paricCheda 1 - mithyAtva anumite: shaityAnumitisAmya bhanga:
अथ मिथ्यात्वानुमिते: शैत्यानुमितिसाम्यभङ्ग: |
The refutation of the argument - the inference of the world's mithyAtva is akin to logically proving that fire is cold - is taken up next.
The opponent argues:
ननु - यदि प्रत्यक्षबाधितमप्यनुमानं साधयेत्तदा वह्न्यनौष्ण्यमपि साधयेत् ; If inference is capable of overruling perception, then even the (spurious) inference proving that fire is cold would be possible.
तथाच कालात्ययापदिष्टकथा सर्वत्रोच्छिद्येत And therefore, contradiction (bAdha) as a ground for rejection of flawed inference would be invalidated everywhere.
नच - औष्ण्यप्रतियोगिकाभावे साध्ये पक्ष एव प्रतियोगिप्रसिद्धिरिति तत्र बाध: सावकाश:, अतो न व्यावहारिकसत्त्वग्राहकेणाध्यक्षेण बाध्यत इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can you argue thus - there is scope for contradiction in the case of the inference of coldness of fire, because if the absence of heat is the object to be proven (the sAdhya), the ground (the paksha) in which its absence is to be proven would itself be unavailable. Therefore, the inference of the world's unreality is not contradicted by the perception of empirical reality.
The opponent assumes that the siddhAntin offers the following argument to show the dissimilarity between the inference of the world's unreality with the inference of fire's coldness:
Coldness is the absence of heat. However, the very notion of heat is only known in the presence of fire and not otherwise. A heat present in something, when fire is totally absent, is not seen anywhere. Thus if we get the notion of heat by observing fire, and having thus known heat, postulate that heat is absent in fire, it would be a contradiction.
This is different from our context - the idea of reality is not something that is exclusively known by observing the world. It is known already, because both the opponent and the siddhAntin agree that Brahman is real. Thus to argue that such a reality is not present in the world is not a contradiction.
The dvaitin argues that such an argument does not refute the grounds for similarity with the (patently absurd) inference of fire's coldness.
वह्निविशेषे औष्ण्याभावानुमाने शैत्यानुमाने वा तदभावात्, पक्षातिरिक्तस्य प्रतियोगिप्रसिद्धिस्थलस्य तत्र सत्त्वात् | If one is seeking to infer that the fire in a particular place is cold, then, as heat is known from fires elsewhere, the grounds for the implausibility of such an inference are circumvented.
Thus, if one does not accept that perception can inherently overrule inference, you end up with situations where absurd inferences cannot be overruled.
The opponent continues:
नच - यत्र प्रत्यक्षं प्रबलं तत्र बाधव्यवस्था, नचात्र तथेति न बाध इति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued thus - "Contradiction by perception is accepted only where perception is stronger, but as it is not the case here, there is no contradiction"
प्रकृतेऽप्यौष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षसमकक्ष्यस्य प्राबल्यप्रयोजकस्य विद्यमानत्वात्, अनौष्ण्यानुमितेर्मिथ्यात्वानुमितेश्च समानयोगक्षेमात् |
Because the determinant of the relative strength of the perception of fire is present even in the context under discussion (the perception of the world's reality), therefore the inference of fire's coldness is comparable to the inference of the world's unreality (in that both are equally flawed).
नच - मिथ्यात्ववादिनां प्रतिपन्नोपाधावौष्ण्यनिषेधग्राह्यनुमानेन मिथ्यात्वानुमिते: समत्वमिष्टमेवेति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that - "the equivalence with the inference of fire's coldness is desirable for those who argue for the world's unreality, because the establishment of the absence of heat is consistent with the inference of the world's reality, which seeks to prove the absence of things in their very locus of appearance".
औष्ण्यानौष्ण्ययोर्भावाभावरूपतया तदनुमितिसाम्येऽपि शैत्यानुमितिसाम्यस्यानभ्युपगमात्, शैत्यस्यौष्ण्याभावरूपत्वाभावात् | Because, while you can claim that an inference proving the absence of heat is similar to the inference of the absence of the world (its mithyAtva), it is not possible to claim equivalence with the inference of the fire's coldness, because coldness is not the same as the absence of heat.
Coldness is an existent property, whereas the absence of existence of the world is not.
तस्मात् बाधस्य दोषता वा त्याज्या, औष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षायजमानत्वप्रत्यक्षादे: सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षापेक्षया विशेषो वा वक्तव्य: | Therefore, either contradiction as a hetvAbhAsa (a ground for the failure of inference) will have to be given up, or alternatively, some special difference between perception of the world's reality on the one hand and the perception of fire's heat, or the perception of the sacrificer not being the prastara (a clump of darbha), etc., will have to be postulated.
नच - औष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षं परिक्षितोभयवादिसिद्धप्रामाण्यं, सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षं तु न तथेति विशेषं - इति वाच्यं ।
That special difference cannot be that both of us agree that the perception of heat is valid on account of it being verified, whereas the perception of reality is not so.
सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षेऽपि प्रामाण्यासम्मतौ हेत्वभावात्, परीक्षायास्तुल्यत्वात् Because, there is no basis to argue that the world's reality, despite being perceived, is invalid - for verification as a test for the validity of perception is equally applicable here.
