNAma of antah karaNa, can have sakarmakatva. देवदत्त: कुठारेण वृक्षं छिनत्ति - he cuts the tree with an axe. Here छिनत्ति is an axe. The same can be conveyed by saying कुठारं उद्यच्छत्ति वृक्षे निपातयति - there is no additional meaning in छिनत्ति that is not conveyed in उद्यच्छत्ति निपातयति (brings the axe and hits the tree). In the former while the tree is the object of the word छिनत्ति, the tree is not the object of the verbs उद्यच्छत्ति निपातयति. The karma of one action becomes the karaNa for the same action when conveyed using a different verb, even though the action is the same.
The same action is sakarmaka in one form and akarmaka in another form.
यथा स्थितेरकर्मिकाया अपि अगमनत्वेन रूपेण सकर्मकत्वम् ;
तथा परिणतित्वेन रूपेणाकर्मिकाया अपि वृत्ते: ज्ञानत्वेन सकर्मकत्वं भविष्यतीत्यदोष: |
Just like “being” is akarkama in its form of not moving, but in another form as “not going” becomes sakarmaka. Similarly, even though “transformation” is akarmaka, the vRtti, being a type of knowledge, will end up as sakarmaka.
ननु तर्ह्यतीत: प्रकाशते इति धीर्न स्यात्,
The opponent argues – “Then there can be no vRtti of the type ‘the past object is revealed’. The opponent picks an example of the recollection of a past object. The object does not exist in the present. If it is true that a vRtti must have an object, then there can be recollection of past objects.
The siddhikAra says:
न ; इष्टापत्ते:, तत्रापि वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यसत्त्वेन प्रकाशत इत्यादिप्रयोग संभवाच्च |
No, because that is desirable to us. Even there, the presence of consciousness reflected in the vRtti (recollection vRtti) means that it is possible to say that it is revealed. Thus, it is not the vRtti that shines, it is consciousness reflected in the vRtti.
Another objection is raised:
ननु यथा अज्ञानविरोधिवृत्तावनुभवत्वं नास्ति, किंतु अन्यत्र; तथा द्वेषविरोधिवृत्तेरन्यत्रेच्छात्वमित्यपि स्यादिति - चेन्न ;
Just like it is said that jnAnatva is not present in the vRtti that is inimical to ignorance, but is present in something else (in advaita it is consciousness that is jnAnam, not vRtti), then let it be the case that icChAtvam is not present in the vRtti that is inimical to hatred.
This is just a vitaNDAvAda. The siddhikAra says no
बाधकसत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां विशेषात्, The difference is that there is a contradiction is present in one and not the other. There is a contradicting pramANa in saying that jnAnatva natva exists in the vRtti, whereas, there is no contradiction in saying icChAtvam can reside in a vritti that is the dispeller of hatred.
According to advaita, vRtti is momentary so it cannot be accepted as the jnAna referred to in satyam jnAnam anantam brahma - jnAna has been said to be permanent and self effulgent, the vRtti is neither.
अत्रेव तत्र सकर्मकाकर्मकविलक्षणक्रियाननुभवाच्च |
Here itself (in the case of jAnAti and prakAshate), there is a difference of sakarkmakatva and akarmakatva that is experienced. However in desire and hatred such a difference is not a matter of experience. Both are sakarmaka, have an object.
However, really speaking, we experience a situation where one does not hate nor desire something, one is merely indifferent. Thus the argument that the absence of desire is hate, and vice versa is not correct. We can accept both as different vRtti-s.
यथा च वृत्त्यतिरिक्तभानसिद्धिस्तथा स्वयं ज्योतिष्ट्वप्रस्तावे विस्तरेण वक्ष्याम: |
The existence of an illumination other than the vRtti will be explained in detail in the chapter on self effulgence.
(Continued in part 2)
From the panchapAdikA vivaraNam onwards, several works have considered this topic of pratikarmavyavasthA. By karma, jnAna viShaya is meant. The same object is seen by one, but may not be seen by someone else. What is the mechanism (vyavasthA) to explain for the difference in what is perceived by each person (prati karma)?
