paricCheda 1 - amshitva hetUpapattih
अथ अंशित्वहेतूपपत्ति: |
The ancient teachers of advaita have typically offered three reasons for the mithyAtva of the world - drishyatva, jaDatva, paricChinnatva - knowability, inertness, limitation. However, in the early part of the 13th century, chitsukhAchArya offered a special syllogism, which offered another reason - amshitva or being a composite whole. He argued that any object, being an aggregate of many parts, was itself absent. That is, a composite is an unreal construct. Instead of using a sAmAnya anumAna, a generic inference about the mithyAtva of the world, he used a visheSha anumAna to prove the mithyAtva of a particular object. He argued that a piece of cloth is absent in the very threads that it is weaved from. Having proven the absence of the composite whole in this special case, he extended this to the entire world and argued that the world was also nothing but an aggregate of several parts and similarly, was absent in the very parts that composed it.
चित्सुखाचार्यैस्तु - 'अयं पट:, एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगी, अंशित्वात्, इतरांशिवत् '- इत्युक्तम् |
However (in contrast to the generic inference on the world's unreality presented thus far), chitsukhAchArya says - "This cloth (paksha), is absent in the very threads (sAdhya), because it is a composite whole (hetu), like other composites (driShTAnta).
तत्र तन्तुपदमुपादानपरम्, एतेन स्वोपादाननिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वलक्षणमिथ्यात्वसिद्धि: | By the thread, the material cause is meant - thereby the mithyAtva of an object is proven if the absence of that object in its own material cause is established.
The pUrvapakshi argues that this is already known. He quotes the ArambhaNAdhikaraNa of the brahma sUtra to argue his point.
नच - कार्यस्य कारणाभेदेन तदनाश्रितत्वात् सिद्धसाधनम्, The effect is non-different from the cause. Thus, to say that the effect cannot be located in its cause, is stating the obvious. As the cause and effect are non-different, to say that the effect is absent in the cause is as good as saying the effect is absent in itself - which is obvious, because a thing cannot be located in itself.
अनाश्रितत्वेनान्याश्रितत्वेन वा उपपत्त्या अर्थान्तरं च इति - वाच्यम् ; Alternately, if by this, it is meant that the effect has no locus, or that it is located in some other thing instead, then that is a case of arthAntara - ie it does not prove the effect's unreality, but something else. All that is proven is that the effect is not located anywhere, not that it is unreal. In the second case, all this proves is that the cloth is not located in the thread, but on something else, say, a table.
Before we consider the siddhikAra's reply, we need to clarify a few ideas. In advaita, a distinction is drawn between similarity, equality and identity. A is like B is similarity. A = B is equality and A=A is identity. Equality and similarity involve two objects, whereas identity involves only one object. Thus, equality is not the same as identity. Similarly, when we say that the effect is non-different from the cause, we are not saying that the cause and effect are identical, all we are denying is their difference. As the bhAmatikAra argues in his commentary to the bhAShya of the ArambhaNAdhikaraNa, न खल्वनन्यत्वमित्यभेदं ब्रूमः, किन्तु भेदं व्यासेधामः |
The siddhikAra responds to the original argument:
अभेदे कार्यकारणभावव्याहत्या कथंचिदपि भेदस्यावश्याभ्युपेयत्वात् | To talk of cause and effect in the case of identity would be a contradiction (because identity means that there is only one object and not two), therefore we must accept some distinction between the two - The absence of difference (ananyatva) is not identity (abheda).
नच 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्य' इत्यधिकरणविरोध: ; उपादानव्यतिरेकेनोपदेयं नास्तीत्यस्यैव तदर्थत्वात् | This is not contrary to the non-difference of the cause and the effect argued by VedavyAsa in the brahma sUtra. All that the sUtra means is that the effect has no existence independent of the material cause.
बाधात्तन्मात्राश्रितत्वेन पक्षविशेषणाद्वा नार्थान्तरम् | We are not arguing that the cloth is present elsewhere (ie somewhere other than the thread), for that would be contradictory. We are saying that the cloth is absent in the very thread in which it is located. Thus it is mithyAtva that is proven by this, not the absence of any basis whatsoever. The charge of arthAntara is not admissable.
Secondly, by adding the adjective of 'being in association with the paksha (ie the cloth)' to the thread, we are implying that the absence of the paksha is located in the very locus of the paksha, the thread. The absence of an object in its very locus implies its mithyAtva, and not something else.
The pUrvapakshi argues that this is contrary to direct perception. No one observes a cloth being absent in the thread, in fact the cloth is very much perceived. How can it be absent?
नच प्रकृतेऽपि बाध:, तस्योद्धरिष्यमाणत्वात् | One cannot argue that this is unacceptable because it would be contradictory to perception. We will prove why being contrary to perception is not a fundamental defect. In a chapter titled pratyaksha bAdhoddhAra:, it will be later proven that perception is often illusory and therefore if an inference contradicts an erroneous perception, that is not a problem.
Thus far, we have looked at three defects cited - siddha sAdhanam (establishing the established), arthAntaram (proving something else), bAdham (contradicting other valid means of knowledge). Now we will consider the fourth defect, prAmANikatvam (is the absence real or unreal?).
The argument is similar to the chapter on the second definition of mithyAtva.
नचात्यान्ताभावस्य प्रामाणिकत्वाप्रामाणिकत्वविकल्पावकाश:, तस्य प्रागेव निरस्तत्वात् | There is no room to query the ontological status of the absence of the cloth - this has been refuted previously.