Until now, the arguments of the opponent were presented. The siddhikAra begins his refutation next.
- इति चेन्मैवम् ; If this is the argument, not so.
विरुद्धार्थग्राहित्वेन विशेषात्, The difference (between the inference of fire's coldness and the mithyAtva of the world) is that there is a contradiction (between perception and inference in one case, but not in the other).
प्रत्यक्षसिद्धायजमानत्वौष्ण्यादिवच्छब्दलिङ्गग्राह्ययजमानत्वानौष्ण्याद्यपि व्यावहारिकमिति समत्वात् प्रत्यक्षेण बाध्यते,
The objects of perception - the heat of the fire, and the fact that the prastara is not the sacrificer - have empirical reality. As are the objects of inference - the coldness of fire, and shruti - that the prastara is the sacrificer. These being both empirically real, there is an actual contradiction between perception and inference and perception and shruti, and they can be overruled by perception.
प्रकृते तु सत्त्वं व्यावहारिकं प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं तद्विरुद्धं च न मिथ्यात्वम् ; तस्य पारमार्थिकसत्त्वविरोधात् | Whereas, in the topic under discussion, the empirical reality (of the world) established by perception is not contradictory to the mithyAtva established by inference. It only contradicts the absolute validity (of the world).
अतो न तत् व्यावहारिकसत्त्वग्राहकेणाध्यक्षेण बाध्यते | Thus that inference cannot be contradicted by perception, which can only reveal the empirical reality of the world.
The opponent retorts -
ननु - एवं वदतस्तव को वाऽभिप्राय:? किं तात्त्विकविषयत्वात् बाधकतैव मिथ्यात्वानुमानादेर्न बाध्यता, उत सत्त्वमिथ्यात्वग्राहिणोर्व्यावहारिकतात्त्विकविषययो: परस्परविरुद्धविषयत्वाभावात् न बाध्यबाधकभाव: |
What is your intention in saying this? Is it that
1) as inference of unreality reveals the absolutely real, it is capable of overruling (perception), but is itself not overruled, or is it that
2) there is no overruled-overruling relationship between the pramANa which reveals reality and that which reveals mithyAtva because their objects being empirical reality and absolute reality respectively are not contradictory to each other?
अन्त्येऽपि किमध्यक्षसिद्धव्यावहारिकसत्त्वमगृहीत्वैव तदसिद्धस्य तात्त्विकसत्त्वस्यैवाभावम् गृह्नात्यनुमानादि, उत प्रत्यक्षविषयीकृतस्यैव तात्त्विकमभावम् |
Additionally, in the latter alternative, are you saying that
1) inference reveals the absence of absolute reality, which reality is not revealed by perception as it can only reveal empirical reality? Or
2) is inference revealing the absence of absolute reality, which happens to be revealed by perception?
नान्त्य:, प्रत्यक्षविषयाभावग्राहिणि तदबाधकत्वोक्त्ययोगात् | It is not the last option, because if inference is revealing the absence of a reality that happens to be affirmed by perception, then it cannot be argued by you that inference is not in contradiction with perception.
न द्वितीय:, प्रत्यक्षागृहीतप्रतिषेधकत्वेनाप्रसक्तप्रतिषेधापत्ते:, प्रत्यक्षविषयस्य तात्त्विकापत्तेश्च | Nor is it the second option, because by contradicting something that perception does not reveal, it is negating something which was never postulated in the first place. (Such a negation ends up being redundant.) Further, as inference does not contradict perception, the object of perception stands unrefuted and real.
न प्रथम:, उपजीव्यप्रत्यक्षविरोधेनानुमित्यादिविषयस्य तात्त्विकत्वासिद्धि:, It is not the first option either, because if inference contradicts perception which is its upajIvya, very basis, then the validity of inference itself is in question - and the reality of the object of inference is not proven.
It is the siddhikAra's turn to respond to this particular argument.
इति चेन्न । No.
प्रथमे द्वितीये च पक्षे अनुपपत्त्यभावात्। There is no issue with the first or second options.
तथाहि - प्रथमेपक्षे न तात्त्विकत्वासिद्धिः यस्मा 'दिदं रजत'मित्यनेन 'नेदं रजत' मित्यस्य बाधदर्शनात् परीक्षितमेव बाधकमभ्युपेयम् | To explain, it cannot be said that the absolute validity of inference has not yet been established (because it contradicts perception, upon which it is upajIvya, dependent), for it has been observed that the cognition "this is not silver" is capable of overruling the cognition "this is silver" (despite the general rule that for something to be negated, its object must be thought to exist).
Thus mere dependence (upajIvyatva) does not confer validity to an erroneous cognition.
परीक्षा च प्रवृत्तिसंवादादिरूपा व्यवहारदशायामबाध्यत्वम् विनानुपपन्ना तद्दशाबाधग्राहिणम् बाधते, नाद्वैतश्रुत्यनुमानादिकमित्युक्तमेव |
Verification, like the natural inclination towards an object, etc. is not possible without that object being empirically real, and if a cognition tries to contradict its empirical reality, then such a verification would invalidate the cognition. However, neither advaita shruti nor the inference of mithyAtva falsifies the empirical reality of the world.
