paricCheda 1 - mithyAtve visheShAnumAnam

The previous chapter was a refutation of anumAna-s provided by the nyAyAmRtakAra against the mithyAtva of the world. The purpose of that chapter was defence. In this chapter, the siddhikAra goes on the attack and provides several anumAna-s to prove the mithyAtva of the world. At the end of this chapter, he will conclude by saying that the opponent's inferences are few and have been refuted, whereas he has provided more anumAna-s which are irrefutable. 

मिथ्यात्वे च विशेषतोऽनुमानानि | The specific inferences in relation to mithyAtva (are as follows):

(1) ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाध्यब्रह्मान्यासत्त्वानधिकरणत्वम् पारमार्थिकसत्त्वाधिकरणावृत्ति, ब्रह्मावृत्तित्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यत्ववत्, परमार्थसद्भेदवच्च,  
Here the paksha is not the world, but the pakshatAvacChadeka dharma - the qualities identified to be present in the world, in the generic inference of the world's mithyAtva.
paksha - The qualities of : a) unsublatability by anything (any cognition) other than the cognition of Brahman, b) being other than Brahman c) Not being the locus of non-existence
sAdhya - are not located in the locus of ultimate reality
hetu - because they are not present in Brahman.
dRShTAnta 1  - Like shell-silverness. This is not present in Brahman. It is also not present in a substance which is ultimately real.
dRShTAnta 2 - or, Like the quality of being different from ultimate reality.

(2) विमतं, मिथ्या, ब्रह्मान्यत्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यवत्,
The object under discussion is mithyA, because it is different from Brahman, like shell silver.

(3) परमार्थसत्त्वं, स्वसमानाधिकरणान्योन्याभावप्रतियोग्यवृत्ति, सदितरावृत्तित्वात्, ब्रह्मत्ववत्,
Absolute reality is not present in the counterpositive of a difference of another object which is absolutely real, because it is not present in anything other than the existent, like Brahman-hood.

Potness is present in a pot. The difference from other pots is present in the same pot. However, ultimate reality is not present in any other ultimately real object different from Brahman.

(4) ब्रह्मत्वमेकत्वम् वा सत्त्वव्यापकम्, सत्त्वसमानाधिकरणत्वात्, असद्वैलक्षण्यवत्,
The nature of Brahman, or alternatively, Oneness, is pervaded by existence, because it is colocated with Existence, like difference from Non-Existence.

असद्वैलक्षण्य, or difference from non-existence is colocated with existence (in Brahman) - thus, the hetu is present in the example. Whatever is existent is different from the non-existent or alternatively, existence pervades that which is different from the non-existent. Thus the sAdhya is present. From this, we can draw a generic concomitance - whatever is colocated with existence, is pervaded by existence.

Similarly, existence pervades Brahman and Oneness. By implication, that which is not Brahman, or that which is not the only One, is not existent.


The world, which is admitted to be not Brahman, and in which there is multiplicity, is not existent.

(5) व्याप्यवृत्तिघटादि:, जन्याभावातिरिक्तस्वसमानाधिकरणाभावमात्रप्रतियोगी, अभावप्रतियोगित्वात्, अभिधेयत्ववत् |
An object which is fully present in its location (to exclude the case of the avyApya vRtti - e.g, the monkey present in the top of the tree, but absent in the bottom), is the counterpositive of every absence colocated with the object, excluding an absence that has a beginning (the absence of destruction), because it is the counterpositive of an absence, like the quality of expressibility.

A question may arise here - in the madhva school, expressibility is kevalAnvayi, that is, it is universally present. How then can the hetu - being the counterpositive of absence - apply for something that is present everywhere?

अभिधेयत्वं हि परमते केवलान्वयित्वादन्योन्याभावमात्र प्रतियोगी | In other schools (madhva), as abhidheyatva, expressibility, is universally present, (the sAdhya should be taken as) the counterpositive of difference from everything else.

