paricCheda 1 - prathama mithyAtva vichAra: (part 3)
The previous posts in this topic are available here:
http://www.advaitasiddhi.com/blog/pariccheda-1-prathama-mithyatva-vichara-part-1
http://www.advaitasiddhi.com/blog/pariccheda-1-prathama-mithyatva-vichara-part-2
In the previous post, the first and second options for the meaning of sadasatvilakshaNatva were considered. Now the third option suggested by the nyAyAmritakAra is taken up for discussion. However, instead of considering the third option as "sattvAbhAvam and asattvAbhAvam present together in one substratum" (because the arguments and the counterarguments would be quite similar to the second option), the siddhikAra takes this option as "that which is different from sat and asat", that is, satbheda and asatbheda pratiyogi.
To understand the difference between the two, we need to consider the difference between atyantAbhAva and bheda (anyonyAbhAva). The logician holds that there is a difference between the two. According to him, abhAva and its pratiyogi (i.e. absence and the thing absent) can be present in the same substratum, whereas bheda and its pratiyogi (a substance, and that which it is different from) cannot.
The former, where absence and its counter-positive are present in the same location, is a special case which in nyAya is called avyApyavritti. Take the example of a monkey sitting on a tree. The naiyyAyika says that there is a type of a relationship between the monkey and the tree called samyoga, where the monkey is in physical contact with the tree. The monkey is sitting at the top of the tree, not the bottom. Thus samyoga sambandha between the monkey and the tree exists at the top of the tree, but is absent at the bottom of the tree. Thus both samyoga and its abhAva exists in the same adhikaraNa.
However, a pot and that which is different from a pot, cannot exist in the same place.
Thus absence and difference are different.
Extending this to mithyA, the siddhikAra says
सत्प्रतियोगिकासत्प्रतियोगिकभेदद्वयं वा साध्यं - Alternatively, the sAdhya can be that which is different from sat and that which is different from asat.
तथाचोभयात्मकत्वे अन्यतरात्मकत्वे वा, तादृग्भेदासंभवेन ताभ्यामर्थान्तरनवाकाश: | There is no possibility of arthAntara (i.e. proving something other than what is meant) because this definition of difference is not possible in the case of that which is both sat and asat or that is only one of the two (ie sat only or asat only).
Further, this sAdhya will not be siddha sAdhana (proving what is already known) for any of these three groups of people - those who hold the world to be sat, those who hold it to be asat, those who hold it to be sadasat.
न च - असत्त्वव्यतिरेकांशस्यासद्भेदस्य च प्रपञ्चे सिद्धत्वेनांशत: सिद्धसाधनमिति वाच्यं - do not argue thus - "as the world being different from asat is already known, it leads to a part of the sAdhya already being known, leading to partial siddha sAdhana".
The opponent already accepts that the world is different from asat, thus a part of what needs to be proved - that it is different from sat and asat - is already known. This leads to amshatah siddha sAdhana, or partial redundancy. The siddhikAra rejects this line of argument, because the nature of what we are trying to prove falls outside the scope of amshatah siddha sAdhanam.
To prove why, he cites an example which is accepted by everyone as not having amshatah siddhasAdhanam. Comparing this to the case at hand, he argues that calling mithyA as different from sat and asat is also not a case of amshatah siddhasAdhanam.
We take a slight detour to consider an argument between the bhedAbheda vAdi and the tArkika. The bhedAbheda vAdi says that wherever there is sAmAnAdhikaraNyam (sharing a common locus), there is bhedAbheda (difference and lack of difference). When we say "this pot is black", black is guNa (attribute), pot is dravyam / guNi (the substance). This is an instance of sAmAnAdhikaraNyam, where both blackness and potness are found in the same locus. The argument of the bhedAbheda vAdi is that an attribute and its substratum are both similar and different.