नच - कस्यचित् पटस्य संयोगवृत्त्यैतत्तन्तुषु सत्त्वेन तत्र व्यभिचार इति - वाच्यम् ;
It would be futile to argue thus - if another cloth is kept on top of this one, there would be contact between the two, thus the other cloth is present in contact with the threads of this one.
तत्समवेतस्य तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वमङ्गीकुर्वत: तत्संयोगिनस्तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वाङ्गीकारेण पक्षसमत्वात् | To us, who argue that a cloth made from this thread is absent in the thread itself, to say that the contact of some other cloth (ie not made from this thread) is not present here is not too difficult. The two pakshas are similar. We are willing to say that the an object is absent in the locus with which it has samavAya sambandha, which is a permanent relationship. So it is not difficult for us to say that an object is absent in the locus with which it has samyoga sambandha, a temporary relationship, as well.
नचाव्याप्यवृत्तित्वेनार्थान्तरम् ; We also do not argue that the object is both present and absent in the locus. If we did it would have been avyApva vritti and thus your charge of proving something else (arthAntara) would have been valid. But we argue that it is mithyA, not avyApya vritti.
Advaitins argue that it is impossible for an object to be both present and absent in the same locus at the same time.
पटतदभावयोरेकाधिकरणवृत्तौ विरोधस्य जगति दत्तजलाञ्जलित्वप्रसङ्गात् , The presence and absence of a cloth in the same locus would be a contradiction and if possible, is as good as washing one's hands off the world's affairs - ie we would be unfit for any vyavahAra.
संयोगतदभावयोरप्येकाधिकरणवृत्तित्वानभ्युपगमात् | Therefore, neither do we accept that the presence and absence of contact (samyoga) in a locus is a possibility. Previously we had denied the existence and non-existence of an object in a locus, now we are denying the simultaneous existence and non-existence of samyoga sambandha with that object.
अभ्युपगमे वा एतत्तन्तुत्वावच्छिन्नवृत्तित्वमत्यन्ताभावस्य विशेषणं देयम् ; If you insist that such a thing is possible, then by qualifying the cloth's absence as the absence which is colocated with threadness, one rules out the simultaneous presence of both the existence and the non-existence of the cloth in the thread (by doing so, in the thread, wherever 'this threadness' is present, we say that the 'cloth's absence' is also present - there is no part of the thread without threadness, thus there is no part of the thread without the cloth's absence). In other words, the absence of the cloth fully pervades the thread - it is not avyApya vritti.
एवमेतत्कालीनत्वमपि | तेन कालान्तरीयाभावमादाय नार्थान्तरम् । Similarly, by qualifying this anumAna as "the cloth that is seen now in this thread is absent", the charge that the hetu only proves that the object is absent at some other time (and thus it is not mithyAtva, but only anityatva that is proven) is remedied.
नचेह तन्तुषु पट इति प्रत्यक्षबाधः ; One cannot argue that absence of the cloth here in these threads is contrary to direct perception.
तस्य भ्रमसाधारणतया चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वप्रत्यक्षवदप्रामाण्यशङ्कास्कन्दितत्वेनाबाधकत्वात् - Because perception can either be correct or an illusion. Thus, like the moon appears small enough to fit between the gap between the thumb and the forefinger (prAdeshika), a perception whose validity is doubtful cannot contradict an inference which has the support of shruti. This will be discussed in detail in the pratyaksha bAdhoddhAra chapter.
नच - अन्यासमवेतस्यांशित्वमेतत्तन्तुसमवेतत्वं विना न युक्तमिति विरुद्धो हेतुरिति - वाच्यम् ;
The pUrvapakshi retorts - This cloth cannot be made from any other object other than this thread. The advaitin says that because the the cloth is a composite whole, it does not exist in the thread. Therefore, one cannot say that the cloth is a composite whole consisting of these threads unless one agrees that this cloth is made from these threads. However, the advaitin claims that the cloth does not even exist in the thread, then how can it be made from the thread? If it is not made from the thread, how can it be a composite of the thread? Thus we start off with the cloth being a composite of the thread, and end up disproving that it is a composite. The hetu is contradictory.
The siddhikAra disagrees:
एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वेऽप्येतत्तन्तुसमवेतत्वस्य सत्त्वेनांशित्वस्य साध्येनाविरोधात् | Even if the cloth is absent in the thread, it is possible for the cloth to be a creation of the thread. Thus the hetu of being a composite is not contradictory to the sAdhya of mithyAtva.
amshitvam is not dependent on existence of the cloth in the thread but the existence of samavAya sambandha between cloth and thread.
एतन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभाव अप्रतियोगित्वं हि एतत्समवेतत्वे प्रयोजकं न भवति ; The presence of the cloth in the thread does not imply that cloth will have a samavAya sambandha with the thread.
परमते केवलान्वयिधर्ममात्रस्य एतत्समवेत्वापत्ते: According to others (naiyyAyika), things which are universally present (kevala anvayi dharmas) do not have samavAya sambandha with anything. However, if presence implies samavAya sambandha, then kevala anvayi attributes will end up having samavAya sambandha. This would be contradictory to nyAya.
किन्त्वेतन्निष्ठप्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वादिकम् ; Therefore it is not the existence or non-existence of the object that implies its samavAya sambandha with its locus, but the prior absence of that object in that locus that implies the samavAya sambandha between the two.
