paricCheda 1 - jAtyupakramanyAyAdibhi: pratyakshaprAbalyanirAsa:
The next chapter in the advaita siddhi examines the relative strength of direct perception compared to the other means of knowledge. The nyAyAmritakAra cites various rules from pUrva-mImAmsa to argue for the relative strength of perception. Using this, he wishes to prove that when perception is in contradiction with inference, perception will overrule the conclusion of inference. Perception according to him, proves the reality of the world. The advaitin says that inference proves its unreality. The nyAyAmritakAra wishes to prove that even if the advaitin's inference was correct, perception would overrule it.
This was refuted by the siddhikAra in several ways. In a previous chapter, he had argued that perception does not prove a reality to the world that is contradictory to the unreality postulated by inference. In other words, the empirical reality that is observed by perception, is the same as the unreality established by inference.
In the current chapter, he refutes this argument differently - he argues that perception cannot rule out inference per se.
अथ जात्युपक्रमादिन्यायै: प्रत्यक्षप्राबल्यनिरास: | Now we shall refute the arguments to establish the relative strength of direct perception using pUrva mImAmsa maxims such as innate character (jAti), first arising (upakrama) etc.
किञ्च निश्चितप्रामाण्यमेव प्रत्यक्षमितरबाधकं भवेत्, नचात्र प्रामाण्यं निश्चितम्; आगमविरोधात्, अनुमानविरोधात्, भाविबाधाभावानिर्णयाच्च, Only when the validity of perception is certain, can it override other means of knowledge. However, the validity of perception is not certain here, for it contradicts shruti (sentences such as "there is no multiplicity here"), inference (of the world's unreality), and because the absence of a future sublation of the world is uncertain in the present.
The pUrvapakshi replies:
ननु - प्रत्यक्षमेव प्रबलमनुमानागामबाधकम्, नानुमानागमौ, प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्ये तद्विरोधाभावेनानुमानागमयो: प्रामाण्यम्, तयो: प्रामाण्ये च तद्विरोधात् प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्यमित्यन्योन्याश्रयात्, नहि प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रामाण्येप्येवमन्योन्याश्रय:, तस्यानपक्षेत्वात् -
प्रत्यक्षमेव प्रबलमनुमानागामबाधकम्, नानुमानागमौ, Direct perception is definitely stronger and is capable of overruling scripture and inference. Scripture and inference are incapable of contradicting perception by themselves, because
प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्ये तद्विरोधाभावेनानुमानागमयो: प्रामाण्यम् if perception is invalid, because it is unable to contradict scripture and inference, their validity is established
तयो: प्रामाण्ये च तद्विरोधात् प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्यमित्यन्योन्याश्रयात्, and the validity of scripture and inference proves the invalidity of a contradictory perception, leading to a mutual dependence between the two.
Thus the validity of scripture and inference requires that a perception that overrules them is invalid, and in the absence of invalidity in perception, scripture and inference that contradict such a valid perception are themselves invalid.
नहि प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रामाण्येप्येवमन्योन्याश्रय:, तस्यानपक्षेत्वात् However, the validity of perception does not suffer from a similar flaw of mutual dependence, for it does not require the invalidity of other means of knowledge for its own validity.
The basic argument made by the pUrvapakshi is that when there are two means of knowledge of equal strength, and if they happen to contradict each other, the validity of one is dependent on the invalidity of the other; however, if one of the two is stronger than the other, the validity of the stronger means of knowledge is independent - it does not depend on the invalidity of the other.
The siddhikAra responds:
- इति चेन्न ; if this is the argument, no.
चन्द्रतारकादिपरिमाणप्रत्यक्षे अनुमानागमविरोधेन तस्याप्रामाण्यदर्शनात् तेनापि स्वप्रामाण्यसिद्ध्यर्थमितराविरोधस्यावश्यमपेक्षणीयत्वात् | The moon and stars may appear to be small, but because it is contradictory to inference and scientific testimony, it is established as invalid. Thus even in the case of perception, its validity is dependent on the absence of contradiction by other means of knowledge. One cannot argue on the basis of the absolute strength of perception that its validity is not affected by a contradiction by other means of knowledge.
तथाचान्योन्याश्रयतुल्यत्वात् परस्परविरोधेन प्रामाण्यसन्देहे सत्यनाप्ताप्रणीतत्वादिना प्रमाजनकत्वव्याप्तेः वेदप्रामाण्यनिश्चये जाते तेन स्वतस्सम्भावितदोषस्य प्रत्यक्षया बाधात् अस्मन्मते क्वान्योन्याश्रय:? Thus, as mutual dependency is similarly present, when the two means of knowledge are in contradiction, the validity of perception is also similarly called into doubt. That being so, as vedic scripture is not a creation of faulty agents, its capacity for giving rise to valid knowledge must be admitted. Therefore, as there is the cognition of certainty of the validity of the vedas, how can the fault of mutual dependence be levied against us, even when that vedic scripture is in contradiction with perception, which has the potential for being faulty, as it is born from sense organs, which could be mistaken?
अन्यथा देहात्मैक्यप्रत्यक्षबुद्ध्या बाधाद्देहभिन्नत्वमप्यात्मनो नागमानुमानाभ्यां सिद्ध्येत् | If you insist on perception being always stronger than scripture and inference, the scriptural teaching of "you are the self, not the body", which is accepted by you too, would be overruled by everyone's perception "I am a human being".
First argument of the pUrvapakshi
Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, because that strength is a universal characteristic that is present in perception.
The opponent says:
ननु - प्रत्यक्षमनुमानद्यपेक्षया जात्यैव प्रबलम् ; कथमन्यथा औष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षेण वह्निशैत्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्ध: ?
The strength of perception compared to inference, etc. is an intrinsic property to all perception. If that is not accepted, what prevents one from claiming that the perception "fire is hot" is also overruled by an inference claiming "fire is cold"?
नच - तत्रोपजीव्यत्वनिबन्धनं प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधकत्वम्; धर्म्यादेश्चक्षुरादिनैव सिद्धेस्त्वचोऽनुपजीव्यत्वात्,
You may argue - "As the inference of fire being cold is dependent on the sense of touch to establish the meaning of coldness, such an inference, which depends on the sense of touch, cannot overrule the very same sense of touch which establishes that fire is hot."
This is untrue, because one cannot say that the inference of fire being cold is dependent on touch, because the cognition of fire itself is by sight, so the inference of fire depends on sight, not touch.
किञ्च प्रत्यक्षस्य प्राबल्यम् अनुमाद्यगृहीतरेखोपरेखादिग्राहकत्वात् Moreover, the relative strength of perception is well established because it reveals things that other means of knowledge cannot - No amount of inference can prove whether one line is bigger than the other. Only perception can do that.
अनुमानाद्यनिवर्तितदिङ्ग्मोहादिनिवर्तकत्वाच्च Similarly, if one has lost their sense of bearings, one cannot infer which direction is which, only perception can reveal that. Therefore, perception is certainly stronger than inference.
The siddhikAra replies:
- इति चेन्न ; If this is the argument, no.
त्वाचप्रत्यक्षस्याप्युपजीव्यत्वेनैव शैत्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वसम्भवात्, It is only because the sense of touch is the basis (upajIvya) for the inference for fire's coldness, that it is able to overrule the latter.
चक्षुरादिना धर्म्यादिग्रहेऽपि त्वचं विना साध्यप्रसिद्धेरभावात् | Even though fire is seen, heat or coldness can only be known by touch, not otherwise.
तथाच न जात्या प्राबल्ये मानमस्ति | Therefore one cannot say that the relative strength of perception is something intrinsic to it.
The opponent had argued that as perception is able to reveal things that only it can, it is superior to other means of knowledge. The siddhikAra refutes this next.
तदगृहीतग्राहित्वमपि न प्राबल्ये प्रयोजकम् ; The fact that perception reveals things that are otherwise unknown does not make perception universally stronger.
प्रत्यक्षागृहीतधर्मादिग्राहकत्वेन परोक्षप्रमाणस्यैव प्राबल्यापत्ते: | Because, by that logic, as only mediate knowledge (scripture) reveals merit and sin (puNya, pApa etc) which are not otherwise revealed by perception, they would end up stronger than perception.
