paricCheda 1 - dRgdRshya sambandha bhaNga: (part 3)
Continue from here.
किंचैवमभावभ्रमानुपपत्ति:, तत्रापि विशिष्टप्रतीतिसंभवेस्वरूपसंबन्धस्यैव सत्त्वात् | Moreover, this would mean that the illusion of absence would not be possible, because the cognition of relation would necessarily require the presence of svarUpasambandha.
In the svarUpasambandha between absence and its locus, any appearance of absence would necessarily require the absence to be actually present. If svarUpasambandha was defined as the svarUpa-s of the absence and the ground, without the svarUpa of the absence and the ground being both present, how can the absence be perceived on the ground? Therefore, there would be no situation where there was no absence, but someone mistakenly sees absence.
नच प्रमाघटितं तल्लक्षणम् वास्तवसंबन्धसत्त्वे प्रमात्वस्याप्यापाद्यत्वात् | Nor can one insist that the definition implies that svarUpasambandha means the capacity to generate a valid cognition, because if the sambandha is real, then the validity of the cognition is automatically implied.
अन्यथा तत्र तस्याप्रमात्वे संबन्धाभाव: तस्मिन्श्च तस्य अप्रमात्वमित्यन्योन्याश्रयात् | Otherwise, one has to say that where there is an illusion, there is no svarUpasambandha possible. Similarly, to know that sambandha is not possible, we have to say that the cognition is not a valid one. Thus the validity of the cognition and what is a svarUpasambandha end up mutually dependent, having anyonyAshraya.
The opponent argues:
A daNDI-n is a person with a stick. There is a samyoga (contact) relationship between the person and the stick, which is seen. A person seeing this may not know this is samyoga at the time that he sees this and may understand this later after studying nyAya. Thus there is a samyogatvAvacChinna sambandha present, but it may not be known.
Similarly, if there are two svarUpa-s that are capable of generating a cognition of the two entities in relationship (sambandha vishiShTa pratIti). To know that the entities themselves are capable of generating a cognition of relationship between them, we cannot rely on the effect (the cognition of relationship), to know whether they themselves have the capacity - there is not much benefit in inferring that something is capable of generating an outcome, after the outcome is generated itself. There has to be some avacChedaka dharma (determining attribute) that allows one to know that capability directly. For example, by knowing that daNDatva (stick-ness) is present in the object (stick), we know that it is capable of being used to make a pot. There is no need to know that the relationship as yogyatAavacChedakaavacChinna sambandha (a relationship that is endowed with the determining characteristic of leading to a cognition of relationship) as long as that sambandhatva is known.
This addresses the charge by the advaitin that the relationship is not seeable because the yogyatAvacChedaka - the characteristic that establishes whether the svarUpa of the objects themselves is capable of leading to a cognition of relationship between them - is not seeable.
ननु - संबन्धान्तरमन्तरेण विशिष्टप्रतीतिजनन्योग्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नस्वरूपस्य संबन्धत्वं संयोगत्वावच्छिन्नस्य दण्डीत्यादौ संबन्धत्ववत्,
Just like in the cognition of a daNDin, a man with a stick, the relationship of the man with the stick is such that even when the relationship is not known to be samyoga, one knows that the man is in contact with the stick, without requiring the perception of any other relationship between the two, (in the svarUpasambandha, the cognition and its object are innately endowed with the capability to show them as being related even when one does not know what that characteristic is).
To explain:
विशिष्टबुद्धिश्चावच्छेदकाविषयिण्येवावच्छेद्यविषया, In the cognition of the relation, without revealing the nature of that relationship (अवच्छेदक अविषयिणि), the relation between the two entities, which happens to be endowed with that particular nature is revealed (अवच्छेद्य विषया)
अतो न स्वरूपसंबन्धगोचरविशिष्टबुद्धेश्चाक्षुषत्वविरोध: ; Therefore, the charge that the visual perception of the svarUpa sambandha is not possible in the cognition of relationship between two objects, is unfounded.
नच - तर्ह्यभावप्रमाभ्रमयो: स्वरूपद्वयमात्रविषयत्वाविशेषात् प्रमाभ्रमव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिरिति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue then that as the svarUpa sambandha is the same whether the cognition of absence is a valid one or an invalid one, it would become impossible to distinguish between a valid cognition and invalid cognition. Because:
घटाभाववति घटाभावज्ञानत्वेन तद्भिन्नज्ञानत्वेन च व्यवस्थोपपत्ते: | Where there is the absence of a pot on the ground, if the person perceives the absence, that would be valid, whereas its opposite - ie, seeing the absence of a pot where the pot is present is invalid. These two scenarios are different, and that is sufficient to determine which is valid and invalid.
