Until now was
the argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra. The siddhikAra now responds.:
तन्न; सर्पज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नस्यासर्पज्ञानाद्व्यावृत्तौ प्रयोजकं न तत्तत्स्वरूपमेव; सर्वज्ञानसाधारण्याभावात्, किन्त्वनुगतो धर्म: कश्चित् |
That is not correct. The differentiator that separates the cognition of non-snake, from the cognition endowed with snake-cognition-ness (that is, snake cognition), is not intrinsic to the cognitions themselves - because the intrinsic nature of all cognitions is the same. On the other hand, it is differentiated on the basis of some attribute present in them.
सोऽपि सर्पज्ञानमात्रे न जातिरूप:, प्रयक्षत्वानुमानत्वादिना सङ्करप्रसङ्गात्, किन्तूपाधिरूप: |
That attribute is not a category (jAti) of cognition that is located in all snake-cognitions, because the cognition of the same object can sometimes be direct, sometimes indirect and therefore, one could mistaken for the other. Rather, the adjunct of the cognition is the differentiator.
स च स्वरूपसंबन्धेनाध्यासिकसंबन्धेन वा संबन्धिभूतविषयादन्यो न भवति; मानाभावात् |
That adjunct is
svarUpasambandha, or AdhyAsika sambandha – in either case,
it is not different from the sambandhi, the object of the cognition, for
there is no proof to hold that it is different.
अत एव धर्म्यन्तरसंबन्धमनपेक्ष्य विलक्षणमित्युक्तानुमानं बाधितं द्रष्टव्यं व्यभिचारि च | Thus, the inference that the difference between the cognition of the snake, and the cognition of another object is known, without taking recourse to the object, has been contradicted and is defective because of vyabhichAra. Why?
तथाहि - घटसंयोग:, पटसंयोगान्न जात्या भिद्यते, तदवृत्तिजात्यनधिकरणत्वात्, To explain - the contact that the pot has (with the ground) and the contact that the cloth has (with the ground) are not different because of the jAti. There is no jAti present in any of the contacts that can be used to differentiate one with the other.
किंतु घटरूपोपाधिनैवेति धर्म्यन्तरसंबन्धमपेक्ष्यैव विलक्षणे घटसंयोगित्वावच्छिन्ने साध्याभाववति उक्तहेतुसत्त्वाद्व्यभिचार:, अप्रयोजकं च | Rather, the difference arises only on the basis of the pot-upAdhi etc. Thus, as the difference arises on the basis of the relationship with the substratum, it follows that with regards to the one endowed with pot contact-ness (i.e., pot contact), the sAdhya is absent, but the stated hetu is present, and therefore the inference suffers from vyabhichAra. Further, such a hetu does not prove the sAdhya, and hence is aprayojaka.
नच - उपलक्षणीभूतचैत्रसंबन्धेनापि कलमाङ्कुरादेर्व्यावृत्ततापत्ति:, विपक्षबाधायामिष्टापत्ते: | It was said that the connection with some unrelated factor like Chaitra can end up as a differentiator between the rice and wheat saplings. If it does, so be it – that is not undesirable for us.
न हि जातेर्व्यावर्तकत्वे उपाधिरव्यावर्तको भवति | If the jAti was a differentiator, it does not mean that the upAdhi is not.
एवं शिलोद्धरणमाषोद्धरणकृत्यो: परस्परं जात्या व्यावृत्तावपि विषयरूपोपाधिनापि व्यावृत्तिरविरुद्धा | For example, even if the effort to lift a rock and a bag of grains is different on the basis of a jAti, it does not rule out that there is some difference on account of the object upAdhi.
शिलोद्धरणे च जातिविशेषविशिष्टाया: कृतेर्जनकत्वेन तद्रहिताया माषोद्धरणकृतेस्तदनिष्पत्तिरविरुद्धा | If some jAti exists in the effort required to lift a stone which is absent in the case of lifting a sack of grains, that does not prove that they are not different because of the objects also, and hence does not contradict our position.
व्यावृत्तेरन्यतोऽपि सिद्धिसंभवे कार्यकारणभावादिनिर्वाहाय जातिविशेषस्यापि कल्पनात्, अतीतासद्विषयकज्ञानव्यवहारादौ चातीतासतोरेव व्यावर्तकत्वम् | Even if differentiation is done in some other way and that if a jAti is postulated to account for the maintenance of a cause and effect relationship, the differentiation of activity involving past objects from activity involving non-existent objects is on the basis of the past objects and the non-existent objects only.
न हि व्यावृत्तिधीजनकत्वं तत्; येन सत्त्वाभावे प्राक्सत्त्वशरीरतया न स्यात्, किं तु व्यावृत्तिधीजनकधीविषयत्वमित्युक्तम् | That differentiator is not the cognition being born from a differentiating cognition, for prior to the existence of the differentiating cognition, the differentiation would not exist. Rather, it was said that the differentiation is because of being the object of a knowledge that gives rise to the differentiating knowledge. That is, the object knowledge.