द्वितीयेऽपि पक्षे नाप्रसक्तप्रतिषेध:, परोक्षप्रसक्ते: संभवात् | The charge that - something unpostulated / impossible is being negated - is not applicable in the second option, because (even though perception does not reveal the world to be absolutely real), one may consider the world to be absolutely real through some other indirect means of knowledge. Therefore, it is possible for the inference of mithyAtva to reject such a notion.
यत्तु केचिदात्मनि तात्विकसत्त्वप्रसिद्ध्या प्रसक्तिमुपपादयन्ति | तन्न ; Some people however argue that the notion of absolute reality is known as being present in the Self, and that much is sufficient for its subsequent negation in the world. However, that is not correct.
नहि प्रतियोगिज्ञानमात्रं प्रसक्ति:, किं तर्हि निषेधाधिकरणकप्रतियोगिज्ञानम् | Merely knowing the object of negation is not sufficient for negation to have scope of application. Then what? The object of negation must appear to exist in the locus of negation, for it to have scope.
नचात्मा निषेधाधिकरणम् ; तस्मात्परोक्षप्रसक्तिरेव दर्शनीया | And the locus where absolute reality is being denied is not the Self (but the world), therefore it must be admitted that one has some indirect notion of the possibility of the world having absolute reality and that much is sufficient for it to be denied in the world through inference and shruti.
अथ वा माभूत् प्रसक्ति:, अभावप्रत्यक्षे हि संसर्गारोपत्वेन सोपयुज्यते, शब्दानुमानयोस्तु, तस्या: क्वोपयोग: | Alternatively, let there be no requirement for prasakti (the possibility) of something for its denial later. While the perception of the absence of something requires that such a thing is superimposed in that location, what purpose does such a requirement serve for verbal testimony and inference? (That is, inference and verbal testimony are not contingent upon the knowledge of the possible existence of their object).
नचाप्रसक्तौ निषेधवैयर्थ्यम्, अनर्थनिवृत्तिरूपस्य प्रयोजनस्य विद्यमानत्वात् | Nor can it be said that as such a possibility does not exist, its negation serves no purpose - because in this case, it serves the purpose of removing all evil (i.e the cessation of the evils of samsAra).
नच प्रत्यक्षविषयतात्त्विकत्वापत्ति:, तद्विषयाधिकरणस्यैव पारमार्थिकत्वव्यतिरेकस्य बोधनात् |
Nor does this lead to the object of perception ending up as absolutely real, because the absence of absolute reality in the world is what is being revealed by the inference.
तथाच न काप्यनुपपत्ति: | Therefore, there are no logical incongruities.
The nyAyAmRta tarangiNi raises an objection in this context. On what basis did the siddhikAra allege that negation in verbal testimony and inference does not require the possibility of the existence of the object of negation? On the contrary, not requiring such a possibility will contradict pUrva mImAmsa.
In the darsha pUrNamAsa ritual two sacrifices called Ajya bhAgam are prescribed. Two statements occur in this context - न तौ पशौ करोति | न सोमे अध्वरेत् | - In the performance of the pashu sacrifice, do not do perform these two. Do not perform these in the soma sacrifice.
The pUrva mImAmsa scripture raises a doubt - is the second statement a prohibition (a niShedha) or is it arthavAda? There is no pramANa that raises the possibility (prasakti) of the Ajya bhAga being performed in a soma sacrifice. Therefore, the second statement is not a niShedha, rather it is arthavAda.
On the other hand, the pashu sacrifice, is a vikRti sacrifice, which is modeled on the prakRti, which is the darsha pUrNamAsa. In the darsha pUrNamAsa, the two Ajya bhAga sacrifices are performed. By the rule, prakRtivat vikRti: kartavyA (perform the vikRti on the lines of the prakRti), there is scope for the performance of the Ajya bhAga-s at the pashu sacrifice. In order to rule out such a prasakti, the first statement is made. Therefore it is a niShedha, and not an arthavAda.
In this case, pUrva mImAmsa contends that prohibitions (niShedha-s) in shruti (which falls under the category of verbal testimony) require a prior prasakti. Why did the siddhikAra argue that verbal testimony does not require prasakti?
In response, the laghuchandrika by gauDa brahmAnanda argues that the intention of the siddhikAra has not been understood by the tarangiNikAra. Every vedic sentence that negates does not fall under the category of a niShedha (prohibition). It is only classified thus when there is a natural inclination towards a particular activity or for something to be understood in a particular way (ie, pravRtti), and a scriptural statement forbids / negates it.
The sentence do not perform the Ajya bhAgam in a soma sacrifice is not preventing the listener from an activity that they would otherwise have naturally performed (for the soma sacrifice has no scope for Ajya bhAgam). Thus it is an arthavAda and not a niShedha, because it is verbalising what is already known.
The point that the siddhikAra is making is that verbal sentences do not need prior prasakti for their meaning to be understood. Irrespective of whether there is prior prasakti or not (irrespective of whether the ultimate reality of the world is known previously or not), the sentence from the veda denying its ultimate reality conveys meaning to a listener who understands the language of the shruti.