ननु - अतिरिक्ताविषयत्वे तस्यैवानुपपत्ति:, नहि भवद्रीत्या तस्योभयात्मकत्वेन तदुभयसत्त्वेन व्यधिकरणप्रकारत्वरूपभ्रमत्वस्यैवाभावे भ्रमतदन्यत्वाभ्यां व्यवस्था संभवतीति - चेन्न;
If the advaitin argues thus - "(The absence and the ground are common to both scenarios, and because their svarUpa is the relationship, the relationship is also common). When no other sambandha is perceived (to differentiate the two), it is not possible to differentiate the two scenarios. In your (dvaitin's) system as the sambandha is of the nature of both (the absence and the ground), which is present in both (scenarios), there is no possibility itself for an illusion where something else is seen in the place of something else (vyadhikaraNa prakArakatva bhrama). Therefore, it is not possible to differentiate between illusion and valid cognition." - No.
घटाभावाभावस्य घटत्वेन तद्वति घटाभावज्ञानस्य व्यधिकरणप्रकारकत्वसंभवात् | It is possible for vyadhikaraNa prakArakatva bhrama because it is possible for the cognition of pot absence to occur when the pot absence is absent (ie the pot is present).
Let us look at the 2 scenarios of pot absence being seen:
1) where a pot is really absent - The cognition of pot absence is occurring where the pot is absent.
2) where a pot is really present - The pot, is the absence of pot-absence. The pot absence is present here as the absence of pot absence. Thus, the pot absence and the ground are present even in that scenario, and because the svarUpa of the two is present, it is possible for one to erroneously think "the pot is absent on the ground" - even when the pot is actually present.Thus such a vyadhikaraNa prakArakatva bhrama is indeed possible.
किंच भ्रमस्य वस्तुगत्या यत् घटवत्स विषय:, नतु प्रमाया इत्यतिरिक्तविषयत्वमस्त्येव; Moreover, the object of the two cognitions is different. The 'ground with the pot' seen in an illusion is different from the 'ground with the pot' seen in a right cognition. Thus, there is an additional difference between valid cognitions and illusion.
नचातीन्द्रियाभावे अव्याप्ति:, There is no under-extension of the definition in the case of the absence of extra-sensory objects. That is, it is possible to discern the capability of the absence of extra-sensory objects to generate a cognition of relation?
The opponent postulates a mechanism to determine the capability in the case of
1) absolute absence, atyantAbhAva
2) prior absence, prAgabhAva / posterior absence, pradhvamsAbhAva
3) difference, anyonyAbhAva
अत्यन्ताभावे प्रतियोगिदेशान्यदेशत्वं, in the case of absolute absence, the capability of absolute absence to generate a cognition of relationship is in places other than where the counterpositive of the absence is present. That is, the absolute absence of the pot's ability to generate the cognition "there is a pot absent here" is in all places other than where the pot is present.
प्रागभावादौ प्रतियोगिदेशत्वे सति प्रतियोगिकालान्यकालत्वं, In the case of prior and posterior absence, their capability to generate a cognition of relationship is in the locus of counterpositive, but in a different time to the existence of the counterpositive.
अन्योन्याभावे प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकदेशान्यदेशत्वं, विशिष्टप्रत्ययजननयोग्यतावच्छेदकम् | In the case of difference, its capability to generate a cognition of relationship is in a place other than where the attribute of being a counterpositive of difference with the locus, is present.
In the given example of dharma and adharma being absent in a pot, the pot and the absence of dharma are said to have svarUpa sambandha because the capacity to generate a cognition of relationship (ie "The pot has the absence of dharma") is because: 1) dharma / adharma can only be present in Atma, hence the pratiyogidesha, the locus of the the counter-positive is the Atma. 2). The pot is not located in the Atma (according to the dvaitin), hence the pot has pratiyogidesha anyadeshatva, thus the pot has the yogyatva, or the capability of leading to the cognition, "the pot does not contain dharma".
तदवच्छिन्नत्वं च विशिष्टप्रतीत्यजनकेऽप्यतीन्द्रियाभावे सुलभम्, therefore being endowed with such a yogyatva is easily provable, leading to the absence of super-sensory objects having the capacity to lead to a cognition of relationship.