तच्चैतन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि न विरुद्धमित्युपपादितमधस्तात् | That (prior absence) can co-exist with absolute absence (as was seen in the chapter on the fourth definition of mithyAtva), thus there is no contradiction.
However, this does not imply that the advaitin accepts the concept of samavAya sambandha wholesale, for that has been disproven by the sUtrakAra.
एतत्समवेतत्वं चैतदुपादानकत्वम् , नतु नित्यसम्बन्धशालित्वम् ; तस्यानभ्युपगमात् | We have accepted samavAya only as material causation. However, we do not accept that the samavAya is a permanent / eternal relation, as held by the logician. The only eternal entity is Brahman, in advaita's view.
The next charge of hetvAbhAsa is sapratipaksham. The opponent suggests an alternative syllogism of his own. He says:
ननु - अयं पट एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगी न , एतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वात्, व्यतिरेकेण पटान्तरवदिति प्रतिरोध:,
The cloth's absence in the thread is absent (that is, the cloth is present in the thread), because it was created from this thread. Like any other cloth, which is existent in its cause.
नचाप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वम् ; The pUrvapakshi anticipates an objection to this anumAna - that it suffers from a qualifier which is not well-known. How?
In the phrase nIlo ghaTa: (black pot), unless one knows nIlatva (blackness), one cannot know a black pot. Similarly, unless one knows the cloth's absence in its threads, the absence of that absence (ie its presence, which the pUrvapakshi wishes to establish) cannot be known. If the pUrvapakshi admits that cloth's absence in its threads is well-known, then that would go on to prove the siddhAntin. If he admits that the cloth's absence is not known, then the absence of its absence is also not knowable - or the adjective is not known at all.
He gets round this problem by providing a syllogism which reveals the absence of the cloth without conceding that the cloth is absent.
एतन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम्, किञ्चिन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि, संसर्गाभावप्रतियोगित्वव्याप्यत्वात्, प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्ववदिति | The absence of this cloth in this thread, is the object of some absence located somewhere, because it implies samsarga abhAva (which includes prAgabhAva, dhvamsa and atyantAbhAva), just like the prior absence.
सामान्यतस्तत्प्रसिद्धे: Therefore the absence of the cloth is well known. Thus the defect of an unknown adjective is not present.
He continues. Do not argue that there is an error in the anumAna thus:
नच - आकाशात्यन्ताभावस्य घटादौ संसर्गाभावप्रतियोगित्वव्याप्यत्वग्रहात् Where a pot is present, space cannot exist. Therefore, space is absent in a pot. By the inference provided, space's samsarga abhAva must also be present.
तस्य च केवलान्वयित्वेन किञ्चिन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वाभावात् तत्र व्यभिचार इति - वाच्यम् ; However, as the absence of space is universally present (according to nyAya, AkAsha atyantAbhAva is kevala anvayi) one cannot say that space is absent in some place. Thus this syllogism fails there. This is the argument of the siddhAntin, as imagined by the pUrvapakshi.
This is not correct, according to the pUrvapakshi. The absence of an object implying samsarga abhAva is true for things like pots, but it cannot be true for universally present objects. He says:
संसर्गाभावप्रतियोगित्वानधिकरणे केवलान्वयिनि धर्मे सत्त्वेनाकाशात्यन्ताभावस्य संसर्गाभावप्रतियोगित्व अव्याप्यत्वेन व्यभिचाराभावात् universally present attributes such as the absence of space, cannot be the counterpositives of samsarga abhAva, therefore the syllogism is not meant to cover universally present objects. Therefore the charge that the syllogism breaks down there is not applicable.
However, the siddhikAra's attack on the contradictory anumAna is not on this basis. Instead, he says:
- इति चेन्न ; No
The syllogism itself is defective. According to the pUrvapakshi, wherever a cloth is created from a thread, the cloth must necessarily exist in the thread. Turning this around, this is equivalent to saying if a cloth does not exist in a thread, then it must not be made from that thread.
यत्रैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं , तत्रैतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वाभाव इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तौ एतन्निष्ठप्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्वस्योपाधित्वेन प्रतिरोधस्य हीनबलत्वात्, In the reversed syllogism of the pUrvapakshi - viz., where a cloth is absent in a thread, it must not be a creation of the thread, a defect called the upAdhi is present.
This is not the upAdhi that students of vedAnta are familiar with, so this ought to be explained. upAdhi, according to nyAya is a conditionality which if present, weakens the syllogism.
This is defined in the tarka sangraha as साध्य व्यापकत्वे सति साधन अव्यापकत्वं उपाधि:.
That is, a syllogism which is defective due to an upAdhi will contain a feature which is present in the sAdhya always but is not always present in the hetu. The popular syllogism - the mountain is on fire, because of smoke - is valid. Let us take the reverse - the mountain is on smoke, because of fire. This is defective because even though smoke always implies fire, fire does not always imply smoke. It is possible to have smokeless fire.
Fire will be present along with smoke only if the fuel is wet. Here the wet fuel is the upAdhi. Thus where the hetu is flawed due to an upAdhi , it is not independently able to prove the the sAdhya. It needs the upAdhi to be present alongside it. When the upAdhi is absent, the sAdhya will also be absent. Thus without wet fuel, fire will not cause smoke. Wet fuel is present in every instance where smoke is present (sAdhya vyApakatve sati) but is not present wherever fire is present (sAdhana avyApakatvam).