To explain, a pot can be spoken about, that is, it has expressibility. However, the quality of expressibility is different from the pot itself. Thus, if the sAdhya was understood here as being the counterpositive of a difference (difference is one of the four kinds of absence in nyAya) colocated with expressibility, one can observe the concomitance of the sAdhya and the hetu.
 
स च समानाधिकरण एव, अस्मन्मते तु मिथ्यैवेति, नोभयथापि साध्यवैकल्यम् | That (expressibility) is certainly colocated (with anyonyAbhAva, difference). In our system however, there is no such thing as kevalAnvayi. Expressibility is only present for that which is mithyA. Thus, whether expressibility is kevalAnvayi or mithyA, it is colocated with absence. Therefore, the absence of the sAdhya in the example, sAdhya vaikalya, cannot be alleged.

(6) अत्यन्ताभाव:, प्रतियोग्यवच्छिन्नवृत्ति:, नित्याभावत्वादन्योन्याभाववत् |
Absence is contemporaneous and colocated (kAla / desha avacChinna) with the counterpositive, because it is an eternal absence, like difference.
Prior absence has an end, posterior absence has a beginning, difference and absence have no beginning or end. If something is absent where it is seen, it is mithyA.

(7) अत्यन्ताभावत्वं प्रतियोग्यशेषाधिकरणवृत्तिमात्रवृत्ति, प्रतियोग्यवच्छिन्न वृत्तिमात्रवृत्ति वा, नित्याभावमात्रवृत्तित्वात्, अन्योन्याभावत्ववत् |
Absence-ness, is located in an (absence) which is present wherever the counterpositive is present, or alternatively, is located in an (absence) which is associated with every location of the counterpositive, because it is located in every eternal absence, like difference.

(8) घटात्यन्ताभावत्त्वम्, प्रतियोगिजनकाभावसमानाधिकरणवृत्ति, एतत्कपालसमानकालीनैतद्घटप्रतियोगिकाभाववृत्तित्वात्, प्रमेयत्ववत् |
The absolute absence-ness of the pot is present in an (absence) which is colocated with that object (pot-shards) which is location of the counterpositive's (pot's) prior-absence*,  because it is located in the absolute absence which has this pot as a counterpositive which is contemporaneous with these pot-shards, like the feature of knowability.

* Literally translated, pratiyogi janaka abhAva means an absence that is the cause of the counterpositive. In nyAya, prior absence is stated to be one of the causes of the birth of the counterpositive. 

In the ancients' sub-school within nyAya, it was held that prior absence (prAgabhAva) and absolute absence (atyantAbhAva) cannot be colocated simultaneously. If it is now proved that absolute absence of the pot can co-exist with its prior-absence, then it is possible only if the pot is mithyA.

The qualifier "which is contemporaneous with the pot-shards" is to remove the flaw of vyabhichAra in the case of the pot's posterior-absence (dhvamsa) caused due to the destruction of the pot-shards. Such a posterior-absence is contemporaneous with the pot's absolute absence, but is not colocated in the pot-shards, which are the location of the pot's prior absence (because the pot-shards themselves have been destroyed). In such an instance, the hetu is present, but the sAdhya is not, leading to vyabhichAra. The use of the stated qualifier removes such a possibility.

The example of knowability is appropriate because it is located in the thing which is colocated with the pot's prior absence (sAdhya) and which is also present in this pot's absence, which is contemporaneous with these pot-shards (hetu).

(9) एतत्कपालमेतत्घटात्यन्ताभावाधिकरणमाधारत्वात्पटादिवत् |
This pot shard is the substratum for the absolute absence of this pot, as it is its support, like the cloth. A cloth, upon which a pot is placed is the support of the cloth (hetu), and at the same time the pot is not located in the cloth (sAdhya).