नह्यरण्यस्थो दण्डो न घटजननयोग्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्न It is not that a stick found in a forest is incapable of being used to make a pot (to rotate the potter's wheel) - it may not be so used, but it certainly has the capacity to aid in the creation of a pot.
This was the opponent's argument to establish yogyatva as something intrinsic to the the object's svarUpa itself.
इति - चेत्, मैवम् ; The siddhikAra saysL not so.
There is a rule that if something is eternal, and has a yogyatva, the capacity to lead to a result, it will eventually lead to the result. A stick found in the forest may not be used to create the pot, because it can get destroyed before it is so used. However, if something is eternal, and has the capacity to produce an outcome, it will eventually produce the outcome.
नित्यस्यातीन्द्रियस्याकाशात्यन्ताभावादेर्विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्वे अवश्यं विशिष्टप्रत्ययजननकत्वप्रसङ्गात् | If the absence of an eternal, super-sensory object, like the eternal absence of space*, has the capacity to lead to the perception of a relationship, it will eventually lead to the perception of a relationship. This is a problem, because if an eternal super-sensory object has the capacity to lead to perception, it will no longer be super-sensory. The error here is not that it is eternal, but that it is eternally capable of leading to perception and be imperceptible simultaneously.
* space is eternal, and so is its absence - and is considered to be something not perceptible by the senses in nyAya.
नित्यस्य स्वरूपयोग्यस्य सहकारिसमवधाननियमात् | Because of the rule that if something is eternally capable of being in svarUpasmbandha, it will lead to it being perceived as such.
किंच विशिष्टस्य प्रत्यय इत्यत्र स्वरूपसंबन्धस्य षष्ठ्यर्थत्वे आत्माश्रय:, The usage of the sixth-case ending (denoting relationship) in the phrase "cognition of a relationship" is self-referential. We are trying to determine the definition of the relationship between cognition and its object, and using a case ending denoting relationship in defining the relationship is self-referential.
संबन्धमात्रस्य तदर्थत्वे आत्मत्वादिविशिष्टात्मसंबन्धिसमूहालम्बनविषये घटपटादावतिव्याप्ति:, If it refers to relationship in general, then in the cognition of multiple objects as being related to oneself in a single cognition, where we perceive many things as related to us, but not in relation to each other, the relations with each other would end up as objects of the cognition.
To explain, a samUhAlambana jnAna is where there are multiple objects of a cognition, which each object being a separate, primary object of the cognition. For example, if I see 5 people, I also see the clothes worn by each person, but I don't see the relationship between the different people.
When I see a man wearing a white shirt, whiteness is a qualifier for the qualified shirt. The shirt in turn is a qualifier for the man, who is the primary object (mukhya visheShya) of the cognition. A samUhAlambana jnAna is where there multiple mukhya visheShya's in the cognition, but there is no relationship between the mukhya visheShya.
If the relationship between the object and cognition is that there is merely defined as having "some relationship" because that is the nature of the cognition and object, then each mukhya visheShya in the samUhAlambana jnAna will have svarUpa sambandha with the cognition. That is, the svarUpa of each object has sambandha yogyatva, or capacity to be in relationship. That being so, why cannot the objects not have sambandha with each other as well?
So when we see a pot and cloth etc in the same cognition, even when there is is no relationship between the pot and the cloth, as the same cognition is capable of having svarUpa sambandha with the pot and cloth, the two objects themselves will end up having svarUpa sambandha also. Thus there is a problem in merely taking svarUpa sambandha to be the relationship between cognition and its object.
The siddhikAra took the example of samUhAlambana of oneself and the pot and cloth. In this samUhAlambana Atma jnAna, there would end up be a svarUpa sambandha between the pot and the cloth.
तयोरपि विशिष्टसंबन्ध्यविशिष्टविषयज्ञानजनकत्वात् | As the one cognition is related to each of the objects, the unrelated objects themselves end up becoming related.
ज्ञानस्याभाव: ज्ञातोऽभाव इति प्रतीत्योर्वैलक्षण्यं न स्यात् ; There would be no difference between the absence of cognition and the cognition of absence. However, there is a very big difference between the two. If I am doing some work, there is the absence of the pot cognition in my mind. However, if I see the ground, I perceive the absence of the pot there. The two circumstances are very different.