Coming back to the original statement of the siddhikAra:
यत्रैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं , तत्रैतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वाभाव इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तौ एतन्निष्ठप्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्वस्योपाधित्वेन प्रतिरोधस्य हीनबलत्वात्, The syllogism of the pUrvapakshi is weakened by the presence of an upAdhi. What is it? Not being the counterpositive of prior absence.
The pUrvapakshi had said - wherever a cloth is made by the thread, the cloth must be existent too. The reverse of the syllogism is - wherever the cloth is not existent in the thread, it must not be made by the thread. The siddhikAra takes this for analysis. The sAdhya of this reversed syllogism is एतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वाभाव - it is not made from the thread. If an item is not made from the thread, the prior absence of that object cannot exist in the thread. Thus an object not made from thread cannot be the counterpositive of its prior absence in the thread. Or - prAgabhAva apratiyogitva pervades etat tantu Arabdhatva abhAva.
The hetu of the reversed syllogism of the pUrvapakshi is एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं - the absolute absence of the object is located in these threads. As we discussed in the chapter on the fourth definition of mithyAtva, it is possible for the prior absence and absolute absence to be located in the same place. If prAgabhAva pratiyogitva can be co-present with atyantAbhAva pratiyogitva (the hetu), it is the same as prAgabhAva apratiyogitva can be absent if the hetu is present.
Therefore, prAgabhAva apratiyogitva is always present when the sAdhya of the pUrvapakshi's anumAna is present, but is not always present when the hetu of the pUrvapakshi's anumAna is present. Thus, prAgabhAva apratiyogitva is an upAdhi for the pUrvapakshi's anumAna.
एतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वाभावव्यापकस्यैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठप्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्वस्य पक्षावृत्ते: Wherever an object is not created from this thread, its prior absence cannot be located in the thread. Therefore, not being the counterpositive of prior absence pervades the sAdhya of the pUrvapakshi's anumAna - being created from the thread, which does not apply for the paksha, the cloth (because we both agree that the cloth is created from the thread).
पक्षवृत्तितया संदिह्यमानैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वाव्यपकत्वात् ; Whereas not being the counterpositive of prior absence does not pervade the hetu of the anumAna, being the counterpositive of absolute absence of the cloth in the thread, whose validity is currently in doubt.
दृश्यत्वाद्यनुपपत्तिप्रतिकूलतर्कपराहतेर्वक्ष्यमाणत्वाच्च | Moreover, in the chapter about the absence of any contradictory logic to disprove the hetu of knowability, this will be further explained.
Can the opponent prove that our syllogism also has upAdhi? We had said, यत्र अंशित्वं तत्र एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं.
अतएव एतत्तन्त्वनारब्धत्वमपि नोपाधि: ; Therefore, not being created from the thread is also not an upAdhi to our syllogism.
उपाधिव्यतिरेकेण साध्यव्यतिरेके साध्यमाने सोपाधिकत्वस्योक्तत्वात् Because it can be an upAdhi only if you can prove the absence of my sAdhya (the existence of the cloth) by proving the absence of your upAdhi (being created from the thread). Your syllogism tried to prove that wherever the cloth was not created from the thread, the cloth would be absent in the thread. However, that syllogism was disproved by us. Therefore, even if the cloth is created from the thread, the cloth's absence is not disproved.
अव्याप्यवृत्तिसंयोगाभ्युपगमे तत्र व्यभिचाराच्च | If avyApya vritti was accepted, then the cloth is both in contact and not in contact with the thread. Thus taking the portion where it is not in contact (ie where it is the atyantAbhAva pratiyogi), it would imply that the cloth is not made from the thread. However, the cloth is made from the the thread and therefore there is vyabhichAra in the pUrvapakshi's anumAna in the case of avyApya vritti of the cloth and thread.
अतएव यत्रैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं तत्रैतत्तन्त्वनारब्धमिति न साध्यव्यापकताग्रहोऽपि तत्रैव व्यभिचारादिति सर्वमनवद्यम् | Therefore the syllogism, wherever the cloth is not present in the thread, the cloth is not made from the thread, is an incorrect one.
एवंच 'विमतं, ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणासत्, ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणानुपलभ्यमानत्वात् , स्वप्नादिवदि'ति - विद्यासागरोक्तमपि साधु ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणासत्त्वमुक्तमिथ्यात्वान्यतमत्वं साध्यम् |
AnandapUrNa vidyAsagara, in a work called nyAya chandrika, wrote that the world is non-existent, apart from consciousness, because outside of consciousness, it is not available for perception. Just like objects seen in a dream are not seen independent of the perceiving consciousness. The siddhikAra argues that this is also appropriate because classifying anything other than consciousness as non-existent is very much included in the five definitions of mithyA.
ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणानुपलभ्यमानत्वं चिदाभासे सत्येवोपलभ्यमानत्वं हेतुरिति न किञ्चिदनुपपन्नम् | The non perception of things outside consciousness (equivalent to non-self-luminosity) means that objects are perceivable only when the chidAbhAsa is present. Thus, AnandapUrNa-vidyAsAgara's comments are not defective.
एवमन्येषामपि प्रयोगा यथायोगमुपपादननीया इति शिवम् | All other arguments proposed by the various teachers of advaita have to be understood in a similar manner.
