paricCheda 1 - drishyatva hetu upapattih (part 1)
Until now, we have been analysing the sAdhya (mithyAtva) in the anumAna (inference) to prove the world's mithyAtva. That is, until now, we have been looking at the "what" in the question "What is the ontological status of the world?".
Starting from this chapter onwards, we will consider three primary hetu's (reasons) - drishyatvam, jaDatvam and paricChinnatvam that are used to prove the world's mithyAtva. That is, now we will commence a detailed look at the "why" in the question, "Why do we say that the world is mithyA?".
In any anumAna, the hetu serves to prove the sAdhya. This is done through the concept of vyApti, or invariable concomitance - that is, where the hetu is present, the sAdhya will invariably be present. Therefore, in order to prove that the sAdhya is present in the paksha, it is sufficient to prove that the hetu is present in the paksha. The first hetu to be considered is drishyatvam.
What is drishyatvam?
advaita vedAnta has a two fold classification of reality - drik, the seer and drishya, the seen.
According to advaita, drik is one, drishya are many. Everything in the world has drishyatvam (everything is knowable, or everything has knowability). Therefore, the advaitin claims that wherever drishyatvam is present, mithyA is also invariably present.
The nyAyAmritakAra objects to this. He asks:
ननु - मिथ्यात्वे साध्ये हेतूकृतं यद्दृश्यत्वं तदप्युपपादनीयम् | Knowability as a basis for establishing mithyAtvam needs to be examined.
तथाहि - किमिदं दृश्यत्वं? Thus, what is this drishyatvam?
1) वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वं वा? Is it vritti vyApyatvam - being revealed by a vritti (thought)?
2) फलव्याप्यत्वं वा? Is it phala vyApyatvam - being revealed by consciousness reflected / delimited by a vritti?
3) साधारणं वा ? Is it that which is common to both?
4) कदाचित् कथंचिद्चिद्विषयत्वम् वा ? Is it being the object of consciousness in some way at some time?
5) स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्त संविदन्तरापेक्षानियतिर्वा ? is it the requirement, as a rule, of another conscious entity for its own vyavahAra?
6) अस्वप्रकाशं वा ? Is it not being self-evident?
The nyAyAmritakAra wishes to prove that every alternative for the meaning of knowability is flawed. If the hetu is proved to be defective, the anumAna is rendered useless.
नाद्य:, आत्मनो वेदान्तजन्यवृत्तिव्याप्यत्वेन तत्र व्यभिचारात् | It cannot be the first alternative (revealed by a thought), because Brahman is revealed by a thought born from the study of vedAnta. If such is the definition of knowability, Brahman is knowable. However, Brahman is not mithyA. Thus the hetu of knowability does not invariably imply the presence of mithyAtva - in other words, there is vyabhichAra.
अत एव न तृतीयोऽपि | For the same reason, the third alternative (that which is common to both vritti vyApya and phala vyApya) is also not true. Simply put, if A is false then (A and B) must be false too.
नापि द्वितीय:, नित्यातीन्द्रिये शुक्तिरूप्यादौ च तदभावेन भागासिद्धिसाधनवैकल्ययो: प्रसङ्गात् | It cannot be the second alternative too (ie being revealed by the phala, reflection of consciousness in a thought) - because there are several objects that are beyond the reach of sensory perception (e.g. gurutvam (weight), dharma/ adharma etc). These are not revealed by the reflection of consciousness in a thought, thus there is the defect of bhAgAsiddhi - that is, the hetu is not present in many things considered mithyA by the advaitin. Again, the invariable concomitance between the hetu and sAdhya is disproven. Further, according to the advaitin, shell-silver is revealed by the sAkshi (inner witness), and not phala, the reflection of consciousness in thought. Therefore in addition to bhAgAsiddhi, there is also the defect of sAdhana vaikalya - the hetu is not present in the driShTAnta itself.
नापि चतुर्थ:, ब्रह्म पूर्वम् न ज्ञातमिदानीम् वेदन्तेन ज्ञातमित्यनुभवेन आत्मनि व्यभिचारात् | It cannot be the fourth alternative too (being the object of consciousness in some way at some time) - because, Brahman, which was not known first, becomes known after studying vedAnta. Thus, Brahman becomes the object of a conscious entity at some time in some fashion. However, Brahman is not mithyA. As the hetu is present, but the sAdhya is not, this leads to the defect of vyabhichAra.