नाप्यनुमानाद्यनिवर्तितदिङ्ग्मोहादिनिवर्तकत्वेन प्राबल्यम् ; एतावता हि वैधर्म्यमात्रं सिद्धम् | Just because a confusion about directions is unresolved by inference, but is clarified by perception, one cannot conclude that perception is universally stronger than perception. By that much, all that is proven is that perception and inference are different.
नच तावतेतरप्रमाणापेक्षया प्राबल्यं भवति | अन्यथात्वाचप्रत्यक्षानिवर्तितवंशोरगभ्रमनिवर्तकत्वाच्चक्षुषोऽपि त्वगपेक्षया
प्राबल्यं स्यात् । With that much alone, the strength of perception compared to other means of knowledge is not proven. If the criterion for universal strength is that in any particular instance, one means of knowledge happens to overrule the other, then another example can be quoted to arrive at an opposite conclusion. For example, someone may touch a piece of bamboo and mistake it for a snake (because both are smooth to touch), but when they see the object carefully they realise it is a bamboo stick, not a snake. By that much, can you say that sight is always stronger than touch ?
ततश्च चित्रनिम्नोन्न्तज्ञानस्य चाक्षुषस्य तद्विरोधित्वाचज्ञानात् बाधो न स्यात् | If that was universally true, an experience where touch overrules sight would not occur. For example, sometimes a picture of an object is so natural that the object it depicts appears to be real, but when someone reaches to touch it, it is discovered to be only a picture. Touch disproves what sight revealed. Does that make touch stronger than sight always?
प्रत्युतागमस्यैव सर्वत: प्राबल्यं स्मार्यते | However, in reality, we hold that vedic scripture is stronger than all other means of knowledge.
'प्राबल्यमागमस्यैव जात्या तेषु त्रिषु स्मृतम् | ' इति | As the smriti says, shruti is the strongest of the three - perception, inference and shruti.
नच - तद्वैदिकार्थविषयमिति - वाच्यम् ; अद्वैतस्यापि वैदिकार्थत्वात् | Do not argue that the veda's authority is limited to only scriptural matters, for non-duality also happens to be within that realm.
क्वच प्रत्यक्षत: प्राप्तमनुमानागमबाधितमिति तु परीक्षितप्रामाण्यप्रत्यक्षविषयम् | In some instances, where the results of perception are well-tested, and there is certainty that it is the truth, such a perception is capable of overruling inference and scripture, requiring them to be reinterpreted. However, that does not mean that all inference and scripture lose their validity.
Second argument of the pUrvapakshi
Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, because of the mImAmsa maxim of upakrama nyAya, it is the first one to arise.
Until now, we had looked at the first argument advanced by the opponent, that perception was stronger because of a characteristic that is intrinsic and universal to all perception. Now we will consider a second argument.
ननु - प्रत्यक्षस्यासंजातविरोधित्वादुपक्रमन्यायेनैव प्राबल्यम् | Perception is stronger than other means of knowledge, on the basis of the rule that the means of knowledge that arises first is the strongest. When it arises, it is not accompanied by a doubt over its veracity, and a means of knowledge that arises afterwards cannot overrule it.
The world is first perceived to be real, it is only later when someone studies advaita that they are told it is mithyA. The first cognition is the correct one, because there was no doubt when it arose.
उक्तंहि - 'असंजातविरोधित्वादर्थवादो यथाश्रुत:| आस्थेयस्तद्विरुद्धस्य विध्युद्देशस्य लक्षणा'
According to pUrva mImAmsa: "When an arthavAda is encountered without anything to contradict it, it has to be interpreted literally (as heard). Where there is a (subsequent) injunction that contradicts that literal meaning, it is the injunction that has to be reinterpreted to take a secondary meaning."
This rule occurs in the context of an arthavAda which says that the rig veda was born from agni (fire), the yajur veda from vAyu (wind), sAma veda from Aditya (the sun). Later, there is an injunction which says that one should recite the rig loudly, the yajus quietly, etc. Here a question is raised - Do the words rig, yajus, etc. in the injunction refer to some individual mantra occurring in the respective veda or the should the entire veda be recited thus? The pUrva mImAmsaka argues that when the arthavAda is heard, there is no doubt that it refers to the entire rig veda being born from agni, yajurveda from vAyu etc. When the injunction subsequently arises, it needs to be interpreted in line with the arthavAda - therefore, that meaning must be used when there is a doubt whether the injunction applies to only mantra or the entire veda.
The nyAyAmritakAra is invoking that rule and argues that when the world is perceived, there is no doubt about its validity, therefore when an inference or the veda itself is contradicting that perception, one must reinterpret the inference and the veda to bring it in line with perception, and not the other way around.
The siddhikAra responds:
- इति चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
The mImAmsa "principle of first arising" can only be applied where there is a link between the arthavAda and the injunction. If the veda only stipulates injunctions and prohibitions, people may not be inspired to follow them. Thus arthavAda portions occur to extol the benefits of following a particular injunction, or the dangers of doing something prohibited.
यत एकवाक्यस्थ परस्परसापेक्षपदत्वेन उभयो: साम्ये सति उपक्रमस्थवेदपदानुरोधेन उपसंहारस्थर्गादिपदानां मन्त्रमात्रवाचिनां कृत्स्नवेदपरत्वे निर्णीतेऽपि न प्रकृते तन्न्याय: संभवति;
Where the arthavAda and injunction constitute one sentence, that is, where both deal with the same topic, on account of the mutual dependence between each other, there is an equality assigned to both, and the word "veda" that appears in the beginning (in the arthavAda) is taken to mean the entire veda even though the word "rig", etc. appearing subsequently (in the injunction) seems to indicate only a particular mantra. However, that rule cannot be applied in our context.
उभयो: साम्याभावात्, गृहीतप्रमाणभावश्रुत्यपेक्षया भ्रमविलक्षणत्वेनानिश्चितस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य न्यूनबलत्वात् ; because, there is no equality between the world's reality as perceived and its mithyAtva as stipulated by shruti - for, a perception whose validity is in doubt is weaker than the shruti whose validity is certain.
अन्यथा 'इदं रजत' मिति भ्रमोऽपि 'इयं शुक्ति' रिति आप्तोपदेशापक्षया प्रबलं स्यात् | Otherwise (if it is not accepted that the relative certainty of validity between the two contradictory means of knowledge is the determining factor of which one overrules the other), then the illusion of shell-silver perceived will end up overruling a statement made by a wise well-wisher that "it is actually a shell".
Let us assume that a person rushes to pick up a shell thinking it is silver and is stopped by a well-wisher who advises him that it is only a shell. The illusion occurs before the verbal testimony, and as it arises there is no doubt in the seer's mind that it is valid (it is not accompanied by an overruling cognition). If the opponent is true, that would be sufficient for the illusion to overrule the verbal testimony, but that would end up with the wrong result.
Third argument of the pUrvapakshi
Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, because it is shIghragAmi, it is the quickest to produce a result.
The siddhikAra says:
एतेन - लिङ्गात् श्रुतेरिव शीघ्रगामित्वात् प्रत्यक्षस्य प्राबल्यम्, तदुक्तम् - 'प्रत्यक्षे चानुमेने च यथा लोके बलाबलम् | शीघ्रमन्थरगामित्वात्तथैव श्रुतिलिङ्गयो: ॥' इत्यपास्तम् ; By the above, your following argument is also refuted.
The opponent's argument: Similar to shruti being accepted as stronger than inference, on account of it producing a result quicker than inference, perception is stronger than both. As was said elsewhere: "In worldly matters it is accepted that perception is stronger than inference because it produces a result faster than inference, similarly in vedic matters shruti is stronger than inference".
In a particular portion of the rig veda there is a mantra which says "Indra, you do not deceive those that worship you with offerings. You provide them with all manner of happiness". Hearing this, one may think the deity being invoked with this mantra is Indra, on account of the indicatory mark, linga, that refers to the god Indra. However, the shruti in the same context provides an injunction "the wife of the sacrificer worships the gArhapatya agni with this mantra".