The nyAyAmRtakAra had cited several defects against the pratikarmavyavasthA postulated by the vivaraNakAra.
He says:
ननु - विश्वस्याध्यासिकत्वे प्रातिभासिकस्थल इव विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाधीनाया: प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थाया अनुपपत्तिरिति - चेन्न ;
If the world is mithyA, then like in the case of prAtibhAsika objects, the pratikarmavyavasthA that is subject to the contact between sense organs and the object is untenable.
Let's take the example of shell silver, a prAtibhAsika object. It is admitted that the shell silver only exists when it seen. However, it has to be accepted that it is not the eyes that see the shell silver, because for the eyes to see any object, there has to be some pre-existing connection possible between the eyes and the object. However, no such connection is possible, because the shell silver did not exist prior to its cognition. If the eyes do not see it, how to account for the fact that one person sees it, but others do not?
The siddhikAra says no.
वृत्ते: पूर्वमेव घटादीनां चैतन्येऽध्यासेन प्रातिभासिकस्थालापेक्षया वैलक्षण्यात् |
As the world, comprising of pots etc., is superimposed on consciousness even prior to the rise of the vRtti, it is different from prAtibhAsika.
Thus pratikarmavyavasthA for the objects of the world is possible.
तथाहि - अन्त: करणं चक्षुर्वत्तेर्जोवयवि | To explain - the mind, like the eyes is a product of fire (ie the fire principle is more predominant in the case of eyes and the mind).
The organ of sight get a connection with objects by traveling to the object. It does so quickly like a ray of light because it is a product of fire. Similar to sight, the mind also travels to the object in an instant and grasps it.
तच्चेन्द्रियद्वारेण तत्संयुक्तं विषयं व्याप्य तदाकार भवति |
The mind travels through the medium of sense organs pervades the object which is in contact with the sense organs and takes its AkAra (objectifies it).
यथा नद्याद्युदकं प्रणाड्या नि:सृत्य केदाराद्याकारं भवति, सैव वृत्तिरित्युच्यते |
Like water in a river is transported by a canal to a field and envelops the field and takes its shape, that transformation of the mind is called vRtti.
तत्र जीवचैतन्यमविद्योपाधिकं सत् सर्वगतं अन्त:करणोपाधिकं सत् परिच्छिन्नमिति मतद्वयम् | There are two schools of thought here, one which says that the jIvAtma is consciousness with avidyA upAdhi and is all pervading, and the other, which says that it is limited on account of being delimited by the mind.
तत्राद्ये विषयप्रकाशकं जीवचैतन्यम् |
In the first case, the all pervading jIva chaitanya is the revealer of everything.
द्वितीये ब्रह्मचैतन्यम् |
In the second case, brahman is the revealer of everything.
Then why does jIva not see everything in the first case?
आद्ये पक्षेऽपि जीवचैतन्यमविद्यानावृतम् आवृतं च |
The first case is divided into two – one where the jIva is veiled by ignorance and one where he is not.
In the school which holds that the jIva is covered by ignorance, until the vRtti destroys the covering over the object, he does not witness it. In the other school which says that the jIva is not covered by ignorance, until the vRtti establishes a connection between the jIva and the object, the jIva does not see the object.
तत्राद्ये वृत्तिर्जीवचैतन्यस्य विषयोपरागार्था |
In the former (where the jIva is not covered by ignorance), the vRtti is needed to establish the connection (for the jIva consciousness) with the object.
द्वितीये त्वावरणाभिभवार्था |
In the latter, however, (where the jIva is covered by ignorance), the vRtti is necessary to remove ignorance.
परिच्छिन्नत्वपक्षे तु जीवचैतन्यस्य विषयप्रकाशकतदधिष्ठानचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्त्यर्था |
Where the jIva is limited, the vRtti is necessary to unite the jIva consciousness with the substratum consciousness which reveals the object.