ज्ञानाभावयोरुभयोरेवोभयत्र स्वरूपसंबन्धत्वे विषयकृतविशेषाभावात् | As svarUpasambandha is the cognition and absence, there is no way to differentiate between the two situations.
Until now, the svarUpa of the two objects being the relationship called svarUpasambandha was being refuted. Now the siddhikAra refutes the position where there is an attribute in addition to the svarUpa which is taken to be the svarUpasambandha.
अतएव - विशिष्टप्रतीति जननयोग्यत्वं ज्ञानज्ञेयादिस्थले अतिरिक्तमेव संबन्ध इति - निरस्तम् ; It is for this reason that the statement - the capability to generate a cognition of relationship is an additional attribute in the case of cognition and its object.
अतीन्द्रिये नित्याभावेऽव्याप्ते: | Because the definition does not apply in the case of the eternal absence of a super-sensory object. If there is the capacity to generate, it will end up generating a perception of relation, but that would be self-defeating (it would not be super-sensory any longer).
न हि तत्र विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यता; फलोपधानापत्ते:, In that instance must be no capability to generate a perception of relationship. If such a capability existed, it would certainly do so.
Sometimes, the relationship between two things is perceptible, like the samyoga between the pot and the ground. However, there are instances, where the relationship is not perceptible. This is because if there are many factors involved in the relationship which are not perceptible, the relationship itself is not perceptible.
Similarly, if the svarUpa sambandha between cognition and its object is defined as that which is capable of leading to the perception that the two are related, such a relationship is not perceptible, because the factors involved in it are not perceptible.
प्रतीतिघटितस्य चक्षुषादिप्रतीतावविषयत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च | As definition of svarUpasambandha is linked with the cognition (which are not perceptible), it would lead to the svarUpasambandha is not perceptible by the eyes, etc.
तस्मात्सत्यत्वे संबन्धानुपपत्तेराध्यासिक एव दृग्दृश्ययो: संबन्ध इति | Therefore, as there is no real relationship possible cognition and its object, it follows that there is only an unreal relationship between the two.
इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वे दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धभङ्ग: ||
Thus we have established that the real relationship between cognition and its object, which is necessary to prove the reality of the world, is not possible.
This is one of the most important anukUla tarka, or supportive reasoning used to establish the mithyAtva of the universe.
किंचैवमभावभ्रमानुपपत्ति:, तत्रापि विशिष्टप्रतीतिसंभवेस्वरूपसंबन्धस्यैव सत्त्वात् | Moreover, this would mean that the illusion of absence would not be possible, because the cognition of relation would necessarily require the presence of svarUpasambandha.
In the svarUpasambandha between absence and its locus, any appearance of absence would necessarily require the absence to be actually present. If svarUpasambandha was defined as the svarUpa-s of the absence and the ground, without the svarUpa of the absence and the ground being both present, how can the absence be perceived on the ground? Therefore, there would be no situation where there was no absence, but someone mistakenly sees absence.
नच प्रमाघटितं तल्लक्षणम् वास्तवसंबन्धसत्त्वे प्रमात्वस्याप्यापाद्यत्वात् | Nor can one insist that the definition implies that svarUpasambandha means the capacity to generate a valid cognition, because if the sambandha is real, then the validity of the cognition is automatically implied.
अन्यथा तत्र तस्याप्रमात्वे संबन्धाभाव: तस्मिन्श्च तस्य अप्रमात्वमित्यन्योन्याश्रयात् | Otherwise, one has to say that where there is an illusion, there is no svarUpasambandha possible. Similarly, to know that sambandha is not possible, we have to say that the cognition is not a valid one. Thus the validity of the cognition and what is a svarUpasambandha end up mutually dependent, having anyonyAshraya.
The opponent argues:
A daNDI-n is a person with a stick. There is a samyoga (contact) relationship between the person and the stick, which is seen. A person seeing this may not know this is samyoga at the time that he sees this and may understand this later after studying nyAya. Thus there is a samyogatvAvacChinna sambandha present, but it may not be known.
Similarly, if there are two svarUpa-s that are capable of generating a cognition of the two entities in relationship (sambandha vishiShTa pratIti). To know that the entities themselves are capable of generating a cognition of relationship between them, we cannot rely on the effect (the cognition of relationship), to know whether they themselves have the capacity - there is not much benefit in inferring that something is capable of generating an outcome, after the outcome is generated itself. There has to be some avacChedaka dharma (determining attribute) that allows one to know that capability directly. For example, by knowing that daNDatva (stick-ness) is present in the object (stick), we know that it is capable of being used to make a pot. There is no need to know that the relationship as yogyatAavacChedakaavacChinna sambandha (a relationship that is endowed with the determining characteristic of leading to a cognition of relationship) as long as that sambandhatva is known.