Here, the shruti is directly saying that the deity being invoked is gArhapatya agni, and not Indra. Therefore, the shruti is taken to be stronger than the indicatory mark, because it is more direct in producing the knowledge compared to the indicatory mark whereby one has to infer the meaning. Similarly, the opponent argues that between perception on the one hand and shruti and inference on the other, the former is stronger because it is more direct in meaning.
With the inference of fire in the mountain, one needs to first perceive smoke in the mountain, he must have the prior knowledge of invariable concomitance that wherever smoke is present, fire must also be present, the sight of smoke must trigger the memory of the invariable concomitance, which will finally allow him to conclude that fire must also be present. Instead of this process, if he had seen fire in the first instance, that would be a quicker way to come to the conclusion. If the speed of arriving at a conclusion is the basis for relative strength, perception is stronger than inference.
Similarly shruti is also slower than perception. The teacher must first teach the veda to the student, the student should understand the language, the words must meet various criteria to generate the appropriate meaning, etc. Thus on the same basis, shruti too can be argued to be weaker than perception.
परीक्षतस्य मन्थरगामिनोऽपि प्राबल्यात् | The siddhikAra refutes this line of argument on the grounds that the strength of a means of knowledge is in it being verified to be true, even if it happens to be slower.
Fourth argument of the pUrvapakshi
Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, invoking the mImAmsa principle of sAmAnya-visheSha nyAya, special and general rules.
The opponent then argues that perception is stronger because of the mImAmsa maxim of sAmAnya visheShya nyAya.
There is a general rule that is applicable across various rituals that when a 'homa' (offering of oblations directed to a particular deity in the sacrificial fire) is performed, it is to be performed in the AhavanIya fire. However, there is a special rule in the case of a particular homa performed in the jyotiShToma sacrifice, which is a soma sacrifice. The soma, a particular species of creeper used in the sacrifice, is to be purchased in exchange for a very particular kind of calf - A one-year old black calf with yellow eyes must be offered to the seller of the soma. The veda further prescribes that a homa must be performed at the place where the offered cow plants its hooves.
There are two conflicting injunctions - a general rule that the homa is to be performed at the place of AhavanIya fire, and another specific to the jyotiShToma, that it is to be performed at the location of the hoofprint. A doubt occurs - which rule is to be followed in the jyotiShToma? According to pUrva mImAmsa, when there is a rule applicable generally in contradiction to another applied in a specific situation, the special rule prevails. The opponent tries to apply this maxim to argue that perception is stronger than veda.
न च - 'यदाहवनीये जुहोति' इत्यस्मात् 'पदे जुहोती'त्यस्य विशेष्यत्वेन प्राबल्यात् घटविषयसत्त्वग्राहिण: प्रत्यक्षस्य सामान्यतो द्वैतनिषेधकश्रुत्यपेक्षया प्राबल्यमिति - वाच्यम्;
The siddhikAra says, do not argue thus - 'As the special rule "offer the oblations at the hoof" is accepted to be stronger than the general rule "offer oblations in the AhavanIya", perception establishing the reality of a particular pot must also be accepted to be stronger then a general denial of duality'.
This is not applicable in the context because,
सामान्यविशेषन्यायस्य निश्चितप्रामाणभावोभयविषयत्वात्, the maxim of special and general rules can only be applied when the validity of both rules is certain. In this context, perception is not always valid - it sometimes produces valid cognition, and sometimes invalid. Therefore this mImAmsa maxim cannot be applied here.
अन्यथा 'अयं गौरश्व' इत्यादेरपि गौरश्वो न भवतीत्यादित: प्राबल्यं भवेत् | If this was not true, if someone were to say "this cow is a horse", to indicate that a particular cow happens to run fast, such a statement applicable to a particular case where a figurative meaning is intended, would always overrule the general statement, "a cow and horse are different", even where that particular meaning is not valid, which would be an absurd situation. Therefore, the mImAmsa maxim is to be applied only in the context where both rules happen to be true, and not indiscriminately.
Fifth argument of the pUrvapakshi
Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, invoking the mImAmsa principle of sAvakAsha - niravakAsha nyAya, the application of rules in a manner that offers scope for both rules.
The pUrvapakshi's argument is summarised first:
In the portion of the veda describing the procedure for the jyotishToma sacrifice, there is an injunction: यत्किञ्चित्प्राचीनमग्नीषोमीयात्तेनोपांशुचरति - Any subsidiary rituals (dIkshaNIya, yUpAvaTam, dharbhairavasTRNam, RtvikvaraNam, etc) that precede the agnIShomIya sacrifice (part of the jyotiShToma) must be performed in a quiet voice (only the performer should be able to hear the mantras).
However after this injunction, there is a sentence 'यावत्या वाचा कामयेत तावत्या दीक्षणीयायामनुब्रूयात्', one may chant the mantra howsoever one desires (whether loudly, quietly, etc) in the dIkshaNIya sacrifice.
This raises a question - the mantras in the dIkshaNIya, which is a sacrifice that occurs before the agnIShomIya, must be spoken in a quiet voice according to the first rule. However, the second rule says that one may chant the mantras howsoever one desires. If the sacrificer interprets the contradiction to say the first rule overrules the second one, then the latter is rendered useless - the freedom to chant the mantra in any tone exists only for the dIkshaNIya, and no other ritual. It would have no scope for application. However, if one does go with the second rule, and chants the mantra loudly, he would be in violation of the first rule.
In such a situation, pUrvamImAmsa stipulates that in this case, the first rule should be reinterpreted to give avakAsha, scope for the second rule's application. Breaking the first rule and applying the second rule is acceptable so that the legitimacy of both rules is preserved. If one just applied the first rule in all precedent rituals, the second one will have no area of application, and its validity would be lost.
Therefore, the interpretation according to pUrvamImAmsa states that in all precedent rituals except the dIkshaNIya, the first rule (chanting quietly) is applied, and in the dIkshaNIya alone, the second rule (freedom to chant as one desires) is applied.
This is generalised into a maxim called sAvakAsha - niravakAsha nyAya, which essentially means that when there are two rules - one which has a broad scope for application, and another one which has a narrow scope for application, and one is faced with a choice of which rule to apply in any given situation, one must always apply the rule with the narrower scope in its specific area of scope, and the other rule with the broader rule can be applied in other areas.
The pUrvapakshi invokes that rule and tries to prove that perception is stronger than inference and shruti.
नच - यथा 'यत्किञ्चित्प्राचीनमग्नीषोमीयात्तेनोपांशुचरतित्यत्रत्यस्य यत्किञ्चिच्छब्दस्य यत्किन्चित्प्रकृतवाचित्वेन सामान्याविषयत्वेऽपि दीक्षणीयाव्यतिरिक्ते सावकाशत्ववत् 'यावत्या वाचा कामयेत तावत्या दीक्षणीयायामनुब्रूया ' दित्यनेन निरवकाशेन संकोचस्तथा प्रत्यक्षेण निरवकाशेन वृत्त्यन्तरेनानेकार्थत्वेन वा विषयान्तरपरत्वेन सावकाशाया: श्रुते: सङ्कोच: किं न स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
He says:
यथा 'यत्किञ्चित्प्राचीनमग्नीषोमीयात्तेनोपांशुचरतित्यत्रत्यस्य यत्किञ्चिच्छब्दस्य यत्किन्चित्प्रकृतवाचित्वेन सामान्याविषयत्वेऽपि दीक्षणीयाव्यतिरिक्ते सावकाशत्ववत् Like in the case of the injunction "In any sacrifice preceding the agnIShOmIya, one must chant the mantras quietly", the words "in any", are interpreted to apply to all sacrifices except the dIkshaNIya,
'यावत्या वाचा कामयेत तावत्या दीक्षणीयायामनुब्रूयात्' इत्यनेन निरवकाशेन सङ्कोच: in order to preserve the scope of application of the other injunction "One can chant in the dIkshaNIya as one desires", for in the absence of reinterpreting those words in that manner, the second rule would have no application
तथा प्रत्यक्षेण निरवकाशेन वृत्त्यन्तरेणानेकार्थत्वेन वा विषयान्तरपरत्वेन सावकाशाया: श्रुते: सङ्कोच: किं न स्यात् ? Similarly, why cannot shruti, which has such a broad scope for interpretation - the same words can refer to different things, by direct denotation (shakti vritti), or by implication (lakshaNA vritti) or can be reinterpreted saying that their import is in conveying something else altogether - be interpreted in such a way that the reality of the world that is conveyed by perception is not lost? Perception cannot be reinterpreted in any other way, so it has a limited scope, whereas shruti can take a range of meaning, and therefore it is the latter that must be reinterpreted, in line with the pUrva mImAmsa maxim of sAvakAsha niravakAsha nyAya.