Coming back to the advaita siddhi, the siddhikAra continues:
तदुक्तं खण्डनकृद्भि: - 'पारमार्थिकमद्वैतं प्रविश्य शरणं श्रुति: | विरोधादुपजीव्येन न बिभेति कदाचन ||' इति |
The khaNDanakAra, Sriharsha says - Shruti is revealing advaita as the ultimate reality, and as such is not scared of contradicting the pramANa upon which it is dependent.
The opponent asks:
ननु - एवामप्यनौष्ण्यं तात्विकमिति तदनुमितिरपि न बाध्येत व्यावहारिकौष्ण्यग्राहिणाध्यक्षेण ; (If that be the case) why don't you argue that the inference of fire's coldness is real and is not contradicted by perception which only reveals empirical reality?
एवं 'चादित्यो यूप' इत्यादावपि 'तात्त्विकादित्यतां यूपस्याश्रितस्य शरणं श्रुति: | विरोधादुपजीव्येन न बिभेति कदाचन ||' इत्याद्यपि स्यात् Similarly, in shruti sentences such as "The sun is the sacrificial post", it can be argued that - 'the sun is the sacrificial post' is the reality, and shruti need not be reinterpreted out of fear of contradicting perception, upon which it is dependent.
- इति चेन्न ; The siddhikAra responds - No.
अनौष्ण्यं तात्त्विकं स्यादिति कोऽर्थ:? What do you mean by "the absence of fire's heat is real"?
यदि तत्त्वत औष्ण्यं नास्तीत्यर्थ:, तदा अद्वैते पर्यवसादिष्टापत्ति: | If you say the heat is not present in reality, then it is desirable, because it leads to advaita.
यदि व्यवहारतोऽपि नास्तीति, तदा व्यवहाराविसंवादादिरूपपरीक्षितत्वविशिष्टमौष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षं बाधकमिति नानौष्ण्यस्य तात्त्विकत्वसिद्धि: | If you are saying it is absent even empirically, then because that is contradicted by perception which has been verified in practice to be empirically real, the empirical absence of heat is not established by such an inference.
एतेन शैत्यानुमानं व्याख्यातम् | By the same argument, the case of the inference of fire's coldness can also be explained.
एवमादित्ययूपभेदस्य तत्त्वतो व्यवाहरतो वा निषेधे योज्यम् | Similarly, in the case of the difference between the sun and the sacrificial post, one must question whether the negation of difference is being said to be ultimately real or empirically real.
श्रुतेरन्यशेषतया आदित्ययूपाभेदपरत्वाभावेन परीक्षितप्रत्यक्षविरोधेन गौणार्थतया स्तावकत्वोपपत्तेश्च।
That sentence (the sun is the sacrificial post) is subsidiary to a vedic injunction, and its import is not in revealing an identity between the sun and the sacrificial post. Moreover, such a meaning would contradict a validated perception. That being the case, the shruti sentence, by taking a figurative meaning, serves to extol the sacrificial post.
अतएव - 'तात्त्विकादित्यतां यूपस्ये' त्यादिना अद्वैतश्रुते 'रादित्यो यूप' इत्यादिश्रुतिसाम्यापादनम् - अपास्तम् | Thus, your verse alleging similarity between the shruti statement "the sun is the sacrificial post" and the shruti statements revealing advaita has been refuted.
न च -अनुमितिसिद्धमिथ्यात्वग्राहकत्वे सत्यद्वैतश्रुतिरनुवादिका स्यात्, यथा'ऽग्निर्हिमस्य भेषज' मित्यादिश्रुति: प्रमाणान्तरगृहीतहिमनिवारणशक्त्यनुवादिकेति वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - If mithyAtva is already established by inference, shruti that reveals advaita is merely repeating what is known (anuvAda), and therefore does not have validity - like the vedic statement "fire is the remedy for cold" is called an anuvAda on account of revealing something that is already known through some other pramANa.
स्वस्वचमत्कारानुसारिणोऽनुमानस्य सकलसाधारण्याभावेन तस्य श्रुत्यनुवादकत्वाप्रयोजकत्वात् | Because as inference's ability to reveal its meaning is ultimately dependent on each person's logical ability, it is not universal, thus a shruti which reveals the same truth cannot be said to be merely repeating what inference has revealed.
तदुक्तं - 'तर्काप्रतिष्ठाना' दित्यत्र वचास्पतिमिश्रै: - 'यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थ: कुशलैरनुमातृभि: | अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ||' इति |
Thus has been argued by vAcaspati miSra in the context of the sUtra "It cannot be established by logical reasoning" - "Even if a skilful logician presents an inference after great effort, others more skilled (abhiyuktatara:) can turn up and prove its opposite."
दृष्टान्तीकृतश्रुतौ तु हिमनिवृत्तिकारणतया वह्नौ सर्वसाधारणप्रत्यक्षार्थापत्तिभ्यामवसेयत्वाद्वैषम्यम् ;
On the other hand, as the exemplified shruti sentence revealing fire's propensity to remove coldness is universally known by all through pratyaksha and arthApatti, it is different from the shruti revealing the mithyAtva of the world.
तस्मान्मिथ्यवानुमानस्य न वह्निशैत्यानुमितिसाम्यम् ||
Therefore, the inference of the world's mithyAtva is not similar to the inference of fire's coldness.