अनावृतत्वपक्षे ह्यनावृतं सर्वगतमपि जीवचैतन्यं तत्तदाकारवृत्त्यैवोपरज्यते, न तु विषयै:, असङ्गत्वात्,
Where the jIva is not veiled by ignorance, the jIva consciousness, despite being unobstructed and all pervading, cannot have any relationship with objects, being relationless, (therefore) the vRtti objectifying the object serves as the connecting medium with objects.
यथा गोत्वं सर्वगतमपि सास्नादिमद्व्यक्त्याऽभिव्यज्यते, न तु केसरादिमद्व्यक्त्या ;
For example, despite the (jAti) gotva being all pervading, it is manifest only in the individuals having a dewlap, not in individuals having manes.
यथावा प्रदीप्रभा आकाशगन्धरसादिव्यापिन्यापि तान्न प्रकाशयन्ती रूपसंसर्गितया रूपमेव प्रकाशयति तद्वत्,
Or, despite a ray of light pervading space, fragrance, taste etc, it does not reveal them, but only reveals form, when it happens to be in contact with it.
A question may be raised here – As the jIva is free of relations, how can it have a relationship with vRtti? Because that is its nature. The jIva in this school is defined as consciousness delimited by ignorance, so by nature, it has a relationship with vRtti. However, as it is relationless, it has no relation with objects.
केवलाग्न्यदाह्यस्यापि अय:पिण्डादिसमारूढाग्निदाह्यत्ववच्च केवलचैतन्याप्रकाश्यस्यापि घटादेस्तत्तदाकारवृत्त्युपारूढचैतन्यप्रकाश्यत्वम् युक्तम् |
Even though, fire on its own (ie without fuel) cannot burn, when in association with an iron ball, burns, consciousness by itself cannot reveal objects, but when reflected in vRtti objectifying pots, etc., can reveal them.
एवञ्चानावृतत्वपक्षे तत्तदाकारवृत्तिद्वारा चैतन्यस्य तत्तदुपरागे तत्तदर्थप्रकाश: |
Therefore, in the school where consciousness is unveiled, it is through the association with thought objectifying each object, that consciousness is able to reveal them.
आवृतत्वपक्षे तत्तदाकारवृत्त्या तत्तद्विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणाभिभवेन तत्तदर्थप्रकाश: |
Where the jIva consciousness is veiled, the object is revealed when the veil obstructing the consciousness delimited by the object is removed by the vRtti objectifying the object.
अन्त:करणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यरूपत्वे जीवस्यावच्छेदकान्त:करणतत्तद्विष्याकारवृत्त्या तत्तद्विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्य्याभेदााभिव्यक्तौ तत्तत्प्रकाश: |
Where the jIva is consciousness delimited by the mind, the object is revealed when the vRtti belonging to the mind, which happens to the delimiter of the jIva, objectifies the object, and through that vRtti, the jIva consciousness becomes one with the object delimited consciousness.
यद्यपि प्रकाशकमधिष्ठानचैतन्यं सर्वगतं जीवचैतन्यंचान्त:करणावच्छिन्नम् ; तथापि चैतन्याभेदेनाभिव्यक्तत्वात् व्यवस्थोपपत्ति: |
Even though the revealer is the substratum consciousness which is all pervading and the jIva consciousness is delimited, the mechanism (for pratikarmavyavasthA) is possible because of the jIva consciousness becoming one with the substratum consciousness.
Until now the siddhikAra provided a very quick summary of the three primary prakriyA-s (teaching methodologies) within advaita for pratikarmavyavasthA. He then cites the key objections from the nyAyAmRtakAra on this topic:
ननु - इयं प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थानोपपद्यते, तथाहि - स्वसन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियजन्यस्वज्ञानात् पूर्वं घटादे: सत्वे प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वव्याप्तकाल्पनिकत्वायोग: |
This pratikarmavyavasthA is untenable, because if objects such as pots, etc exist prior to the cognitions born from the senses that come into contact them, then they cannot be mithyA where things exist only when they are cognised.