To such an argument, the siddhikAra says no. नच वाच्यम्
तात्पर्यलिङ्गैरुपक्रमादिभिर्द्वैतनिषेधपरत्वे अवधृते अद्वैतश्रुतेरपि निरवकाशत्वात्, The six marks of intention (ShaDvidha tAtparya linga), which are used to determine the import of shruti, such as upakrama (the beginning), etc. all consistently point to shruti's import lying in the denial of duality. That being the case, shruti sentences that talk of non-duality also do not have scope of reinterpretation, and are niravakAsha.
प्रत्यक्षस्यापि व्यावहारिकद्वैतविषयतया सावकाशत्वात्, Whereas, the reality conveyed by perception can be said to be empirical, vyAvahArika, and therefore it has scope to convey something else.
The siddhikAra turns the nyAyAmritakAra's argument around and says that it is perception that has scope for reinterpretation, not shruti.
विरुद्धयोश्च द्वयो 'रहं मनुष्य' इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षे 'आकाशवत्सर्वगतश्च नित्य' इत्यादिश्रुत्योरिव तात्त्विकप्रामाण्यानुपपत्त्या कस्यचिद्व्यावहारिकं कस्यचित्तात्त्विकं प्रामाण्यमभ्युपेयम् ; अत्यन्ताप्रामाण्यस्यान्याय्यत्वात्,
It is accepted by the dvaitin, that these two contradictory cognitions - our perception of ourselves as "I am a human being" and that shruti statement that I am "all pervading like space, and eternal" - cannot both be equally valid. Therefore, as there is no reason to say that both are wrong, one is taken to be empirically true and the other absolutely so.
तत्राद्वैतश्रुतेर्व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यसम्भवे द्वैतग्राहिप्रत्यक्षादेस्तात्त्विकं प्रामाण्यं भवेत्, If it was possible for shruti talking of non-duality to be deemed empirically valid, one can argue that the perception that conveys duality is absolutely valid.
तदसम्भवे तु बलादेवाद्वैतश्रुतेस्तात्त्विकं प्रामाण्यमिति प्रत्यक्षादेर्व्यावहारिकं प्रामाण्यं पर्यवस्यतीति कृतबुद्धयो विदांकुर्वन्तु | However as that is impossible (because all the six indicatory marks of import point to shruti's import only in non-duality), one is left with no other choice but to say that it is shruti advocating non-duality that is ultimately true, and that perception is only empirically valid. May intelligent people understand it thus.
Sixth argument of the pUrvapakshi
Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, invoking the mImAmsa principle of bahubAdha anyAyya, any interpretation of contradictory rules should minimise the number of things negatively affected by the interpretation.
The opponent argues thus:
ननु - पञ्चदशरात्रे प्रथमेऽहन्यग्निष्टुन्नामके नामातिदेशेन एकाहाग्निष्टुद्धर्मभूता सुब्रह्मण्याग्नेयी प्राप्ता,
In the panchadasha rAtra sacrifice, which occurs over 15 days, the first day of the sacrifice is termed agniShTut. The term agniShTut conveys that a particular sAma called the Agneyi subrahmaNya should be sung then.
The panchadasha rAtra belongs to a group of sacrifices called vikRti, which have a corresponding template sacrifice called the prakRti. There are different kinds of prakRti sacrifices, each of which serves as a basic procedural template for the varied vikRti sacrifices. The general rule is prakRtivat vikRti: kartavyA - the procedure in the vikRti follows the prakRti.The prakRti that the panchadasha sacrifice is based on, says that a sAma called the Aindri subrahmaNya is to be sung on all days. There is a conflict now because the name agniShTut indicates that Agneyi subrahmaNya is to be sung on day 1. However, the prakRti manual says that Aindri subrahmaNya is to be followed on all days. If Agneyi subrahmaNya is sung on all days, it would invalidate the prakRti rule 15 times. If the Aindri subrahmaNya is sung on all days, it would invalidate the first rule only on one day.
तस्या अल्पविषयत्वाच्चतुर्दशाहस्सु चोदकेन प्राप्त्या ऐन्द्र्या सुब्रह्मण्यया However, as that (the first rule) is only a limited one, the other rule of Aindri subrahmaNya being sung is proved to be correct over 14 days and is hence said to be stronger.
बहुविषयया यथा बाधा:, बहुबाधस्यान्याय्यत्वात् Because, several things would be harmed otherwise from the principle of avoiding harm to the many.
तथा द्वैतग्राहिप्रत्यक्ष तदुपजीव्यनुमान, कर्मकाण्डसगुणोपासनावाक्यादिरूपबहुप्रमाणाबाधायाः, अद्वैतवाक्यस्य प्रतीतार्थबाध: किं न स्यात् ? Similarly, to avoid the violation of perception conveying that duality is real, inference, which is dependent on perception, entire portions of the vedas dealing with ritualistic performance (karma kANDa) and advocating the meditation of God (saguNa upAsana), why is it not more appropriate to discard the apparent meaning of sentences in the shruti that talk of non-duality. Why can we not reinterpret them instead?
That is why it is said:
तदुक्तम् - 'बहुप्रमाणविरोधे चैकस्याप्रामाण्यम् | दृष्टं शुक्तिरजतादिज्ञाने' Instead of contradicting many means of knowledge, it is better to accept the invalidity of one. It is better to rule out the reality of the seen shell-silver than to violate many other means of knowledge in trying to establish its reality.
The siddhikAra responds
इति - चेन्न ; If this is the argument, no.
दृष्टान्ते बहुविषयया बाधोऽत्र बहुभिरिति वैषम्यात् The example and the exemplified are different. In the example, several ends are affected, whereas in the exemplified, several means are affected.
To explain:
In the example, there are two competing rules, one which applies to many things and the other which applies to one thing alone. The choice is which rule to pick between the two. If the first rule is picked, only the one thing referred to by the second rule would be negated. If the second rule is accepted, it would lead to a negation of all things referred to by the first one.
The exemplified is different from this because the opponent is advocating the preservation of a multiplicity of means of knowledge by denying the validity of one means of knowledge. The basic principle is to minimise the number of ends harmed by a decision to pick one rule, not to minimise the number of rules harmed by the selection of any one. If there are multiple incorrect rules contradicting one correct rule, one cannot say that by this mImAmsa maxim, one has to necessarily preserve the many incorrect ones.
देहात्मैक्ये प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दाभासादिसत्त्वे अपि Even though everyone seems to consider the body to be the self, even when it is apparently proven by perception, scientific inference and everyday language, देहात्मभेदबोधकस्यानन्यपरत्वेन प्राबल्यवत् we accept that the validity of shruti which says that the body and the self are different, on the basis that it is the shruti which is stronger than them all, because of every indicator of the import of that sentence points to that interpretation, and so it cannot be reinterpreted to mean anything else.
Thus even here, one means of knowledge is said to overrule many other means of knowledge, because it is stronger than them all.
अत्रापि अनन्यपरत्वेनाद्वैतश्रुते: प्राबल्यात् Here too, as the shruti that advocates non-duality cannot be interpreted in any other way, it is stronger than perception.
Having argued for the strength of shruti all along, the siddhikAra ends with a sting in the tail:
विद्याविद्याभेदेन विद्वदविद्वत्पुरुषभेदेन च विरोधाभावादिति | Really speaking, there is no contradiction between shruti and the other means of knowledge, because one is said from the standpoint of knowledge and the other from the standpoint of ignorance. Moreover, the former is meant for the wise person, and the latter is directed to the everyday layman. That being the case, the two means of knowledge are not in contradiction with each other.