(10) ब्रह्मत्वं न परमार्थसन्निष्ठान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकम्, ब्रह्मवृत्तित्वादसद्वैलक्षण्यवत्,
Brahman-hood is not the qualifier of the counterpositive of a difference with any other object in which absolutely reality is present, because it is located in Brahman, like difference from the absolutely non-existent. Essentially this sAdhya proves that there is no other object other than Brahman which is absolutely real. Refer anumAna 4 for the reasons for the appropriateness of asat vailakshaNya as an example.

(11) परमार्थसत्प्रतियोगिको भेदो न परमार्थसन्निष्ठ: परमार्थसत्प्रतियोगिकत्वात्, परमार्थसत्त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकाभाववत्,
A difference which has an absolutely real object as its counterpositive cannot be located in an absolutely real object, because it has the absolutely real object as its counterpositive, like an absence which has as its counterpositive an object which has absolutely reality as its qualifier.

The absence of absolute reality cannot be located in an absolutely real entity hence the sAdhya is present. The absence of absolute reality has absolute reality as its counterpositive, so the hetu is present too.

(12) भेदत्वावच्छिन्नं, सद्विलक्षणप्रतियोग्यधिकरणान्यतरवत्, अभावत्वाच्छुक्तिरूप्यप्रतियोगिकाभाववत्,
In every difference between two entities, at least one entity is not absolutely real because it is a kind of absence, like the absence of shell-silver.
To explain, if at least one item in every pair of different items is not ultimately real, then it follows that there cannot be two (different) ultimately real items.

(13) परमार्थसन्निष्ठो भेद:, न परमार्थसत्प्रतियोगिक:, परमार्थसदधिकरणत्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यप्रतियोगिकभेदवत्,
Any difference residing in Brahman, does not have an ultimately real object as its counterpositive, because it has an ultimately real object as its substratum, like the difference which has the shell silver as its counterpositive.
The difference with shell-silver is present in Brahman (hetu), and does not have an ultimately real object as its counterpositive (sAdhya).

(14) मिथ्यात्वं, ब्रह्मतुच्छोभयातिरिक्तत्वव्यापकम्, सकलमिथ्यावृत्तित्वात्, मिथ्यात्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वाद्वा, दृश्यत्ववत्,
mithyAtva is present in every object except Brahman and the absolutely non-existent (tucCha / asat) because a) all objects that are mithyA have mithyAtva or b) where mithyAtva is absent, this is absent. The example for such a concomitance is knowability.

Knowability is present in every location except Brahman and the non-existent. It is also present in every mithyA object (first hetu), and where mithyAtva is absent, knowability is absent. So both hetu-s and sAdhya are invariably concomitant.

(15) दृश्यत्वं परमार्थसदवृत्ति, अभिधेयमात्रवृत्तित्वाच्छुक्तिरूप्यत्ववत्,
Knowability is not present in the ultimately real, because it is present in objects denotable by words, like shell silver-ness. Shell-silverness is not present in Brahman (sAdhya), and is the object of a word (hetu).

(16) दृश्यत्वं, परमार्थसद्भिन्नत्वव्याप्यम्, दृश्येतरावृत्तिधर्मत्वात्, प्रातिभासिकत्ववत्
Wherever knowability is present, is different from the ultimately real, because it is not located in any object which is not knowable, like apparent reality.
Whatever is apparently real is different from the ultimately real (sAdhya), and apparent reality can never be located in an object which is not knowable - because it wouldn't be apparent otherwise (hetu).

(17) उभयसिद्धमसद्विलक्षणं मिथ्यात्वासमानाधिकरणधर्मानधिकरणम्, आधारत्वाच्छुक्तिरूप्यवत्,
That which has been accepted by both (the dvaitin and the advaitin) as different from the non-existent (e.g the world), is not the locus of any attribute that is not colocated with mithyAtva, because it is a locus, like the shell silver.
Every attribute in shell-silver is colocated with mithyAtva.

 (18) प्रतियोग्यवच्छिन्नो देश:, अत्यन्ताभावाश्रय:, आधारत्वात्कालवत्
The location of the counterpositive is also the locus of the absence of the counterpositive, because it is a locus, like time.
Both the object and its absence are located in time.