तच्चातीतादौ सुलभमेव | In activity involving past objects, that differentiation is easily apparent. The objects experienced in the past give rise to memories, whereas non-existent objects do not lead to a recollection.
अत एवाभावादिनिदर्शनमपि निरस्तम् ; That is why, the case of differentiation of absence arising without taking recourse to the counterpositives has also been disproved.
उक्तरूपव्यावर्तकत्वस्यात्यन्तासत्यपि संभवेन कदाचित् सति संभवस्य कैमुतिकन्यायसिद्धत्वात् | As the differentiation as defined can exist in absolutely non-existent objects, what to talk of those that exist at some time?
ननु - विषयस्य व्यावर्तकत्वेऽपि सर्वत्र विशेषणत्वासंभवात् उपलक्षणत्वमेव वाच्यम् ; The opponent objects – even if the object is the differentiator, they need not be visheShaNa-s everywhere, and therefore their causation must be admitted to be as upalakshaNa-s.
उपलक्षणेन चोपलक्ष्यगतस्वसंबन्धव्यतिरिक्त: कश्चिद्धर्म एवोपस्थाप्यते, काकेनेव गृहसंबन्धिना तद्गतसंस्थानविशेष: ; As upalakshaNa-s, they establish some attribute in the upalakshya independent of the connection between the upalakshaNa and the upalakshya. Like in the case of the crow used to identify the house, which leaves a mark in the house (the hay in the roof is standing up indicating that the crow had been sitting there previously and has subsequently flown away), which is then later use to differentiate that house from other houses.
तथाच स एव व्यावर्तक इति विषयसंबन्धमनपेक्ष्य स्वगतेनैव धर्मेण ज्ञानस्य व्यावृत्तिरिति Thus, that (established attribute) itself is the differentiator. Therefore, without requiring some connection between with the object, the cognition is able to differentiate based on some attributed located in it. Thus the cognition itself becomes the differentiator.
- चेन्न; The siddhikAra says - If this is the argument no.
विषयस्य विशेषणत्ववदुपलक्षणत्वस्याप्यनभ्युपगमात् | Just like you had argued that the thing is not a visheShaNa, it is not an upalakshaNa either.
येन हि स्वोपरागाद्विशेष्ये व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिर्जन्यते, तद्विशेषणं व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिकाले विशेष्योपरञ्जकमित्यर्थ:, यथा गोत्वादि | That which generates the differentiating knowledge due to its association with the visheShya but which is dependent on the visheShya at the time of differentiation is classified as a visheShaNa. For example, the cowness differentiates a cow from the horse, and is dependent on the individual cow at the time of differentiation.
येन च स्वोपरागमुदासीनं कुर्वता विशेष्यगतव्यावर्तकधर्मोपस्थापनेन व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिर्जन्यते तदुपलक्षणम् , यथा काकादि | That which is not associated with the visheShya, but differentiates the visheShya by establishing a differentiating attribute in the visheShya is upalakshaNa, like the crow, etc.
A house is identified by saying that the one with the crow is Devadatta’s house. The crow does not belong to the house. It happened to be seated there. However, when it flies off the house clutching the straw on the roof of the house. There are still some pieces of straw on the roof which are left standing, indicating that the crow had sat there. That clue is used to identify Devadatta’s house.
यत्तु - विशेष्ये नोपरञ्जकम्, न वा धर्मान्तरोपस्थापकम्, अथ च व्यावर्तकं तदुपाधि: However, that which does not associate with the visheShya, nor does it establish some attribute in the visheShya, but is still a differentiator, is an upAdhi.
यथा पङ्कजशब्दप्रयोगे पद्मत्वं , यथा वोद्भिदादिशब्दप्रयोगे यागत्वावन्तरजातिविशेष: | For example, when the word pankaja is used to identify a lotus, and the word udbhid is used to denote a special type of sacrifice.
अत्र हि पद्मत्वयागत्वावान्तरधर्मौ पङ्कजनिकर्तरि फलोद्भेदनकर्तरि च न धर्मान्तरमुपस्थापयत:, अप्रतीते: ; Here the lotus is called pankaja because it is born from the mud, and a particular kind of sacrifice is called udbhid due to a unique result being created from the sacrifice. Neither differentiator establishes an attribute in the substratum, for such a thing is not observed.
न वा स्वोपरक्तां बुद्धिं जनयत:, समुदाये शक्त्यन्तरानभ्युपगमात्, Nor is there some intrinsic connection revealed between the word and the object. In the jAti, no other shakti is accepted.
अथ च कुमुदज्योतिष्टोमादिभ्यो व्यावर्तकावित्युपाधी एव | Thus, they are understood to be upAdhi-s by which lotuses and the jyotiShToma sacrifices are differentiated.
इदं च प्राभाकराणां भाट्टानां च संमतमुदाहरणयुगलम् | These two examples are acceptable to both the prAbhAkara and bhATTa sub-schools of pUrvamImAmsa.