इति प्रत्यक्षस्य जात्युपक्रमन्यायादिभि: प्राबल्यनिराकरणम् || Thus, the strength of perception, argued on the basis of the mImAmsa principles of intrinsic characteristics, first arising, etc, has been refuted.
Originally posted on 3rd November, 2018
This was refuted by the siddhikAra in several ways. In a previous chapter, he had argued that perception does not prove a reality to the world that is contradictory to the unreality postulated by inference. In other words, the empirical reality that is observed by perception, is the same as the unreality established by inference.
In the current chapter, he refutes this argument differently - he argues that perception cannot rule out inference per se.
अथ जात्युपक्रमादिन्यायै: प्रत्यक्षप्राबल्यनिरास: | Now we shall refute the arguments to establish the relative strength of direct perception using pUrva mImAmsa maxims such as innate character (jAti), first arising (upakrama) etc.
किञ्च निश्चितप्रामाण्यमेव प्रत्यक्षमितरबाधकं भवेत्, नचात्र प्रामाण्यं निश्चितम्; आगमविरोधात्, अनुमानविरोधात्, भाविबाधाभावानिर्णयाच्च, Only when the validity of perception is certain, can it override other means of knowledge. However, the validity of perception is not certain here, for it contradicts shruti (sentences such as "there is no multiplicity here"), inference (of the world's unreality), and because the absence of a future sublation of the world is uncertain in the present.
The pUrvapakshi replies:
ननु - प्रत्यक्षमेव प्रबलमनुमानागामबाधकम्, नानुमानागमौ, प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्ये तद्विरोधाभावेनानुमानागमयो: प्रामाण्यम्, तयो: प्रामाण्ये च तद्विरोधात् प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्यमित्यन्योन्याश्रयात्, नहि प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रामाण्येप्येवमन्योन्याश्रय:, तस्यानपक्षेत्वात् -
प्रत्यक्षमेव प्रबलमनुमानागामबाधकम्, नानुमानागमौ, Direct perception is definitely stronger and is capable of overruling scripture and inference. Scripture and inference are incapable of contradicting perception by themselves, because
प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्ये तद्विरोधाभावेनानुमानागमयो: प्रामाण्यम् if perception is invalid, because it is unable to contradict scripture and inference, their validity is established
तयो: प्रामाण्ये च तद्विरोधात् प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्यमित्यन्योन्याश्रयात्, and the validity of scripture and inference proves the invalidity of a contradictory perception, leading to a mutual dependence between the two.
Thus the validity of scripture and inference requires that a perception that overrules them is invalid, and in the absence of invalidity in perception, scripture and inference that contradict such a valid perception are themselves invalid.
नहि प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रामाण्येप्येवमन्योन्याश्रय:, तस्यानपक्षेत्वात् However, the validity of perception does not suffer from a similar flaw of mutual dependence, for it does not require the invalidity of other means of knowledge for its own validity.
The basic argument made by the pUrvapakshi is that when there are two means of knowledge of equal strength, and if they happen to contradict each other, the validity of one is dependent on the invalidity of the other; however, if one of the two is stronger than the other, the validity of the stronger means of knowledge is independent - it does not depend on the invalidity of the other.
The siddhikAra responds:
- इति चेन्न ; if this is the argument, no.
चन्द्रतारकादिपरिमाणप्रत्यक्षे अनुमानागमविरोधेन तस्याप्रामाण्यदर्शनात् तेनापि स्वप्रामाण्यसिद्ध्यर्थमितराविरोधस्यावश्यमपेक्षणीयत्वात् | The moon and stars may appear to be small, but because it is contradictory to inference and scientific testimony, it is established as invalid. Thus even in the case of perception, its validity is dependent on the absence of contradiction by other means of knowledge. One cannot argue on the basis of the absolute strength of perception that its validity is not affected by a contradiction by other means of knowledge.
तथाचान्योन्याश्रयतुल्यत्वात् परस्परविरोधेन प्रामाण्यसन्देहे सत्यनाप्ताप्रणीतत्वादिना प्रमाजनकत्वव्याप्तेः वेदप्रामाण्यनिश्चये जाते तेन स्वतस्सम्भावितदोषस्य प्रत्यक्षया बाधात् अस्मन्मते क्वान्योन्याश्रय:? Thus, as mutual dependency is similarly present, when the two means of knowledge are in contradiction, the validity of perception is also similarly called into doubt. That being so, as vedic scripture is not a creation of faulty agents, its capacity for giving rise to valid knowledge must be admitted. Therefore, as there is the cognition of certainty of the validity of the vedas, how can the fault of mutual dependence be levied against us, even when that vedic scripture is in contradiction with perception, which has the potential for being faulty, as it is born from sense organs, which could be mistaken?
अन्यथा देहात्मैक्यप्रत्यक्षबुद्ध्या बाधाद्देहभिन्नत्वमप्यात्मनो नागमानुमानाभ्यां सिद्ध्येत् | If you insist on perception being always stronger than scripture and inference, the scriptural teaching of "you are the self, not the body", which is accepted by you too, would be overruled by everyone's perception "I am a human being".
First argument of the pUrvapakshi
Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, because that strength is a universal characteristic that is present in perception.
The opponent says:
ननु - प्रत्यक्षमनुमानद्यपेक्षया जात्यैव प्रबलम् ; कथमन्यथा औष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षेण वह्निशैत्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्ध: ?
The strength of perception compared to inference, etc. is an intrinsic property to all perception. If that is not accepted, what prevents one from claiming that the perception "fire is hot" is also overruled by an inference claiming "fire is cold"?
नच - तत्रोपजीव्यत्वनिबन्धनं प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधकत्वम्; धर्म्यादेश्चक्षुरादिनैव सिद्धेस्त्वचोऽनुपजीव्यत्वात्,
You may argue - "As the inference of fire being cold is dependent on the sense of touch to establish the meaning of coldness, such an inference, which depends on the sense of touch, cannot overrule the very same sense of touch which establishes that fire is hot."
This is untrue, because one cannot say that the inference of fire being cold is dependent on touch, because the cognition of fire itself is by sight, so the inference of fire depends on sight, not touch.
किञ्च प्रत्यक्षस्य प्राबल्यम् अनुमाद्यगृहीतरेखोपरेखादिग्राहकत्वात् Moreover, the relative strength of perception is well established because it reveals things that other means of knowledge cannot - No amount of inference can prove whether one line is bigger than the other. Only perception can do that.
अनुमानाद्यनिवर्तितदिङ्ग्मोहादिनिवर्तकत्वाच्च Similarly, if one has lost their sense of bearings, one cannot infer which direction is which, only perception can reveal that. Therefore, perception is certainly stronger than inference.
The siddhikAra replies:
- इति चेन्न ; If this is the argument, no.
त्वाचप्रत्यक्षस्याप्युपजीव्यत्वेनैव शैत्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वसम्भवात्, It is only because the sense of touch is the basis (upajIvya) for the inference for fire's coldness, that it is able to overrule the latter.
चक्षुरादिना धर्म्यादिग्रहेऽपि त्वचं विना साध्यप्रसिद्धेरभावात् | Even though fire is seen, heat or coldness can only be known by touch, not otherwise.
तथाच न जात्या प्राबल्ये मानमस्ति | Therefore one cannot say that the relative strength of perception is something intrinsic to it.
The opponent had argued that as perception is able to reveal things that only it can, it is superior to other means of knowledge. The siddhikAra refutes this next.
तदगृहीतग्राहित्वमपि न प्राबल्ये प्रयोजकम् ; The fact that perception reveals things that are otherwise unknown does not make perception universally stronger.
प्रत्यक्षागृहीतधर्मादिग्राहकत्वेन परोक्षप्रमाणस्यैव प्राबल्यापत्ते: | Because, by that logic, as only mediate knowledge (scripture) reveals merit and sin (puNya, pApa etc) which are not otherwise revealed by perception, they would end up stronger than perception.
नाप्यनुमानाद्यनिवर्तितदिङ्ग्मोहादिनिवर्तकत्वेन प्राबल्यम् ; एतावता हि वैधर्म्यमात्रं सिद्धम् | Just because a confusion about directions is unresolved by inference, but is clarified by perception, one cannot conclude that perception is universally stronger than perception. By that much, all that is proven is that perception and inference are different.