The statement "this pot is a cloth" - is not a case of sAmAnAdhikaraNyam. Because it is not possible for pot-ness and cloth-ness to exist within the same locus. Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that where two things are absolutely different (bheda), sAmAnAdhikaraNya is not possible. On the other hand, the statement "this pitcher is a jug" is not a case of sAmAnAdhikaraNya, because the words 'pitcher' and 'jug' are synonyms, referring to the same object. It is not a case of two things sharing one locus, both words refer to only one object. Thus where there is identity, abheda, sAmAnAdhikaraNya is not possible there also. Therefore, the bhedAbheda vAdi draws the conclusion that sAmAnAdhikaraNya and bhedAbheda share a invariable concomitance ie wherever sAmAnAdhikaraNya is present, bhedAbheda is present as well. He uses this vyApti to draw the conclusion that the relationship between an attribute and its substratum is a case of bhedAbheda.
The bhedAbheda vAdi uses this vyApti to make the inference "As sAmAnAdhikaraNya is present between the attribute and the substratum, they must have bhedAbheda between them." The naiyyAyika holds that the attribute and substratum have bheda, are different. Thus he seeks to disprove the anumAna made by the bhedAbheda vAdi.
However, in refuting the bhedAbheda vAdi's argument, the naiyyAyika does not take recourse to amshatah siddhasAdhanam. He does not say, I already know that they have bheda, why are you trying to prove bhedAbheda to me? He does not do so because he realises that the aspect of the sAdhya that he does not accept, abheda, is not sufficient for a vyApti with sAmAnAdhikaraNya.
As there can be no sAmAnAdhikaraNya with only one element, the bhedAbhedavAdi has to say that the sAdhya is bhedAbheda.
The naiyyAyika refutes this anumAna in a different way, but that is outside the scope of the present context. The important thing to the topic at hand is that he concedes that this anumAna does not have amshatah siddhasAdhanam.
The siddhikAra says, if the naiyyAyika does not cite amshatah siddhasAdhanam against the bhedAbheda vAdi, why are you citing amshatah siddhasAdhanam against me under similar circumstances?
'गुणादिकं गुण्यादिना भिन्नाभिन्नं समानाधिकृतत्वादिति' भेदाभेदवादिप्रयोगे तार्किकाद्यङ्गीकृतस्य भिन्नस्य सिद्धावपि उद्देश्यप्रतीत्यसिद्धेर्यथा न सिद्धसाधनं | "the attribute and substance are different-and-not-different, on account of sAmAnAdhikaraNyam", in this piece of inference by the bhedAbheda vAdi, the logician who holds that they are different, does not cite the doSha of siddha sAdhanam - because it is not sufficient to say that there is abheda for sAmAnAdhikaraNya to be present.
The power of the hetu to prove the presence of the sAdhya lies in the hetu always being present with the sAdhya. If the hetu is present even without the sAdhya, it cannot establish the sAdhya in the paksha. There can be no smoke without fire. Similarly, the bhedAbhedavAdin argues that both bheda and abheda have to be present for sAmAnAdhikaraNya to be present. The siddhikAra extends this to say that difference from both sat and asat have to be present together for drishyatvam to be present.
If that is the case, when can amshatah siddhasAdhanam occur? It can occur when the sAdhya (pakshatA avacChedakam) is multiple. To explain - if I want to prove that all men are mortal and intelligent, the sAdhya is two-fold. We are seeking to establish both mortality and intelligence in men. If my opponent already knows that all men are mortal, then I would be committing amshatah siddhasAdhanam. It would be sufficient if I prove intelligence alone. By doing that, I would have achieved my objective of proving mortality (already accepted) and intelligence (proved now) in men.
तथा प्रकृते अपि मिलितप्रतीतेरुद्देश्यत्वान्न सिद्धसाधनं in our context (sadasat vilakshaNa), its only when the sAdhya consists of both elements (sat bhedam asat bhedam) together, can the desired objective be achieved.
The pUrvapakshi may argue, in the case of bhedAbhedam, one needs to have both bheda and abheda for the hetu of sAmAnAdhikaraNya to be present. The hetu for the advaitin is drishyatvam (knowability). For drishyatvam, you do not need both sad bhedam and asat bhedam, it is sufficient if you have asat bhedam. Why are you seeking both?
To this, the siddhikAra says - the case of bhedAbheda is not different from sadasatvilakshaNam.