This addresses the charge by the advaitin that the relationship is not seeable because the yogyatAvacChedaka - the characteristic that establishes whether the svarUpa of the objects themselves is capable of leading to a cognition of relationship between them - is not seeable.
ननु - संबन्धान्तरमन्तरेण विशिष्टप्रतीतिजनन्योग्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नस्वरूपस्य संबन्धत्वं संयोगत्वावच्छिन्नस्य दण्डीत्यादौ संबन्धत्ववत्,
Just like in the cognition of a daNDin, a man with a stick, the relationship of the man with the stick is such that even when the relationship is not known to be samyoga, one knows that the man is in contact with the stick, without requiring the perception of any other relationship between the two, (in the svarUpasambandha, the cognition and its object are innately endowed with the capability to show them as being related even when one does not know what that characteristic is).
To explain:
विशिष्टबुद्धिश्चावच्छेदकाविषयिण्येवावच्छेद्यविषया, In the cognition of the relation, without revealing the nature of that relationship (अवच्छेदक अविषयिणि), the relation between the two entities, which happens to be endowed with that particular nature is revealed (अवच्छेद्य विषया)
अतो न स्वरूपसंबन्धगोचरविशिष्टबुद्धेश्चाक्षुषत्वविरोध: ; Therefore, the charge that the visual perception of the svarUpa sambandha is not possible in the cognition of relationship between two objects, is unfounded.
नच - तर्ह्यभावप्रमाभ्रमयो: स्वरूपद्वयमात्रविषयत्वाविशेषात् प्रमाभ्रमव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिरिति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue then that as the svarUpa sambandha is the same whether the cognition of absence is a valid one or an invalid one, it would become impossible to distinguish between a valid cognition and invalid cognition. Because:
घटाभाववति घटाभावज्ञानत्वेन तद्भिन्नज्ञानत्वेन च व्यवस्थोपपत्ते: | Where there is the absence of a pot on the ground, if the person perceives the absence, that would be valid, whereas its opposite - ie, seeing the absence of a pot where the pot is present is invalid. These two scenarios are different, and that is sufficient to determine which is valid and invalid.
ननु - अतिरिक्ताविषयत्वे तस्यैवानुपपत्ति:, नहि भवद्रीत्या तस्योभयात्मकत्वेन तदुभयसत्त्वेन व्यधिकरणप्रकारत्वरूपभ्रमत्वस्यैवाभावे भ्रमतदन्यत्वाभ्यां व्यवस्था संभवतीति - चेन्न;
If the advaitin argues thus - "(The absence and the ground are common to both scenarios, and because their svarUpa is the relationship, the relationship is also common). When no other sambandha is perceived (to differentiate the two), it is not possible to differentiate the two scenarios. In your (dvaitin's) system as the sambandha is of the nature of both (the absence and the ground), which is present in both (scenarios), there is no possibility itself for an illusion where something else is seen in the place of something else (vyadhikaraNa prakArakatva bhrama). Therefore, it is not possible to differentiate between illusion and valid cognition." - No.
घटाभावाभावस्य घटत्वेन तद्वति घटाभावज्ञानस्य व्यधिकरणप्रकारकत्वसंभवात् | It is possible for vyadhikaraNa prakArakatva bhrama because it is possible for the cognition of pot absence to occur when the pot absence is absent (ie the pot is present).
Let us look at the 2 scenarios of pot absence being seen:
1) where a pot is really absent - The cognition of pot absence is occurring where the pot is absent.
2) where a pot is really present - The pot, is the absence of pot-absence. The pot absence is present here as the absence of pot absence. Thus, the pot absence and the ground are present even in that scenario, and because the svarUpa of the two is present, it is possible for one to erroneously think "the pot is absent on the ground" - even when the pot is actually present.Thus such a vyadhikaraNa prakArakatva bhrama is indeed possible.
किंच भ्रमस्य वस्तुगत्या यत् घटवत्स विषय:, नतु प्रमाया इत्यतिरिक्तविषयत्वमस्त्येव; Moreover, the object of the two cognitions is different. The 'ground with the pot' seen in an illusion is different from the 'ground with the pot' seen in a right cognition. Thus, there is an additional difference between valid cognitions and illusion.