नच तावतेतरप्रमाणापेक्षया प्राबल्यं भवति | अन्यथात्वाचप्रत्यक्षानिवर्तितवंशोरगभ्रमनिवर्तकत्वाच्चक्षुषोऽपि त्वगपेक्षया
प्राबल्यं स्यात् । With that much alone, the strength of perception compared to other means of knowledge is not proven. If the criterion for universal strength is that in any particular instance, one means of knowledge happens to overrule the other, then another example can be quoted to arrive at an opposite conclusion. For example, someone may touch a piece of bamboo and mistake it for a snake (because both are smooth to touch), but when they see the object carefully they realise it is a bamboo stick, not a snake. By that much, can you say that sight is always stronger than touch ?
ततश्च चित्रनिम्नोन्न्तज्ञानस्य चाक्षुषस्य तद्विरोधित्वाचज्ञानात् बाधो न स्यात् | If that was universally true, an experience where touch overrules sight would not occur. For example, sometimes a picture of an object is so natural that the object it depicts appears to be real, but when someone reaches to touch it, it is discovered to be only a picture. Touch disproves what sight revealed. Does that make touch stronger than sight always?
प्रत्युतागमस्यैव सर्वत: प्राबल्यं स्मार्यते | However, in reality, we hold that vedic scripture is stronger than all other means of knowledge.
'प्राबल्यमागमस्यैव जात्या तेषु त्रिषु स्मृतम् | ' इति | As the smriti says, shruti is the strongest of the three - perception, inference and shruti.
नच - तद्वैदिकार्थविषयमिति - वाच्यम् ; अद्वैतस्यापि वैदिकार्थत्वात् | Do not argue that the veda's authority is limited to only scriptural matters, for non-duality also happens to be within that realm.
क्वच प्रत्यक्षत: प्राप्तमनुमानागमबाधितमिति तु परीक्षितप्रामाण्यप्रत्यक्षविषयम् | In some instances, where the results of perception are well-tested, and there is certainty that it is the truth, such a perception is capable of overruling inference and scripture, requiring them to be reinterpreted. However, that does not mean that all inference and scripture lose their validity.
Second argument of the pUrvapakshi
Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, because of the mImAmsa maxim of upakrama nyAya, it is the first one to arise.
Until now, we had looked at the first argument advanced by the opponent, that perception was stronger because of a characteristic that is intrinsic and universal to all perception. Now we will consider a second argument.
ननु - प्रत्यक्षस्यासंजातविरोधित्वादुपक्रमन्यायेनैव प्राबल्यम् | Perception is stronger than other means of knowledge, on the basis of the rule that the means of knowledge that arises first is the strongest. When it arises, it is not accompanied by a doubt over its veracity, and a means of knowledge that arises afterwards cannot overrule it.
The world is first perceived to be real, it is only later when someone studies advaita that they are told it is mithyA. The first cognition is the correct one, because there was no doubt when it arose.
उक्तंहि - 'असंजातविरोधित्वादर्थवादो यथाश्रुत:| आस्थेयस्तद्विरुद्धस्य विध्युद्देशस्य लक्षणा'
According to pUrva mImAmsa: "When an arthavAda is encountered without anything to contradict it, it has to be interpreted literally (as heard). Where there is a (subsequent) injunction that contradicts that literal meaning, it is the injunction that has to be reinterpreted to take a secondary meaning."
This rule occurs in the context of an arthavAda which says that the rig veda was born from agni (fire), the yajur veda from vAyu (wind), sAma veda from Aditya (the sun). Later, there is an injunction which says that one should recite the rig loudly, the yajus quietly, etc. Here a question is raised - Do the words rig, yajus, etc. in the injunction refer to some individual mantra occurring in the respective veda or the should the entire veda be recited thus? The pUrva mImAmsaka argues that when the arthavAda is heard, there is no doubt that it refers to the entire rig veda being born from agni, yajurveda from vAyu etc. When the injunction subsequently arises, it needs to be interpreted in line with the arthavAda - therefore, that meaning must be used when there is a doubt whether the injunction applies to only mantra or the entire veda.
The nyAyAmritakAra is invoking that rule and argues that when the world is perceived, there is no doubt about its validity, therefore when an inference or the veda itself is contradicting that perception, one must reinterpret the inference and the veda to bring it in line with perception, and not the other way around.
The siddhikAra responds:
- इति चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
The mImAmsa "principle of first arising" can only be applied where there is a link between the arthavAda and the injunction. If the veda only stipulates injunctions and prohibitions, people may not be inspired to follow them. Thus arthavAda portions occur to extol the benefits of following a particular injunction, or the dangers of doing something prohibited.
यत एकवाक्यस्थ परस्परसापेक्षपदत्वेन उभयो: साम्ये सति उपक्रमस्थवेदपदानुरोधेन उपसंहारस्थर्गादिपदानां मन्त्रमात्रवाचिनां कृत्स्नवेदपरत्वे निर्णीतेऽपि न प्रकृते तन्न्याय: संभवति;
Where the arthavAda and injunction constitute one sentence, that is, where both deal with the same topic, on account of the mutual dependence between each other, there is an equality assigned to both, and the word "veda" that appears in the beginning (in the arthavAda) is taken to mean the entire veda even though the word "rig", etc. appearing subsequently (in the injunction) seems to indicate only a particular mantra. However, that rule cannot be applied in our context.
उभयो: साम्याभावात्, गृहीतप्रमाणभावश्रुत्यपेक्षया भ्रमविलक्षणत्वेनानिश्चितस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य न्यूनबलत्वात् ; because, there is no equality between the world's reality as perceived and its mithyAtva as stipulated by shruti - for, a perception whose validity is in doubt is weaker than the shruti whose validity is certain.
अन्यथा 'इदं रजत' मिति भ्रमोऽपि 'इयं शुक्ति' रिति आप्तोपदेशापक्षया प्रबलं स्यात् | Otherwise (if it is not accepted that the relative certainty of validity between the two contradictory means of knowledge is the determining factor of which one overrules the other), then the illusion of shell-silver perceived will end up overruling a statement made by a wise well-wisher that "it is actually a shell".
Let us assume that a person rushes to pick up a shell thinking it is silver and is stopped by a well-wisher who advises him that it is only a shell. The illusion occurs before the verbal testimony, and as it arises there is no doubt in the seer's mind that it is valid (it is not accompanied by an overruling cognition). If the opponent is true, that would be sufficient for the illusion to overrule the verbal testimony, but that would end up with the wrong result.
Third argument of the pUrvapakshi
Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, because it is shIghragAmi, it is the quickest to produce a result.
The siddhikAra says:
एतेन - लिङ्गात् श्रुतेरिव शीघ्रगामित्वात् प्रत्यक्षस्य प्राबल्यम्, तदुक्तम् - 'प्रत्यक्षे चानुमेने च यथा लोके बलाबलम् | शीघ्रमन्थरगामित्वात्तथैव श्रुतिलिङ्गयो: ॥' इत्यपास्तम् ; By the above, your following argument is also refuted.
The opponent's argument: Similar to shruti being accepted as stronger than inference, on account of it producing a result quicker than inference, perception is stronger than both. As was said elsewhere: "In worldly matters it is accepted that perception is stronger than inference because it produces a result faster than inference, similarly in vedic matters shruti is stronger than inference".
In a particular portion of the rig veda there is a mantra which says "Indra, you do not deceive those that worship you with offerings. You provide them with all manner of happiness". Hearing this, one may think the deity being invoked with this mantra is Indra, on account of the indicatory mark, linga, that refers to the god Indra. However, the shruti in the same context provides an injunction "the wife of the sacrificer worships the gArhapatya agni with this mantra".
Here, the shruti is directly saying that the deity being invoked is gArhapatya agni, and not Indra. Therefore, the shruti is taken to be stronger than the indicatory mark, because it is more direct in producing the knowledge compared to the indicatory mark whereby one has to infer the meaning. Similarly, the opponent argues that between perception on the one hand and shruti and inference on the other, the former is stronger because it is more direct in meaning.
