paricCheda 1 - jaDatva hetUpapattih (part 4)

In the previous post, we had looked at the siddhikAra's justification for jnAna to exist in the absence of a knower and the known. Therefore, the quality of being different from objectless consciousness was postulated as the definition of the term jaDatva, or inertness. 

The pUrvapakshi now asks:

ननु - प्रमाभ्रमभिन्नं न ज्ञानं, Cognition cannot be that which is different from pramA, right knowledge or bhrama, wrong knowledge. It has to belong to one of the two categories.
न चात्मस्वरूपं ज्ञानं प्रमा; तद्विषयस्याविद्यादेस्तात्त्विकत्वापातात्; The knowledge of the nature of the self cannot be valid knowledge, because the object of such a knowledge cannot be sublated. The object of the knowledge of self is nescience, avidyA. If self knowledge was valid knowledge, then its object, nescience, cannot be sublated. The destruction of nescience would be rendered impossible.
नच अप्रमा दोषजन्यत्वापातात् | It cannot be wrong knowledge either, because it would imply that such a knowledge is born from a defective source. However, it is the knowledge of the vedic mahAvAkyas that generates this self-knowledge, and the vedas can never be defective. Thus it cannot be wrong knowledge either.


The siddhikAra replies
- इति चेन्न; if this is your argument, no. The position that all knowledge must either be right or wrong is not true always.

तार्किकसिद्धेश्वरज्ञानवत् घटादिनिर्विकल्पकवच्च स्वभावत उभयवैलक्षण्येनानुपपत्ते:; It is possible for knowledge to be intrinsically different from either category, like God's knowledge in nyAya, or the indeterminate knowledge of objects such as pots.

According to the logician, God's knowledge is permanent. The logician defines valid knowledge as guNa janyam, ie that which is born from a non-defective source, and wrong knowledge as doSha janyam, ie that which is born from a defective source. Since God's knowledge is permanent, it is not born - thus according to him, God's knowledge is neither pramA nor bhrama. 

Similarly, the indeterminate cognition of objects like a pot (ie I know some object is present, but I am not sure what it is exactly), cannot fit into either category - right or wrong knowledge.


तत्रापि ईश्वरज्ञानस्य प्रमात्वे गुणजन्यत्वस्य भ्रमत्वे दोषजन्यत्वस्य चापत्ते:, Because even in that case if God's knowledge is right, then it would be born from a non-defective source, and if it was wrong, it would be born from a defective source. Either possibility would be unacceptable to the naiyyAyika, as according to him, God's knowledge is not born, it always exists. 

निष्प्रकारके च निर्विकल्पके तद्वति तत्प्रकारत्वस्य तदभाववति तत्प्रकारत्वस्य चानुपपत्ते: Neither niShprakAraka (non-relational cognition) nor nirvikalpaka jnAna (indeterminate cognition) can be classified as either as right knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of the object contains the feature that is present in the object (tadvati tatprakArakatva) or as wrong knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of the object contains a feature that is not present in the object (tadabhAvavati tatprakArakatva). 

जन्यसविकल्पकत्वेन भ्रमप्रमान्यतरत्वनियमे चास्माकं क्षत्यभावात्, If the rule of classification as either right or wrong is applicable for generated determinate cogintion, that does our view no harm.
विलक्षणवृत्तिद्वयोपरागेण च स्वभावतो भ्रमप्रमाविलक्षणस्याप्यात्मज्ञानस्य तदुभयरूपेण व्यवहारोपपत्ते: | Because the knowledge of the self is intrinsically neither right or wrong, being unclassifiable into either category (tadvati tatprakAraka or tadabhAvavati tatprakAraka). However for the sake of vyavahAra, one may take it as either right or wrong.