इत्यंशित्वहेतूपपत्ति: | This concludes the chapter on amshitva.
The ancient teachers of advaita have typically offered three reasons for the mithyAtva of the world - drishyatva, jaDatva, paricChinnatva - knowability, inertness, limitation. However, in the early part of the 13th century, chitsukhAchArya offered a special syllogism, which offered another reason - amshitva or being a composite whole. He argued that any object, being an aggregate of many parts, was itself absent. That is, a composite is an unreal construct. Instead of using a sAmAnya anumAna, a generic inference about the mithyAtva of the world, he used a visheSha anumAna to prove the mithyAtva of a particular object. He argued that a piece of cloth is absent in the very threads that it is weaved from. Having proven the absence of the composite whole in this special case, he extended this to the entire world and argued that the world was also nothing but an aggregate of several parts and similarly, was absent in the very parts that composed it.
चित्सुखाचार्यैस्तु - 'अयं पट:, एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगी, अंशित्वात्, इतरांशिवत् '- इत्युक्तम् |
However (in contrast to the generic inference on the world's unreality presented thus far), chitsukhAchArya says - "This cloth (paksha), is absent in the very threads (sAdhya), because it is a composite whole (hetu), like other composites (driShTAnta).
तत्र तन्तुपदमुपादानपरम्, एतेन स्वोपादाननिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वलक्षणमिथ्यात्वसिद्धि: | By the thread, the material cause is meant - thereby the mithyAtva of an object is proven if the absence of that object in its own material cause is established.
The pUrvapakshi argues that this is already known. He quotes the ArambhaNAdhikaraNa of the brahma sUtra to argue his point.
नच - कार्यस्य कारणाभेदेन तदनाश्रितत्वात् सिद्धसाधनम्, The effect is non-different from the cause. Thus, to say that the effect cannot be located in its cause, is stating the obvious. As the cause and effect are non-different, to say that the effect is absent in the cause is as good as saying the effect is absent in itself - which is obvious, because a thing cannot be located in itself.
अनाश्रितत्वेनान्याश्रितत्वेन वा उपपत्त्या अर्थान्तरं च इति - वाच्यम् ; Alternately, if by this, it is meant that the effect has no locus, or that it is located in some other thing instead, then that is a case of arthAntara - ie it does not prove the effect's unreality, but something else. All that is proven is that the effect is not located anywhere, not that it is unreal. In the second case, all this proves is that the cloth is not located in the thread, but on something else, say, a table.
Before we consider the siddhikAra's reply, we need to clarify a few ideas. In advaita, a distinction is drawn between similarity, equality and identity. A is like B is similarity. A = B is equality and A=A is identity. Equality and similarity involve two objects, whereas identity involves only one object. Thus, equality is not the same as identity. Similarly, when we say that the effect is non-different from the cause, we are not saying that the cause and effect are identical, all we are denying is their difference. As the bhAmatikAra argues in his commentary to the bhAShya of the ArambhaNAdhikaraNa, न खल्वनन्यत्वमित्यभेदं ब्रूमः, किन्तु भेदं व्यासेधामः |
The siddhikAra responds to the original argument:
अभेदे कार्यकारणभावव्याहत्या कथंचिदपि भेदस्यावश्याभ्युपेयत्वात् | To talk of cause and effect in the case of identity would be a contradiction (because identity means that there is only one object and not two), therefore we must accept some distinction between the two - The absence of difference (ananyatva) is not identity (abheda).
नच 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्य' इत्यधिकरणविरोध: ; उपादानव्यतिरेकेनोपदेयं नास्तीत्यस्यैव तदर्थत्वात् | This is not contrary to the non-difference of the cause and the effect argued by VedavyAsa in the brahma sUtra. All that the sUtra means is that the effect has no existence independent of the material cause.
बाधात्तन्मात्राश्रितत्वेन पक्षविशेषणाद्वा नार्थान्तरम् | We are not arguing that the cloth is present elsewhere (ie somewhere other than the thread), for that would be contradictory. We are saying that the cloth is absent in the very thread in which it is located. Thus it is mithyAtva that is proven by this, not the absence of any basis whatsoever. The charge of arthAntara is not admissable.
Secondly, by adding the adjective of 'being in association with the paksha (ie the cloth)' to the thread, we are implying that the absence of the paksha is located in the very locus of the paksha, the thread. The absence of an object in its very locus implies its mithyAtva, and not something else.
The pUrvapakshi argues that this is contrary to direct perception. No one observes a cloth being absent in the thread, in fact the cloth is very much perceived. How can it be absent?
नच प्रकृतेऽपि बाध:, तस्योद्धरिष्यमाणत्वात् | One cannot argue that this is unacceptable because it would be contradictory to perception. We will prove why being contrary to perception is not a fundamental defect. In a chapter titled pratyaksha bAdhoddhAra:, it will be later proven that perception is often illusory and therefore if an inference contradicts an erroneous perception, that is not a problem.
Thus far, we have looked at three defects cited - siddha sAdhanam (establishing the established), arthAntaram (proving something else), bAdham (contradicting other valid means of knowledge). Now we will consider the fourth defect, prAmANikatvam (is the absence real or unreal?).
The argument is similar to the chapter on the second definition of mithyAtva.
नचात्यान्ताभावस्य प्रामाणिकत्वाप्रामाणिकत्वविकल्पावकाश:, तस्य प्रागेव निरस्तत्वात् | There is no room to query the ontological status of the absence of the cloth - this has been refuted previously.