यथा तत्त्वाभेदे घट: कुम्भ इति सामानिधिकरण्यप्रतीते: अदर्शनेन मिलित्सिद्धेरुद्देश्या, तथा प्रकृते अपि सत्त्वरहिते तुच्छे दृश्यत्वादर्शनेन मिलितस्य तत्प्रयोजकतया मिलितसिद्धेरुद्देश्ये इति समानं just like sAmAnAdhikaraNya cannot be seen by abheda alone (the pitcher and a jar, do not have sAmAnAdhikaraNya as they are one and the same), in the present conext too, drishyatva is not necessarily present if you have only asatbhinnam (Brahman is asatbhinnam, but it is not drishyam) or satbhinnam (a hare's horn is satbhinnam, but it is not drishyam). drishyatva can necessarily be present only when satbhedam and asatbhedam are simultaneously present. The two cases are similar.
अतएव सत्त्वात्यन्ताभावे अपि सत्यसत्त्वात्यन्ताभावरूपं साध्यं विशिष्टं साध्यमित्यपि साधु । therefore, the third option of the nyAyAmritakAra, the absence of sat and the absence of asat present in conjunction can also be accepted as the sAdhya. In this section, he had started off by proving the simultaneous presence of difference from sat and difference from asat as an acceptable sAdhya. He extends this to the simultaneous absence of sat and absence of asat.
न च - मिलितस्य विशिष्टस्य वा साध्यत्वे तस्य कुत्राप्रसिद्ध्या अप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वं, प्रत्येकं सिद्ध्या मिलितस्य विशिष्टस्य वा साधने, शशशृङ्गयोः प्रत्येकं प्रसिद्ध्या शशीयशृङ्गंसाधनमपि स्यादिति - वाच्यम्;
The opponent argues: The absence of sat present simultaneously with asat is not seen anywhere. If you, the advaitin argue that, as each is individually seen in separate places, one can join those two elements to get to the sAdhya, we would say that by that logic, we can prove that a hare's horn is also capable of being seen. We see a hare in one place, we see a horn elsewhere. Can we join these two to say that a hare's horn can be seen? Therefore, your sAdhya of sadasatvilakshaNam is aprasiddham, not observed anywhere.
The siddhikAra says, if this your argument, that is incorrect because:
तथाविधप्रसिद्धेः शुक्तिरूप्ये एवोक्तत्वात् | I have already proved how sadasatvilakshaNatva is possible in the case of the shell silver.
The sAdhya of mithyA can also be said to be the lakshaNa, definition of mithyA. The pUrvapakshi wants to say that such a definition of mithyA would lead to ativyApti (ie the definition applies to an entity that is not mithyA).
न च निर्धर्मकत्वात् ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वासत्त्वरूपधर्मद्वयशून्यत्वेन तत्र अतिव्याप्तिः The opponent says that this lakshaNa has ativyApti doSha because Brahman, being without attributes, has neither sat, nor asat as its attributes. This is the same as the lakshaNa, and therefore Brahman would be covered by this definition of mithyA, therefore this is ativyApti. The siddhikAra says, no.
What does ativyApti mean? It means that the definition (lakshaNa) covers something that is not meant to be covered by it (alakshya). If Brahman is without attributes, how can it have the attributes of sat atyantAbhAvam and asat atyantAbhAvam? Therefore, by nirdharmakam, perhaps what is meant by the pUrvapakshi is that Brahman does not have bhAva rUpa dharma, but it does have abhAvarUpa dharma.
Sattvam itself can be abhAva rUpam. How? Because sattvam is that which is abAdhyam - that which is not sublatable. That is the absence of sublatability is sat.
सद्रूपत्वेन ब्रह्मणः तदत्यन्त्याभावानधिकरणत्वात् As Brahman is sat (ie it is bAdhyatva abhAva), it cannot have sat atyantAbhAva. Thus the lakshaNa of mithyA cannot apply to Brahman.
निर्धर्मकत्वेनैवाभावरूपधर्मानधिकरणत्वाच्चेति दिक् If Brahman means that it is nirdharmakam (ie it has neither bhAva rUpa or abhAva rUpa dharmas), it cannot have the attributes of sat atyantAbhAva or asat atyantAbhAva either. Thus the lakshaNam cannot apply there.
The nyAyAmritakAra had made several objections to this definition of mithyA - if we apply the principles outlined in this chapter, all of them can be addressed. This brings us to the end of the chapter titled prathama mithyAtva vichAra:.