नापि पञ्चम:, ब्रह्मण्यप्यद्वितियत्वादिविशिष्टव्यवहारे संविदन्तरापेक्षानियतिदर्शनेन व्यभिचारात् | It cannot be the fifth alternative too (the requirement of another consciousness for its vyavahAra) - because activities such as claiming Brahman to be endowed with non-duality, etc., requires another consciousness as a rule. If this was the definition of knowability, then Brahman is endowed with it. However, it is not mithyA. Therefore there is vyabhichAra of this hetu with respect to Brahman.
नापि षष्ठ:, स हि अवेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वाभावरूप: | It is not the sixth (not being self evident). svaprakAshatvam (being self luminous) is the capability of being perceived directly, while being unobjectifiable. The absence of such a capacity is asvaprakAshatvam, or not being self evident. Why does this rule out such a meaning for drishyatvam?
तथाच शुक्तिरूप्यादेरपि अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वेन साधनवैकल्यात् Because shell silver, while being suitable for direct perception, is not objectified by consciousness (it is revealed by the sAkshi, the witness, but is not phala vyApya). Thus, it too is arguably self luminous. Therefore, the hetu of knowability (meaning a-svaprakAshatvam) is not present in the shell silver, leading to sAdhanavaikalyam - the hetu is not present in the example itself.
The siddhikAra replies to these charges:
इति चेन्मैवं- फलव्याप्यत्वव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्यापि पक्षस्य क्षोदक्षमत्वात् | If these are the objections, No - apart from the phala vyApti option, all others are acceptable definitions of knowability, albeit with some refinements.
********Option 1 - Knowability as vritti vyApyatvam**********
नच - वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वपक्षे ब्रह्मणि व्यभिचार:, अन्यथा ब्रह्मपराणां वेदान्तानां वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गादिति - वाच्यं ; Do not argue thus - "With regards to the option of vritti vyApyatvam, as Brahman is revealed by a thought, such a definition of knowability would make Brahman knowable and thus mithyA, leading to vyabhichAra. If on the other hand, Brahman is not revealed by a thought, no knowledge of Brahman is possible, rendering useless all scriptures of vedAnta that talk of Brahman".
There are several reasons why such an argument is untenable. In this case, the siddhikAra uses an argument of vAcaspati miSra, the author of the bhAmati, a commentary on SankarAchArya's brahma sUtra bhAShya. The bhAmatikAra's position is that Brahman can be classified into two - pure Brahman and conditioned Brahman. Pure Brahman is not knowable, and is real. Conditioned Brahman is known via vedAnta, thus saving scripture's utility. However, as it is knowable, it is mithyA. This is being said now:
शुद्धं हि ब्रह्म न दृश्यम्; Pure Brahman is not revealed by any vritti. Why?
"यत्तदद्रेश्य"मिति श्रुते: किन्तूपहितमेव, तच्च मिथ्यैव; नहि वृत्तिदशायां अनुपहितं तद्भवति | On the basis of the muNDaka shruti, which defines Brahman as "That which is not knowable". The object of the vritti generated by vedAnta is conditioned Brahman, which happens to be mithyA. As long as Brahman remains an object of such a vritti, it cannot be unconditioned (ie. pure).
The purpose of scripture is the revelation of conditioned Brahman through a special kind of thought called the akhaNDAkAra vritti. This vritti has the unique property of removing ignorance and its effects. As all thoughts, including this vritti itself, are effects of ignorance, the akhaNDAkAra vritti destroys not only ignorance but also its products, including itself. What remains afterwards is pure Brahman.
This may lead to a few objections because some teachers of vedAnta talk of Brahman as the object of thought. The siddhikAra replies to this:
नच - "सर्वप्रत्ययवेद्येऽस्मिन् ब्रह्मरूपे व्यवस्थिते" इति स्ववचनविरोध इति - वाच्यं तस्याप्युपहितपरत्वात् | Do not argue that such a view suffers from internal contradiction with the author of the Brahma Siddhi, who says, "This Brahman is that which is known through every thought" - because, the brahmasiddhikAra (maNDana miSra) is referring to conditioned Brahman only.