नच काल्पनिकत्वविशेष: प्रातिभासिकत्वादिरेव तद्व्याप्त:, गौरवात्,
Nor can it be argued that such a definition of mithyAtva only applies for prAtibhAsika objects, because such a qualifier is superfluous. It will lead to the defect of vyApyatvAsiddhi, because apart from objects such as shell silver which have this quality (of existing only when they appear), there are no other mithyA objects.
नच प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वाभावेऽपि ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वादिनैव कल्पितत्वं भविष्यति ;
Nor can it be argued that even in the absence of existence only at the time of appearance, a mithyAtva of the nature of being sublatable by cognition etc, will be possible.
प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वाभावेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वाभावस्याप्यापाद्यत्वात्,
Because, if existence at the time of cognition is absent, sublation by cognition also will be absent.
If this is true then the world is real, how can it appear? He says
प्रतीतेर्विश्वसत्यत्वेन वा, मिथ्यात्वेऽपि स्वप्नादिवदिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षनिरपेक्षतयावोपपत्ते:,
The appearance of the world is still possible if the world was real, and even if the world was mithyA, like in the case of the dream, it is possible to see things even without the contact of sense organs with things.
Thus pratikarmavyavasthA is untenable with advaita.
Then how to account for the difference between objects such as pots and shell silver?
व्यावहारिकत्वस्यापि भ्रान्तिदैर्घ्यमात्रेणोपपत्तेश्चेति
Concepts like empirical reality (vyAvahArikatva) can be simply explained by the duration of the illusion
Having quoted the objections of the nyAyAmRtakAra, the siddhikAra says
- चेत्, मैवम्; It is not as you say.
प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वस्य कल्पितत्वं न व्याप्यम् ; दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धानुपपत्त्यादिसहकृतोक्तानुमानात् प्रपञ्चे कल्पितत्वे सिद्धे प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलाच्च स्थायित्वे तत्रैव व्यभिचारात् | the
mithyAtva does not imply existence only at the time of appearance, because as
mithyAtva of the world has already been established by an inference supported by the impossibility of any relationship between consciousness and the seen, and the continued existence of the world is established by recognition (the object seen now was the same object seen yesterday), there is an exception to such a rule right there.
The opponent had cited the concomitance – wherever there is mithyAtva, there is existence only at the time of cognition. However, the inference of mithyAtva has already revealed that the object is mithyA. At the same time, pratyabhijnA, recognition, has established that the same object existed even before the cognition now, so right there, there is an exception to the concomitance.
नच - शुक्तिरूप्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञासाम्यं प्रकृतप्रत्यभिज्ञाया इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that the recognition cited here is of the same nature as the recognition of illusory silver (one may have mistaken the shell for silver many times, and draw a false recognition).
प्रतीत्यविशेषेऽपि वणिग्वीथीस्थशुक्तिरूप्ययो: परिक्षितत्वापरिक्षितत्वाभ्यां स्थायित्वास्थायित्वरूपविशेषसंभवात् |
There is a difference in the recognition of the shop silver and shell silver in that one has been confirmed and the other is unconfirmed, one recognition persists and the other recognition does not.
Thus the first objection has been discussed.
तथापिवा परोक्षवृत्तेरिवापरोक्षवृत्तेरपि प्रकाशत्वमस्तु, किं तदुपरक्तचैतन्येनेति चेन्न ;
If you say – “Even so, let the case of perception be like for indirect cognition (which does not travel to the object) revealing its object. What is gained by saying that it is revealed by consciousness associated with cognition?” - No.
परोक्षस्थलेऽपि परोक्षवृत्त्युपरक्तचैतन्यस्यैव प्रकाशकत्वात् |
Because we hold that even in the case of indirect cognition, it is consciousness associated with the vRtti that is the revealer.
अथ तत्राप्यपरोक्षैकरसचैतन्योपरागे विषयापरोक्ष्यप्रसङ्ग: न;
If it is thought that as consciousness is ever perceived, every cognition will be a perception (even indirect cognitions), no.