(Originally posted on 20th September, 2017.)
http://www.advaitasiddhi.com/blog/pariccheda-1-prathama-mithyatva-vichara-part-1
http://www.advaitasiddhi.com/blog/pariccheda-1-prathama-mithyatva-vichara-part-2
In the previous post, the first and second options for the meaning of sadasatvilakshaNatva were considered. Now the third option suggested by the nyAyAmritakAra is taken up for discussion. However, instead of considering the third option as "sattvAbhAvam and asattvAbhAvam present together in one substratum" (because the arguments and the counterarguments would be quite similar to the second option), the siddhikAra takes this option as "that which is different from sat and asat", that is, satbheda and asatbheda pratiyogi.
To understand the difference between the two, we need to consider the difference between atyantAbhAva and bheda (anyonyAbhAva). The logician holds that there is a difference between the two. According to him, abhAva and its pratiyogi (i.e. absence and the thing absent) can be present in the same substratum, whereas bheda and its pratiyogi (a substance, and that which it is different from) cannot.
The former, where absence and its counter-positive are present in the same location, is a special case which in nyAya is called avyApyavritti. Take the example of a monkey sitting on a tree. The naiyyAyika says that there is a type of a relationship between the monkey and the tree called samyoga, where the monkey is in physical contact with the tree. The monkey is sitting at the top of the tree, not the bottom. Thus samyoga sambandha between the monkey and the tree exists at the top of the tree, but is absent at the bottom of the tree. Thus both samyoga and its abhAva exists in the same adhikaraNa.
However, a pot and that which is different from a pot, cannot exist in the same place.
Thus absence and difference are different.
Extending this to mithyA, the siddhikAra says
सत्प्रतियोगिकासत्प्रतियोगिकभेदद्वयं वा साध्यं - Alternatively, the sAdhya can be that which is different from sat and that which is different from asat.
तथाचोभयात्मकत्वे अन्यतरात्मकत्वे वा, तादृग्भेदासंभवेन ताभ्यामर्थान्तरनवाकाश: | There is no possibility of arthAntara (i.e. proving something other than what is meant) because this definition of difference is not possible in the case of that which is both sat and asat or that is only one of the two (ie sat only or asat only).
Further, this sAdhya will not be siddha sAdhana (proving what is already known) for any of these three groups of people - those who hold the world to be sat, those who hold it to be asat, those who hold it to be sadasat.
न च - असत्त्वव्यतिरेकांशस्यासद्भेदस्य च प्रपञ्चे सिद्धत्वेनांशत: सिद्धसाधनमिति वाच्यं - do not argue thus - "as the world being different from asat is already known, it leads to a part of the sAdhya already being known, leading to partial siddha sAdhana".
The opponent already accepts that the world is different from asat, thus a part of what needs to be proved - that it is different from sat and asat - is already known. This leads to amshatah siddha sAdhana, or partial redundancy. The siddhikAra rejects this line of argument, because the nature of what we are trying to prove falls outside the scope of amshatah siddha sAdhanam.
To prove why, he cites an example which is accepted by everyone as not having amshatah siddhasAdhanam. Comparing this to the case at hand, he argues that calling mithyA as different from sat and asat is also not a case of amshatah siddhasAdhanam.
We take a slight detour to consider an argument between the bhedAbheda vAdi and the tArkika. The bhedAbheda vAdi says that wherever there is sAmAnAdhikaraNyam (sharing a common locus), there is bhedAbheda (difference and lack of difference). When we say "this pot is black", black is guNa (attribute), pot is dravyam / guNi (the substance). This is an instance of sAmAnAdhikaraNyam, where both blackness and potness are found in the same locus. The argument of the bhedAbheda vAdi is that an attribute and its substratum are both similar and different.
The statement "this pot is a cloth" - is not a case of sAmAnAdhikaraNyam. Because it is not possible for pot-ness and cloth-ness to exist within the same locus. Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that where two things are absolutely different (bheda), sAmAnAdhikaraNya is not possible. On the other hand, the statement "this pitcher is a jug" is not a case of sAmAnAdhikaraNya, because the words 'pitcher' and 'jug' are synonyms, referring to the same object. It is not a case of two things sharing one locus, both words refer to only one object. Thus where there is identity, abheda, sAmAnAdhikaraNya is not possible there also. Therefore, the bhedAbheda vAdi draws the conclusion that sAmAnAdhikaraNya and bhedAbheda share a invariable concomitance ie wherever sAmAnAdhikaraNya is present, bhedAbheda is present as well. He uses this vyApti to draw the conclusion that the relationship between an attribute and its substratum is a case of bhedAbheda.