There is a further objection - if pure brahman cannot be the object of any thought, how can it ever be known? If it is never known, how can its knowledge lead to moksha? To such a charge, the siddhikAra replies:
नच - एवं सति शुद्धसिद्धिर्न स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue thus - "This being the case, pure brahman can never be known (obtained)". Why?
स्वतएव तस्य प्रकाशत्वेन सिद्धत्वात् | Because, as pure Brahman is self revealing, no other vritti is needed to know it.
ननु - अज्ञाते धर्मिणि कस्यचित् धर्मस्य विधातुं निषेद्धुं वा अशक्यत्वेन शुद्धेन दृश्यत्वं निषेधता शुद्धस्य ज्ञेयत्वमवश्यं स्वीकरणीयम्, To this, the pUrva pakshi says - as it is impossible to posit the presence or absence of any property in a fundamentally unknown entity, one has to necessarily accept the knowability of Brahman to even deny its knowability. This obviously is self-defeating and an impossibility.
न च - स्वप्रकाशत्वेन स्वत: सिद्धे शुद्धे श्रुत्या दृश्यत्वनिषेधा इति - वाच्यम् ; Further, if the advaitin argues that pure Brahman being self-evident, is available, whereas its unknowability is established through shruti, that is unacceptable because:
शुद्धं स्वप्रकाशमिति शब्दजन्यविशिष्टवृत्तौ शुद्धाप्रकाशे तस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वासिद्धे: - the words "pure Brahman is self evident" must necessarily generate a thought which reveals the meaning that "pure Brahman is self evident". If the thought does not reveal that meaning, pure Brahman is not self-evident. If the thought does generate that meaning, pure Brahman is revealed by it. Either option results in a problem for the advaitin.
To this, the siddhikAra says:
- इति चेन्न; If this is your argument, no.
वृत्तिकाले वृत्तिरुपेण धर्मेण शुद्धत्वासंभवात् शुद्धस्य वृत्तिविषयत्वं न संभवति, Because if Brahman's self revealing nature is known through the thought, then it cannot be pure brahman that is revealed.
अत: "शुद्धं स्वप्रकाश"मिति वाक्यस्य लक्षणया अशुद्धत्वमस्वप्रकाशत्वव्यापकमित्यर्थ: | Therefore, by implication, all that the sentence "pure Brahman is self luminous" means is that "that which is not self luminous, cannot be pure Brahman". To clarify, the statement A->B is equivalent to !B -> !A (not B implies not A). As pure Brahman cannot be the object of any statement, let alone the statement "pure Brahman is self luminous", that particular sentence must be interpreted to mean that all things not self-luminous are not pure Brahman.
तथा च अशुद्धत्वव्यावृत्त्या शुद्धे स्वप्रकाशता पर्यवस्यति, यथा भेदनिषेधेन अभिन्नत्वम् | Therefore, the meaning that remains is that "as pure brahman cannot contain impurity, it must be self-evident too". For example, by denying difference, similarity is established - similarly, by denying the absence of self-luminosity (implied by the absence of impurity), self luminosity is established.
The opponent raises an objection - if a thing can never be referred to by words, any word used to denote such an entity, serves no purpose.
न च - शुद्धपदेन अभिधया लक्षणया वा शुद्धाप्रकाशे तत्प्रयोगवैयर्थ्यमिति - वाच्यम् ;
The siddhikAra says - Do not say thus - "if the word - pure Brahman - cannot be refer to pure Brahman either directly, or by implication, it serves no purpose."
पर्यवसितार्थमादाय सार्थकत्वोपपत्ते: | Because - when all other alternatives for the meaning have been ruled out, whatever remains, the paryavasita artham, imbues the word with meaning.
एवं च "शुद्धं न दृश्यं न मिथ्ये" तस्याप्यशुद्धत्वं दृश्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयोर्व्यापकमित्येतत्परत्वेन शुद्धे दृश्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयोर्व्यतिरेक: पर्यवस्यति |
Therefore, when it is said that "pure Brahman is neither knowable nor mithyA", what is meant is that whichever entity is knowable or mithyA is impure, ie not pure Brahman. The meaning of purity is whatever remains after negating mithyAtva and knowability.