(19) आत्मत्वावच्छिन्नं परमार्थसत्त्वाधिकरणप्रतियोगिकभेदत्वावच्छिन्नरहितं, परमार्थसत्वात्, परमार्थसत्त्वावच्छिन्नवत्,
The one endowed with self-hood (the self) is not endowed with a difference which has as its counterpositive, the locus of ultimate reality, because it is ultimately real, like anything which is endowed with ultimate reality.

If there was another entity endowed with ultimate reality, the self would be endowed with a difference which has an ultimately real entity as its counterpositive. It may be argued that the example, "that which is endowed with ultimate reality", is part of the paksha, and therefore cannot be used. However, the inference mentioned by the tattvachintAmaNikAra, पृथिवी इतरभिन्ना गन्धवत्वात् घटवत् (the earth element is different from the rest, because it has smell, like a pot), the example (pot) is also within the scope of the earth element (it is part of the paksha), but it is cited anyway on the basis that both the sAdhya and the hetu are established in its case, which is sufficient to gather the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyApti grahaNam) that can be applied elsewhere.

परमार्थसति परमार्थसद्भेदाङ्गीकारवादिमतेऽपि सद्भेदो न परमार्थसत्ववन्निष्ठ: | किन्तु, घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्ननिष्ठ एव |
Even those who hold that an ultimately real entity can be the locus of difference with other ultimately real entities, they will agree that "difference from the existent" is not located in the absolutely real. Rather, even they will have to admit that such a difference is located in those objects that are endowed with pot-ness, etc.

The dvaitin may say that one ultimately real entity is different from another ultimately real entity, but he will not say that such a difference has ultimate existence as its qualifier. That is, the difference is not paramArtha sattvAvacChinna bheda:, which can only exist if the counterpositive of difference is not ultimately real (aparamArtha sattvAvacChinna).

(20) शुक्तिरुप्यं, मिथ्यात्वेन प्रपञ्चान्न भिद्यते, व्यवहारविषयत्वात्, ब्रह्मवत् |
The shell silver is not different from the world on account of its mithyAtva, because it is an object of activity, like Brahman.
This may appear odd as the advaitin holds that Brahman is not the object of any activity (vyavahAra), but as this anumAna is directed towards the dvaitin, who accepts that Brahman can be the object of vyavahAra, it is acceptable.

साध्यसत्त्वमात्र त्रेधा | स्वस्यामिथ्यात्वेन, उभयोर्मिथ्यात्वेन, उभयोरमिथ्यत्वेन वा |
The sAdhya is present here in three ways - either the paksha is not mithyA itself, or if both the world and paksha are mithyA or both are not mithyA.

तत्रान्तिमपक्षस्यासंभवात् The third option is an impossibility, as it would not be possible to argue that both the world and the shell-silver are not mithyA (even the opponent concedes that the shell-silver is unreal).
पक्षे साध्यसिद्धिपर्यवसानं मध्यमपक्षेण, If the opponent accepts the middle option, then it stands proven that the world and the shell-silver are mithyA.
दृष्टान्ते तु प्रथमपक्षेणेति विवेक: In the case of the example, the sAdhya is present, in Brahman (Brahman is not different from the world on account of its mithyAtva, because Brahman is not mithyA in the first place).

(21) विमतं मिथ्या, मोक्षहेतुज्ञानाविषयत्वे सत्यसदन्यत्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यवत्,
The object of contention (e.g the world) is unreal, because it is not an object of the cognition that causes enlightenment and is different from the absolutely non-existent, like shell-silver.

(22) मोक्षहेतुज्ञानविषयत्वं, परमार्थसत्त्वव्यापकम्, परमार्थसत्त्वसमानाधिकरणत्वात्, परमार्थिकत्वेन श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्ववत्
Being the object of a cognition that causes enlightenment is present where ultimate reality is present, because it is colocated with ultimate reality, like being the object of the ultimate import of shruti. Ultimate reality is colocated with being the object of the ultimate import of shruti - in Brahman.