The bhedAbheda vAdi uses this vyApti to make the inference "As sAmAnAdhikaraNya is present between the attribute and the substratum, they must have bhedAbheda between them." The naiyyAyika holds that the attribute and substratum have bheda, are different. Thus he seeks to disprove the anumAna made by the bhedAbheda vAdi.
However, in refuting the bhedAbheda vAdi's argument, the naiyyAyika does not take recourse to amshatah siddhasAdhanam. He does not say, I already know that they have bheda, why are you trying to prove bhedAbheda to me? He does not do so because he realises that the aspect of the sAdhya that he does not accept, abheda, is not sufficient for a vyApti with sAmAnAdhikaraNya.
As there can be no sAmAnAdhikaraNya with only one element, the bhedAbhedavAdi has to say that the sAdhya is bhedAbheda.
The naiyyAyika refutes this anumAna in a different way, but that is outside the scope of the present context. The important thing to the topic at hand is that he concedes that this anumAna does not have amshatah siddhasAdhanam.
The siddhikAra says, if the naiyyAyika does not cite amshatah siddhasAdhanam against the bhedAbheda vAdi, why are you citing amshatah siddhasAdhanam against me under similar circumstances?
'गुणादिकं गुण्यादिना भिन्नाभिन्नं समानाधिकृतत्वादिति' भेदाभेदवादिप्रयोगे तार्किकाद्यङ्गीकृतस्य भिन्नस्य सिद्धावपि उद्देश्यप्रतीत्यसिद्धेर्यथा न सिद्धसाधनं | "the attribute and substance are different-and-not-different, on account of sAmAnAdhikaraNyam", in this piece of inference by the bhedAbheda vAdi, the logician who holds that they are different, does not cite the doSha of siddha sAdhanam - because it is not sufficient to say that there is abheda for sAmAnAdhikaraNya to be present.
The power of the hetu to prove the presence of the sAdhya lies in the hetu always being present with the sAdhya. If the hetu is present even without the sAdhya, it cannot establish the sAdhya in the paksha. There can be no smoke without fire. Similarly, the bhedAbhedavAdin argues that both bheda and abheda have to be present for sAmAnAdhikaraNya to be present. The siddhikAra extends this to say that difference from both sat and asat have to be present together for drishyatvam to be present.
If that is the case, when can amshatah siddhasAdhanam occur? It can occur when the sAdhya (pakshatA avacChedakam) is multiple. To explain - if I want to prove that all men are mortal and intelligent, the sAdhya is two-fold. We are seeking to establish both mortality and intelligence in men. If my opponent already knows that all men are mortal, then I would be committing amshatah siddhasAdhanam. It would be sufficient if I prove intelligence alone. By doing that, I would have achieved my objective of proving mortality (already accepted) and intelligence (proved now) in men.
तथा प्रकृते अपि मिलितप्रतीतेरुद्देश्यत्वान्न सिद्धसाधनं in our context (sadasat vilakshaNa), its only when the sAdhya consists of both elements (sat bhedam asat bhedam) together, can the desired objective be achieved.
The pUrvapakshi may argue, in the case of bhedAbhedam, one needs to have both bheda and abheda for the hetu of sAmAnAdhikaraNya to be present. The hetu for the advaitin is drishyatvam (knowability). For drishyatvam, you do not need both sad bhedam and asat bhedam, it is sufficient if you have asat bhedam. Why are you seeking both?
To this, the siddhikAra says - the case of bhedAbheda is not different from sadasatvilakshaNam.