The refutation of the argument - the inference of the world's mithyAtva is akin to logically proving that fire is cold - is taken up next.
The opponent argues:
ननु - यदि प्रत्यक्षबाधितमप्यनुमानं साधयेत्तदा वह्न्यनौष्ण्यमपि साधयेत् ; If inference is capable of overruling perception, then even the (spurious) inference proving that fire is cold would be possible.
तथाच कालात्ययापदिष्टकथा सर्वत्रोच्छिद्येत And therefore, contradiction (bAdha) as a ground for rejection of flawed inference would be invalidated everywhere.
नच - औष्ण्यप्रतियोगिकाभावे साध्ये पक्ष एव प्रतियोगिप्रसिद्धिरिति तत्र बाध: सावकाश:, अतो न व्यावहारिकसत्त्वग्राहकेणाध्यक्षेण बाध्यत इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can you argue thus - there is scope for contradiction in the case of the inference of coldness of fire, because if the absence of heat is the object to be proven (the sAdhya), the ground (the paksha) in which its absence is to be proven would itself be unavailable. Therefore, the inference of the world's unreality is not contradicted by the perception of empirical reality.
The opponent assumes that the siddhAntin offers the following argument to show the dissimilarity between the inference of the world's unreality with the inference of fire's coldness:
Coldness is the absence of heat. However, the very notion of heat is only known in the presence of fire and not otherwise. A heat present in something, when fire is totally absent, is not seen anywhere. Thus if we get the notion of heat by observing fire, and having thus known heat, postulate that heat is absent in fire, it would be a contradiction.
This is different from our context - the idea of reality is not something that is exclusively known by observing the world. It is known already, because both the opponent and the siddhAntin agree that Brahman is real. Thus to argue that such a reality is not present in the world is not a contradiction.
The dvaitin argues that such an argument does not refute the grounds for similarity with the (patently absurd) inference of fire's coldness.
वह्निविशेषे औष्ण्याभावानुमाने शैत्यानुमाने वा तदभावात्, पक्षातिरिक्तस्य प्रतियोगिप्रसिद्धिस्थलस्य तत्र सत्त्वात् | If one is seeking to infer that the fire in a particular place is cold, then, as heat is known from fires elsewhere, the grounds for the implausibility of such an inference are circumvented.
Thus, if one does not accept that perception can inherently overrule inference, you end up with situations where absurd inferences cannot be overruled.
The opponent continues:
नच - यत्र प्रत्यक्षं प्रबलं तत्र बाधव्यवस्था, नचात्र तथेति न बाध इति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued thus - "Contradiction by perception is accepted only where perception is stronger, but as it is not the case here, there is no contradiction"
प्रकृतेऽप्यौष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षसमकक्ष्यस्य प्राबल्यप्रयोजकस्य विद्यमानत्वात्, अनौष्ण्यानुमितेर्मिथ्यात्वानुमितेश्च समानयोगक्षेमात् |
Because the determinant of the relative strength of the perception of fire is present even in the context under discussion (the perception of the world's reality), therefore the inference of fire's coldness is comparable to the inference of the world's unreality (in that both are equally flawed).
नच - मिथ्यात्ववादिनां प्रतिपन्नोपाधावौष्ण्यनिषेधग्राह्यनुमानेन मिथ्यात्वानुमिते: समत्वमिष्टमेवेति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that - "the equivalence with the inference of fire's coldness is desirable for those who argue for the world's unreality, because the establishment of the absence of heat is consistent with the inference of the world's reality, which seeks to prove the absence of things in their very locus of appearance".
औष्ण्यानौष्ण्ययोर्भावाभावरूपतया तदनुमितिसाम्येऽपि शैत्यानुमितिसाम्यस्यानभ्युपगमात्, शैत्यस्यौष्ण्याभावरूपत्वाभावात् | Because, while you can claim that an inference proving the absence of heat is similar to the inference of the absence of the world (its mithyAtva), it is not possible to claim equivalence with the inference of the fire's coldness, because coldness is not the same as the absence of heat.
Coldness is an existent property, whereas the absence of existence of the world is not.
तस्मात् बाधस्य दोषता वा त्याज्या, औष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षायजमानत्वप्रत्यक्षादे: सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षापेक्षया विशेषो वा वक्तव्य: | Therefore, either contradiction as a hetvAbhAsa (a ground for the failure of inference) will have to be given up, or alternatively, some special difference between perception of the world's reality on the one hand and the perception of fire's heat, or the perception of the sacrificer not being the prastara (a clump of darbha), etc., will have to be postulated.
नच - औष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षं परिक्षितोभयवादिसिद्धप्रामाण्यं, सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षं तु न तथेति विशेषं - इति वाच्यं ।
That special difference cannot be that both of us agree that the perception of heat is valid on account of it being verified, whereas the perception of reality is not so.
सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षेऽपि प्रामाण्यासम्मतौ हेत्वभावात्, परीक्षायास्तुल्यत्वात् Because, there is no basis to argue that the world's reality, despite being perceived, is invalid - for verification as a test for the validity of perception is equally applicable here.