With the inference of fire in the mountain, one needs to first perceive smoke in the mountain, he must have the prior knowledge of invariable concomitance that wherever smoke is present, fire must also be present, the sight of smoke must trigger the memory of the invariable concomitance, which will finally allow him to conclude that fire must also be present. Instead of this process, if he had seen fire in the first instance, that would be a quicker way to come to the conclusion. If the speed of arriving at a conclusion is the basis for relative strength, perception is stronger than inference.
Similarly shruti is also slower than perception. The teacher must first teach the veda to the student, the student should understand the language, the words must meet various criteria to generate the appropriate meaning, etc. Thus on the same basis, shruti too can be argued to be weaker than perception.
परीक्षतस्य मन्थरगामिनोऽपि प्राबल्यात् | The siddhikAra refutes this line of argument on the grounds that the strength of a means of knowledge is in it being verified to be true, even if it happens to be slower.
Fourth argument of the pUrvapakshi
Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, invoking the mImAmsa principle of sAmAnya-visheSha nyAya, special and general rules.
The opponent then argues that perception is stronger because of the mImAmsa maxim of sAmAnya visheShya nyAya.
There is a general rule that is applicable across various rituals that when a 'homa' (offering of oblations directed to a particular deity in the sacrificial fire) is performed, it is to be performed in the AhavanIya fire. However, there is a special rule in the case of a particular homa performed in the jyotiShToma sacrifice, which is a soma sacrifice. The soma, a particular species of creeper used in the sacrifice, is to be purchased in exchange for a very particular kind of calf - A one-year old black calf with yellow eyes must be offered to the seller of the soma. The veda further prescribes that a homa must be performed at the place where the offered cow plants its hooves.
There are two conflicting injunctions - a general rule that the homa is to be performed at the place of AhavanIya fire, and another specific to the jyotiShToma, that it is to be performed at the location of the hoofprint. A doubt occurs - which rule is to be followed in the jyotiShToma? According to pUrva mImAmsa, when there is a rule applicable generally in contradiction to another applied in a specific situation, the special rule prevails. The opponent tries to apply this maxim to argue that perception is stronger than veda.
न च - 'यदाहवनीये जुहोति' इत्यस्मात् 'पदे जुहोती'त्यस्य विशेष्यत्वेन प्राबल्यात् घटविषयसत्त्वग्राहिण: प्रत्यक्षस्य सामान्यतो द्वैतनिषेधकश्रुत्यपेक्षया प्राबल्यमिति - वाच्यम्;
The siddhikAra says, do not argue thus - 'As the special rule "offer the oblations at the hoof" is accepted to be stronger than the general rule "offer oblations in the AhavanIya", perception establishing the reality of a particular pot must also be accepted to be stronger then a general denial of duality'.
This is not applicable in the context because,
सामान्यविशेषन्यायस्य निश्चितप्रामाणभावोभयविषयत्वात्, the maxim of special and general rules can only be applied when the validity of both rules is certain. In this context, perception is not always valid - it sometimes produces valid cognition, and sometimes invalid. Therefore this mImAmsa maxim cannot be applied here.
अन्यथा 'अयं गौरश्व' इत्यादेरपि गौरश्वो न भवतीत्यादित: प्राबल्यं भवेत् | If this was not true, if someone were to say "this cow is a horse", to indicate that a particular cow happens to run fast, such a statement applicable to a particular case where a figurative meaning is intended, would always overrule the general statement, "a cow and horse are different", even where that particular meaning is not valid, which would be an absurd situation. Therefore, the mImAmsa maxim is to be applied only in the context where both rules happen to be true, and not indiscriminately.
Fifth argument of the pUrvapakshi
Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, invoking the mImAmsa principle of sAvakAsha - niravakAsha nyAya, the application of rules in a manner that offers scope for both rules.
The pUrvapakshi's argument is summarised first:
In the portion of the veda describing the procedure for the jyotishToma sacrifice, there is an injunction: यत्किञ्चित्प्राचीनमग्नीषोमीयात्तेनोपांशुचरति - Any subsidiary rituals (dIkshaNIya, yUpAvaTam, dharbhairavasTRNam, RtvikvaraNam, etc) that precede the agnIShomIya sacrifice (part of the jyotiShToma) must be performed in a quiet voice (only the performer should be able to hear the mantras).
However after this injunction, there is a sentence 'यावत्या वाचा कामयेत तावत्या दीक्षणीयायामनुब्रूयात्', one may chant the mantra howsoever one desires (whether loudly, quietly, etc) in the dIkshaNIya sacrifice.
This raises a question - the mantras in the dIkshaNIya, which is a sacrifice that occurs before the agnIShomIya, must be spoken in a quiet voice according to the first rule. However, the second rule says that one may chant the mantras howsoever one desires. If the sacrificer interprets the contradiction to say the first rule overrules the second one, then the latter is rendered useless - the freedom to chant the mantra in any tone exists only for the dIkshaNIya, and no other ritual. It would have no scope for application. However, if one does go with the second rule, and chants the mantra loudly, he would be in violation of the first rule.
In such a situation, pUrvamImAmsa stipulates that in this case, the first rule should be reinterpreted to give avakAsha, scope for the second rule's application. Breaking the first rule and applying the second rule is acceptable so that the legitimacy of both rules is preserved. If one just applied the first rule in all precedent rituals, the second one will have no area of application, and its validity would be lost.
Therefore, the interpretation according to pUrvamImAmsa states that in all precedent rituals except the dIkshaNIya, the first rule (chanting quietly) is applied, and in the dIkshaNIya alone, the second rule (freedom to chant as one desires) is applied.
This is generalised into a maxim called sAvakAsha - niravakAsha nyAya, which essentially means that when there are two rules - one which has a broad scope for application, and another one which has a narrow scope for application, and one is faced with a choice of which rule to apply in any given situation, one must always apply the rule with the narrower scope in its specific area of scope, and the other rule with the broader rule can be applied in other areas.
The pUrvapakshi invokes that rule and tries to prove that perception is stronger than inference and shruti.
नच - यथा 'यत्किञ्चित्प्राचीनमग्नीषोमीयात्तेनोपांशुचरतित्यत्रत्यस्य यत्किञ्चिच्छब्दस्य यत्किन्चित्प्रकृतवाचित्वेन सामान्याविषयत्वेऽपि दीक्षणीयाव्यतिरिक्ते सावकाशत्ववत् 'यावत्या वाचा कामयेत तावत्या दीक्षणीयायामनुब्रूया ' दित्यनेन निरवकाशेन संकोचस्तथा प्रत्यक्षेण निरवकाशेन वृत्त्यन्तरेनानेकार्थत्वेन वा विषयान्तरपरत्वेन सावकाशाया: श्रुते: सङ्कोच: किं न स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
He says:
यथा 'यत्किञ्चित्प्राचीनमग्नीषोमीयात्तेनोपांशुचरतित्यत्रत्यस्य यत्किञ्चिच्छब्दस्य यत्किन्चित्प्रकृतवाचित्वेन सामान्याविषयत्वेऽपि दीक्षणीयाव्यतिरिक्ते सावकाशत्ववत् Like in the case of the injunction "In any sacrifice preceding the agnIShOmIya, one must chant the mantras quietly", the words "in any", are interpreted to apply to all sacrifices except the dIkshaNIya,
'यावत्या वाचा कामयेत तावत्या दीक्षणीयायामनुब्रूयात्' इत्यनेन निरवकाशेन सङ्कोच: in order to preserve the scope of application of the other injunction "One can chant in the dIkshaNIya as one desires", for in the absence of reinterpreting those words in that manner, the second rule would have no application
तथा प्रत्यक्षेण निरवकाशेन वृत्त्यन्तरेणानेकार्थत्वेन वा विषयान्तरपरत्वेन सावकाशाया: श्रुते: सङ्कोच: किं न स्यात् ? Similarly, why cannot shruti, which has such a broad scope for interpretation - the same words can refer to different things, by direct denotation (shakti vritti), or by implication (lakshaNA vritti) or can be reinterpreted saying that their import is in conveying something else altogether - be interpreted in such a way that the reality of the world that is conveyed by perception is not lost? Perception cannot be reinterpreted in any other way, so it has a limited scope, whereas shruti can take a range of meaning, and therefore it is the latter that must be reinterpreted, in line with the pUrva mImAmsa maxim of sAvakAsha niravakAsha nyAya.