नचातीन्द्रियाभावे अव्याप्ति:, There is no under-extension of the definition in the case of the absence of extra-sensory objects. That is, it is possible to discern the capability of the absence of extra-sensory objects to generate a cognition of relation?
The opponent postulates a mechanism to determine the capability in the case of
1) absolute absence, atyantAbhAva
2) prior absence, prAgabhAva / posterior absence, pradhvamsAbhAva
3) difference, anyonyAbhAva
अत्यन्ताभावे प्रतियोगिदेशान्यदेशत्वं, in the case of absolute absence, the capability of absolute absence to generate a cognition of relationship is in places other than where the counterpositive of the absence is present. That is, the absolute absence of the pot's ability to generate the cognition "there is a pot absent here" is in all places other than where the pot is present.
प्रागभावादौ प्रतियोगिदेशत्वे सति प्रतियोगिकालान्यकालत्वं, In the case of prior and posterior absence, their capability to generate a cognition of relationship is in the locus of counterpositive, but in a different time to the existence of the counterpositive.
अन्योन्याभावे प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकदेशान्यदेशत्वं, विशिष्टप्रत्ययजननयोग्यतावच्छेदकम् | In the case of difference, its capability to generate a cognition of relationship is in a place other than where the attribute of being a counterpositive of difference with the locus, is present.
In the given example of dharma and adharma being absent in a pot, the pot and the absence of dharma are said to have svarUpa sambandha because the capacity to generate a cognition of relationship (ie "The pot has the absence of dharma") is because: 1) dharma / adharma can only be present in Atma, hence the pratiyogidesha, the locus of the the counter-positive is the Atma. 2). The pot is not located in the Atma (according to the dvaitin), hence the pot has pratiyogidesha anyadeshatva, thus the pot has the yogyatva, or the capability of leading to the cognition, "the pot does not contain dharma".
तदवच्छिन्नत्वं च विशिष्टप्रतीत्यजनकेऽप्यतीन्द्रियाभावे सुलभम्, therefore being endowed with such a yogyatva is easily provable, leading to the absence of super-sensory objects having the capacity to lead to a cognition of relationship.
नह्यरण्यस्थो दण्डो न घटजननयोग्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्न It is not that a stick found in a forest is incapable of being used to make a pot (to rotate the potter's wheel) - it may not be so used, but it certainly has the capacity to aid in the creation of a pot.
This was the opponent's argument to establish yogyatva as something intrinsic to the the object's svarUpa itself.
इति - चेत्, मैवम् ; The siddhikAra saysL not so.
There is a rule that if something is eternal, and has a yogyatva, the capacity to lead to a result, it will eventually lead to the result. A stick found in the forest may not be used to create the pot, because it can get destroyed before it is so used. However, if something is eternal, and has the capacity to produce an outcome, it will eventually produce the outcome.
नित्यस्यातीन्द्रियस्याकाशात्यन्ताभावादेर्विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्वे अवश्यं विशिष्टप्रत्ययजननकत्वप्रसङ्गात् | If the absence of an eternal, super-sensory object, like the eternal absence of space*, has the capacity to lead to the perception of a relationship, it will eventually lead to the perception of a relationship. This is a problem, because if an eternal super-sensory object has the capacity to lead to perception, it will no longer be super-sensory. The error here is not that it is eternal, but that it is eternally capable of leading to perception and be imperceptible simultaneously.
* space is eternal, and so is its absence - and is considered to be something not perceptible by the senses in nyAya.
नित्यस्य स्वरूपयोग्यस्य सहकारिसमवधाननियमात् | Because of the rule that if something is eternally capable of being in svarUpasmbandha, it will lead to it being perceived as such.
किंच विशिष्टस्य प्रत्यय इत्यत्र स्वरूपसंबन्धस्य षष्ठ्यर्थत्वे आत्माश्रय:, The usage of the sixth-case ending (denoting relationship) in the phrase "cognition of a relationship" is self-referential. We are trying to determine the definition of the relationship between cognition and its object, and using a case ending denoting relationship in defining the relationship is self-referential.
संबन्धमात्रस्य तदर्थत्वे आत्मत्वादिविशिष्टात्मसंबन्धिसमूहालम्बनविषये घटपटादावतिव्याप्ति:, If it refers to relationship in general, then in the cognition of multiple objects as being related to oneself in a single cognition, where we perceive many things as related to us, but not in relation to each other, the relations with each other would end up as objects of the cognition.