Until now, the arguments of the opponent were presented. The siddhikAra begins his refutation next.
- इति चेन्मैवम् ; If this is the argument, not so.
विरुद्धार्थग्राहित्वेन विशेषात्, The difference (between the inference of fire's coldness and the mithyAtva of the world) is that there is a contradiction (between perception and inference in one case, but not in the other).
प्रत्यक्षसिद्धायजमानत्वौष्ण्यादिवच्छब्दलिङ्गग्राह्ययजमानत्वानौष्ण्याद्यपि व्यावहारिकमिति समत्वात् प्रत्यक्षेण बाध्यते,
The objects of perception - the heat of the fire, and the fact that the prastara is not the sacrificer - have empirical reality. As are the objects of inference - the coldness of fire, and shruti - that the prastara is the sacrificer. These being both empirically real, there is an actual contradiction between perception and inference and perception and shruti, and they can be overruled by perception.
प्रकृते तु सत्त्वं व्यावहारिकं प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं तद्विरुद्धं च न मिथ्यात्वम् ; तस्य पारमार्थिकसत्त्वविरोधात् | Whereas, in the topic under discussion, the empirical reality (of the world) established by perception is not contradictory to the mithyAtva established by inference. It only contradicts the absolute validity (of the world).
अतो न तत् व्यावहारिकसत्त्वग्राहकेणाध्यक्षेण बाध्यते | Thus that inference cannot be contradicted by perception, which can only reveal the empirical reality of the world.
The opponent retorts -
ननु - एवं वदतस्तव को वाऽभिप्राय:? किं तात्त्विकविषयत्वात् बाधकतैव मिथ्यात्वानुमानादेर्न बाध्यता, उत सत्त्वमिथ्यात्वग्राहिणोर्व्यावहारिकतात्त्विकविषययो: परस्परविरुद्धविषयत्वाभावात् न बाध्यबाधकभाव: |
What is your intention in saying this? Is it that
1) as inference of unreality reveals the absolutely real, it is capable of overruling (perception), but is itself not overruled, or is it that
2) there is no overruled-overruling relationship between the pramANa which reveals reality and that which reveals mithyAtva because their objects being empirical reality and absolute reality respectively are not contradictory to each other?
अन्त्येऽपि किमध्यक्षसिद्धव्यावहारिकसत्त्वमगृहीत्वैव तदसिद्धस्य तात्त्विकसत्त्वस्यैवाभावम् गृह्नात्यनुमानादि, उत प्रत्यक्षविषयीकृतस्यैव तात्त्विकमभावम् |
Additionally, in the latter alternative, are you saying that
1) inference reveals the absence of absolute reality, which reality is not revealed by perception as it can only reveal empirical reality? Or
2) is inference revealing the absence of absolute reality, which happens to be revealed by perception?
नान्त्य:, प्रत्यक्षविषयाभावग्राहिणि तदबाधकत्वोक्त्ययोगात् | It is not the last option, because if inference is revealing the absence of a reality that happens to be affirmed by perception, then it cannot be argued by you that inference is not in contradiction with perception.
न द्वितीय:, प्रत्यक्षागृहीतप्रतिषेधकत्वेनाप्रसक्तप्रतिषेधापत्ते:, प्रत्यक्षविषयस्य तात्त्विकापत्तेश्च | Nor is it the second option, because by contradicting something that perception does not reveal, it is negating something which was never postulated in the first place. (Such a negation ends up being redundant.) Further, as inference does not contradict perception, the object of perception stands unrefuted and real.
न प्रथम:, उपजीव्यप्रत्यक्षविरोधेनानुमित्यादिविषयस्य तात्त्विकत्वासिद्धि:, It is not the first option either, because if inference contradicts perception which is its upajIvya, very basis, then the validity of inference itself is in question - and the reality of the object of inference is not proven.
It is the siddhikAra's turn to respond to this particular argument.
इति चेन्न । No.
प्रथमे द्वितीये च पक्षे अनुपपत्त्यभावात्। There is no issue with the first or second options.
तथाहि - प्रथमेपक्षे न तात्त्विकत्वासिद्धिः यस्मा 'दिदं रजत'मित्यनेन 'नेदं रजत' मित्यस्य बाधदर्शनात् परीक्षितमेव बाधकमभ्युपेयम् | To explain, it cannot be said that the absolute validity of inference has not yet been established (because it contradicts perception, upon which it is upajIvya, dependent), for it has been observed that the cognition "this is not silver" is capable of overruling the cognition "this is silver" (despite the general rule that for something to be negated, its object must be thought to exist).
Thus mere dependence (upajIvyatva) does not confer validity to an erroneous cognition.
परीक्षा च प्रवृत्तिसंवादादिरूपा व्यवहारदशायामबाध्यत्वम् विनानुपपन्ना तद्दशाबाधग्राहिणम् बाधते, नाद्वैतश्रुत्यनुमानादिकमित्युक्तमेव |
Verification, like the natural inclination towards an object, etc. is not possible without that object being empirically real, and if a cognition tries to contradict its empirical reality, then such a verification would invalidate the cognition. However, neither advaita shruti nor the inference of mithyAtva falsifies the empirical reality of the world.