विषयचैन्याभिव्यक्तावेव विषयस्यापरोक्ष्यम् | नच परोक्षस्थले तदस्ति ; विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाभावेन विषयपर्यन्तं वृत्तेरगमनात्, अन्तरेष तत्र धीसमुल्लासात् |
The object is perceived only when the object delimited consciousness becomes manifest, ie, the ignorance in the object delimited consciousness is removed. That does not happen in the case of indirect cognition, as the vRtti stays inside the mind itself and does not reach the location of the object on account of the senses not being connected to the object.
अपरोक्षस्थाले तु प्रमातृचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्ताधिष्ठानचैतन्योपरागो विषयेऽस्ति ;
Wherease in the case of perception, consciousness becomes associated with the object when the knower-consciousness becomes one with the substratum-consciousness.
In the case of perception, the vRtti travels to the object, removes the ignorance located in the consciousness delimited by the object, which reveals the object, and the seer perceives it when the consciousness delimited by the mind, becomes one with the consciousness delimited by the object through the connection of the consciousness delimited by the vRtti.
It is held that any kAraka, a factor in action, is a cause for the kriya, the action. In the case of perception, the object is the karma kAraka, the object of the cognition. Therefore, it is admitted that one of the causes of the perception of objects is the object itself. However, in the case of indirect cognitions, the object cannot be said to be the cause, because there may be scenarios when the object itself does not exist but the object is cognised, like in the case of memory, etc.
तत्र विषयस्य कर्मकारकत्वात् | There (in perceptions), the object is the karma kAraka,
नच वृत्तिगतविशेषादापरोक्ष्यं ; Nor can it be said that perception is simply a type of vRtti.
तत्र हि विशेषो विषयकृतश्चेदोमिति ब्रूम: | However, if it is said that the type of vRtti becomes perception on account of the object, that is acceptable to us.
जातिकृतस्तु विशेषो न संभवति ; But if it is said that is some jAti, that is not possible.
सोऽयमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञायां परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वयो: सङ्करप्रसङ्गात्, Because sometimes there are elements of perception and indirect cognition can be mixed up in the same cognition itself – for example, in the recognition “This one (perceived here) is that (the one recalled)”. This mixing up or sankara, is inimical to there being a jAti of cognitions called pratyaksha jAti or paroksha jAti.
अव्याप्यवृत्तित्वात्, Moreover, parokshatva or perception-ness does not fully pervade the cognition. Every jAti has to fully pervade its vyakti, whereas in the case of recognition etc, a part of it is perception and a part of it is memory.
प्रमात्वादिना सङ्करप्रसङ्गाच्च | Further the same cognition can have validity mixed-up.
pramAtva is present in some cognitions, pratyakshatva in some other cognitions. pramAtva and pratyakshatva or not always present together - sometimes bhramatva and pratyakshatva are present together, and sometimes pramAtva and parokshatva are present together. Thus pratyakshatva and pramAtva can be mixed up sometimes.
किंच वृत्तेर्जडत्वादेव न प्रकाशकत्वम् | Moreover, as cognition is inert, it cannot reveal anything.
The nyAyAmRtakAra argues that while the mind may be inert, it is not necessary that its product, vRtti will be inert too.
नच - वृत्तावन्त:करणावृत्त्यापि स्वप्रकाशत्वं ज्ञानत्ववदिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that - Just like jnAnatva is present in vRtti, but not in the mind, svaprakAshatva, self effulgence, can be present in vritti, but not in the mind.
स्वप्रकाशात्मसंबन्धेनैव तस्या: प्रकाशत्वोपपत्तौ तत्स्वप्रकाशत्वे मानाभावात् |
It is only through its association with the self effulgent Atma that the vRtti is luminous, there is no proof to state that it is self-effulgent.
किंच घटं जानामीत्यनुभूयमानसकर्मकवृत्त्यन्या संवित् घटप्रकाशरूपा घट: प्रकाशत इत्याकारकानुभवसिद्धैव |
Moreover, it is known from experience that the consciousness that illuminates the pot “The pot shines”, which has no object, is different to the cognition "I know the pot" which happens to be sakarmaka, has an object.