एतेन - स्फुरणमात्रमेव मिथ्यात्वे प्रयोजकं तन्त्रम् लाघवात् ; Applying the principle of parsimony, the rule can be refined to - anything which is the object of thought (sphuraNam) is mithyA.
अत: "स्वत:स्फुरदपि ब्रह्म मिथ्यैवे'ति - शून्यवादिमतपास्तम् ; स्वत:स्फुरणरूपताया: शुक्तिरूप्यादावभावात्, स्फुरणविषयत्वस्य ब्रह्मण्यसिद्धे: | Therefore, this also refutes shUnyavAda buddhism, which claims that Brahman, despite being self-evident, is mithyA - because knowledge necessarily requires thought, whereas Brahman's self luminosity is not as an object of thought. In contrast, shell-silver which is mithyA is not self-luminous, and it is not possible for Brahman to be the object of consciousness.
The pUrvapakshi takes a different tack - Any object that is known, is known as being endowed with attributes. Here the object is visheShya, the attribute is the visheShaNa, and the qualified object is vishiShTa. The knowledge of the object is vishiShTa jnAnam - that is, it is of an object endowed (vishiShTa) with some characteristics. When such an attribute-endowed-object is known, the object is also known. When someone perceives a blue pot, not only is the blueness perceived, the pot is also perceived. Similarly, when the conditioned Brahman is perceived, pure Brahman should also necessarily be perceived. He argues:
ननु - विशिष्टज्ञाने विशेष्यस्यापि भाने श्रुत्या विशिष्टस्य दृश्यत्वेनैव विशेष्यस्यापि दृश्यत्वाद्व्यभिचार:,
In any knowledge of an object endowed with attributes, the object, the visheShya, is also necessarily known. Therefore, as the shruti is said to reveal the conditioned (vishiShTa) Brahman, pure Brahman (the visheShya) should also come under the purview of knowability - leading to the mithyAtva of pure Brahman or the defect of vyabhichAra.
न च - "विष्णवे शिपिविष्टाये"त्यादौ विशिष्टस्य देवतात्ववत् विशिष्टस्य विषयत्वम्, अग्नीषोमयोर्मिलितयोर्देवतात्ववद्वा मिलितस्य विषयत्वम्, अतो न विशेष्ये विषयत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Sensing a counter to his argument, the opponent continues - Do not argue thus: " The deity referred to in the mantra "viShNave shipiviShTAya" is viShNu endowed with the attribute of shipiviShTatvam (pervaded by rays) not just vishNu. Similarly when an offering is made to AgniShoma, the offering is made to agni and soma together, and not any one. Therefore, there is no reason to say that the visheShya is also objectified."
तद्वदेव विशेषणस्याप्यविषयत्वे भागासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् - because by extending the same argument, it can be argued that the qualifier endowed entity (vishiShTa) and qualifier (visheShaNa) are different. While the vishiShTa is known, the visheShaNa is not, and therefore the attribute of knowability will not be present in the visheShaNa. However, the visheShaNa is mithyA too according to the advaitin. That being so, a part of the paksha does not have the sAdhya, leading to bhAgAsiddhi.
To this, siddhikAra says
इति चेन्न; If this is the argument - not so.
विशेष्यतापन्नस्य विषयत्वेऽपि क्षत्यभावात्, तस्य मिथ्यात्वाभ्युपगमात् | There is no harm to us if the qualified entity (visheShyatApanna = vishiShTa) is knowable, as that is mithyA according to us.
अतएव - उपहितविषयत्वेऽप्युपधेयविषयत्वमक्षतमेव इति - अपास्तम् उपहितात्मना तस्यापि मिथ्यात्वाभ्युपगमात्, ज्ञानन्तरविषयत्वेन विशेषणे भागासिद्ध्यभावाच्च | Therefore the view that - "the knowability of conditioned Brahman implies the knowability of pure Brahman" - stands refuted. The mithyAtva of the conditioned brahman has been accepted by us already. Further, mithyAtva of the visheShaNa is possible by it being the object of some other vritti, therefore the charge of bhAgAsiddhi does not apply.