यथा तत्त्वाभेदे घट: कुम्भ इति सामानिधिकरण्यप्रतीते: अदर्शनेन मिलित्सिद्धेरुद्देश्या, तथा प्रकृते अपि सत्त्वरहिते तुच्छे दृश्यत्वादर्शनेन मिलितस्य तत्प्रयोजकतया मिलितसिद्धेरुद्देश्ये इति समानं just like sAmAnAdhikaraNya cannot be seen by abheda alone (the pitcher and a jar, do not have sAmAnAdhikaraNya as they are one and the same), in the present conext too, drishyatva is not necessarily present if you have only asatbhinnam (Brahman is asatbhinnam, but it is not drishyam) or satbhinnam (a hare's horn is satbhinnam, but it is not drishyam). drishyatva can necessarily be present only when satbhedam and asatbhedam are simultaneously present. The two cases are similar.
अतएव सत्त्वात्यन्ताभावे अपि सत्यसत्त्वात्यन्ताभावरूपं साध्यं विशिष्टं साध्यमित्यपि साधु । therefore, the third option of the nyAyAmritakAra, the absence of sat and the absence of asat present in conjunction can also be accepted as the sAdhya. In this section, he had started off by proving the simultaneous presence of difference from sat and difference from asat as an acceptable sAdhya. He extends this to the simultaneous absence of sat and absence of asat.
न च - मिलितस्य विशिष्टस्य वा साध्यत्वे तस्य कुत्राप्रसिद्ध्या अप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वं, प्रत्येकं सिद्ध्या मिलितस्य विशिष्टस्य वा साधने, शशशृङ्गयोः प्रत्येकं प्रसिद्ध्या शशीयशृङ्गंसाधनमपि स्यादिति - वाच्यम्;
The opponent argues: The absence of sat present simultaneously with asat is not seen anywhere. If you, the advaitin argue that, as each is individually seen in separate places, one can join those two elements to get to the sAdhya, we would say that by that logic, we can prove that a hare's horn is also capable of being seen. We see a hare in one place, we see a horn elsewhere. Can we join these two to say that a hare's horn can be seen? Therefore, your sAdhya of sadasatvilakshaNam is aprasiddham, not observed anywhere.
The siddhikAra says, if this your argument, that is incorrect because:
तथाविधप्रसिद्धेः शुक्तिरूप्ये एवोक्तत्वात् | I have already proved how sadasatvilakshaNatva is possible in the case of the shell silver.
The sAdhya of mithyA can also be said to be the lakshaNa, definition of mithyA. The pUrvapakshi wants to say that such a definition of mithyA would lead to ativyApti (ie the definition applies to an entity that is not mithyA).
न च निर्धर्मकत्वात् ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वासत्त्वरूपधर्मद्वयशून्यत्वेन तत्र अतिव्याप्तिः The opponent says that this lakshaNa has ativyApti doSha because Brahman, being without attributes, has neither sat, nor asat as its attributes. This is the same as the lakshaNa, and therefore Brahman would be covered by this definition of mithyA, therefore this is ativyApti. The siddhikAra says, no.
What does ativyApti mean? It means that the definition (lakshaNa) covers something that is not meant to be covered by it (alakshya). If Brahman is without attributes, how can it have the attributes of sat atyantAbhAvam and asat atyantAbhAvam? Therefore, by nirdharmakam, perhaps what is meant by the pUrvapakshi is that Brahman does not have bhAva rUpa dharma, but it does have abhAvarUpa dharma.
Sattvam itself can be abhAva rUpam. How? Because sattvam is that which is abAdhyam - that which is not sublatable. That is the absence of sublatability is sat.
सद्रूपत्वेन ब्रह्मणः तदत्यन्त्याभावानधिकरणत्वात् As Brahman is sat (ie it is bAdhyatva abhAva), it cannot have sat atyantAbhAva. Thus the lakshaNa of mithyA cannot apply to Brahman.
निर्धर्मकत्वेनैवाभावरूपधर्मानधिकरणत्वाच्चेति दिक् If Brahman means that it is nirdharmakam (ie it has neither bhAva rUpa or abhAva rUpa dharmas), it cannot have the attributes of sat atyantAbhAva or asat atyantAbhAva either. Thus the lakshaNam cannot apply there.
The nyAyAmritakAra had made several objections to this definition of mithyA - if we apply the principles outlined in this chapter, all of them can be addressed. This brings us to the end of the chapter titled prathama mithyAtva vichAra:.
(Originally posted on 20th September, 2017.)