The shining has no object (The pot does not shine at something), whereas the cognition has an object (it is the cognition of the pot). This follows that there are two elements in every knowledge – the illumination by consciousness, and the cognition (removal of ignorance) by a vRtti.
नच - करोति यतते चलति गच्छतीत्यादवेकार्थत्वेऽपि सकर्मकाकर्मकस्वभावत्वदर्शनात् अत्राप्येकार्थत्वेऽपि तथा स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be said – “Even though the words karoti (kRn) and yatate (yat) both mean the same (doing), but the root kRn is sakarmaka, whereas the root yat is akarmaka. Similarly while calati and gacChati both mean the same (to go), the former is akarmaka and the latter is sakarmaka. Let this also be the same (prakAshate which is akarmaka is the same as jAnAmi which is sakarmaka)”.
The siddhikAra responds
तत्राप्येकार्थत्वाभावात् | अनुकूलयत्नो हि कृञ् धात्वर्थ:, यत्यर्थस्तु यत्नमात्रम्,
There too the verbs do not denote the same meaning. The root
the root kRn is indicative of causative action, whereas yat is merely indicating an attempt.
There is a kArika that outlines the circumstances in which some well known sakarmaka verb roots become akarkama
धातो: अर्थान्तरे वृत्ते: धात्वर्थेन उपसङ्ग्रहात् प्रसिद्धे: अविवक्षात: कर्मण: अकर्मिका क्रिया
1) भारं वहति - He bears the load. Here vahati is sakarmakam. Whereas, नदी वहति - the river is flowing. Here vahati is akarmaka. There is a difference in the meaning (अर्थान्तरे वृत्ते:)
2) इच्छति / स्पर्धते - स: अपरस्य पराभिभवम् इच्छति (he wishes to defeat the other person). स: तेन सह स्पर्धते (he is competing / fighting with him). In the first case, the defeat of the opponent is not part of the meaning of the word icChati, whereas in the latter, the defeat of the opponent is included within the meaning of the word spardhate (धात्वर्थेन उपसङ्ग्रहात्)
3) In some cases, the object of the verb is very obvious (प्रसिद्धे:), like the word वर्षति does not require us to say पर्जन्यो वर्षति. However, if some other object is to be intended, which is not naturally known in association with the verb (देवा: पुष्पाणि वर्षन्ति), it becomes sakarmaka.
4) Sometimes it is not intended to say what is the object of the verb (अविवक्षात:). So there the verb can become akarmaka - स: गच्छति.
This is a kArika that occurs in vyAkaraNa. Here the siddhikAra says that as karoti contains some aspect not included in yatate, it is said to be different. There is another kArika that specifically addresses this. कृञ: अकर्मकतापत्ते: नहि यत्नोऽर्थ: इष्यते किन्तु उत्पादनमेव अत: कर्मवत्स्यात् यगादपि |
एवं गम्यर्थ उत्तरसंयोगफलक: स्पन्द:, चलत्यर्थस्तु स्पन्दमात्रम् ;
Similarly, there is a difference between gacChati and calati. calati means movement. Whereas gacChati is a movement that is capable of moving from one place to another.
तथाचैकार्थकत्वे कुत्रापि न सकर्मकत्वाकर्मकत्वव्यवस्था |
Therefore it is not appropriate to say that the same meaning can sometimes be sakarmaka and sometimes akarmaka.
नच - त्वन्मते परिणतेतरकर्मकत्वात् परिणतिविशेषभूताया वृत्ते: कथं सकर्मकत्वमिति - वाच्यम्,
Nor can it be argued – “As the verb pariNate (transforms) is akarmaka in your system, so how can vRtti, which is a kind of transformation (of the mind) be sakarmaka?”
एकस्य हि सकर्मकत्वाकर्मकत्वे एकरूपेण विरुद्धे न तु रूपान्तरेणापि ; मानाभावात्,
Just because something cannot be both akarmakatva and sakarmakatva in one form of the action, there is no basis to say it cannot be akarmaka and sakarmaka in a different form of the same action.