(To be continued).
Originally posted on 10th January 2018.
Starting from this chapter onwards, we will consider three primary hetu's (reasons) - drishyatvam, jaDatvam and paricChinnatvam that are used to prove the world's mithyAtva. That is, now we will commence a detailed look at the "why" in the question, "Why do we say that the world is mithyA?".
In any anumAna, the hetu serves to prove the sAdhya. This is done through the concept of vyApti, or invariable concomitance - that is, where the hetu is present, the sAdhya will invariably be present. Therefore, in order to prove that the sAdhya is present in the paksha, it is sufficient to prove that the hetu is present in the paksha. The first hetu to be considered is drishyatvam.
What is drishyatvam?
advaita vedAnta has a two fold classification of reality - drik, the seer and drishya, the seen.
According to advaita, drik is one, drishya are many. Everything in the world has drishyatvam (everything is knowable, or everything has knowability). Therefore, the advaitin claims that wherever drishyatvam is present, mithyA is also invariably present.
The nyAyAmritakAra objects to this. He asks:
ननु - मिथ्यात्वे साध्ये हेतूकृतं यद्दृश्यत्वं तदप्युपपादनीयम् | Knowability as a basis for establishing mithyAtvam needs to be examined.
तथाहि - किमिदं दृश्यत्वं? Thus, what is this drishyatvam?
1) वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वं वा? Is it vritti vyApyatvam - being revealed by a vritti (thought)?
2) फलव्याप्यत्वं वा? Is it phala vyApyatvam - being revealed by consciousness reflected / delimited by a vritti?
3) साधारणं वा ? Is it that which is common to both?
4) कदाचित् कथंचिद्चिद्विषयत्वम् वा ? Is it being the object of consciousness in some way at some time?
5) स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्त संविदन्तरापेक्षानियतिर्वा ? is it the requirement, as a rule, of another conscious entity for its own vyavahAra?
6) अस्वप्रकाशं वा ? Is it not being self-evident?
The nyAyAmritakAra wishes to prove that every alternative for the meaning of knowability is flawed. If the hetu is proved to be defective, the anumAna is rendered useless.
नाद्य:, आत्मनो वेदान्तजन्यवृत्तिव्याप्यत्वेन तत्र व्यभिचारात् | It cannot be the first alternative (revealed by a thought), because Brahman is revealed by a thought born from the study of vedAnta. If such is the definition of knowability, Brahman is knowable. However, Brahman is not mithyA. Thus the hetu of knowability does not invariably imply the presence of mithyAtva - in other words, there is vyabhichAra.
अत एव न तृतीयोऽपि | For the same reason, the third alternative (that which is common to both vritti vyApya and phala vyApya) is also not true. Simply put, if A is false then (A and B) must be false too.
नापि द्वितीय:, नित्यातीन्द्रिये शुक्तिरूप्यादौ च तदभावेन भागासिद्धिसाधनवैकल्ययो: प्रसङ्गात् | It cannot be the second alternative too (ie being revealed by the phala, reflection of consciousness in a thought) - because there are several objects that are beyond the reach of sensory perception (e.g. gurutvam (weight), dharma/ adharma etc). These are not revealed by the reflection of consciousness in a thought, thus there is the defect of bhAgAsiddhi - that is, the hetu is not present in many things considered mithyA by the advaitin. Again, the invariable concomitance between the hetu and sAdhya is disproven. Further, according to the advaitin, shell-silver is revealed by the sAkshi (inner witness), and not phala, the reflection of consciousness in thought. Therefore in addition to bhAgAsiddhi, there is also the defect of sAdhana vaikalya - the hetu is not present in the driShTAnta itself.
नापि चतुर्थ:, ब्रह्म पूर्वम् न ज्ञातमिदानीम् वेदन्तेन ज्ञातमित्यनुभवेन आत्मनि व्यभिचारात् | It cannot be the fourth alternative too (being the object of consciousness in some way at some time) - because, Brahman, which was not known first, becomes known after studying vedAnta. Thus, Brahman becomes the object of a conscious entity at some time in some fashion. However, Brahman is not mithyA. As the hetu is present, but the sAdhya is not, this leads to the defect of vyabhichAra.