(23) एतेत्पटात्यन्ताभाव:, एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठ:, एतत्पटानाद्यभावत्वात्, एतत्पटान्योन्याभाववत्,
The absence of this cloth is located in these threads, because it is a beginningless absence of this cloth, like the difference from this cloth. The difference of the threads from the cloth is located in the threads (sAdhya) and is beginningless (hetu).  
Why was the qualifier beginningless added to the hetu?

तन्तुनाशजन्यपटनाशस्य कदापि तन्तुवृत्तिता नास्तीति तत्र व्यभिचारवारणायानादिपदम् | In order to remedy the vyabhichAra that would otherwise be possible in the case of the destruction of the cloth that is caused by the destruction of the threads. In that instance, the threads themselves would be destroyed, so the absence of the cloth would not be "located in these threads". Therefore, by adding the word "beginningless", the absence that has a beginning (i.e the absence caused due to destruction) is removed, averting such a possibility.

यस्य पटस्याश्रयविभागेन नाशस्तदत्यन्ताभावस्य पक्षत्वे त्वनादिपदमानादेयमेव | If the paksha is qualified such that it only refers to the destruction of the cloth on account of the threads unraveling, there would be no necessity to qualify the hetu using the word, "beginningless".

अत्र चैतत्पटप्रतियोगिकात्यन्ताभावत्वावच्छिन्नस्य पक्षीकरणान्न संबन्धान्तरेणात्यन्ताभावमादायांशत: सिद्धसाधनम्; It may be argued that inference is partially stating the obvious, because it is always possible to say that the cloth is absent on the basis of some other relationship with the threads. However that would be untenable because the paksha has been defined such that every kind of absence of this cloth is present in these threads (atyantAbhAvatvAvacChinna).

पक्षतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेन साध्यसिद्धेरुद्देश्यत्वात् | For the intent is to prove that every cloth in the world is absent in its material cause (pakshatAvacChedakAvacChedena), and that is only possible if the cloth is mithyA.

समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नो व्यधिकरणधर्मानवच्छिन्नश्च य: एतत्पटात्यन्ताभाव: स एव वा पक्ष: |
Alternatively it can be said that the paksha is merely an absence of the cloth in a material cause-effect relationship with the thread and that which is not the absence of some other object in these threads.

तन्तुशब्देन च पटोपादानकारणमुक्तम् | तत्र च प्रागभावस्य सत्वान्न तेन व्यभिचार: |
By the word thread, the material cause of the cloth is meant. One cannot cite vyabhichAra in prior absence, for the prior absence of the cloth in threads is accepted.

कार्यकारणयोरभेदेन सिद्धसाधनादिदूषणानि प्रागेव तत्त्वप्रदीपिकानुमानोपन्यासे निराकृतानि | It may be argued on account of the non-difference of the effect with the cause, that the effect is absent in the cause (as it identical with the cause), but these have already been refuted in the context of the explanation of the anumAna from the tattvapradIpikA (in the chapter on amshitva hetu).

(24) यद्वा - समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नोऽयमेतत्पटात्यन्ताभाव:, एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठ:, एतत्पटप्रतियोगिकात्यन्ताभावत्वात्, संबन्धान्तरावच्छिन्नैतत्पटात्यन्ताभाववदिति विशिष्यानुमानम् |
Alternatively, the absence of this cloth with a material cause-effect relationship with the thread, is located in the thread, because it is an absence that this cloth as its counterpositive, like the absence of the cloth with some other relationship. This can be a special anumAna.