For example, even though pariNAmatva is akarmaka, but jnAnatva, icChAtva, which are pariNAma of antah karaNa, can have sakarmakatva. देवदत्त: कुठारेण वृक्षं छिनत्ति - he cuts the tree with an axe. Here छिनत्ति is an axe. The same can be conveyed by saying कुठारं उद्यच्छत्ति वृक्षे निपातयति - there is no additional meaning in छिनत्ति that is not conveyed in उद्यच्छत्ति निपातयति (brings the axe and hits the tree). In the former while the tree is the object of the word छिनत्ति, the tree is not the object of the verbs उद्यच्छत्ति निपातयति. The karma of one action becomes the karaNa for the same action when conveyed using a different verb, even though the action is the same.
The same action is sakarmaka in one form and akarmaka in another form.
यथा स्थितेरकर्मिकाया अपि अगमनत्वेन रूपेण सकर्मकत्वम् ;
तथा परिणतित्वेन रूपेणाकर्मिकाया अपि वृत्ते: ज्ञानत्वेन सकर्मकत्वं भविष्यतीत्यदोष: |
Just like “being” is akarkama in its form of not moving, but in another form as “not going” becomes sakarmaka. Similarly, even though “transformation” is akarmaka, the vRtti, being a type of knowledge, will end up as sakarmaka.
ननु तर्ह्यतीत: प्रकाशते इति धीर्न स्यात्,
The opponent argues – “Then there can be no vRtti of the type ‘the past object is revealed’. The opponent picks an example of the recollection of a past object. The object does not exist in the present. If it is true that a vRtti must have an object, then there can be recollection of past objects.
The siddhikAra says:
न ; इष्टापत्ते:, तत्रापि वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यसत्त्वेन प्रकाशत इत्यादिप्रयोग संभवाच्च |
No, because that is desirable to us. Even there, the presence of consciousness reflected in the vRtti (recollection vRtti) means that it is possible to say that it is revealed. Thus, it is not the vRtti that shines, it is consciousness reflected in the vRtti.
Another objection is raised:
ननु यथा अज्ञानविरोधिवृत्तावनुभवत्वं नास्ति, किंतु अन्यत्र; तथा द्वेषविरोधिवृत्तेरन्यत्रेच्छात्वमित्यपि स्यादिति - चेन्न ;
Just like it is said that jnAnatva is not present in the vRtti that is inimical to ignorance, but is present in something else (in advaita it is consciousness that is jnAnam, not vRtti), then let it be the case that icChAtvam is not present in the vRtti that is inimical to hatred.
This is just a vitaNDAvAda. The siddhikAra says no
बाधकसत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां विशेषात्, The difference is that there is a contradiction is present in one and not the other. There is a contradicting pramANa in saying that jnAnatva natva exists in the vRtti, whereas, there is no contradiction in saying icChAtvam can reside in a vritti that is the dispeller of hatred.
According to advaita, vRtti is momentary so it cannot be accepted as the jnAna referred to in satyam jnAnam anantam brahma - jnAna has been said to be permanent and self effulgent, the vRtti is neither.
अत्रेव तत्र सकर्मकाकर्मकविलक्षणक्रियाननुभवाच्च |
Here itself (in the case of jAnAti and prakAshate), there is a difference of sakarkmakatva and akarmakatva that is experienced. However in desire and hatred such a difference is not a matter of experience. Both are sakarmaka, have an object.
However, really speaking, we experience a situation where one does not hate nor desire something, one is merely indifferent. Thus the argument that the absence of desire is hate, and vice versa is not correct. We can accept both as different vRtti-s.
यथा च वृत्त्यतिरिक्तभानसिद्धिस्तथा स्वयं ज्योतिष्ट्वप्रस्तावे विस्तरेण वक्ष्याम: |
The existence of an illumination other than the vRtti will be explained in detail in the chapter on self effulgence.
(Continued in part 2)