नापि पञ्चम:, ब्रह्मण्यप्यद्वितियत्वादिविशिष्टव्यवहारे संविदन्तरापेक्षानियतिदर्शनेन व्यभिचारात् | It cannot be the fifth alternative too (the requirement of another consciousness for its vyavahAra) - because activities such as claiming Brahman to be endowed with non-duality, etc., requires another consciousness as a rule. If this was the definition of knowability, then Brahman is endowed with it. However, it is not mithyA. Therefore there is vyabhichAra of this hetu with respect to Brahman.
नापि षष्ठ:, स हि अवेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वाभावरूप: | It is not the sixth (not being self evident). svaprakAshatvam (being self luminous) is the capability of being perceived directly, while being unobjectifiable. The absence of such a capacity is asvaprakAshatvam, or not being self evident. Why does this rule out such a meaning for drishyatvam?
तथाच शुक्तिरूप्यादेरपि अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वेन साधनवैकल्यात् Because shell silver, while being suitable for direct perception, is not objectified by consciousness (it is revealed by the sAkshi, the witness, but is not phala vyApya). Thus, it too is arguably self luminous. Therefore, the hetu of knowability (meaning a-svaprakAshatvam) is not present in the shell silver, leading to sAdhanavaikalyam - the hetu is not present in the example itself.
The siddhikAra replies to these charges:
इति चेन्मैवं- फलव्याप्यत्वव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्यापि पक्षस्य क्षोदक्षमत्वात् | If these are the objections, No - apart from the phala vyApti option, all others are acceptable definitions of knowability, albeit with some refinements.
********Option 1 - Knowability as vritti vyApyatvam**********
नच - वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वपक्षे ब्रह्मणि व्यभिचार:, अन्यथा ब्रह्मपराणां वेदान्तानां वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गादिति - वाच्यं ; Do not argue thus - "With regards to the option of vritti vyApyatvam, as Brahman is revealed by a thought, such a definition of knowability would make Brahman knowable and thus mithyA, leading to vyabhichAra. If on the other hand, Brahman is not revealed by a thought, no knowledge of Brahman is possible, rendering useless all scriptures of vedAnta that talk of Brahman".
There are several reasons why such an argument is untenable. In this case, the siddhikAra uses an argument of vAcaspati miSra, the author of the bhAmati, a commentary on SankarAchArya's brahma sUtra bhAShya. The bhAmatikAra's position is that Brahman can be classified into two - pure Brahman and conditioned Brahman. Pure Brahman is not knowable, and is real. Conditioned Brahman is known via vedAnta, thus saving scripture's utility. However, as it is knowable, it is mithyA. This is being said now:
शुद्धं हि ब्रह्म न दृश्यम्; Pure Brahman is not revealed by any vritti. Why?
"यत्तदद्रेश्य"मिति श्रुते: किन्तूपहितमेव, तच्च मिथ्यैव; नहि वृत्तिदशायां अनुपहितं तद्भवति | On the basis of the muNDaka shruti, which defines Brahman as "That which is not knowable". The object of the vritti generated by vedAnta is conditioned Brahman, which happens to be mithyA. As long as Brahman remains an object of such a vritti, it cannot be unconditioned (ie. pure).
The purpose of scripture is the revelation of conditioned Brahman through a special kind of thought called the akhaNDAkAra vritti. This vritti has the unique property of removing ignorance and its effects. As all thoughts, including this vritti itself, are effects of ignorance, the akhaNDAkAra vritti destroys not only ignorance but also its products, including itself. What remains afterwards is pure Brahman.
This may lead to a few objections because some teachers of vedAnta talk of Brahman as the object of thought. The siddhikAra replies to this:
नच - "सर्वप्रत्ययवेद्येऽस्मिन् ब्रह्मरूपे व्यवस्थिते" इति स्ववचनविरोध इति - वाच्यं तस्याप्युपहितपरत्वात् | Do not argue that such a view suffers from internal contradiction with the author of the Brahma Siddhi, who says, "This Brahman is that which is known through every thought" - because, the brahmasiddhikAra (maNDana miSra) is referring to conditioned Brahman only.