नच - कस्यचित् पटस्य संयोगवृत्त्यैतत्तन्तुषु सत्त्वेन तत्र व्यभिचार इति - वाच्यम् ;
It would be futile to argue thus - if another cloth is kept on top of this one, there would be contact between the two, thus the other cloth is present in contact with the threads of this one.
तत्समवेतस्य तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वमङ्गीकुर्वत: तत्संयोगिनस्तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वाङ्गीकारेण पक्षसमत्वात् | To us, who argue that a cloth made from this thread is absent in the thread itself, to say that the contact of some other cloth (ie not made from this thread) is not present here is not too difficult. The two pakshas are similar. We are willing to say that the an object is absent in the locus with which it has samavAya sambandha, which is a permanent relationship. So it is not difficult for us to say that an object is absent in the locus with which it has samyoga sambandha, a temporary relationship, as well.
नचाव्याप्यवृत्तित्वेनार्थान्तरम् ; We also do not argue that the object is both present and absent in the locus. If we did it would have been avyApva vritti and thus your charge of proving something else (arthAntara) would have been valid. But we argue that it is mithyA, not avyApya vritti.
Advaitins argue that it is impossible for an object to be both present and absent in the same locus at the same time.
पटतदभावयोरेकाधिकरणवृत्तौ विरोधस्य जगति दत्तजलाञ्जलित्वप्रसङ्गात् , The presence and absence of a cloth in the same locus would be a contradiction and if possible, is as good as washing one's hands off the world's affairs - ie we would be unfit for any vyavahAra.
संयोगतदभावयोरप्येकाधिकरणवृत्तित्वानभ्युपगमात् | Therefore, neither do we accept that the presence and absence of contact (samyoga) in a locus is a possibility. Previously we had denied the existence and non-existence of an object in a locus, now we are denying the simultaneous existence and non-existence of samyoga sambandha with that object.
अभ्युपगमे वा एतत्तन्तुत्वावच्छिन्नवृत्तित्वमत्यन्ताभावस्य विशेषणं देयम् ; If you insist that such a thing is possible, then by qualifying the cloth's absence as the absence which is colocated with threadness, one rules out the simultaneous presence of both the existence and the non-existence of the cloth in the thread (by doing so, in the thread, wherever 'this threadness' is present, we say that the 'cloth's absence' is also present - there is no part of the thread without threadness, thus there is no part of the thread without the cloth's absence). In other words, the absence of the cloth fully pervades the thread - it is not avyApya vritti.
एवमेतत्कालीनत्वमपि | तेन कालान्तरीयाभावमादाय नार्थान्तरम् । Similarly, by qualifying this anumAna as "the cloth that is seen now in this thread is absent", the charge that the hetu only proves that the object is absent at some other time (and thus it is not mithyAtva, but only anityatva that is proven) is remedied.
नचेह तन्तुषु पट इति प्रत्यक्षबाधः ; One cannot argue that absence of the cloth here in these threads is contrary to direct perception.
तस्य भ्रमसाधारणतया चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वप्रत्यक्षवदप्रामाण्यशङ्कास्कन्दितत्वेनाबाधकत्वात् - Because perception can either be correct or an illusion. Thus, like the moon appears small enough to fit between the gap between the thumb and the forefinger (prAdeshika), a perception whose validity is doubtful cannot contradict an inference which has the support of shruti. This will be discussed in detail in the pratyaksha bAdhoddhAra chapter.
नच - अन्यासमवेतस्यांशित्वमेतत्तन्तुसमवेतत्वं विना न युक्तमिति विरुद्धो हेतुरिति - वाच्यम् ;
The pUrvapakshi retorts - This cloth cannot be made from any other object other than this thread. The advaitin says that because the the cloth is a composite whole, it does not exist in the thread. Therefore, one cannot say that the cloth is a composite whole consisting of these threads unless one agrees that this cloth is made from these threads. However, the advaitin claims that the cloth does not even exist in the thread, then how can it be made from the thread? If it is not made from the thread, how can it be a composite of the thread? Thus we start off with the cloth being a composite of the thread, and end up disproving that it is a composite. The hetu is contradictory.
The siddhikAra disagrees:
एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वेऽप्येतत्तन्तुसमवेतत्वस्य सत्त्वेनांशित्वस्य साध्येनाविरोधात् | Even if the cloth is absent in the thread, it is possible for the cloth to be a creation of the thread. Thus the hetu of being a composite is not contradictory to the sAdhya of mithyAtva.
amshitvam is not dependent on existence of the cloth in the thread but the existence of samavAya sambandha between cloth and thread.
एतन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभाव अप्रतियोगित्वं हि एतत्समवेतत्वे प्रयोजकं न भवति ; The presence of the cloth in the thread does not imply that cloth will have a samavAya sambandha with the thread.
परमते केवलान्वयिधर्ममात्रस्य एतत्समवेत्वापत्ते: According to others (naiyyAyika), things which are universally present (kevala anvayi dharmas) do not have samavAya sambandha with anything. However, if presence implies samavAya sambandha, then kevala anvayi attributes will end up having samavAya sambandha. This would be contradictory to nyAya.
किन्त्वेतन्निष्ठप्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वादिकम् ; Therefore it is not the existence or non-existence of the object that implies its samavAya sambandha with its locus, but the prior absence of that object in that locus that implies the samavAya sambandha between the two.