To explain, a samUhAlambana jnAna is where there are multiple objects of a cognition, which each object being a separate, primary object of the cognition. For example, if I see 5 people, I also see the clothes worn by each person, but I don't see the relationship between the different people.
When I see a man wearing a white shirt, whiteness is a qualifier for the qualified shirt. The shirt in turn is a qualifier for the man, who is the primary object (mukhya visheShya) of the cognition. A samUhAlambana jnAna is where there multiple mukhya visheShya's in the cognition, but there is no relationship between the mukhya visheShya.
If the relationship between the object and cognition is that there is merely defined as having "some relationship" because that is the nature of the cognition and object, then each mukhya visheShya in the samUhAlambana jnAna will have svarUpa sambandha with the cognition. That is, the svarUpa of each object has sambandha yogyatva, or capacity to be in relationship. That being so, why cannot the objects not have sambandha with each other as well?
So when we see a pot and cloth etc in the same cognition, even when there is is no relationship between the pot and the cloth, as the same cognition is capable of having svarUpa sambandha with the pot and cloth, the two objects themselves will end up having svarUpa sambandha also. Thus there is a problem in merely taking svarUpa sambandha to be the relationship between cognition and its object.
The siddhikAra took the example of samUhAlambana of oneself and the pot and cloth. In this samUhAlambana Atma jnAna, there would end up be a svarUpa sambandha between the pot and the cloth.
तयोरपि विशिष्टसंबन्ध्यविशिष्टविषयज्ञानजनकत्वात् | As the one cognition is related to each of the objects, the unrelated objects themselves end up becoming related.
ज्ञानस्याभाव: ज्ञातोऽभाव इति प्रतीत्योर्वैलक्षण्यं न स्यात् ; There would be no difference between the absence of cognition and the cognition of absence. However, there is a very big difference between the two. If I am doing some work, there is the absence of the pot cognition in my mind. However, if I see the ground, I perceive the absence of the pot there. The two circumstances are very different.
ज्ञानाभावयोरुभयोरेवोभयत्र स्वरूपसंबन्धत्वे विषयकृतविशेषाभावात् | As svarUpasambandha is the cognition and absence, there is no way to differentiate between the two situations.
Until now, the svarUpa of the two objects being the relationship called svarUpasambandha was being refuted. Now the siddhikAra refutes the position where there is an attribute in addition to the svarUpa which is taken to be the svarUpasambandha.
अतएव - विशिष्टप्रतीति जननयोग्यत्वं ज्ञानज्ञेयादिस्थले अतिरिक्तमेव संबन्ध इति - निरस्तम् ; It is for this reason that the statement - the capability to generate a cognition of relationship is an additional attribute in the case of cognition and its object.
अतीन्द्रिये नित्याभावेऽव्याप्ते: | Because the definition does not apply in the case of the eternal absence of a super-sensory object. If there is the capacity to generate, it will end up generating a perception of relation, but that would be self-defeating (it would not be super-sensory any longer).
न हि तत्र विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यता; फलोपधानापत्ते:, In that instance must be no capability to generate a perception of relationship. If such a capability existed, it would certainly do so.
Sometimes, the relationship between two things is perceptible, like the samyoga between the pot and the ground. However, there are instances, where the relationship is not perceptible. This is because if there are many factors involved in the relationship which are not perceptible, the relationship itself is not perceptible.
Similarly, if the svarUpa sambandha between cognition and its object is defined as that which is capable of leading to the perception that the two are related, such a relationship is not perceptible, because the factors involved in it are not perceptible.
प्रतीतिघटितस्य चक्षुषादिप्रतीतावविषयत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च | As definition of svarUpasambandha is linked with the cognition (which are not perceptible), it would lead to the svarUpasambandha is not perceptible by the eyes, etc.
तस्मात्सत्यत्वे संबन्धानुपपत्तेराध्यासिक एव दृग्दृश्ययो: संबन्ध इति | Therefore, as there is no real relationship possible cognition and its object, it follows that there is only an unreal relationship between the two.
इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वे दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धभङ्ग: ||
Thus we have established that the real relationship between cognition and its object, which is necessary to prove the reality of the world, is not possible.
This is one of the most important anukUla tarka, or supportive reasoning used to establish the mithyAtva of the universe.