द्वितीयेऽपि पक्षे नाप्रसक्तप्रतिषेध:, परोक्षप्रसक्ते: संभवात् | The charge that - something unpostulated / impossible is being negated - is not applicable in the second option, because (even though perception does not reveal the world to be absolutely real), one may consider the world to be absolutely real through some other indirect means of knowledge. Therefore, it is possible for the inference of mithyAtva to reject such a notion.
यत्तु केचिदात्मनि तात्विकसत्त्वप्रसिद्ध्या प्रसक्तिमुपपादयन्ति | तन्न ; Some people however argue that the notion of absolute reality is known as being present in the Self, and that much is sufficient for its subsequent negation in the world. However, that is not correct.
नहि प्रतियोगिज्ञानमात्रं प्रसक्ति:, किं तर्हि निषेधाधिकरणकप्रतियोगिज्ञानम् | Merely knowing the object of negation is not sufficient for negation to have scope of application. Then what? The object of negation must appear to exist in the locus of negation, for it to have scope.
नचात्मा निषेधाधिकरणम् ; तस्मात्परोक्षप्रसक्तिरेव दर्शनीया | And the locus where absolute reality is being denied is not the Self (but the world), therefore it must be admitted that one has some indirect notion of the possibility of the world having absolute reality and that much is sufficient for it to be denied in the world through inference and shruti.
अथ वा माभूत् प्रसक्ति:, अभावप्रत्यक्षे हि संसर्गारोपत्वेन सोपयुज्यते, शब्दानुमानयोस्तु, तस्या: क्वोपयोग: | Alternatively, let there be no requirement for prasakti (the possibility) of something for its denial later. While the perception of the absence of something requires that such a thing is superimposed in that location, what purpose does such a requirement serve for verbal testimony and inference? (That is, inference and verbal testimony are not contingent upon the knowledge of the possible existence of their object).
नचाप्रसक्तौ निषेधवैयर्थ्यम्, अनर्थनिवृत्तिरूपस्य प्रयोजनस्य विद्यमानत्वात् | Nor can it be said that as such a possibility does not exist, its negation serves no purpose - because in this case, it serves the purpose of removing all evil (i.e the cessation of the evils of samsAra).
नच प्रत्यक्षविषयतात्त्विकत्वापत्ति:, तद्विषयाधिकरणस्यैव पारमार्थिकत्वव्यतिरेकस्य बोधनात् |
Nor does this lead to the object of perception ending up as absolutely real, because the absence of absolute reality in the world is what is being revealed by the inference.
तथाच न काप्यनुपपत्ति: | Therefore, there are no logical incongruities.
The nyAyAmRta tarangiNi raises an objection in this context. On what basis did the siddhikAra allege that negation in verbal testimony and inference does not require the possibility of the existence of the object of negation? On the contrary, not requiring such a possibility will contradict pUrva mImAmsa.
In the darsha pUrNamAsa ritual two sacrifices called Ajya bhAgam are prescribed. Two statements occur in this context - न तौ पशौ करोति | न सोमे अध्वरेत् | - In the performance of the pashu sacrifice, do not do perform these two. Do not perform these in the soma sacrifice.
The pUrva mImAmsa scripture raises a doubt - is the second statement a prohibition (a niShedha) or is it arthavAda? There is no pramANa that raises the possibility (prasakti) of the Ajya bhAga being performed in a soma sacrifice. Therefore, the second statement is not a niShedha, rather it is arthavAda.
On the other hand, the pashu sacrifice, is a vikRti sacrifice, which is modeled on the prakRti, which is the darsha pUrNamAsa. In the darsha pUrNamAsa, the two Ajya bhAga sacrifices are performed. By the rule, prakRtivat vikRti: kartavyA (perform the vikRti on the lines of the prakRti), there is scope for the performance of the Ajya bhAga-s at the pashu sacrifice. In order to rule out such a prasakti, the first statement is made. Therefore it is a niShedha, and not an arthavAda.
In this case, pUrva mImAmsa contends that prohibitions (niShedha-s) in shruti (which falls under the category of verbal testimony) require a prior prasakti. Why did the siddhikAra argue that verbal testimony does not require prasakti?
In response, the laghuchandrika by gauDa brahmAnanda argues that the intention of the siddhikAra has not been understood by the tarangiNikAra. Every vedic sentence that negates does not fall under the category of a niShedha (prohibition). It is only classified thus when there is a natural inclination towards a particular activity or for something to be understood in a particular way (ie, pravRtti), and a scriptural statement forbids / negates it.
The sentence do not perform the Ajya bhAgam in a soma sacrifice is not preventing the listener from an activity that they would otherwise have naturally performed (for the soma sacrifice has no scope for Ajya bhAgam). Thus it is an arthavAda and not a niShedha, because it is verbalising what is already known.
The point that the siddhikAra is making is that verbal sentences do not need prior prasakti for their meaning to be understood. Irrespective of whether there is prior prasakti or not (irrespective of whether the ultimate reality of the world is known previously or not), the sentence from the veda denying its ultimate reality conveys meaning to a listener who understands the language of the shruti.