तच्चैतन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि न विरुद्धमित्युपपादितमधस्तात् | That (prior absence) can co-exist with absolute absence (as was seen in the chapter on the fourth definition of mithyAtva), thus there is no contradiction.
However, this does not imply that the advaitin accepts the concept of samavAya sambandha wholesale, for that has been disproven by the sUtrakAra.
एतत्समवेतत्वं चैतदुपादानकत्वम् , नतु नित्यसम्बन्धशालित्वम् ; तस्यानभ्युपगमात् | We have accepted samavAya only as material causation. However, we do not accept that the samavAya is a permanent / eternal relation, as held by the logician. The only eternal entity is Brahman, in advaita's view.
The next charge of hetvAbhAsa is sapratipaksham. The opponent suggests an alternative syllogism of his own. He says:
ननु - अयं पट एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगी न , एतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वात्, व्यतिरेकेण पटान्तरवदिति प्रतिरोध:,
The cloth's absence in the thread is absent (that is, the cloth is present in the thread), because it was created from this thread. Like any other cloth, which is existent in its cause.
नचाप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वम् ; The pUrvapakshi anticipates an objection to this anumAna - that it suffers from a qualifier which is not well-known. How?
In the phrase nIlo ghaTa: (black pot), unless one knows nIlatva (blackness), one cannot know a black pot. Similarly, unless one knows the cloth's absence in its threads, the absence of that absence (ie its presence, which the pUrvapakshi wishes to establish) cannot be known. If the pUrvapakshi admits that cloth's absence in its threads is well-known, then that would go on to prove the siddhAntin. If he admits that the cloth's absence is not known, then the absence of its absence is also not knowable - or the adjective is not known at all.
He gets round this problem by providing a syllogism which reveals the absence of the cloth without conceding that the cloth is absent.
एतन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम्, किञ्चिन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि, संसर्गाभावप्रतियोगित्वव्याप्यत्वात्, प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्ववदिति | The absence of this cloth in this thread, is the object of some absence located somewhere, because it implies samsarga abhAva (which includes prAgabhAva, dhvamsa and atyantAbhAva), just like the prior absence.
सामान्यतस्तत्प्रसिद्धे: Therefore the absence of the cloth is well known. Thus the defect of an unknown adjective is not present.
He continues. Do not argue that there is an error in the anumAna thus:
नच - आकाशात्यन्ताभावस्य घटादौ संसर्गाभावप्रतियोगित्वव्याप्यत्वग्रहात् Where a pot is present, space cannot exist. Therefore, space is absent in a pot. By the inference provided, space's samsarga abhAva must also be present.
तस्य च केवलान्वयित्वेन किञ्चिन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वाभावात् तत्र व्यभिचार इति - वाच्यम् ; However, as the absence of space is universally present (according to nyAya, AkAsha atyantAbhAva is kevala anvayi) one cannot say that space is absent in some place. Thus this syllogism fails there. This is the argument of the siddhAntin, as imagined by the pUrvapakshi.
This is not correct, according to the pUrvapakshi. The absence of an object implying samsarga abhAva is true for things like pots, but it cannot be true for universally present objects. He says:
संसर्गाभावप्रतियोगित्वानधिकरणे केवलान्वयिनि धर्मे सत्त्वेनाकाशात्यन्ताभावस्य संसर्गाभावप्रतियोगित्व अव्याप्यत्वेन व्यभिचाराभावात् universally present attributes such as the absence of space, cannot be the counterpositives of samsarga abhAva, therefore the syllogism is not meant to cover universally present objects. Therefore the charge that the syllogism breaks down there is not applicable.
However, the siddhikAra's attack on the contradictory anumAna is not on this basis. Instead, he says:
- इति चेन्न ; No
The syllogism itself is defective. According to the pUrvapakshi, wherever a cloth is created from a thread, the cloth must necessarily exist in the thread. Turning this around, this is equivalent to saying if a cloth does not exist in a thread, then it must not be made from that thread.
यत्रैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं , तत्रैतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वाभाव इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तौ एतन्निष्ठप्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्वस्योपाधित्वेन प्रतिरोधस्य हीनबलत्वात्, In the reversed syllogism of the pUrvapakshi - viz., where a cloth is absent in a thread, it must not be a creation of the thread, a defect called the upAdhi is present.
This is not the upAdhi that students of vedAnta are familiar with, so this ought to be explained. upAdhi, according to nyAya is a conditionality which if present, weakens the syllogism.
This is defined in the tarka sangraha as साध्य व्यापकत्वे सति साधन अव्यापकत्वं उपाधि:.
That is, a syllogism which is defective due to an upAdhi will contain a feature which is present in the sAdhya always but is not always present in the hetu. The popular syllogism - the mountain is on fire, because of smoke - is valid. Let us take the reverse - the mountain is on smoke, because of fire. This is defective because even though smoke always implies fire, fire does not always imply smoke. It is possible to have smokeless fire.
Fire will be present along with smoke only if the fuel is wet. Here the wet fuel is the upAdhi. Thus where the hetu is flawed due to an upAdhi , it is not independently able to prove the the sAdhya. It needs the upAdhi to be present alongside it. When the upAdhi is absent, the sAdhya will also be absent. Thus without wet fuel, fire will not cause smoke. Wet fuel is present in every instance where smoke is present (sAdhya vyApakatve sati) but is not present wherever fire is present (sAdhana avyApakatvam).