(25) अव्याप्यवृत्तित्वानधिकरणत्वे सत्युक्तपक्षतावच्छेदकवत्, स्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि, अनात्मत्वात्, संयोगवत् |
That which has the stated qualifiers for the paksha (that which is sublated by nothing other than right cognition of Brahman, that which is capable of being known as existing, that which is different from Brahman) and fully pervades its locus, is the counterpositive of its own absence in its locus, because it is not the self, like the relationship of contact. Wherever contact is present, there will be a part which is not in contact (sAdhya) and contact is not the self (hetu).

The opponent may try to allege a vyabhichAra for the absence of the world on the basis that the absence of the world is not the self (hetu is thus present), but it is not the counterpositive of its absence in its own locus (the sAdhya is absent). To this, the siddhikAra says:
नच विश्वात्यन्ताभावे व्यभिचार:, तस्याधिकरण्स्वरूपत्वे अनात्मत्वहेतोरेवाभावात्, अतिरिक्तत्वे तस्य मिथ्यात्वेनात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितया साध्यस्यैव सत्त्वात् |
Nor can it be alleged that the inference fails (vyabhichAra) in the case of the absence of the world, because the absence of the world is of the nature of the substratum, the self, and therefore, the hetu of not being the self is absent. If the absence of the world is taken to be different to the self, the sAdhya is present because being mithyA, it is the counterpositive of its absence in its locus.

नच - अत्यन्ताभावस्यात्यन्ताभावे तत्प्रतियोगित्वलक्षणमिथ्यात्वासिद्धिरिति वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that if the absence is absent, then a mithyAtva of the nature of counterpositiveness is denied.
अभावे अभावप्रतियोगित्वस्य भावगताभावप्रतियोगित्वाविरोधित्वात्, Because, the counterpositiveness of absence is not lost by the absence of absence. 
प्रागभावस्यात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि तत्प्रतियोगित्वस्य घटादौ सर्वसिद्धत्वात् | Even if the prior absence of the pot is the counterpositive of its absence, its counterpositive, the pot is not denied. 
उपपादितञ्चैतन्मिथ्यात्वमिथ्यात्वे | This has been proved in the chapter on the mithyAtva of mithyA.

अत्रचाव्याप्यवृत्तित्वानधिकरणशब्देनेकदेशावच्छेदेनाविद्यमानत्वं पक्षविशेषणं विवक्षितम् | Here, by the qualifier "the exclusion of avyApya vritti in the substratum" in the paksha, that which is absent only in one part of the locus is meant. 

By this statement, two possible defects are remedied.
तेन - स्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वोक्तौ बाध: | the first is bAdha, contradiction. The logician defines avyApya vritti as that which is absent in its locus. The sAdhya is "is absent in its locus". If by avyApya vritti anadhikaraNa, we had simply meant that which is not absent in its locus,  then it is tantamount to saying - that which is not absent in its locus is absent in its locus, which would be a contradiction. What we mean instead is - excluding those objects that are only partly located in their locus, every object is absent in its own locus.

अवयववृत्तित्वानधिकरणत्वोक्तौ घटादीनामपक्षत्वापत्तिरिति दूषणद्वयमपास्तम् | If avyApya vritti anadhikaraNatva was defined as that which is not located in its parts, then it would exclude pots etc, that are said to be located in their parts. 

अनात्मत्वहेतुस्तु जडत्वहेतुव्याख्यानेनैव व्याख्यात: |
The hetu of not being the self has been explained in the chapter on jaDatva

(26) अत एव नित्यद्रव्यान्यदव्याप्यवृत्तित्वानधिकरणमुक्तपक्षतावच्छेदकवत्, केवलान्वय्यत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि, पदार्थत्वात्, नित्यद्रव्यवदित्यपि साधु |

Therefore - That which is other than an eternal substance, excludes avyApya vritti, and has the (three) stated qualifiers determining pakshatA, is the counterpositive of absence everywhere, because it is a substance, like eternal substances - this too is appropriate.
दृष्टान्तश्चायं पररीत्या | The example is based on nyAya philosophy, not advaita. Eternal substances in nyAya are those which have no locus. Thus they are not located anywhere.
स्वमते तु शुक्तिरूप्यवदित्येव । In advaita, the example is the shell silver.