Coming back to the advaita siddhi, the siddhikAra continues:
तदुक्तं खण्डनकृद्भि: - 'पारमार्थिकमद्वैतं प्रविश्य शरणं श्रुति: | विरोधादुपजीव्येन न बिभेति कदाचन ||' इति |
The khaNDanakAra, Sriharsha says - Shruti is revealing advaita as the ultimate reality, and as such is not scared of contradicting the pramANa upon which it is dependent.
The opponent asks:
ननु - एवामप्यनौष्ण्यं तात्विकमिति तदनुमितिरपि न बाध्येत व्यावहारिकौष्ण्यग्राहिणाध्यक्षेण ; (If that be the case) why don't you argue that the inference of fire's coldness is real and is not contradicted by perception which only reveals empirical reality?
एवं 'चादित्यो यूप' इत्यादावपि 'तात्त्विकादित्यतां यूपस्याश्रितस्य शरणं श्रुति: | विरोधादुपजीव्येन न बिभेति कदाचन ||' इत्याद्यपि स्यात् Similarly, in shruti sentences such as "The sun is the sacrificial post", it can be argued that - 'the sun is the sacrificial post' is the reality, and shruti need not be reinterpreted out of fear of contradicting perception, upon which it is dependent.
- इति चेन्न ; The siddhikAra responds - No.
अनौष्ण्यं तात्त्विकं स्यादिति कोऽर्थ:? What do you mean by "the absence of fire's heat is real"?
यदि तत्त्वत औष्ण्यं नास्तीत्यर्थ:, तदा अद्वैते पर्यवसादिष्टापत्ति: | If you say the heat is not present in reality, then it is desirable, because it leads to advaita.
यदि व्यवहारतोऽपि नास्तीति, तदा व्यवहाराविसंवादादिरूपपरीक्षितत्वविशिष्टमौष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षं बाधकमिति नानौष्ण्यस्य तात्त्विकत्वसिद्धि: | If you are saying it is absent even empirically, then because that is contradicted by perception which has been verified in practice to be empirically real, the empirical absence of heat is not established by such an inference.
एतेन शैत्यानुमानं व्याख्यातम् | By the same argument, the case of the inference of fire's coldness can also be explained.
एवमादित्ययूपभेदस्य तत्त्वतो व्यवाहरतो वा निषेधे योज्यम् | Similarly, in the case of the difference between the sun and the sacrificial post, one must question whether the negation of difference is being said to be ultimately real or empirically real.
श्रुतेरन्यशेषतया आदित्ययूपाभेदपरत्वाभावेन परीक्षितप्रत्यक्षविरोधेन गौणार्थतया स्तावकत्वोपपत्तेश्च।
That sentence (the sun is the sacrificial post) is subsidiary to a vedic injunction, and its import is not in revealing an identity between the sun and the sacrificial post. Moreover, such a meaning would contradict a validated perception. That being the case, the shruti sentence, by taking a figurative meaning, serves to extol the sacrificial post.
अतएव - 'तात्त्विकादित्यतां यूपस्ये' त्यादिना अद्वैतश्रुते 'रादित्यो यूप' इत्यादिश्रुतिसाम्यापादनम् - अपास्तम् | Thus, your verse alleging similarity between the shruti statement "the sun is the sacrificial post" and the shruti statements revealing advaita has been refuted.
न च -अनुमितिसिद्धमिथ्यात्वग्राहकत्वे सत्यद्वैतश्रुतिरनुवादिका स्यात्, यथा'ऽग्निर्हिमस्य भेषज' मित्यादिश्रुति: प्रमाणान्तरगृहीतहिमनिवारणशक्त्यनुवादिकेति वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - If mithyAtva is already established by inference, shruti that reveals advaita is merely repeating what is known (anuvAda), and therefore does not have validity - like the vedic statement "fire is the remedy for cold" is called an anuvAda on account of revealing something that is already known through some other pramANa.
स्वस्वचमत्कारानुसारिणोऽनुमानस्य सकलसाधारण्याभावेन तस्य श्रुत्यनुवादकत्वाप्रयोजकत्वात् | Because as inference's ability to reveal its meaning is ultimately dependent on each person's logical ability, it is not universal, thus a shruti which reveals the same truth cannot be said to be merely repeating what inference has revealed.
तदुक्तं - 'तर्काप्रतिष्ठाना' दित्यत्र वचास्पतिमिश्रै: - 'यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थ: कुशलैरनुमातृभि: | अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ||' इति |
Thus has been argued by vAcaspati miSra in the context of the sUtra "It cannot be established by logical reasoning" - "Even if a skilful logician presents an inference after great effort, others more skilled (abhiyuktatara:) can turn up and prove its opposite."
दृष्टान्तीकृतश्रुतौ तु हिमनिवृत्तिकारणतया वह्नौ सर्वसाधारणप्रत्यक्षार्थापत्तिभ्यामवसेयत्वाद्वैषम्यम् ;
On the other hand, as the exemplified shruti sentence revealing fire's propensity to remove coldness is universally known by all through pratyaksha and arthApatti, it is different from the shruti revealing the mithyAtva of the world.
तस्मान्मिथ्यवानुमानस्य न वह्निशैत्यानुमितिसाम्यम् ||
Therefore, the inference of the world's mithyAtva is not similar to the inference of fire's coldness.