There is a further objection - if pure brahman cannot be the object of any thought, how can it ever be known? If it is never known, how can its knowledge lead to moksha? To such a charge, the siddhikAra replies:
नच - एवं सति शुद्धसिद्धिर्न स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue thus - "This being the case, pure brahman can never be known (obtained)". Why?
स्वतएव तस्य प्रकाशत्वेन सिद्धत्वात् | Because, as pure Brahman is self revealing, no other vritti is needed to know it.
ननु - अज्ञाते धर्मिणि कस्यचित् धर्मस्य विधातुं निषेद्धुं वा अशक्यत्वेन शुद्धेन दृश्यत्वं निषेधता शुद्धस्य ज्ञेयत्वमवश्यं स्वीकरणीयम्, To this, the pUrva pakshi says - as it is impossible to posit the presence or absence of any property in a fundamentally unknown entity, one has to necessarily accept the knowability of Brahman to even deny its knowability. This obviously is self-defeating and an impossibility.
न च - स्वप्रकाशत्वेन स्वत: सिद्धे शुद्धे श्रुत्या दृश्यत्वनिषेधा इति - वाच्यम् ; Further, if the advaitin argues that pure Brahman being self-evident, is available, whereas its unknowability is established through shruti, that is unacceptable because:
शुद्धं स्वप्रकाशमिति शब्दजन्यविशिष्टवृत्तौ शुद्धाप्रकाशे तस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वासिद्धे: - the words "pure Brahman is self evident" must necessarily generate a thought which reveals the meaning that "pure Brahman is self evident". If the thought does not reveal that meaning, pure Brahman is not self-evident. If the thought does generate that meaning, pure Brahman is revealed by it. Either option results in a problem for the advaitin.
To this, the siddhikAra says:
- इति चेन्न; If this is your argument, no.
वृत्तिकाले वृत्तिरुपेण धर्मेण शुद्धत्वासंभवात् शुद्धस्य वृत्तिविषयत्वं न संभवति, Because if Brahman's self revealing nature is known through the thought, then it cannot be pure brahman that is revealed.
अत: "शुद्धं स्वप्रकाश"मिति वाक्यस्य लक्षणया अशुद्धत्वमस्वप्रकाशत्वव्यापकमित्यर्थ: | Therefore, by implication, all that the sentence "pure Brahman is self luminous" means is that "that which is not self luminous, cannot be pure Brahman". To clarify, the statement A->B is equivalent to !B -> !A (not B implies not A). As pure Brahman cannot be the object of any statement, let alone the statement "pure Brahman is self luminous", that particular sentence must be interpreted to mean that all things not self-luminous are not pure Brahman.
तथा च अशुद्धत्वव्यावृत्त्या शुद्धे स्वप्रकाशता पर्यवस्यति, यथा भेदनिषेधेन अभिन्नत्वम् | Therefore, the meaning that remains is that "as pure brahman cannot contain impurity, it must be self-evident too". For example, by denying difference, similarity is established - similarly, by denying the absence of self-luminosity (implied by the absence of impurity), self luminosity is established.
The opponent raises an objection - if a thing can never be referred to by words, any word used to denote such an entity, serves no purpose.
न च - शुद्धपदेन अभिधया लक्षणया वा शुद्धाप्रकाशे तत्प्रयोगवैयर्थ्यमिति - वाच्यम् ;
The siddhikAra says - Do not say thus - "if the word - pure Brahman - cannot be refer to pure Brahman either directly, or by implication, it serves no purpose."
पर्यवसितार्थमादाय सार्थकत्वोपपत्ते: | Because - when all other alternatives for the meaning have been ruled out, whatever remains, the paryavasita artham, imbues the word with meaning.
एवं च "शुद्धं न दृश्यं न मिथ्ये" तस्याप्यशुद्धत्वं दृश्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयोर्व्यापकमित्येतत्परत्वेन शुद्धे दृश्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयोर्व्यतिरेक: पर्यवस्यति |
Therefore, when it is said that "pure Brahman is neither knowable nor mithyA", what is meant is that whichever entity is knowable or mithyA is impure, ie not pure Brahman. The meaning of purity is whatever remains after negating mithyAtva and knowability.