तार्किकाणाम् त्वाकाशशब्दप्रयोगे शब्दाश्रयत्वमुदाहरणम् | To convey the idea to logicians, the example of the word space to indicate being the locus of sound is used.
अतेवाविद्यादिकं साक्षित्वादावुपाधिरिति सिद्धान्तो वेदान्तिनाम् | It is for this reason that ignorance etc are said to be the upAdhi-s of the sAkshi in vedAnta siddhAnta.
अतो यत्र विषयस्य विशेषणत्वम् न संभवति, तत्कालासत्त्वात्, तत्रोपाधित्वाभ्युपगमान्नोपलक्षणत्वनिबन्धनदोषावकाश:, Where the object cannot have a qualifier, because the qualifier is not present at the time, its differentiation on the basis of an upAdhi does not suffer from the same defects as upalakshaNa-s.
संदेहे तु विशेषणत्वमेवाभ्यर्हितत्वादुपेयते | If there is a doubt about the existence of the object, we should use a visheShaNa.
तस्माद्विषय एव सर्वत्र ज्ञाने व्यावर्तक: | Therefore, in all instances, objects alone are the differentiator of cognitions.
एकविषयकस्मृत्यनुभवयोःपरोक्षापरोक्षयोश्च विषयमनपेक्ष्य जात्या परस्परव्यावृत्तिदर्शनात्, सर्वत्र विषयनिरपेक्षा जातिरेव व्यावर्तिकेति न युक्तम् ; It may be that in the case of the experience of the object and the memory, which are direct and indirect cognitions respectively, mutual differentiation is possible on the basis of jAti, without resorting to the object, but that does not mean that in every case one can use a jAti to differentiate, without depending on the object.
भिन्नविषयके समानजातीये तदसंभवात् | For, that is not possible for the cognition of different objects, or those cognitions belonging to the same jAti.
नच - तत्रापि जातिरस्ति क्षीरादिमाधुर्यवदिति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be held that – there too, jAti exists, like in the case of the sweetness of milk being used to differentiate milk from sugar, honey etc.
चाक्षुषत्वादिना सङ्करस्योक्तत्वात् | Because, it has been already said that using visual perceptibility differentiate can lead to mixing up of cognitions.
नच - तव मते तत्तद्व्यावृत्तेस्तत्तदाकारत्वेन चैतन्यस्य तत्प्रतिबिम्बितत्वेन वा मम तु तत्तज्ज्ञानस्य तत्तदीयस्वभावत्वेन तत्तद्व्यवहारजननशक्तत्वेन वा स्वत एव वैलक्षण्यमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus – In your system (advaita), the differentiation of objects is based on the cognition taking on the object's Akara, and consciousness being either delimited by such a cognition, or being reflected in such a cognition. In my system (dvaita) though, the cognition of each object differentiates itself from the cognition of other object, by its own (the cognition’s own) nature, or alternatively by its power to lead to a particular kind of activity, or alternatively by itself it is different.
विषयस्यैवाकारसमपर्कत्वेन स्वभावव्यवहारयो: परिचायकत्वेन च तन्नैरपेक्ष्येण व्यावर्तकताया वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् ; Because cognition is able to perform its function only by taking on the ‘AkAra’ of the object, and by ignoring it, it is not possible to explain how one cognition is different from the other.
अस्माभिश्च तुच्छे जनकत्वस्यानुक्तत्वात् | We never admit that the absolutely non-existent (like the hare’s horn etc., are capable of inducing activity.
विशेषणत्वोपाधित्वयो: संभवे च नोपलक्षणत्वमित्युक्तम् | Further, as we can prove that this differentiation is possible through visheShaNa or upAdhi, the charge that we are resorting to upalakshaNa does not apply.
नच 'कथमसत: सज्जायेते'ति श्रुत्या 'नासतोऽदृष्ट्वा' दिति सूत्रेण शशविषाणादिभ्य: सदुत्पत्त्यदर्शनादित्यादिभाष्येण च विरोध: , Nor can it be argued thus – This contention contradicts the shruti “How can sat be born from asat?”, the sUtra, “asat cannot be the cause, because such a scenario is observed nowhere” and the bhAShya, which says that “that the birth of an existent object cannot be from a non-existent object such as the hare’s horn”.
तेषां तुच्छे जनकत्वनिषेधपरत्वात्, अस्माभिश्च तुच्छे जनकत्वस्यानुक्तत्वात् | Because, all those have the negation of tucCha (absolutely non-existent entities) being the cause of anything as their primary intent. We never claim that tucCha is the cause of things.
तस्मात् सद्विविक्तत्वं साधनमिति सिद्धम् || Therefore, it follows that ‘being other than sat’ is a sAdhana (hetu in the inferential reasoning) for mithyAtva.
इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ असत: साधकत्वाभावे बाधकम् || Thus, in this chapter of the advaita siddhi, we have refuted the argument that asat (mithyA objects) cannot prove / establish anything.