Coming back to the original statement of the siddhikAra:
यत्रैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं , तत्रैतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वाभाव इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तौ एतन्निष्ठप्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्वस्योपाधित्वेन प्रतिरोधस्य हीनबलत्वात्, The syllogism of the pUrvapakshi is weakened by the presence of an upAdhi. What is it? Not being the counterpositive of prior absence.
The pUrvapakshi had said - wherever a cloth is made by the thread, the cloth must be existent too. The reverse of the syllogism is - wherever the cloth is not existent in the thread, it must not be made by the thread. The siddhikAra takes this for analysis. The sAdhya of this reversed syllogism is एतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वाभाव - it is not made from the thread. If an item is not made from the thread, the prior absence of that object cannot exist in the thread. Thus an object not made from thread cannot be the counterpositive of its prior absence in the thread. Or - prAgabhAva apratiyogitva pervades etat tantu Arabdhatva abhAva.
The hetu of the reversed syllogism of the pUrvapakshi is एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं - the absolute absence of the object is located in these threads. As we discussed in the chapter on the fourth definition of mithyAtva, it is possible for the prior absence and absolute absence to be located in the same place. If prAgabhAva pratiyogitva can be co-present with atyantAbhAva pratiyogitva (the hetu), it is the same as prAgabhAva apratiyogitva can be absent if the hetu is present.
Therefore, prAgabhAva apratiyogitva is always present when the sAdhya of the pUrvapakshi's anumAna is present, but is not always present when the hetu of the pUrvapakshi's anumAna is present. Thus, prAgabhAva apratiyogitva is an upAdhi for the pUrvapakshi's anumAna.
एतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वाभावव्यापकस्यैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठप्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्वस्य पक्षावृत्ते: Wherever an object is not created from this thread, its prior absence cannot be located in the thread. Therefore, not being the counterpositive of prior absence pervades the sAdhya of the pUrvapakshi's anumAna - being created from the thread, which does not apply for the paksha, the cloth (because we both agree that the cloth is created from the thread).
पक्षवृत्तितया संदिह्यमानैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वाव्यपकत्वात् ; Whereas not being the counterpositive of prior absence does not pervade the hetu of the anumAna, being the counterpositive of absolute absence of the cloth in the thread, whose validity is currently in doubt.
दृश्यत्वाद्यनुपपत्तिप्रतिकूलतर्कपराहतेर्वक्ष्यमाणत्वाच्च | Moreover, in the chapter about the absence of any contradictory logic to disprove the hetu of knowability, this will be further explained.
Can the opponent prove that our syllogism also has upAdhi? We had said, यत्र अंशित्वं तत्र एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं.
अतएव एतत्तन्त्वनारब्धत्वमपि नोपाधि: ; Therefore, not being created from the thread is also not an upAdhi to our syllogism.
उपाधिव्यतिरेकेण साध्यव्यतिरेके साध्यमाने सोपाधिकत्वस्योक्तत्वात् Because it can be an upAdhi only if you can prove the absence of my sAdhya (the existence of the cloth) by proving the absence of your upAdhi (being created from the thread). Your syllogism tried to prove that wherever the cloth was not created from the thread, the cloth would be absent in the thread. However, that syllogism was disproved by us. Therefore, even if the cloth is created from the thread, the cloth's absence is not disproved.
अव्याप्यवृत्तिसंयोगाभ्युपगमे तत्र व्यभिचाराच्च | If avyApya vritti was accepted, then the cloth is both in contact and not in contact with the thread. Thus taking the portion where it is not in contact (ie where it is the atyantAbhAva pratiyogi), it would imply that the cloth is not made from the thread. However, the cloth is made from the the thread and therefore there is vyabhichAra in the pUrvapakshi's anumAna in the case of avyApya vritti of the cloth and thread.
अतएव यत्रैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं तत्रैतत्तन्त्वनारब्धमिति न साध्यव्यापकताग्रहोऽपि तत्रैव व्यभिचारादिति सर्वमनवद्यम् | Therefore the syllogism, wherever the cloth is not present in the thread, the cloth is not made from the thread, is an incorrect one.
एवंच 'विमतं, ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणासत्, ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणानुपलभ्यमानत्वात् , स्वप्नादिवदि'ति - विद्यासागरोक्तमपि साधु ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणासत्त्वमुक्तमिथ्यात्वान्यतमत्वं साध्यम् |
AnandapUrNa vidyAsagara, in a work called nyAya chandrika, wrote that the world is non-existent, apart from consciousness, because outside of consciousness, it is not available for perception. Just like objects seen in a dream are not seen independent of the perceiving consciousness. The siddhikAra argues that this is also appropriate because classifying anything other than consciousness as non-existent is very much included in the five definitions of mithyA.
ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणानुपलभ्यमानत्वं चिदाभासे सत्येवोपलभ्यमानत्वं हेतुरिति न किञ्चिदनुपपन्नम् | The non perception of things outside consciousness (equivalent to non-self-luminosity) means that objects are perceivable only when the chidAbhAsa is present. Thus, AnandapUrNa-vidyAsAgara's comments are not defective.
एवमन्येषामपि प्रयोगा यथायोगमुपपादननीया इति शिवम् | All other arguments proposed by the various teachers of advaita have to be understood in a similar manner.
इत्यंशित्वहेतूपपत्ति: | This concludes the chapter on amshitva.