एतेन - स्फुरणमात्रमेव मिथ्यात्वे प्रयोजकं तन्त्रम् लाघवात् ; Applying the principle of parsimony, the rule can be refined to - anything which is the object of thought (sphuraNam) is mithyA.
अत: "स्वत:स्फुरदपि ब्रह्म मिथ्यैवे'ति - शून्यवादिमतपास्तम् ; स्वत:स्फुरणरूपताया: शुक्तिरूप्यादावभावात्, स्फुरणविषयत्वस्य ब्रह्मण्यसिद्धे: | Therefore, this also refutes shUnyavAda buddhism, which claims that Brahman, despite being self-evident, is mithyA - because knowledge necessarily requires thought, whereas Brahman's self luminosity is not as an object of thought. In contrast, shell-silver which is mithyA is not self-luminous, and it is not possible for Brahman to be the object of consciousness.
The pUrvapakshi takes a different tack - Any object that is known, is known as being endowed with attributes. Here the object is visheShya, the attribute is the visheShaNa, and the qualified object is vishiShTa. The knowledge of the object is vishiShTa jnAnam - that is, it is of an object endowed (vishiShTa) with some characteristics. When such an attribute-endowed-object is known, the object is also known. When someone perceives a blue pot, not only is the blueness perceived, the pot is also perceived. Similarly, when the conditioned Brahman is perceived, pure Brahman should also necessarily be perceived. He argues:
ननु - विशिष्टज्ञाने विशेष्यस्यापि भाने श्रुत्या विशिष्टस्य दृश्यत्वेनैव विशेष्यस्यापि दृश्यत्वाद्व्यभिचार:,
In any knowledge of an object endowed with attributes, the object, the visheShya, is also necessarily known. Therefore, as the shruti is said to reveal the conditioned (vishiShTa) Brahman, pure Brahman (the visheShya) should also come under the purview of knowability - leading to the mithyAtva of pure Brahman or the defect of vyabhichAra.
न च - "विष्णवे शिपिविष्टाये"त्यादौ विशिष्टस्य देवतात्ववत् विशिष्टस्य विषयत्वम्, अग्नीषोमयोर्मिलितयोर्देवतात्ववद्वा मिलितस्य विषयत्वम्, अतो न विशेष्ये विषयत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Sensing a counter to his argument, the opponent continues - Do not argue thus: " The deity referred to in the mantra "viShNave shipiviShTAya" is viShNu endowed with the attribute of shipiviShTatvam (pervaded by rays) not just vishNu. Similarly when an offering is made to AgniShoma, the offering is made to agni and soma together, and not any one. Therefore, there is no reason to say that the visheShya is also objectified."
तद्वदेव विशेषणस्याप्यविषयत्वे भागासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् - because by extending the same argument, it can be argued that the qualifier endowed entity (vishiShTa) and qualifier (visheShaNa) are different. While the vishiShTa is known, the visheShaNa is not, and therefore the attribute of knowability will not be present in the visheShaNa. However, the visheShaNa is mithyA too according to the advaitin. That being so, a part of the paksha does not have the sAdhya, leading to bhAgAsiddhi.
To this, siddhikAra says
इति चेन्न; If this is the argument - not so.
विशेष्यतापन्नस्य विषयत्वेऽपि क्षत्यभावात्, तस्य मिथ्यात्वाभ्युपगमात् | There is no harm to us if the qualified entity (visheShyatApanna = vishiShTa) is knowable, as that is mithyA according to us.
अतएव - उपहितविषयत्वेऽप्युपधेयविषयत्वमक्षतमेव इति - अपास्तम् उपहितात्मना तस्यापि मिथ्यात्वाभ्युपगमात्, ज्ञानन्तरविषयत्वेन विशेषणे भागासिद्ध्यभावाच्च | Therefore the view that - "the knowability of conditioned Brahman implies the knowability of pure Brahman" - stands refuted. The mithyAtva of the conditioned brahman has been accepted by us already. Further, mithyAtva of the visheShaNa is possible by it being the object of some other vritti, therefore the charge of bhAgAsiddhi does not apply.
(To be continued).
Originally posted on 10th January 2018.