The pUrvapakshi says:
नच - ज्ञानपदवाच्यभिन्नत्वविवक्षायां उपाधेरपि ज्ञानपदवाच्यत्वात्तत्रासिद्धि:, ज्ञानपदलक्ष्यभिन्नत्वविवक्षायां तु घटादेरपि ज्ञानपदलक्ष्यत्वात्तत्राप्यसिद्धिरिति - वाच्यम्;
"If you desire to define (jaDatvam) as that which is different from the direct meaning of the word 'cognition', then as the adjunct (thought) is the direct meaning of the word 'cognition', this will lead to bhAgAsiddhi." Thought is mithyA, but if jaDatva is defined as that which is different from the primary meaning of the word 'cognition', it would result in the meaning of jaDatva as not thought. This will result in thought being excluded from the set of all mithyA objects, which would result in bhAgAsiddhi.
 

"If instead you say that (jaDatvam) is that which is different from the implied meaning of the word 'cognition', then everyday objects such as pots (as cognitions objectify objects such as pots, the word 'cognition' would imply those objects) will be excluded from the set of of mithyA objects. Again bhAgAsiddhi.
The siddhikAra says - Do not argue thus.

ज्ञानपदजन्यप्रतीतिविशेष्यभिन्नत्वविवक्षायामुक्तदोषाभावात् |  Because if (jaDatva) is defined as that which is different from the visheShya, the qualificand, in the meaning generated by the word 'cognition', such defects would be absent. To explain, the meaning of the word jnAna or cognition is 'vritti vishiShTa chaitanyam', or consciousness qualified by thought. Thus if jaDatva is defined as everything other than consciousness in the meaning of cognition, then the said defects will be absent. 

एवमानन्दभिन्नत्वरूपमनात्मत्वमुपपाद्यम् | Similarly, if the meaning of non-self (the third alternative for jaDatva proposed by the nyAyAmritakAra) is taken as that which is different from bliss, that would be appropriate.

The happiness derived from objects is also the bliss of the self in reality - we falsely assume that objects cause the happiness - but the real source of happiness is the self. 

वैषयिकानन्दस्यापि ब्रह्मरूपत्वात्, तदुपाधिमात्रस्यैवोत्पत्तिविनाशप्रतियोगित्वात् | The nature of objective happiness is as Brahman only, because it is only the upAdhi of that happiness (ie the thought) that is generated and destroyed. The thought that generates the experience of happiness may come and go, but the real source of happiness eternally shines.

The pUrvapakshi objects to this:

नच - ज्ञानभिन्नत्वस्यानन्दभिन्नत्वस्य च काल्पनिकस्य ब्रह्मणि सत्त्वात् तत्र व्यभिचार इति - वाच्यम्; If that is the case, then because a difference from consciousness and a difference from bliss are both imagined in Brahman, such qualities exist in Brahman too - Thus there is vyabhichAra.
The siddhikAra says - do not argue thus.


धर्मिसमानसत्ताकतद्भेदस्य हेतुत्वात् | Because we can remedy the defect by adding "a difference that is not of the same order of reality as its locus" to the definition of the hetu. An imaginary difference will be of a lower order of reality than Brahman.

अनौपाधिकत्वेन वा भेदो विशेषणीय:, तुच्छे पञ्चमप्रकाराविद्यानिवृत्तौ च व्यभिचारपरिहार: पूर्ववत्  | Alternatively, one can add the qualifier "non-relationally" to the difference in the definition. i.e. jaDatva means that which is non-relationally different from the qualifand in the meaning of the word 'cognition'. The vyabhichAra in absolutely non-existent objects, and the destruction of nescience, which is considered as belonging to a fifth order of reality can be remedied by adding the same qualifier as previously discussed in the drishyatva chapter. There, the vyabhichAra with asat and avidyAnivritti was remedied by adding the qualifier - अज्ञानकालवृत्तित्वं, ie "existing contemporaneously with ignorance" - to the definition.

एवं अस्वप्रकाशत्वम् वा जडत्वम्, तच्च पूर्वमेवोपपादितमिति शिवम् || Similarly, the definition of jaDatva as the absence of self-luminosity is also acceptable, as has been said previously. In the drishyatva chapter, the absence of self-luminosity was defined as अवेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वाभावं - the absence of a characteristic of being unobjectifiable, while being directly known.

That completes the chapter on the suitability of jaDatvam as a hetu for the mithyAtva anumAna.

Originally posted on 16th February 2018.