To such an argument, the siddhikAra says no. नच वाच्यम्
तात्पर्यलिङ्गैरुपक्रमादिभिर्द्वैतनिषेधपरत्वे अवधृते अद्वैतश्रुतेरपि निरवकाशत्वात्, The six marks of intention (ShaDvidha tAtparya linga), which are used to determine the import of shruti, such as upakrama (the beginning), etc. all consistently point to shruti's import lying in the denial of duality. That being the case, shruti sentences that talk of non-duality also do not have scope of reinterpretation, and are niravakAsha.
प्रत्यक्षस्यापि व्यावहारिकद्वैतविषयतया सावकाशत्वात्, Whereas, the reality conveyed by perception can be said to be empirical, vyAvahArika, and therefore it has scope to convey something else.
The siddhikAra turns the nyAyAmritakAra's argument around and says that it is perception that has scope for reinterpretation, not shruti.
विरुद्धयोश्च द्वयो 'रहं मनुष्य' इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षे 'आकाशवत्सर्वगतश्च नित्य' इत्यादिश्रुत्योरिव तात्त्विकप्रामाण्यानुपपत्त्या कस्यचिद्व्यावहारिकं कस्यचित्तात्त्विकं प्रामाण्यमभ्युपेयम् ; अत्यन्ताप्रामाण्यस्यान्याय्यत्वात्,
It is accepted by the dvaitin, that these two contradictory cognitions - our perception of ourselves as "I am a human being" and that shruti statement that I am "all pervading like space, and eternal" - cannot both be equally valid. Therefore, as there is no reason to say that both are wrong, one is taken to be empirically true and the other absolutely so.
तत्राद्वैतश्रुतेर्व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यसम्भवे द्वैतग्राहिप्रत्यक्षादेस्तात्त्विकं प्रामाण्यं भवेत्, If it was possible for shruti talking of non-duality to be deemed empirically valid, one can argue that the perception that conveys duality is absolutely valid.
तदसम्भवे तु बलादेवाद्वैतश्रुतेस्तात्त्विकं प्रामाण्यमिति प्रत्यक्षादेर्व्यावहारिकं प्रामाण्यं पर्यवस्यतीति कृतबुद्धयो विदांकुर्वन्तु | However as that is impossible (because all the six indicatory marks of import point to shruti's import only in non-duality), one is left with no other choice but to say that it is shruti advocating non-duality that is ultimately true, and that perception is only empirically valid. May intelligent people understand it thus.
Sixth argument of the pUrvapakshi
Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, invoking the mImAmsa principle of bahubAdha anyAyya, any interpretation of contradictory rules should minimise the number of things negatively affected by the interpretation.
The opponent argues thus:
ननु - पञ्चदशरात्रे प्रथमेऽहन्यग्निष्टुन्नामके नामातिदेशेन एकाहाग्निष्टुद्धर्मभूता सुब्रह्मण्याग्नेयी प्राप्ता,
In the panchadasha rAtra sacrifice, which occurs over 15 days, the first day of the sacrifice is termed agniShTut. The term agniShTut conveys that a particular sAma called the Agneyi subrahmaNya should be sung then.
The panchadasha rAtra belongs to a group of sacrifices called vikRti, which have a corresponding template sacrifice called the prakRti. There are different kinds of prakRti sacrifices, each of which serves as a basic procedural template for the varied vikRti sacrifices. The general rule is prakRtivat vikRti: kartavyA - the procedure in the vikRti follows the prakRti.The prakRti that the panchadasha sacrifice is based on, says that a sAma called the Aindri subrahmaNya is to be sung on all days. There is a conflict now because the name agniShTut indicates that Agneyi subrahmaNya is to be sung on day 1. However, the prakRti manual says that Aindri subrahmaNya is to be followed on all days. If Agneyi subrahmaNya is sung on all days, it would invalidate the prakRti rule 15 times. If the Aindri subrahmaNya is sung on all days, it would invalidate the first rule only on one day.
तस्या अल्पविषयत्वाच्चतुर्दशाहस्सु चोदकेन प्राप्त्या ऐन्द्र्या सुब्रह्मण्यया However, as that (the first rule) is only a limited one, the other rule of Aindri subrahmaNya being sung is proved to be correct over 14 days and is hence said to be stronger.
बहुविषयया यथा बाधा:, बहुबाधस्यान्याय्यत्वात् Because, several things would be harmed otherwise from the principle of avoiding harm to the many.
तथा द्वैतग्राहिप्रत्यक्ष तदुपजीव्यनुमान, कर्मकाण्डसगुणोपासनावाक्यादिरूपबहुप्रमाणाबाधायाः, अद्वैतवाक्यस्य प्रतीतार्थबाध: किं न स्यात् ? Similarly, to avoid the violation of perception conveying that duality is real, inference, which is dependent on perception, entire portions of the vedas dealing with ritualistic performance (karma kANDa) and advocating the meditation of God (saguNa upAsana), why is it not more appropriate to discard the apparent meaning of sentences in the shruti that talk of non-duality. Why can we not reinterpret them instead?
That is why it is said:
तदुक्तम् - 'बहुप्रमाणविरोधे चैकस्याप्रामाण्यम् | दृष्टं शुक्तिरजतादिज्ञाने' Instead of contradicting many means of knowledge, it is better to accept the invalidity of one. It is better to rule out the reality of the seen shell-silver than to violate many other means of knowledge in trying to establish its reality.
The siddhikAra responds
इति - चेन्न ; If this is the argument, no.
दृष्टान्ते बहुविषयया बाधोऽत्र बहुभिरिति वैषम्यात् The example and the exemplified are different. In the example, several ends are affected, whereas in the exemplified, several means are affected.
To explain:
In the example, there are two competing rules, one which applies to many things and the other which applies to one thing alone. The choice is which rule to pick between the two. If the first rule is picked, only the one thing referred to by the second rule would be negated. If the second rule is accepted, it would lead to a negation of all things referred to by the first one.
The exemplified is different from this because the opponent is advocating the preservation of a multiplicity of means of knowledge by denying the validity of one means of knowledge. The basic principle is to minimise the number of ends harmed by a decision to pick one rule, not to minimise the number of rules harmed by the selection of any one. If there are multiple incorrect rules contradicting one correct rule, one cannot say that by this mImAmsa maxim, one has to necessarily preserve the many incorrect ones.
देहात्मैक्ये प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दाभासादिसत्त्वे अपि Even though everyone seems to consider the body to be the self, even when it is apparently proven by perception, scientific inference and everyday language, देहात्मभेदबोधकस्यानन्यपरत्वेन प्राबल्यवत् we accept that the validity of shruti which says that the body and the self are different, on the basis that it is the shruti which is stronger than them all, because of every indicator of the import of that sentence points to that interpretation, and so it cannot be reinterpreted to mean anything else.
Thus even here, one means of knowledge is said to overrule many other means of knowledge, because it is stronger than them all.
अत्रापि अनन्यपरत्वेनाद्वैतश्रुते: प्राबल्यात् Here too, as the shruti that advocates non-duality cannot be interpreted in any other way, it is stronger than perception.
Having argued for the strength of shruti all along, the siddhikAra ends with a sting in the tail:
विद्याविद्याभेदेन विद्वदविद्वत्पुरुषभेदेन च विरोधाभावादिति | Really speaking, there is no contradiction between shruti and the other means of knowledge, because one is said from the standpoint of knowledge and the other from the standpoint of ignorance. Moreover, the former is meant for the wise person, and the latter is directed to the everyday layman. That being the case, the two means of knowledge are not in contradiction with each other.
इति प्रत्यक्षस्य जात्युपक्रमन्यायादिभि: प्राबल्यनिराकरणम् || Thus, the strength of perception, argued on the basis of the mImAmsa principles of intrinsic characteristics, first arising, etc, has been refuted.
Originally posted on 3rd November, 2018