नच - स्वरूपेणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वे अत्यन्तासत्त्वापात:; तद्वैलक्षण्यप्रयोजकाभावादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued - if something is absent by nature, it is absolutely non-existent (asat), as there is no means to differentiate that (from mithyA).

उत्पत्तिनिवृत्त्योरन्यतरप्रतियोगित्वेन परिहारात् | mithyA objects have a birth and death, unlike asat, and thus there is a basis to differentiate them.

(27) आत्मत्वावच्छिन्नधर्मिको भेदो न परमार्थसत्प्रतियोगिक:, आत्माप्रतियोगित्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यप्रतियोगिकभेदवत् |
The difference that has the self as its substratum does not have a counterpositive which is ultimately real because it does not have the self as its counterpositive, like the difference which has the shell-silver as its counterpositive.
The opponent may argue that there is vyabhichAra in the contact between the pot and the cloth.  The hetu is present, as contact does not have the self as its counterpositive. However the sAdhya is not present, because the counterpositive of contact is ultimately real (according to the opponent). To this the siddhikAra argues:

नच घटपटसंयोगे व्यभिचार:, There is no vyabhichAra for the contact between the pot and the cloth.
हेतुमत्तया निर्णीते अङ्कुरादाविव साध्यसन्देहस्यादोषत्वात् | Where the hetu is certain and the sAdhya in doubt, there can be no vyabhichAra, like in the case of saplings etc.

A vyabhichAra occurs if the hetu is present, but the sAdhya is not. There are also certain instances where it is doubtful whether a vyabhichAra is present or not. A doubtful vyabhichAra is a defect only there is certainty that the sAdhya is present but there is a doubt whether the hetu is present or not. There can be no defect if there is certainty that the hetu is present but there is a doubt whether the sAdhya is present or not - no inference would be possible at all, as before every inference there is certainty that the hetu is present in the paksha, the doubt is in relation to the existence or non-existence of the sAdhya in the paksha.

The anumAna क्षिति: सकर्तृका कार्यत्वात् घटवत् - Creation has a creator, because it is a product, like a pot. A doubt is raised whether there is a vyabhichAra in the case of अङ्कुर:, a sapling. It is clear that a sapling is a product (hetu's presence is certain), but it is not certain that it has a creator (sAdhya's presence is uncertain). Here, such a suspected vyabhichAra cannot be cited as a defect because the sapling is within the paksha - it is a part of Creation, and therefore an uncertainty about the presence of the sAdhya in some part of the paksha is not really a defect that can be leveled at the inference. 

एवमन्येऽपि प्रयोगा यथोचितमारचनीया विपश्चिद्भिरिति दिक् I Similarly intelligent one can come up with other anumAna-s to show the mithyAtva of the world - I have showed them the way.

He tells the nyAyAmRtakAra:
'हेतवोऽभीष्टसिद्ध्यर्थम् सम्यञ्चो बहवश्च न: |
अल्पा: परस्य दृष्टाश्चेत्यत्र स्पष्टमुदीरितम् ||
We have provided several defect-free hetu-s to prove what is desirable (by us), whereas others have been able to demonstrate fewer hetu-s, which have proven to be defective. That has been demonstrated here. 

अभीष्टसिद्धावनुकूलतर्कबलाबलं चात्र परीक्ष्य यत्नात् | 
प्रवक्ष्यते दोषगण: परेषां न खेदनीयं तु मनोऽधुनैव ||'
In order to achieve the desired result, a lot of effort has been spent to show the respective strengths and weaknesses of various supporting reasons for each of our anumAna-s.
Many more defects will be cited in the opponent's anumAna-s, so he should not be disheartened with this much itself.


इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ विश्वमिथ्यात्वे विशेषतोऽनुमानानि   ||   This concludes the chapter in the advaita siddhi on the special anumAna-s to prove the world's mithyAtva.